CORNELIO ALZONA, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS VS. GREGORIA CAPUNITAN AND MANUEL REYES, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

On January 28, 1950, plaintiffs instituted an action in the Court of
First Instance of Laguna, for the recovery of two registered parcels of
land of the Biñan Cadastre (Lots Nos. 2968 and 2524), and for the
cancellation of the corresponding certificates of title in the names of
the defendants and the issuance of the proper certificates in their
(plaintiffs’) names. Defendants interposed the special defenses of estoppel and prescription of action.

Before trial, the parties submitted a partial Stipulation of Facts.
After the plaintiffs had presented their evidence, the lower court
admitted an amendment to the answer, which states—

“Que niegan los hechos alegados en los parrafos 7 y
8, pues, la verdad es que los aqui demandantes iniciaron solamente dos
asuntos en el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Laguna con respecto a los
terrenos en litigio que son los numeros 5340 y 5657 en los años 1929 y
1931 respectivamente, cuyos asuntos fueron sobreseidos por este
Honorable Juzgado, y nunca iniciaron, por lo tanto, un tercw asunto en
el año 1938 * * * “.

The lower court, on December 1, 1951, rendered judgment dismissing
plaintiffs’ complaint on grounds of estoppel and prescription of
action. Upon appeal by plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals found the
following facts as having been fully established (Rec. on Appeal pp.
29-45).

The parcels of land in question were part of the friar lands in the
Spanish times and were then possessed by spouses Perfecto Alomia and
Cipriana Almendras, both deceased; that the spouses were survived by
three children, Arcadio Alomia, Eulogio Alomia, (deceased father of
plaintiff Gregorio and Eleuteria Alomia) and Crispina Alomia (deceased
mother of plaintiff Cornelio Alzona). Arcadio Alomia purchased from the
Friar Lands Administration, Lot 2968, which is residential, on March
22, 1915, and was issued Patent Title No. 2258 (Exh. B). He also
purchased Lot 2524, a rice land, by installment (Exh. D-5); but Arcadio
died on May 8, 1924, before completing the installments on said Lot
2524 and his widow Ildefonsa Almeda, upon affidavit (Exh. D-7), that
she was her husban’s only heir, because he left no children,
descendants, ascendants, brothers or sisters, was made the assignee of
his contract (Exh. D-6), Upon payment of the last installment in 1925,
she received from the Bureau of Lands the corresponding conveyance of
lot No. 2524 and was issued Certificate of Title No. 6432. Ildefonsa
died on March 26, 1929, survived by two sisters, Marciana Almeda and
Narcisa Almeda, the latter being the mother of defendant Gregoria
Capunitan, wife of defendant Manuel Reyes. After Ildef onsa’s death,
plaintiffs herein instituted an action in the CFI of Laguna on July 24,
1929 (Civ. Case No. 5240), for the recovery of the lots (Exh. A); that
the case was dismissed on December 16, 1930, for failure of the parties
and their lawyers to appear at the hearing (Exh. A-3). As early as
September 27,1930, both parties asked for continuance stating that they
were about to reach an amicable settlement (Exh. A-2). On January 15,
1931, the plaintiffs renewed the action (Civ. Case No. 5657), against
the spouses Reyes and Capunitan (defendants herein), Marciana Almeda
and “Alfonsa” Almeda, for the recovery of lots 210, 332, 2968 and 2524,
plus damages at P300.00 per annum (Exh. B). Upon request of the
parties, allegedly because they were about to reach a settlement, the
case was discontinued indefinitely (Exh. D-2). In August, 1936,
however, the court again dismissed the case for failure to comply with
its Order dated August 20, 1936 (the record does not show what the
order was about).

The Court of Appeals concluded that the parcels of land in question
were conjugal properties of the spouses Arcadio Alomia and Ildefonsa
Almeda; upon the death of Arcadio, one-half of the disputed lots
belonged to Ildefonsa in her own right, as her share in the conjugal
property, while the other half was inherited by appellants, as nephews
and nieces of Arcadio; when Ildefonsa stated in her affidavit submitted
to the Bureau of Lands (Exh. D-7), that she was Arcadio’s only heir (Unica y exclusiva heredera del finado)
and obtained the transfer of the contract covering lot No. 2524 to her
exclusive name, she practiced a legal fraud on the plaintiffs herein;
Ildefonsa was only entitled to a lifetime usufract over one-half of the
estate of Arcadio, title to such one-half belonged to the plaintiffs;
in law she held in trust the legally belonging to the herein
plaintiffs; defendants herein (the spouses Reyes-Capunitan), who are
Ildefonsa’s niece and the latter’s husband respectively, purchased the
litigated lots with knowledge that same were conjugal properties; and
plaintiffs as heirs have the right to ask for a reconveyance of their
share, unless the action is barred by prescription.

The Court of Appeals, therefore, held—

“* * * Without deciding now the question of
prescription on the merits, we are of the opinion that the lower court
should have admitted the evidence offered by the appellants that the
appellees have recognized their title after 1929, as well as thoroughly
inquired into the existence of a third suit between the appellee and
the appellants in 1938, and its pendency at the date of the liberation.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is revoked and set
aside and the records are hereby ordered remanded to the Court of
origin, with instructions to reopen the trial and admit evidence of
both parties on (1) whether or not appellees agreed to recognize
appellants’ title and promised to recover the lots in question, and (2)
whether or not appellants filed a third suit against appellees, and
such suit was still pending upon the liberation of the Philippines. The
case shall then be decided anew, taking into account the old and the
new evidence, and the rulings of this opinion. Evidence already of
record shall not be retaken. Costs against appellees”.

After the adduction of additional evidence, at the new trial, the
CFI rendered judgment, upholding its first decision that the cause of
action of plaintiffs had already prescribed and dismissed the
complaint, with costs against the plaintiffs, who brought this appeal
directly to this Court on purely legal questions.

Plaintiffs-appellants alleged (1) that the property in litigation
being registered under the torrens system and it having been found by
the Court of Appeals that plaintiffs-appellants inherited the undivided
one-half of the said property, and that the rights and interests of
plaintiffs-appellants being imprescriptible, it was grave error for the
lower court to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription, and
(2) that it having been found by the Court of Appeals that Ildefonsa
merely held in trust the undivided 4 for the heirs of her deceased
husband, and that when the appellees purchased the lands from the
trustee (their aunt), they had actual knowledge of the conjugal nature
of said lands, the lower court likewise committed error in not
declaring defendants-appellees also mere trustees and thereby the
action of the beneficiaries (plaintiffs) did not prescribe.

It is true “that no title to registered land m derogation to that of
the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession” (Sec. 46 of the Land Registration Act), but as correctly
stated by the trial court “the protection given by the law is in favor
only of registered owners and consequently, the plaintiffs cannot
invoke it in support of their cause of action as they are not the
registered owners of the property in litigation”. The titles of the
lands in question are not in the names of plaintiffs-appellants, but in
the names of the defendants-appellees since the year 1928 or for a
period of more than 27 years. Appellants, however, contend that
notwithstanding their admission that they are not the registered owners
of the land, their theory finds support in the case of Eugenio, et al. vs.
Perdido, et al., (97 Phil., 41), in which the court has upheld the imperceptibility of the action against the heirs, for being “the
continuation of the personality of their decedents”; affirmed in a
later case of Guinoo vs. CA, et al, 97 Phil., 235. The facts
in the cited cases, however, have no parity with those present. Both in
the Eugenio and Guinoo cases, the plaintiffs were the children of
parents whose properties and titles were registered in the names of
said parents, and the lower court had reasons to consider the said
children as the continuation of the personality of the decedents. In
the case at bar, the lands were not registered in the names of their
parents, Eulogio Alomia and Crispina Alomia, but in the names of
Arcadio Alomia and Ildefonsa Almeda, the latter being Arcadio’s widow,
who sold the lands in question to her niece Gregoria Capunitan
(defendant) daughter of Narcisa Almeda and cousin of plaintiffs-appellants and in whose name new certificate of title was issued in
1928.

The case at bar involves an implied or constructive trust upon the
defendants-appellees. The Court of Appeals declared that Ildefonsa held
in trust the 1/2 legally belonging to the plaintiffs; of which
condition, the defendants had full knowledge. The sale made by
Ildefonsa in favor of the defendants, was not void or inexistent
contract, action in which is imprescriptible (Art. 1450, N.C.C.). It is
voidable, at most, and as such is valid until revoked within the time
prescribed by law for its revocation, and that is undoubtedly the
reason why the Court of Appeals pronounced that “the appellees had the
right to ask for a re-conveyance of their share, unless the action is
barred by prescription”. The prescriptibility of an action for
re-conveyance based on implied or constructive trust, is now a settled
question in this jurisdiction. It prescribes in ten (10) years (Boñaga vs. Soler, et al. 112 Phil., 651; 58 Off. Gaz., [52] 8637; J. M. Tuason & Co. Inc. vs. Magdangal, supra, P42; special attention to footnote No. 1).

The fact that plaintiffs-appellants had filed suits against the
defendants-appellees first in 1928 and second in 1931, reveals that the
latter had consistently repudiated the trust. Of course, the
plaintiffs-appellants alleged that they filed a third suit in 1938 and
during the lifetime of the trust the said appellees had acknowledged
the title to and promised to re-convey one-half of the property to the
appellants, reasons for which the Court of Appeals ordered a new trial
to verify these points. But at the new trial, the lower court found the
following facts (a) that on October 11, 1929, Gregorio Alomia filed
civil case No. 5340 against Marciana Almeda, Gregoria Capunitan and
Manuel Reyes, (appellees herein) for recovery of lots Nos. 332, 210
& 2969, which was set six times for hearing during 1930. The trial
thereof was never held because the court always granted postponements
to the parties, except the 6th, which the court denied, resulting in
its dismissal because of the non-appearance of the parties and their
attorneys; (b) on January 23, 1931, same plaintiffs, thru same counsel
filed another action No. 5657 for the recovery of lots Nos. 332, 210,
2968 and 2524. Again, due to numerous petitions for postponement from
September 1931 to 1935, on December 28, 1935, an order was issued in
said case, directing that proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of Marciana Almeda be immediately commenced in order that the
administrator thereof could be substituted as a party to the case.
Nothing was done up to the deadline, August 29, 1936, to comply with
said order. On August 31, 1936, the court dismissed the case. The lower
court found that the dismissal of these two cases was not due to an
amicable settlement because of defendants’ recognition of plaintiffs’
rights or to a promise to reconvey one-half of the property to them,
(c) With respect to the alleged filing of a third action by the same
plaintiff against the same defendants in 1938, the lower court found
that on the basis of the evidence presented, the plaintiffs did not
commence any action in 1938. The correctness of these findings should
now bind the parties because the appeal of the second decision of the
lower court was not taken to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court
directly, on questions of law.

The cause of action of the plaintiffs against the defendants accrued
in 1928 when the latter purchased and took possession of the two lots
from Ildefonsa Almeda. The action, being for recovery of title to and
possession of real property, the same should be brought within ten (10)
years from 1928, or up to 1938 (Sec. 40, Act 190). But after the
dismissal of the second case on August 31, 1936, the
plaintiffs-appellants went into a long swoop only to wake up when they
filed the present action on November 28, 1949 (according to the lower
court) or January 28, 1950 (according to appellants). In the first
case, 13 years had elapsed and in the second, 14 years. In either case,
the action has long prescribed.

Furthermore, and by the same token, the defendants-appellees being
third persons, and having repudiated the trust and expressed claim of
ownership over the litigated properties, by themselves and by their
predecessors-interest, they have also acquired the said properties by
the law of prescription (Tolentino vs. Vitug, 39 Phil. 126; Government of the Philippines vs. Abadilla, 46 Phil. 642).

Premises considered, the decision appealed from, hereby is affirmed, with costs against plaintiffs-appellants.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.