G. R . No. 15669. February 28, 1962
D E C I S I O NSEVERINO ARAMBULO, MAYOR OF CALAMBA, LAGUNA, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF CALAMBA, RESPONDENTS.
PADILLA, J.:
petitioner Severino Arambulo prays for the reversal of a judgment
rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA-G. R. No. 24188-R) that set aside
the alias writ of execution issued by the Court of First
Instance of Laguna and allowed the Municipality of Calamba, Laguna, to
intervene in an appeal brought thereto from a judgment rendered by the
Justice of the Peace Court of Calamba (Civil Case No. B-138).
It appears that on 20 January 1956 Severino Arambulo, after assuming
office as Mayor of Calamba, Laguna, dismissed from service and replaced
with new ones thirteen municipal patrolmen of Calamba. Three of the
dismissed patrolmen, namely, Juan B. Isip, Pablo Palupit and Cornelio
Luna, appealed to the Provincial Governor of Laguna. Warned by the
latter of being suspended from office if the three patrolmen be not
reinstated to their former positions, Mayor Arambulo immediately filed
in the Court of First Instance of Laguna a case for prohibition against
the Governor. On 14 May 1956 the court, finding the patrolmen’s removal
and replacement illegal, ordered that they be reinstated, without
stating who was to pay their back salaries during the period of their
temporary separation from the service.
After having been reinstated, the three patrolmen tried to collect
payment of the back salaries from the Municipality of Calamba, but the
Provincial Auditor of Laguna refused to pass in audit the payment
thereof in view of an unnumbered Provincial Circular issued on 9
February 1955 by the Office of the President, which reads as follows:
SUBJECT: Payment of salaries during the period of illegal separation of civil service employees—Official responsible for
PROVINCIAL AND CITY AUDITORS:
For
the information and guidance of all concerned, Provincial Circular
(Unnumbered) dated February 9, 1955 of the Office of the President is
hereunder quoted:It has been observed that civil service
employees who, under the Civil Service Law, may only be removed or
suspended or otherwise disciplined by the Commissioner of Civil Service
for cause as provided by law as a result of administrative proceedings
instituted against them, are often time dismissed arbitrarily and
without cause only to be later on reinstated. In order, therefore, to
protect the interest of the government and to avoid unnecessary payment
by the government (of) salaries during the period of illegal separation
of civil service employees, where no service have (has) been rendered
at all to the detriment of the government, provincial governors, city
and municipal mayors, who separate or remove from the service employees
without cause and without instituting against them administrative
proceedings as required by Civil Service Law and Regulations are hereby
made personally responsible and liable for the payment of the salaries
of said employees in the event they are reinstated and the payment of
their salaries corresponding to the periods they have been out of the
service is ordered.* * *
By Authority of the President:
and of the opinion rendered on 16 November 1956 on the case by the Commissioner of Civil Service, which is quoted in part:
* * * this Office believes that the Municipal Mayor
of Calamba, Laguna, is responsible for the payment of the salaries of
Messrs. Isip, Luna and Palupit during the period of their illegal
separation in the event that they are reinstated in (to) their former
positions as policemen.
So, on 24 September 1957 in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Calamba the three patrolmen brought an action against Mayor Severino
Arambulo to collect from him in his personal capacity the sums of P495,
P483.80 and P540 as back salaries, interest thereon from date of
demand, P250 as litigation expenses and attorney’s fees, and P1,000 as
moral damages (civil No. 223). On 12 December 1957 the defendant Mayor
filed an answer and a third-party complaint against the Municipality of
Calamba averring, among others, that the latter and not he should
answer for the patrolmen’s back salaries. On 16 December 1957 the
municipality, through one of its councilors, who was a lawyer, filed an
answer admitting its liability for the patrolmen’s back salaries and
stating that its council had passed resolution No, 105 dated 6 October
1956 which appropriated the necessary amount to pay such salaries.
On 17 December 1957 the plaintiffs patrolmen moved for a judgment on
the pleadings, for Mayor Severino Arambulo had not denied the right of
the patrolmen to be paid their back salaries, although he claimed that
the Municipality of Calamba, that had admitted in its answer its
responsibility to pay such salaries, should answer and pay for them. On
8 March 1958 the Justice of the Peace Court of Calamba rendered
judgment ordering the Municipality of Calamba to pay the patrolmen’s
back salaries and absolving Mayor Arambulo from any liability, without
costs. Their motion for reconsideration and new trial filed on 9 April
1958 having been denied, on 6 June 1958 the plaintiffs patrolmen
appealed to the Court of First Instance of Laguna only in so far as it
held defendant Severino Arambulo, in his private capacity, not liable
to pay the patrolmen’s back salaries. The defendant Mayor filed a
motion to dismiss the appeal, on the ground that by their motion for a
judgment on the pleadings, which in effect is an admission of the facts
alleged in the defendant’s and third-party defendant’s answers, the
plaintiffs patrolmen no longer had a cause of action. On 27 August 1958
the motion to dismiss was denied.
Before the expiration of the period for appeal, the Justice of the
Peace Court issued a writ for the execution of the judgment rendered
against the Municipality of Calamba, which was not satisfied. During
the pendency of the appeal the Court of First Instance of Laguna issued
an alias writ of execution.
On 15 September 1958 the third-party defendant Municipality of
Calamba filed a motion praying for the setting aside of the writ of
execution issued by the Justice of the Peace Court of Calamba, for the
reason that the appeal taken by the plaintiffs patrolmen had the effect
of vacating the judgment rendered by the Justice of the Peace Court and
the case had to be tried de novo in the Court of First
Instance of Laguna. However, before the court could act on the motion
to set aside the writ of execution, the Municipality of Calamba filed
on 11 September 1958 a motion to intervene and an answer attached
thereto. On 3 November 1958 the Court of First Instance denied the two
motions, on the ground that as to the third-party defendant
Municipality of Calamba the judgment rendered by the Justice of the
Peace Court of Calamba had become final and executory as it did not
appeal therefrom, and that even if it wanted to appeal, it could not do
so, for the judgment in question was one by confession which became
immediately final, executory and unappealable. On 28 November 1958 the
third-party defendant filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied on 2 December 1958.
On 15 December 1958 the third-party defendant Municipality of
Calamba filed in the Court of Appeals a verified petition for
certiorari and mandamus, and, on the following day, prayed for a writ
of preliminary injunction to restrain the Court of First Instance of
Laguna from proceeding with the trial of the appealed case (civil No.
B-138) and the Provincial Sheriff of Laguna from carrying out the alias writ
of execution issued by the Court of First Instance. On 12 January 1959
the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon the
filing by the third-party defendant Municipality of Calamba of a bond
in the sum of P500. On 24 June 1959 the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment ordering the Court of First Instance of Laguna to grant the
third-party defendant’s motions of 11 September 1958 to intervene and
of 15 September 1958 to set aside the writ of execution, and revoking
the order entered on 2 December 1958 by the Court of First Instance
which had denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the
Municipality of Calamba, with costs against Mayor Arambulo.
Mayor Severino Arambulo seeks the reversal of the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals.
The question to determine is: In a case involving a third-party
defendant, does the appeal taken by the plaintiffs against the
defendant operate to vacate the judgment rendered by the justice of the
peace or municipal court as only between the appealing plaintiffs and
the defendant against whom the appeal is taken and not as regards the
third-party defendant that has not appealed from the judgment rendered
against it?
Relying mainly on section 9, Rule 40, of the Rules of Court, which provides that—
A perfected appeal shall operate to vacate the
judgment of the justice of the peace or the municipal court, and the
action when duly entered in the Court of First Instance shall stand for
trial de novo upon its merits in accordance with the regular
procedure in that court, as though the same had never been tried before
and had been originally there commenced. * * *
the third-party defendant Municipality of Calamba contends that the
judgment rendered by the Justice of the Peace Court of Calamba was
vacated by the appeal taken by the plaintiffs patrolmen, and for that
reason the admission of its liability to pay for their back salaries is
deemed as if it never had been made and is brought and submitted on
appeal for determination by the appellate court. On the other hand, the
petitioner Mayor Severino Arambulo argues that as the appeal taken by
the plaintiffs patrolmen was only in so far as it did not hold him in
his private capacity liable to pay the plaintiffs’ back salaries, it is
only that part of the judgment that is brought and submitted on appeal
to the Court of First Instance of Laguna for determination.
The appeal from the judgment rendered by the Justice of the Peace
Court of Calamba to the Court of First Instance of Laguna vacated the
judgment of the former court not only as between the plaintiffs
patrolmen who have appealed and the petitioner Mayor Severino Arambulo,
who was absolved from the complaint, but also as to the third-party
defendant Municipality of Calamba which has not appealed therefrom.
Section 9, Rule 40, of the Rules of Court, aforequoted, considers an
appealed case from an inferior court “as though the same had never been
tried before and had been originally there commenced.” In effect, it
considers all the proceedings in the inferior court, including the
judgment, inexistent. Only the complaint is not vacated, which is
deemed reproduced in the Court of First Instance.[1]
Such being the case, the appeal reopens all issues or questions already
passed upon by the inferior court, regardless of whoever appeals. Thus,
in Royal Shirt Factory, Inc. vs. Co Bon Tic, 94 Phil, 994) although a third-party defendant was not involved, this Court held—
* * * that any and all issues involved in a case originating in an inferior court, whether or not passed upon by said court and whether or not appealed upon by any or both parties are thrown open and may be passed upon by the Court of First Instance when the case is appealed to it. (Italics supplied.)
The Court of Appeals correctly held that the Court of First Instance of Laguna is not empowered to issue an alias
writ of execution. Section 8, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court provides
that execution must issue “from the court in which the judgment or
order is entered.” The judgment sought to be executed having been
rendered by the Justice of the Peace Court of Calamba, only this court
could issue the writ of execution.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.
[1] Section 7, Rule 40, of the Rules of Court.