G.R. No. L-16981. March 30, 1962
CHUA TAY, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. REGIONAL OFFICE 3, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR F. A. FUENTES, HEARING OFFICER PAULINO S. PEREZ AND FELIPE AGUPAN, RESPONDENTS-…
BARRERA, J.:
“Acme Furniture”, for its owner and manager, Chua Tay. Having
contracted pulmonary tuberculosis after his discharge, and believing
the same to have been caused by his previous employment, Agupan filed a
complaint in the Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor,
docketed as Case RO3-WC-388, for injury and/or sickness in line of
duty, claiming for hospitalization expenses and compensation.
The case was, accordingly, set for hearing during which both parties presented their respective evidence.
On July 30, 1959, the hearing officer rendered a decision ordering
respondent Chua Tay to pay claimant Agupan disability compensation in
the amount of pl,893.46, as of August 6, 1959, and thereafter the sum
of P25.74 a week until the compensable ailment is pronounced cured or
arrested, but not to exceed £4,000.00; to reimburse claimant of duly
receipted hospitalization and medical expenses; and to remit to the
Regional Office the required fees.
Respondent Chua Tay filed a notice, dated August 13, 1959,
controverting the award. On September 1, 1959, claimant filed with the
Regional Office a motion for execution of the decision rendered therein
on the ground that the notice controverting the award, being pro forma,
said decision had already become final and executory. As thus prayed
for, the Regional Administrator issued a writ of execution against the
properties of respondent.
On October 21, 1959, respondent Chua Tay filed a petition for
certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction in the
Court of First Instance of Manila, questioning the jurisdiction and
authority of Regional Office No. 3 to try and decide money claims such
as Case RO3WC-388, as well as the validity of the proceedings conducted
therein. As a consequence thereof, a writ of preliminary injunction was
issued by the court restraining the Sheriff of the City of Manila and
the Regional Administrator or their agents from enforcing the
aforementioned writ of execution.
On February 15, 1960, the lower court rendered judgment holding
Reorganization Plan 20-X insofar as it vests judicial powers and
functions to the regional offices of the Department of Labor, illegal,
and declared the proceedings had in the case (RO3-WC-388) null and
void. It is from this decision that the instant appeal has been
interposed by the Regional Administrator F. A. Fuentes, Hearing Officer
Paulino Perez and claimant Felipe Agupan.
It is here contended by appellants that the lower court erred (1) in
applying the provisions of Reorganization Plan 20-A to the case at bar,
and (2) in declaring said Reorganization Plan 20-A unconstitutional and
invalid.
There is merit in the first allegation. It is true that in a long line of decided cases,[1]
this Court ruled against the validity and constitutionality of
Reorganization Plan 20-A, insofar as it vests the regional offices of
the Department of Labor with exclusive and original jurisdiction to try
and adjudicate money claims arising out of labor relations. However, as
we clarified in the case of Miller vs. Mardo (112 Phil., 792;
59 Off. Gaz. [14] 2307) the invalidity did not extend to the exercise,
by the said regional offices, of jurisdiction over cases falling under
the Workmen’s Compensation Law, because with respect to such
matter, the disputed provision of the reorganization plan merely
effected a reallocation or re-assignment, not a new j’ grant, of
authority already bestowed on Labor-officials by Republic Act 997, as
amended by Republic Act 1241.[2]
The claim herein being one for compensation under the Work1 Corominas,
et al. vs. Labor Standard Comm. 112 Phil., 551; 59 Off. Gaz., (43) 7432
and subsequent cases. San Miguel Brewery vs. Sobremesana, L-18730,
Sept. 16, 1961. men’s Compensation Act, the authority of appellant
Hearing Officer to take cognizance of and render judgment on the case
must be upheld.
The possession by the regional offices of such authority to try and
decide a claim for compensation, however, does not carry with it the
authority to issue writs of execution for the enforcement of their
decisions. By specific provision of law,[3]
the power to enforce award or decision in Workmen’s Compensation cases
is reserved exclusively to the court of record under whose jurisdiction
the compensable injury occurred.[4]
It is noted that the award rendered by the Hearing Officer has been
duly controverted or appealed by the employer Chua Tay. It is error to
say that this is merely proforma, as the law authorizes such
appeal to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. Under the
circumstances, the award has not yet become final and the appeal should
be given due course and submitted to the Commission for appropriate
adjudication.
With the foregoing modification, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in all other respect, without costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.
[1] Corominas, et al, v. Labor Standard Comm, L-14837, June 30, 1961, and subsequent cases.
[2] San Miguel Brewery v. Sobremesana, L-18730, Sept. 16, 1961.
[3] Sec. 51, Act 3428, as amended by Act 3812, Comm, Act 210 and Rep. Act 772.
[4] Pastoral v. commissioners, etc., L-12903, July 31, 1961.