ANUNCIACION CANDELARIO, ON HER BEHALF, AND AS THE LEGAL GUARDIAN OF THE MINORS AGUSTINA MATUTE Y CANDELARIO, ELENA MATUTE Y CANDELARIO, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ANTONIO CAÑ…

Two special civil actions are joined in the above entitled
proceedings before Us, one for mandamus to compel the sending of the
record on appeal and another for certiorari to review an order of the
court for the recording of an attorneys lien. Both actions are related
to the same subject, the sufficiency of fees already paid to respondent
Atty. Paterno R. Canlas for services rendered in the probate
proceedings for the testate estate of Amadeo Matute Olave. Petitioners
herein are heirs of the deceased.

Upon the opening of special proceedings No. 25876 entitled “Testate
Estate of Amadeo Matute Oiave” petitioners herein entered into an
agreement with Attys. Paterno R. Canlas and Jose L. Matias whereby
petitioners agreed to pay the respondent attorneys as fees for their
services in representing the petitioners in the probate proceedings,
10% of the shares that they would receive as heirs of the deceased
Respondent attorneys appeared on behalf of the petitioners in the
proceedings below. In the course of the proceedings, a compromise
settlement was agreed upon between the parties in the probate
proceedings whereby the respective shares of each heir was determined.

On September 18,1959, petitioner Candelario, in her name and on
behalf of her minor children, filed an urgent motion to stop all
payments of attorneys’ fees to Attys. Paterno R. Canlas and Jose L.
Matias for herself and for the account of the heirs, Agustina Matute
Candelario, Elena Matute Candelario and Amadeo Matute Candelario, Jr.
It is alleged in the motion that the respondent attorneys had received
an advance payment of their attorneys’ fees amounting to P77,000.00 up
to March 26, 1958, plus an additional amount of P11,710.00; that
according to the findings of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue the
value of the estate left by the deceased amounted to P2,481,702.28,
this appraisal having been made on December 4, 1958; that according to
the compromise agreement entered into for the settlement of the estate,
each of the petitioners herein were to receive 10% of the 30% of the
entire estate; and that according to the agreement entered into between
petitioners and respondent lawyers, the latter would be entitled only
to P63,968.77. So that there is already an over payment of 924,741.23
made to the said attorneys.

Opposition to the above motion was interposed by respondent
attorneys on the ground that the actual value of the estate left by the
deceased Amadeo Matute Candelario is 95,000,000, more or less, and
based on this value, the attorneys’ fees due them under the contract
had not been fully paid as alleged.

Further arguments were filed by the respective parties on the issue
and on March 13, 1960, the court below entered an order denying the
petition of jthe petitioners to stop the payment of attorneys fees, and
requiring the administrator to pay Atty. Paterno R. Canlas the unpaid
balance of P29,000.00. In arriving at this conclusion, the court took
account of the fact that an agreement dated July 7,1958, upon which the
order to pay Atty. Canlas P40.000.00 is based, was signed by the
petitioners and Atty. Canlas, and according to it, the latter would be
entitled to receive by way of attorneys fees a total of P40,000.00 or
P10,000.00 from each of his clients, the four heirs; and that
P11,000.00 of said amount has already been paid, leaving a balance of
P29,000.00 due to respondent Atty. Paterno R. Canlas. The order of the
court is as follows:

“Considering that the order of July 16, 1958 has
already been partially executed, and considering further that it was
issued upon the joint motion of all the heirs and their respective
counsel, said order became immediately final and non-appealable.
Anunciacion Candelario and her children are estopped and cannot now
question the amount that they themselves asked this Court to approve
and ordered paid to Paterno R. Canlas under the second advances, for
the reason that the amount is fixed in the joint motion filed on July
7, 1958. Moreover, as the records show, even long after appraisal was
already made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, further payments
on the second advances were made to Paterno R, Canlas at P3,000.00
each. As admitted by Anunciacion Candelario and her three minor
children in paragraph 3 of her urgent motion to stop payments of
attorney’s fees, of the P40,000.00 due to Paterno R. Canlas under the
second advances, M only P11,000.00 has so far been received by Paterno
R. Canlas, thereby of leaving unpaid a balance of P29.000.00 due to
him.” (p. 44, R. O. A.)

A motion to set aside the order was presented on the ground that the
order for payment of the advances to Atty. Paterno Canlas, amounting to
P40,000.00 never became , final, as stated in the court order, so it
would be unfair and is illegal for the heirs to continue the payment of
the advances in excess of 10% of the value of the properties to be
received by the heirs as their shares in the inheritance. This motion
was denied on June 22, 1960 and thereupon the petitioner filed a notice
of appeal. The appeal was objected to by Atty. Canlas on the ground
that the order for the payment of P40,000.00 is final and executory,
hence, non-appealable. The objection was sustained in an order dated
August 24, 1960, and as a result, the court dismissed the appeal.
Hence, this petition for mandamus to compel the judge to allow the
appeal against its order declaring that the order for the payment of
the fees had become final and executory, and denying the original
motion to stop payment of attorneys fees.

So much for the petition for mandamus to compel the allowance of the
appeal interposed by the herein petitioner. We will now consider the
petition for certiorari against the order of the court authorizing
registration of respondent attorneys’ charging lien.

On January 21, 1960, respondent Atty. Canlas presented a motion
before the court praying that a charging lien for .attorney’s fees
amounting to P201,300.00 be created “on whatever properties, rights and
interest Anunciacion Candelario and her three minor children will
receive in the estate of the deceased Amadeo Matute Olave, plus 10%
attorney’s fees on whatever future advances that they will receive to
be taken from the fruits and products of the property of said estate.”
Petitioners presented an objection to the motion, denying that the
value of the estate of the deceased Matute is P5,000,000, (for the
appraised market value thereof is only P2,048,599.34 as per appraisal
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue); that various amounts would
still have to be deducted from the market value for claims against the
estate presented by various claimants, such as internal revenue taxes,
fees of administrator, and attorney’s fees of former lawyers for the
administrator; that some of the properties adjudicated to the
petitioners were due them as heirs in their own right and not as heirs
of Amadeo Matute; that the advances received by petitioners were given
to them in their own right, as f they are fruits of the estate, and,
therefore, respondent attorneys had no right to claim a percentage
thereon as attorneys fees; that respondent attorneys had actually
received P88,710.00 already and petitioners had already presented a
motion to stop further payments of attorneys fees.

On March 18, 1960, the Court overruled the opposition of ;i the
petitioners herein and ordered that the charging lien of Atty. Canlas
be recorded. It is against this order that the petition for certiorari
has been filed before Us, petitioners contending that the order for the
registration of the lien is an abuse of discretion on the part of the
court below.

The issue now presented is: Is it not the proper procedure f to
first ascertain if a full payment has already been made to Attys.
Canlas and Matias, as claimed by petitioners, before a charging lien is
created in their favor The payments already made to the respondent
attorneys are claimed to be sufficient, and appear to be so, to cover
respondents’ claims’ for attorneys’ fees.

A consideration of the facts and the circumstances indicated above
shows that the one issue remaining undecided before the court is
whether payment of the sum of P29,000.00 should be enforced, as
demanded by respondent attorneys, or whether payment be stopped because
the amounts already received by the respondent attorneys are sufficient
to cover the attorneys’ fees agreed upon between petitioners and
respondent attorneys. This is the claim of petitioners. The same issue
is also involved in the petition for certiorari, for if the claim of
the petitioners that the fees have already been fully paid is true,
then it would be unjust and illegal for the charging lien to be
created. ,

In connection with the first petition (for mandamus to compel
allowance of the appeal), it is true as found by the court below that
the payment of P29,000.00 ordered to be made, forms part of the amount
of P40,000.00 agreed upon between the petitioners on one hand and the
respondent attorneys on the other, to be advanced to respondent
attorneys as part of the agreed fees sometime before the motion to stop
payments was presented. But the mere fact that the order for the
payment of said P40,000.00 was issued as early as July 7, 1958, should
not prevent the petitioners herein from showing that the said amount
should no longer be demanded from them, because the amount theretofore
received by them appears to be already more than the 10% agreed upon.
The discovery made by petitioners that the fees to which respondent
attorneys are entitled had already been fully paid, was made by the new
lawyer of the petitioner, after the latter had changed counsel and
terminated the services of the respondent attorneys. True the assessment by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue of P2,481,728 was given to
the administrator of the estate as early as December 4, 1958, whereas
the motion to stop payment was made on September 17, 1959. But the
agreement to pay P40,000.00 was made on July 7, 1958, which is five
months before the assessment was made by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. The petitioners could not have known,. at the time of entering
into the agreement, of the assessment of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue for this came later. Counsel for petitioners cites the case of
“Tambunting de Tengco vs. Hon. Ramon San Jose”, 97 Phil., 491, in which
We held that as a general rule, the probate court retains control and
jurisdiction over incidents connected with it, including its orders not
affecting third parties who may have acquired vested rights. Said case
is decisive of this case. We are quoting it herein below:

“As a rule, during the pendency of special
proceedings, the probate court retains control and jurisdiction over
incidents connected with it, including its orders not affecting third
parties who may by such orders, have acquired vested rights. This
control and jurisdiction is particularly extensive to and effective
against its own officers, such as administrators appointed by it, and
attorneys representing them or representing parties included in the
proceedings. As this Court has said in the case of Onas vs. Javillo, 54
Phil., 604, “In probate proceedings considerable latitude is allowed a
Court of First Instance in modifying or revoking its own orders as long
as the proceedings are . pending in the same Court and timely
application or motions for such modifications or revocations are made
by the interested parties.” Just as the probate court may increase as
it had increased the fees of the attorneys in the present case, it
could equally and with the same authority decrease said attorney’s fees
when so warranted, as for instance, if it is found that the value of
the estate is much less than what was originally assessed, and on which
erroneous assessment, the original fees were awarded. The same thing is
true with regards to fees to be allowed administrators. In other words,
an order fixing the fees of an administrator or of an attorney
rendering professional services to an administrator, continues to be
under the control of the probate court until the case is closed, and
until then, the court may modify or set it aside in the sense that it
may decrease or increase the same according to the facts and
circumstances as they develop and unfold in the course of the probate
proceedings; and even if said fees have already been partially or fully
paid, they may yet be ordered returned or reimbursed to the estate, or
a bond may be required of the ¦court officer receiving them, to
guarantee the return or reimbursement if later found to be necessary
(Dais vs. Garduno, 49 Phil., 165). Respondent Judge therefore erred in
denying the petition of Julieta Tambunting dated August 14, 1953 to set
aside the two orders of April 9, 1952 and November 26, 1952, in the
mistaken belief that said orders had become final and executory and so
came under the provisions of Rule 38, and because the petition for
relief was filed beyond the period prescribed by said Rule 38.”

We also held in a recent case (City of Butuan vs. Hon. Judge Montano
Ortiz, G. R. No. L-18054, prom. December 22, 1961) that after a
judgment has become final, if there is evidence of an event or
circumstance which would affect or change the rights of the parties
thereto, the court should be allowed to admit evidence of such new
facts and circumstances, and thereafter suspend its execution and grant
relief as the new facts and circumstances warrant. We, therefore, find
that the ruling of the court declaring that the order for the payment
of P40,000.00 is final and may not be reversed, is erroneous as above
explained.

Another point which we should consider is the fact that the first
petition is for mandamus merely to compel allowance of the appeal,
which appeal the order of the court below had dismissed. But besides
considering whether the appeal should be allowed, we had decided to
abbreviate the proceedings by considering the petition for mandamus as
a petition for certiorari, thus avoiding the tortious and expensive
course of an appeal, and saving the parties and the courts the trouble
of going through another proceeding. Having decided to consider the
petition for mandamus as a petition for certiorari, and having found
that the order appealed from is erroneous, We hereby set it aside, and
remand the case anew and receive evidence on the question of whether or
not the fees of the respondent attorneys have already been fully paid,
in view of the value of the property upon which the agreed fees are to
be based.

In the second action (for certiorari), we find that the lower court
abused its discretion in ordering the annotation of the lien,
notwithstanding the apparently valid claim that the attorneys’ fees
have been fully paid and without previous trial and finding that the
claim of petitioners of full payment of fees is not true or correct.

The order of the lower court for the payment of P29,000.00 to
respondent attorneys and for the registration of the charging lien in
favor of the said attorneys is hereby set aside and the case remanded
to the court below for further proceedings in accordance herewith.
Costs against respondents attorneys. So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.