G.R. No. L-48065. March 30, 1979

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. LEOPOLDO TRAYA ALIAS “DADY”, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions March 30, 1979 FIRST DIVISION GUERRERO, J.:
Download PDF


GUERRERO, J.:


This case was certified to Us by the
Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 12, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court.

Appellant Leopoldo Traya, together with co-accused Octavio Traya,
Wenceslao Verterra and Antonio Natulla Cinco were charged before the Circuit
Criminal Court, 13th Judicial District, Tacloban City
for the crime of murder in the fatal shooting of Dr. Pedro Alvero who was then
the incumbent, Vice-Mayor of Abuyog, Leyte.  The offense was allegedly committed by means
of treachery and with evident premeditation, and the aggravating circumstances
of grave abuse of superior strength and disregard of the respect due the victim
on account of his rank.  For
insufficiency of evidence to support the qualifying circumstances of treachery
and evident premeditation, the trial court found conviction only for the lesser
offense of homicide.  Thus, Leopoldo
Traya was sentenced to a minimum period of six (6) years and four (4) months of
prision mayor to a period not exceeding thirteen (13) years and
ten (10) months of reclusion temporal with all the accessory
penalties of the law and to pay jointly and severally with his other co-accused
the sum of P12,000.00 to the heirs of the victim, Dr.
Pedro Alvero, by way of indemnification without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and to pay half of the costs.

The accused Wenceslao Verterra was sentenced to nineteen (19)
years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period and to share in the indemnity jointly and severally with Leopoldo
Traya.  Octavio Traya was acquitted.  Antonio Natulla Cinco remained at large
throughout the proceedings.

From the judgment, accused Leopoldo Traya appealed to the Court
of Appeals.  After making its findings of
fact and evaluation of the evidence, particularly the testimonies of the
eyewitnesses, the appellate court rendered an opinion disagreeing with the
trial court that the crime committed was homicide, considering that the offense
was proved satisfactorily to have been qualified with treachery.  Believing that the penalty which should be
imposed is reclusion perpetua, the Court of Appeals, in
compliance with the Rules, refrained from rendering judgment and thus certified
the case to the Supreme Court.

In the case, of People vs. Daniel, L-40330, promulgated on
November 20, 1978, this
Court reviewed the procedure in the Court of Appeals outlined in the second
paragraph of Section 12, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court.  The pertinent rule provides:

xxxxx             xxxxx               xxxxx

“Whenever in any criminal case submitted to a division the
said division should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life
imprisonment should be imposed, the said court shall refrain from entering
judgment thereon and shall forthwith certify the case to the Supreme Court for
final determination, as if the case had been brought before it on appeal.”

The Court through Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro directed
that:  “xxxx, henceforth, should the
Court of Appeals be of the opinion that the penalty of death or reclusion
perpetua (life imprisonment) should be imposed in any criminal case
appealed to it where the penalty imposed by the trial court is less than reclusion
perpetua, the said Court, with a comprehensive written analysis of the
evidence and discussion of law involved, render judgment expressly and
explicitly imposing the penalty of either death or reclusion perpetua
as the circumstances warrant, refrain from entering judgment, and forthwith
certify the case and elevate the entire record thereof to this Court for
review.”

WHEREFORE, in accordance with this new ruling and
directive, this case is hereby remanded to the Court of Appeals for rendition
of the proper judgment.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Fernandez, De Castro, and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., (Chairman),
concurs in a separate opinion.


150
Clean

6 pt
6 pt
0
3

MicrosoftInternetExplorer4

st1:*{behavior:url(#ieooui) }

/* Style Definitions */
table.MsoNormalTable
{mso-style-name:”Table Normal”;
mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;
mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;
mso-style-noshow:yes;
mso-style-parent:””;
mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt;
mso-para-margin:0in;
mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt;
mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:”Times New Roman”;}

SEPARATE OPINION

TEEHANKEE, J.:

I hold the opposite view as per my vote concurring with the
valedictory mail opinion of Mme. Justice Palma in the cited 1978 case of People
vs. Daniel[1]
that under the theretofore consistent interpretation (of over forty years
standing since the creation of the Court of Appeals) of the pertinent
provisions of the Constitution and the law[2],
whenever the Court of Appeals in an appealed criminal case before it (where the
penalty imposed by the trial court is reclusion temporal or a lesser
penalty and which therefore falls under its exclusive appellate jurisdiction,
for cases wherein the trial court imposed the penalty of death or reclusion
perpetua
are vested by the Constitution and Judiciary Act within the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of this Court[3])
is of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be
imposed, it shall refrain from rendering (entering) judgment and shall
forthwith certify the case to the Supreme Court for final determination as if
the case had been brought before the Supreme Court on appeal.

However, since this Court by a majority vote in the said case of Daniel
has overruled this long standing doctrine and would now require the Court of
Appeals to “render judgment expressly and explicitly imposing the penalty
of either death or reclusion perpetua as the circumstances warrant,
refrain from entering judgment and forthwith certify the case and elevate the
entire record thereof to this Court for review” and such majority vote has
prevailed to now, I am constrained to defer thereto and concur in the result.


[1]
L-40330, November 20, 1978.

[2] Section 34 of the Judiciary Act and Rule 124, section 12 of the
Rules of Court.

[3]
Art. X, sec. 5, sub-par. (2) (d), 1973 Constitution, Art. VIII,
sec. 2 (4) 1935 Constitution; and sec­tion 17 of the Judiciary Act, RA 296).