ASSOCIATED TRADE UNIONS-ATU (ATU–KILUSAN), PETITIONER, VS. HON. CARMELO C. NORIEL, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, FEDERATION …

This Court has repeatedly been on record as favoring the holding
of a certification election as the most democratic means of determining which
labor association should be the exclusive bargaining agent, thus effectively
implementing the clear policy of the New Labor Code.^[1]
Nonetheless, in appropriate cases, on a showing that there is in existence a
collective bargaining contract duly certified, there is a legal obstacle to its
taking place.  It is on that premise that
this certiorari petition is based, the allegation being that respondent
Director Carmelo C. Noriel
acted in violation of the due process guarantee in disregarding what it alleged
are proven and uncontested facts as to the existence of a certified collective
bargaining contract and thus acted at the very least with grave abuse of
discretion.  The plausibility of the
petition was bolstered by the inclusion of four annexes, apparently justifying
its contention.  The first^[2]
was a certification of the collective bargaining contract of the employer^[3]
with petitioner Union. 
The other two consisted of the dismissal of the petition for certification^[4]
of respondent Federation Unions of Rizal (FUR) and
the denial by respondent Director of a Motion for Reconsideration.^[5]
More specifically, there is an allegation of arbitrariness, for according to
petitioner there was unaccountably and unjustifiably a reversal of the decision
reached by respondent Director in denying the plea for the holding of a
certification election.  To be precise,
on May 28, 1977, he ordered
that such election be held.^[6]
Accordingly, a restraining order was issued by this Court, and respondents were
required to comment.  The Comment of
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza^[7]
on behalf of respondent Director Noriel clarified
matters.  It stressed that one month
before the application by petitioner for the certification of the collective
bargaining contract, there was a pending petition for certification election
filed by respondent Union and that when the collective
bargaining contract was certified, it had not been as yet decided.  Even its dismissal was provisional.  Moreover, “petitioner in requesting for
the certification of said collective bargaining agreement failed to inform the
Bureau that there was a pending petition for certification election in the
company.  Had said fact been disclosed to
the Bureau, the latter could not have certified the aforementioned collective
bargaining agreement.  As aptly pointed
out by public respondent Noriel in the assailed order
of May 28, 1977, to
wit:  ‘ATU, in requesting that the
agreement be certified, should have volunteered the information that there is a
pending petition for certification election at the contracting company.  Instead, it chose to conceal this very
important fact from the Bureau.  Had ATU
dealt with the Bureau with candor, the matter should not have become muddled by
the subsequent certification of the CBA.'”^[8]
It cannot be said, therefore, in the light of the above facts, that the
actuation of respondent Noriel is susceptible to the
charge of arbitrariness.  No due process
question arises.

The petition must fail.

1. It should occasion no surprise if a labor organization in the
position of petitioner would take steps to continue as the collective
bargaining representative.  That is an
aspect of the competitive struggle between unions for supremacy in a collective
bargaining unit.  Petitioner Union
ought to have realized that whatever step it took should be in conformity with
and not in defiance of the law.  From the
above facts, it is quite apparent that it was unmindful of such a basic
principle so essential to the maintenance of the rule of law.  Respondent labor Union on the other hand was
guided by and, therefore, acted in accordance with the applicable provision of
the Labor Code.  Thus:  “No certification election issue shall
be entertained by the Bureau in any collective bargaining unit if a certified
collective bargaining agreement exists between the employer and a legitimate
labor organization, except within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of
the life of such certified collective bargaining agreement.  The organization receiving the majority of
the votes cast in such election shall be certified by the Bureau as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees concerned.”^[9]
Nor could any question be raised as to the petition for certification by respondent
labor Union being supported by the written consent of 30% of all the employees
in the bargaining unit.  In such a case,
the law makes it mandatory for respondent Director to order that certification
election be held.^[10]
That is what was done by respondent Director. 
To repeat, no arbitrariness had been shown or could be imputed to
respondent Director.

2.       This Court has ever
been alert against such attempts at circumventing the clear statutory policy to
conduct a certification election as the most appropriate means of ascertaining
which labor organization should be the exclusive bargaining representative by
collective contracts concluded under the circumstances present in this
controversy.  In the first case cited in
this opinion, Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor
Relations,^[11]
this Court did not consider a duly certified collective bargaining contract as
a bar to a certification election when it was shown that it was entered into
pending an appeal against an earlier rejection of the plea for certification by
respondent union.  In General Textiles
Allied Workers Association v. Director of Bureau of Labor Relations,^[12]
this Court dismissed a certiorari proceeding by petitioner labor union
assailing an order of respondent Director to call a certification election on
the plea that there was a previous renewal of collective bargaining
contract.  Reference may likewise be made
to Vassar Industries Employees Union v. Estrella,^[13]
where it was alleged that the management subsequently entered into a collective
bargaining agreement with respondent labor organization, a contract approved
and ratified by the general membership or employees of such firm.  Nonetheless, it did not suffice to nullify an
order requiring that a certification election be held.  There is relevance to this excerpt from the
opinion:  “With a pending petition
for certification, any such agreement entered into by management with a labor
organization is fraught with the risk that such a labor union may not be chosen
thereafter as the collective bargaining representative.  That is the situation that is confronted by
private respondents.  Any other view
would render nugatory the clear statutory policy to favor certification
election as the means of ascertaining a true expression of the will of the
workers as to which labor organization would represent them.”^[14]
So it must be in this case.

3.       The last point to be
considered is the legal effect, if any, of the certified collective bargaining
contract prior to the holding of the certification election.  Fortunately, this is not the first time this
question had confronted this Tribunal. 
The latest case in point, National Mines and Allied Workers’ Union
v. Estrella,^[15] supplies the guiding principle.  It was set forth with clarity in the opinion
of Justice Antonio thus:  “It also
appears that after the expiration of the existing Collective Bargaining
Agreement, or on March 31, 1976, the company and respondent Union executed a
new Collective Bargaining Agreement incorporating all the conditions imposed by
the decision of the Labor Arbiter of May 12, 1976 in the compulsory arbitration
case (No. RB-IV-4138-76) to wit:  (1) a
wage increase of P1.04 a day per man; and (2) incentive for assay workers in
the amount of P21,280.00 a year, and providing that the Collective Bargaining
Agreement shall be for a period of three (3) years effective on the date of its
execution, but the wage increase should be retroactive to the day immediately
following the expiration of the 1972 agreement. 
It is claimed this Collective Bargaining Agreement has much more
favorable terms than the previous agreement. 
This agreement should be enforced in the meantime.  If a union, other than the one that executed
the agreement, should be certified, then such union shall negotiate with
management for a new Collective Bargaining Agreement.  [Then came this citation]:  ‘* * * we are not unmindful that he
supplemental collective bargaining contract entered into in the meanwhile
between management and respondent Union contains provisions beneficial to
labor.  So as not to prejudice the
workers involved, it must be made clear that until the conclusion of a new
collective bargaining contract entered into by it and whatever labor
organization may be chosen after the certification election, the existing
collective labor contract as thus supplemented should be left undisturbed.  Its terms call for strict compliance.  This mode of assuring that the cause of labor
suffers no injury from the struggle between contending labor organizations follows
the doctrine announced in the recent case of Vassar Industries Employees Union
v. Estrella (L-46562, March 31, 1978).  To quote from the opinion:  “In the meanwhile, if as contended by
private respondent labor union the interim collective bargaining agreement,
which it engineered and entered into on September 26, 1977, has much more
favorable terms for the workers of private respondent Vassar Industries, then
it should continue in full force and effect until the appropriate bargaining
representative is chosen and negotiations for a new collective bargaining
agreement thereafter concluded.” ‘ “^[16]
On the assumption then that the stipulations in the certified collective
bargaining agreement in this case are more advantageous to the laborers, then
it must, in the meanwhile, be observed and maintained until the certification
election is conducted, the collective bargaining representative chosen, and the
collective bargaining contract concluded.

WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is
dismissed for lack of merit.  The
restraining order is hereby lifted.  The
certification election must be held forthwith. 
This decision is immediately executory.

Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., and
Santos, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., did not take part.

Aquino, J., concurs in the result because the existing collective bargaining
agreement will expire on July 26, 1979 and during the four-month period preceding its
expiration, the question of representation might as well be decided.

Abad Santos, J., is on official leave.

^[1]
At least twelve decisions of this character may be cited, starting from
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor
Relations, L-42115, January 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 132.  The latest case is Associated Trade Unions v.
Noriel, L-48367, January 16, 1979.

^[2]
Annex H.

^[3]
Annex A.

^[4]
Annex G.

^[5]
Annex M.

^[6]
Annex Q.

^[7]
He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Reynato
S. Puno and Trial Attorney Felix B. Lerio.

^[8]
Comment, 8-9.

^[9]
Art. 257, The New Labor Code (1974).

^[10]
According to Art. 258 of the New Labor Code: 
“Any petition for certification election filed by any legitimate
labor organization shall be supported by the written consent of at least thirty
percent (30%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit.  Upon receipt and verification of such
petition, it shall be mandatory for the Bureau to conduct a certification
election for the purpose of determin­ing the representative of the employees in
the appropriate bargaining unit and certify the winner as the exclusive
collective bargaining represent­ative of all the employees in the unit.”

^[11]
69 SCRA 132.

^[12]
L-45719, July 31, 1978.

^[13]
L-46562, March 21, 1978, 82
SCRA 280.

^[14]
Ibid, 288.

^[15]
L-45293, November 25, 1978.

^[16]
Ibid.  The citation is from Federation
of Free Workers (Bisig ng Manggagawa sa UTEX), v. Noriel, L-47182-83, October 30, 1978.