EMMA J. CASTILLO, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE MANUEL M. CALANOG, JR., RESPONDENT.
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Castillo versus Calanog
The Case
This is an administrative matter in which Emma J. Castillo charged Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76, with immorality and conduct unbecoming of a public official. The complaint alleged that the judge, a married man, established an intimate relationship with the complainant, who had sought his help in expediting the intestate proceedings of her late common-law husband, and that a child was born of that relationship. The case matters because it is the Court's own statement that there is no dichotomy of morality in the judiciary: a judge is judged by his private morals as much as by his official acts, and an affidavit of desistance cannot buy him peace.
Procedural History
The complainant filed a sworn letter-complaint dated January 17, 1990, addressed to the Supreme Court and docketed as an administrative matter. The Court required the respondent to answer. After two motions for extension, he filed a two-paragraph Answer and later a Supplemental Answer, both praying that the complaint be considered withdrawn or dismissed. The complainant herself filed a sworn letter-request dated February 1, 1990, asking that her complaint be considered withdrawn because she was no longer interested in pursuing it.
Notwithstanding the desistance, the Court, as a matter of procedure in cases of this serious nature, issued a Resolution on September 6, 1990, referring the case to Associate Justice Gloria C. Paras of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and recommendation. Justice Paras heard the testimonies of Ernesto Bustamante and Jose Javier, both employees in the respondent's sala. On October 19, 1990, the complainant submitted a formal Affidavit of Desistance denying totally the allegations of her complaint. The National Bureau of Investigation, upon the instruction of the Court, carried out a discreet verification of the facts. Justice Paras submitted her report and recommendation on November 19, 1990, and the matter was resolved by the Court en banc.
Facts
Sometime in 1987, the complainant intervened in the intestate estate proceedings of her late common-law husband, then pending before a branch of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City where Judge Calanog was temporarily holding office. An acquaintance referred her to the judge as a person who could assist her and help facilitate the early termination of the case in her favor. She met him in his office at the Quezon City Hall, and he advised her to see him at his law office in Mandaluyong.
When she met him there at noon, he invited her to eat in a restaurant and asked her to ride with him in his car, but instead took her to a motel where he made sexual advances on her. When he did not succeed, he proposed that he be her sub-husband and promised to give her his condominium unit at Pagasa Bliss Condominium in Quezon City, to provide financial support for her two minor children, and to place them in an exclusive school for girls. She consented, and he immediately gave her the condominium unit, where she and her two minor daughters reside. On May 27, 1989, she gave birth to a baby boy named Jerome Christopher Calanog. From the time of the birth, the judge refused to provide financial support and failed to pay the monthly installments on the condominium unit.
Jose Javier, who had worked as court interpreter in the respondent's sala for almost ten years, testified that his extra work given to him by the judge was to bring the weekly allowance of the complainant, to pay the monthly electric and water bills of the Bliss apartment, to bring her to the Chinese General Hospital to give birth on May 25, 1989, to fetch her from the hospital after she had given birth to the baby boy, and in February 1990 to secure an educational plan for the child with a first payment of 534 pesos. The National Bureau of Investigation verified that the complainant resided at the condominium unit, that she was known as the mistress of a judge of a Quezon City court, that the unit had been acquired by the judge through a friend, and that the child's birth certificate listed Emma J. Castillo as mother and Manuel M. Calanog as father.
Issues
- Whether or not the Affidavit of Desistance has any effect on the continuation of the administrative case.
- Whether or not the circumstances shown are sufficient to convict the respondent judge of immorality and conduct unbecoming of a public official.
Applicable Provisions
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, probity and independence.
This rule fixes the standard against which the respondent's private conduct is measured, and the Court's Commentary on it explains that the integrity and independence of the judiciary reduce to one common denominator, the judge himself, upon whose attributes the public perception of the judiciary depends.
Rule 140 on serious charges provides the sanction for immorality:
Dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits (except accrued leaves) and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office including a government-owned or controlled corporation.
Immorality is classified under serious charges, so this is the penalty the Court may impose once the charge is established.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that it generally attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought, as in this case. It quoted with approval the rule that it would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before the courts of justice simply because the witnesses who had given them later changed their mind, for such a rule would make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Even without the desistance, the Court said, it would not have been swayed solely by the complainant's allegations, and it found from the testimony of Jose Javier that her charges rested on sufficient grounds.
On the second issue, the Court found that the complainant's allegations were verified by Justice Paras and confirmed by Jose Javier and by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation. Judge Calanog did establish an intimate, albeit immoral, relationship with the complainant although he is a married man, and out of that liaison a child was born, whom he housed in a condominium unit together with the child's mother and her two older children. The Court held that it is of no import that the evidence is not sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the facts of concubinage, because this is not a criminal case for concubinage but an administrative matter invoking the Court's power of supervision over members of the judiciary. The circumstances showed a lack of circumspection and delicadeza on the part of the respondent judge by failing to avoid situations that made him suspect of committing immorality, and worse, having that suspicion confirmed.
The Court stressed that the Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only in the performance of his judicial duties but also in his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service, and his personal behavior, both in the performance of official duties and in private life, should be above suspicion. The Court also noted that the respondent, in violating a judicial precept, committed a grave injustice upon the complainant, who had sought his assistance, and that he took advantage of her helplessness and state of material deprivation, an exploitation made more reprehensible by the brute force of his position of power and authority.
Doctrine
First, an affidavit of desistance is generally given no persuasive value, especially when executed as an afterthought, and it does not divest the Supreme Court of its power to continue an administrative case against a member of the judiciary.
Second, an administrative case for immorality is not a criminal prosecution for concubinage; proof beyond reasonable doubt of the crime is not required, because the proceeding invokes the Court's power of supervision over the judiciary.
Third, there is no dichotomy of morality: a judge is judged by his private morals as well as his official conduct, and under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct he must be the embodiment of competence, integrity, probity and independence, behaving with propriety at all times and accepting restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
Fourth, immorality is a serious charge under Rule 140, for which the penalty is dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits, except accrued leaves, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office.
Disposition
The Court found Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr. guilty of immorality and dismissed him from the roll of judges, with prejudice to reinstatement or appointment to any public office including a government-owned or controlled corporation, and with forfeiture of retirement benefits, if any.
Remember This
Memorize the line that there is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals, and a judge's personal behavior must be above suspicion. Examiners use this case for the weight of an affidavit of desistance in administrative proceedings and for the rule that immorality, not criminal concubinage, is the ground and the standard in disciplinary cases against judges.