A.M. No. RTJ-90-447. July 12, 1991
EMMA J. CASTILLO, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE MANUEL M. CALANOG, JR., RESPONDENT.
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint dated January 17, 1990, docketed as Adm. Matter No. RTJ-90-447,
Emma J. Castillo charged Judge Manuel M. Calanog,
Jr., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 76, with immorality
and conduct unbecoming of a public official.
The sworn complaint is copied in full:
January
17, 1990
The Honorable Justice
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Padre Faura, Manila
Attn: Hon.
Marcelo B. Fernan
Chief Justice, Supreme Court
Your Honors:
I would like to register this letter-complaint against the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 76 who is likewise the
incumbent President of the Philippine Judges Association, Judge Manuel
M. Calanog, Jr., for immorality and conduct
unbecoming of a public official.
Sometime in 1987, when I intervened in the case for (sic) intestate
estate of my late common-law husband which was then pending before the RTC,
Branch 94, Quezon City, where incidentally Judge
Manuel M. Calanog, Jr. was temporarily holding office
at that time, the latter was referred to me by an acquaintance of mine as a
person who could assist me and help facilitate for (sic) the early termination
of the case in my favor. Subsequently, I
personally met Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr. in his
office located at the 11th floor of the Quezon City Hall
where he transferred. At the said
meeting, he advised me to see him at his law office located in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila which I did. When I met him at noon, he invited me to eat in a restaurant and even asked
me to ride with him in his car but instead, to my surprise, he took me to a
motel where he made sexual advances on me.
As he did not succeed in his evil design, he asked me if I will (sic) agree to the proposition that he be my
sub-husband (sic) and promised to give me his condominium unit located at Pagasa Bliss Condominium, Quezon
City, as well as to provide financial
support for my two (2) minor
children and place them in an exclusive school for girls. Due to confusion because of the untimely
death of my common-law husband coupled with the persistent pleadings of Judge
Manuel M. Calanog, Jr., he was able to convince me. Upon
giving my consent, he immediately gave his condominium unit no. 19-22 at Pagasa Bliss Condominium, Quezon City, where l and my two
(2) minor daughters reside up to the present.
On May 27, 1989, as a result of our relationship, l gave
birth to a baby boy which (sic) we named Jerome Christopher Calanog.
Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr. is very
well-known to my two (2) minor daughters as they fondly called him as
“Tito Nonong“.
From the time I gave birth to our son Jerome Christopher Calanog, said Judge Manuel M. Calanog,
Jr. has refused to provide us financial support nor placed my two (2) minor daughters to an
exclusive school as he had promised.
Worst, to the present, he fails and refuses to pay the monthly
installments of the condominium unit he gave
to me despite being informed by the
National Housing Authority that we will
be evicted from the said place for failure
to pay the same. Despite my
repeated verbal demands for him to give us, or at least his son Jerome
Christopher Calanog; financial support, Judge Manuel
M. Calanog, Jr. just ignored my pleas.
May I then ask and pray that justice be given to me and my children
or at least for my son Jerome Christopher Calanog?
May I further request that the proper sanction be meted against Judge Manuel M.
Calanog, Jr. for his conduct unbecoming of a public
official and immorality?
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) EMMA
J. CASTILLO
Bldg. 19-22 Bliss Pagasa, Q.C.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this Jan. 25, 1990,
at Quezon City,
Metro Manila, affiant exhibited to me her
Res. Cert. No. 500827K issued at Quezon City, Metro Manila, on January 19, 1990.
(Sgd.) JOSE
L. MA SANTOS
Notary Public
Comm. until Dec. 31, 1991
PTR No. 8016341-Q.C.
Jan.
2, 1990
TAN: 1525-203-4
Doc. No. 89;
Page No. 19;
Book No. 238;
Series of 1990.
Copy furnished:
All SC Justices
Ombudsman
NBI, Manila[1]
Acting on the complaint filed by Castillo, the Court required the
respondent to answer. The respondent
took time in answering the complaint. It
was only after two motions for extension of time to file answer did he file on April 10, 1990 his two-paragraph
Answer dated April 5, 1990 followed by another two-paragraph pleading entitled
“Supplemental Answer” dated May 30, 1990. In both answers he simply averred that the
complainant “has expressly stated that she is no longer interested in
pursuing the same (complaint) and therefore, pray that the said complaint be
considered withdrawn.” The respondent prayed “that the instant case
be considered Withdrawn and/or Dismissed.”
In his Supplemental Answer he “vehemently denies for being untrue the
material allegations of complainant in her letter-complaint dated January 17, 1990.” He reiterated his prayer “that
the instant case be dismissed.” Later, on February 5, 1990, the complainant filed a sworn
letter-request dated February 1, 1990,
praying that her complaint be considered withdrawn “because I (she) am no
longer interested in pursuing it.”[2]
Just like that.
Notwithstanding the turn of events, the Court, as a matter of procedure in cases of this
serious nature, on September 6, 1990,
issued a Resolution referring the case to Associate Justice Gloria C. Paras of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
In her investigation, Justice Paras
heard the testimonies of Ernesto Bustamante and Jose
Javier, both employees in the sala of the respondent.
On October 19, 1990,
the complainant submitted a formal
“Affidavit of Desistance” in which she denied totally the allegations
of her complaint:
2. That after I have filed the above-complaint,
I began to be bothered by my own conscience inasmuch as what I have narrated
therein are not true, especially the fact that I had an amorous relationship
with him and that my child
namely Jerome Christopher is his son and also the fact that I was given by him
a condominium unit located at my above address;
3. That after filing, however, the
above-mentioned letter- complaint with the Supreme Court, I have come to my
right senses and realized the injustice I have committed against Judge Manuel M. Calanog,
Jr., so that as an evidence of repentance and desire on my part to straighten
everything I executed that letter addressed to the Honorable Justices of the
Supreme Court which I filed with the Office of the Chief Justice on January 26,
1990 manifesting therein that I am considering my subject complaint against
Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr. as withdrawn and that I
am no longer interested in further pursuing it and that recently I asked the forgiveness of Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr. for the dishonor I have done to him as a
consequence of the subject complaint and I was forgiven by him;[3]
The other witnesses, namely Ernesto Bustamante
and Jose Javier, however, stood firm on their testimonies.
Jose Javier, who had worked as court interpreter in the sala of the respondent for almost ten years, testified on
the circumstances mentioned in the following affidavit:
1. During my stay with Branch 76, Quezon City, my extra work given to me by Honorable Manuel
M. Calanog, Jr. is to bring the weekly allowance of
Ms. Emma J. Castillo and to pay the monthly electric and water bills or the
said Bliss located at Blg. 19-22 Apartment, Pag-asa, Quezon City where Ms.
Emma J. Castillo is residing and also instructed me last May 25, 1989 to bring
Ms. Emma J. Castillo to the Chinese General Hospital to give birth and further
instructed me to fetch from the hospital Ms. Emma J. Castillo after having
given birth to a Baby Boy named JEROME CHRISTOPHER CALANOG and also on February
1990 instructed me to secure educational plan for JEROME CHRISTOPHER CALANOG in
the amount of P534.00 for first payment only.
2. In view of being a lay minister of Mary
Immaculate Concepcion
Parish Church
at Pasig,
Metro Manila who distributes Holy Communion during Holy Mass on Sundays, I
considered to (sic) revolting to my conscience to be an errand boy by doing
every now and then.[4]
xxx xxx xxx
In addition, the National Bureau of Investigation Intelligence
Service, upon the instruction of this Court, carried out a discreet verification of the facts raised in the
testimonies and furnished the following information:
xxx xxx xxx
On June 29, 1990
initial discreet verification disclosed that indeed EMMA J. CASTILLO resides at
#19-22 Bliss Condominium, Pag-Asa, Q.C.,
xxx xxx xxx
It was further discreetly gathered at that time that EMMA J.
CASTILLO, is the mistress of a Judge of a Quezon City Court; about 50
plus years old; always wearing long sleeve shirt.
Further initial discreet verification also revealed that EMMA J.
CASTILLO has three children and that the youngest is still a baby.
On June 30,1990,
it was discreetly gathered from Judge CALANOG’s staff
at Branch 76, RTC, Q.C., that subject CALANOG is scheduled to leave the country
for China on a
vacation.
On same day, from another source who is familiar with EMMA J.
CASTILLO, it was discreetly gathered that EMMA J. CASTILLO is the mistress of a
Judge of a Quezon City Court
and has three children. Accordingly,
this Judge has been frequently seen at EMMA J. CASTILLO’s unit, especially during
the afternoon and that when they go out, they walk separately, pretending not
to know each other.
xxx xxx xxx
On the same day, it was discreetly verified from the National
Housing Authority (NHA) that a Bliss Condominium #19-22 was originally awarded
to one EVANGELINE JACINTO, who is an employee of NHA. JACINTO sold her rights to the said
condominium unit to one Atty. CAMAYA who happens to be a close friend of
subject CALANOG. Atty. CAMAYA’s wife, MELY CAMAYA is also familiar with Subject
CALANOG because she used to work at the RTC where Subject CALANOG is the judge.
Atty. CAMAYA sold his Bliss Condominium unit #19-22 to Subject CALANOG. However, monthly amortization payments were
made still under the name of EVANGELINE JACINTO. About a month ago, EMMA J. CASTILLO approached EVANGELINE JACINTO and requested the latter to sign an Absolute
Deed of Sale for the said condominium unit #19-22 in her (Emma J. Castillo)
favor. All the copies of said Absolute
Deed of Sale are with EMMA J. CASTILLO. Per NHA records, Emm
J. Castillo has not yet presented the said absolute deed of sale with NHA.
On 2 July 1990,
a Barangay Census record (attached) was discreetly
obtained where EMMA J. CASTILLO, in her own handwriting, listed the names of
all her co-occupants in the said
condominium unit. At the bottom of said
list, Emma listed the names of her children, including JEROME CHRISTOPHER, born
27 May 1989. An opportunity arose where the child JEROME
CHRISTOPHER was personally seen inside the said condominium unit.
On 2 July 1990,
a Certified True Copy of the BIRTH CERTIFICATE of the child JEROME CHRISTOPHER
was discreetly obtained from the National Statistics Office (attached). In this Birth Certificate, the surname of the
child JEROME CHRISTOPHER is listed as CALANOG.
Furthermore, in this Birth Certificate, the listed parents of the child
JEROME CHRISTOPHER are EMMA J. CASTILLO as mother, and MANUEL M. CALANOG as
father. EMMA J. CASTILLO gave birth at
the Chinese General Hospital.[5]
xxx xxx xxx
Among the issues raised for our determination are:
1) Whether or not the “Affidavit of Desistance” has any
effect on the continuation of the administrative case; and
2) Whether or not the circumstances shown are sufficient to
convict the respondent judge for immorality and conduct unbecoming of a public
official.
Generally, the Court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of
desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought, as in the case at bar.[6]
As held in People v. Obina:
It would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies
solemnly taken before the courts of justice simply because the witnesses who
had given them later on changed their mind for one reason or another; for such
rule would make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of truth at
the mercy of unscrupulous witness.[7]
Even if Emma Castillo had not filed her “Affidavit of
Desistance,” we would not have been swayed solely by her allegations, and
we find from the testimony of Jose Javier that the former’s
charges, indeed, rest on sufficient grounds.
As alleged by the complainant, verified by Justice Gloria C. Paras, and confirmed by Jose Javier and agents of the
National Bureau or Investigation, Judge Calanog did
establish an intimate, albeit immoral, relationship with complainant Emma
Castillo although he, Judge Calanog, is a married
man. Out of that liaison Emma Castillo
gave birth to Judge Calanog’s child, Jerome
Christopher, whom he housed in a condominium unit together with his (Jerome’s)
mother and her two older children.
Judge Calanog has behaved in a manner
not becoming of his robes and as a model or rectitude, betrayed the people’s
high expectations, and diminished the esteem in which they hold the judiciary
in general.
It is of no import that the evidence on record is not sufficient
to prove beyond reasonable doubt the facts of concubinage
having indeed existed and been committed.
This is not a criminal case for concubinage
but an administrative matter that invokes the power of supervision of this
Court over the members of the judiciary.
The circumstances show a lack of circumspection and delicadeza on the part of the respondent judge by failing
to avoid situations that make him suspect to committing immorality and worse,
having that suspicion confirmed.
Canon I states:
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 1.01 — A judge should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity, probity and independence.
The Court’s Commentary on this Rule states:
The integrity and independence of the judiciary can be reduced to
one common denominator: the judge–the individual who dispenses justice, and
upon whose attributes depend the public perception of the judiciary.
Independence or the
judiciary requires that the judge should be independent-minded, imbued with a
sense of mission, a person of honor, integrity, courage and conviction.[8]
Under Rule 140, Immorality is classified under “Serious
Charges”. This means that the
following sanction may be imposed:
Dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits (except
accrued leaves) and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office including a government-owned or controlled corporation;[9]
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge
must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial
duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and
as a private individual. There is no
dichotomy of morality: a public official
is also judged by his private morals.
The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at
all times. As we have very recently
explained, a judge’s official life can not simply be detached or separated from
his personal existence. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public
scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on
conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest
public service. The personal behavior of
a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should
be above suspicion.[10]
Justice Gloria C. Paras of the Court of
Appeals, the assigned investigator of this case, submitted on November 19, 1990 her report and
recommendation the ultimate portions of which state:
xxx xxx xxx
The statements of the aforesaid witnesses, Ernesto Bustamante and Jose Javier confirm the amorous relationship
between the respondent and the complainant.
The Investigator is of the view that the respondent who is a married
man, and a member of the judiciary and the incumbent President of the
Philippine Judges Association, had committed immorality.
Exacting standards of morality and decency have been strictly
adhered to and laid down by the Highest Court of the land in regard to those in
the service of the judiciary and more specifically so when the malefactor is a judge (Sicat
vs. Alcantara, 161 SCRA 284 [1988]). It need not be stated that the personal and
official actuations of every member of the bench must be beyond reproach and
above suspicion for the faith and confidence of the public in the administration
of justice can not be maintained if a Judge who dispenses it is not equipped
with the cardinal judicial virtue of moral integrity, and if he obtusely
continues to commit an affront to public decency. The Supreme Court, in the case of Leynes vs. Veloso, 82 SCRA (1978),
has also said: “A Judge suffers
from moral obtuseness or has a weird notion of morality in public office when
he labors under the delusion that he can be a judge and at the same time have a
mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the community. The absence of criminal liability does not
preclude disciplinary action by reason of his highly unconventional and
censurable behaviour.”
Concluding, the undersigned Investigator respectfully recommends
that:
(1) The “Motion to Strike Out Testimony From The
Records”, filed by counsel for the complainant be DENIED; and
(2) respondent Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr. be found
guilty of immorality and be meted out the severest disciplinary action of
Dismissal from the service with prejudice to appointment to any government
position and forfeiture of retirement benefits, if any.
We have examined the entire record of the case vis-a-vis this report and recommendation and we are in full
accord with them.
It is worth noting here
that the respondent judge, in violating a judicial precept, has also committed a grave injustice upon the
complainant, who had sought his assistance in expediting the intestate estate
proceedings of her deceased common-law husband.
The judge, who was in the first place, prohibited by the Code of
Judicial Conduct[11]
from intervening in a case in any court, took
advantage of the complainant’s helplessness and state of material deprivation
and persuaded her to become his mistress.
The exploitation of women becomes even more reprehensible when the
offender commits the injustice by the brute force of his position of power and
authority, as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the respondent Judge, the Hon. Manuel M. Calanog, Jr., is found guilty of IMMORALITY and is hereby DISMISSED
from the roll of judges, with prejudice to his reinstatement or appointment to
any public office including a government-owned or controlled corporation, and
forfeiture of retirement benefits, if any.
Let a copy of this resolution be included in his
record and be served on all courts throughout the land.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Feliciano, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., please see dissent.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Cruz, and Medialdea,
JJ., join Justice Gutierrez, Jr. in his dissent.
Paras and
Davide, Jr., JJ., no
part.
Gancayco, J., on leave.
[1]
Rollo, 1.
[2]
Id., 4.
[3]
id., at 43.
[4]
Id., at 48.
[5]
Confidential Report of the NBI, Department of Justice, addressed to the Hon. Chief Justice
Marcelo B. Fernan, dated July 5, 1990.
[6]
PLDT v. NLRC, No. 74562, July 31,
1987, 152 SCRA 707;
People v. Royo, No. 52038, May 31, 1982, 114 SCRA 309. See Bais v. Tugaoen, Adm. Matter No. 1294-MJ, March 23, 1979, 89 SCRA 109.
[7]
97 Phil. 515 cited in PLDT v.
NLRC, supra, and People v.
Galicia, No. L-39235, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 556.
[8]
Code of Judicial Conduct, 1989
[9]
Approved by the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated November 22, 1990.
[10]
Commentaries on Canon 2.01, Code of Judicial Conduct, supra note 7.
[11]
Canon 2, Rules 2.01, 2.03, 2.04.
: En Banc : Dissent as to the Penalty
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DISSENT AS TO THE PENALTY
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
I must state at the outset that this dissent is not a brief for
immorality. It is a plea for fairness
and compassion. Respondent Judge Manuel M.
Calanog, Jr. has been found guilty of the charges
filed against him. I believe that there
is enough basis for the administrative finding that,
being a married man, he had sexual liaisons with the complainant.
The respondent has erred.
He has sinned. His conduct in
this instance has fallen short of the highest standards of morality and virtue
expected of all who serve in the judiciary.
However, the penalty of virtually capital punishment meted upon him is
too severe considering the circumstances surrounding the offense and the
offender.
No infraction should go unpunished but the punishment should also
fit the offense. I believe that the
Court should also take into account the fact that fault should not
automatically and entirely be attributed solely to the respondent. Judge Calanog’s
record of excellent public service, his dedication to the welfare of the
members of the bench, his involvement in civic and national affairs, the
leadership traits acknowledged by his peers, and the respect and unstinted cooperation
he has always given to this Court should also be considered.
I am aware of the cases brought before this Court where
immorality is cited as a reason for the dismissal, suspension or disbarment of
a member of the Bar or Bench (Rule 138, Section 27) It is a course of conduct
inconsistent with the requirement of good moral character that is required for
the continued practice of law. (Cordova
vs. Cordova, Adm. Case No. 3249, Nov. 29, 1982) If good moral character is
required of a lawyer, with more reason is the requirement exacted of a member
of the judiciary who at all times is expected to observe irreproachable
behavior and is bound not to outrage public decency. (Leynes v. Veloso, 82 SCRA 325 [1978]) Members of the judiciary are
admonished to so conduct themselves as to be beyond reproach and suspicion, and
to be free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, not
only in the discharge of their official duties but also in their everyday,
life. (Association of
Court Employees of Panabo v. Tupas,
Adm. Matter No. MTJ-87-141, July 12, 1989; Sicat
V. Judge Alcantara, Adm. Matter No. R-006-RTJ, May
11, 1988) In cases where the charges, of immorality
have been sufficiently established and where public decency has been outraged;
the Court has not hesitated to impose the penalty of removal from office.
The penalty in the instant case, however, deserves to be treated
in a different light. As aptly stated by
former Chief Justice Fernando in Garcia v. Comelec
(105 SCRA 250 [1981), “There can be a diversity of result in the
decision-making process in cases which apparently are not dissimilar. This perspective allows for individualization
of justice.” Thus, I believe that justice would be better served if we
were to view the present controversy with equity and compassion.
It should be emphasized that all the evidence against the
respondent has been taken from the allegations of the complaint an ex-parte “discreet” investigation by agents of the
National Bureau of Investigation, and statements from two subordinate personnel
of the respondent’s court. But while the
silence of the respondent may be taken as proof that indeed there was a sexual
relationship with the complainant, it does not necessarily follow that the
various details in the Investigator’s Report must be taken as unvarnished truth
and that the implications may not be negated or minimized by contrary
considerations.
The present case arose from a complaint filed by a woman who
sought help from the respondent regarding the settlement of the intestate
estate of her common-law husband. It was alleged, although the allegation was
later withdrawn, that the complainant initially refused the respondent’s
amorous advances during their first meetings but she later agreed to be the
respondent’s mistress after promises of financial stability were given to her;
i.e. the purchase of a condominium unit, schooling for the complainant’s two
minor daughters at an exclusive girl’s school and because of the “confusion”
arising from the death of her common-law-husband.
The case may be considered peculiar in the sense that the
complainant is not the offended, abandoned or neglected wife nor is she a
person with only the best of intentions in mind. It would have been easy for us to give total
credence to a complaint filed by one who has no ill-motive or cause to complain
against the respondent. (See Dela. Paz v. Inutan, 64 SCRA 540 [1975]) But here, the other party is a
liberated woman who appears to have no compunctions about living in illicit
relations with men. There is, of course,
no proof that, Judge Calanog was the one seduced but
I will not also swallow hook, line, and sinker the picture of an aggressive
middle-aged man importuning a reluctant woman, whose common-law-husband had
just died, and practically forcing or inducing her to submit to his advances.
What I see from the scanty records of this administrative case is
a woman who was willing, if she did not actually inveigle, to enter, into a
sexual relationship. When the financial
expectations were not forthcoming and a life of relative ease and comfort could
not be assured, she struck out with the administrative complaint. Realizing perhaps that he had sinned and
should sin no more, the respondent had assumed what to the other party was a
sudden, cold, and security-threatening attitude. The complainant’s intentions are indeed
suspect, if not motivated by revenge and bad faith. (See Lim v. Antonio, 125 SCRA 273 [1983]) The
case, especially the punishment imposed, deserves to be examined more carefully.
The complainant is obviously a woman of experience, wise in the
ways of the world, with two (2) children from an earlier common-law
relationship. She appears to be
sufficiently, mature and intelligent, enough to know what she was entering
into. She certainly was aware of the
consequences of an illicit arrangement with the respondent. Her consent to the illicit relationship with
the respondent is without question. From
all indications, this was a voluntary act of indiscretion between two (2) consenting
adults who were fully aware of the consequences of their deed and for which
only they should ordinarily be held responsible. (Abaigar v. Paz, 93
SCRA 91 [1979])
The liaison was a most discreet affair. If the other party had only remained quiet,
it would not have been discovered. In
other words, the affair was not characterized by scandalous behavior or a
public flaunting, of decency and morals.
It was wrong to be sure but not outrageously so.
The majority considers the promise of a dwelling place and
education for the children as financial helplessness taken advantage of by the
respondent. I have a different
view. Instead of concluding that the
complainant is a helpless woman wronged by a predatory profligate, I prefer to
think that the complainant and the respondent alike are both offenders and
victims.
I can not, therefore, agree that the respondent should be made to
suffer the most severe penalty we can impose when the immorality committed by
him was made possible by the rather equivocal conduct of the complainant
herself. The ruling in Viojan v. Duran, (4 SCRA 390 [1962])
could very well apply to this case before us:
“‘The respondent has committed an act of immorality. The flesh is weak. But man should possess that consciousness to
do the right and avoid the wrong. And one who has taken the oath of public service to dispense
with justice, should be more possessed of the courage and the will to overcome
the weakness of the flesh. Since the
dispensation of justice has to originate from sound moral consciousness, one
who lacks it, or has shown to be wanting of it, cannot offer the guaranty
required for the performance of a just dispensation. A magistrate has to live by the example of
his precepts. He cannot judge the
conduct of others when his own needs judgment.
It should not be ‘do as I say and not what I do.’ For then the court over which he is called to
preside will be a mockery, one devoid of respect. Hence, the necessity for
the magistrate to possess enough fortitude to subdue his passion for wrong.
There is, therefore, no question that for the immorality he
committed within the territory of his jurisdiction as a Justice of the Peace,
the respondent should be punished. But, considering
the tempting circumstances which surrounded him
for that length of time, which circumstances,
were indirect invitations, his falling to
sin should not be dealt with severity. Few men, and very
few indeed, could have resisted that temptation;
could have the moral strength, the spiritual
energy to impose on his weaker self
the will to ignore such enticement. Although we want to
count the respondent among these few,
yet it would be too much wishing
to expect him to be among them
before he learns the hard lesson brought
about by repentance.
This misstep, the first that he
committed, should not be taken as the
measure of his whole conduct. He should be given
the chance after now to benefit himself
out of his stumble.
For after all, it was
rightly said that ‘without an element
of the obscene, there can be no
true and deep aesthetic or moral conception
to life.’” (at p. 392;
Emphasis supplied)
True, the respondent is a Judge.
But he is also human.
Regrettably, yielding to the cravings of the flesh is a most common
human failing. There is ample literature
to show that Presidents, Prime Ministers, Generals, high ranking members of the
clergy, and other representatives of the powerful and famous all over the world
pave unfortunately engaged in sexual escapades.
As so succinctly stated by Henry Kissinger, “Power is the greatest
aphrodisiac.” If such publications like the Kinsey Report are to be
trusted, the incidence of infidelity and immorality in polite society is
unbelievably if not shockingly high. A
Judge who falls into the trap of this altogether human and common failing
should be disciplined. The Court cannot
be indulgently permissive. At the same
time, the above nature of the offense requires that we should take into account
all relevant circumstances and, where warranted, mitigate the severity of the
punishment for a few who somehow failed to summon the moral fiber needed to
resist this all too human failing.
If a public officer, on his or her own initiative or through the
enticements of the other party, is involved in an illicit relationship, he or she
should be allowed and encouraged to get out of that situation. However, if instant and automatic dismissal
is always the punishment, a scheming paramour would have a weapon to keep the erring officer going deeper and deeper into the
mess instead of rectifying the unfortunate error. It would be a sword of Damocles keeping a
Judge who has stumbled from rising up, correcting the error, and terminating
the unfortunate relationship.
Judge Calanog has positive
accomplishments in his favor. We are not
aware of any other shortcoming or offense committed by him. As a member of the Judiciary Planning
Development and Implementation Office (JPDIO), he has with talent and
resourcefulness represented judges allover the country, bringing their problems
to the JPDIO and the Courts attention.
Judicial reforms are more readily implemented because of close
coordination between the Office of the Court Administrator and the Philippine
Judges Association (PJA) which the respondent headed until recently. The respondent initiated the College
Assurance Plan for children of Judges and a modest insurance plan which gives
death benefits to qualified members. He
has tried his best these past few years to push through a housing development
for members of the bench and apparently his efforts are about to bear
fruit. He and the other officers of the
PJA have shown unfailing respect for and cooperation with this Court. Respondent Calanog
has rallied all Judges to stand behind the Court when we were unfairly charged
or subjected to senseless vituperation.
The respect which members of the bench and bar have accorded to the
respondent is shown by the warm receptions extended to him in Cebu, Bacolod, Davao, and other parts of the country when the PJA officers
visit their fellow Judges or attend judicial conferences and conventions.
Ours is not only a court of law but also a court of equity. Mindful of the circumstances surrounding a
case, this Court has shown compassion and exercised prudent restraint in
dealing with errant members of the Bar or Bench especially when the offenses
committed is the subject’s first offense.
To illustrate a few:
1) In re: Petition for the Dismissal
from Service and/or Disbarment of Judge
Baltazar R. Dizon
(173 SCRA 719 [1989] – This is a case where reinstatement was ordered after
Judge Baltazar Dizon had,
in our view, sincerely evinced humble repentance. He admitted that he committed an error in
interpreting the law but we considered the mistake as not so grave as to
warrant the penalty of “virtually capital punishment.” The Court also
considered Judge Dizon’s long years of dedicated and devoted, service to the government.
2) In Tolentino
v. Mangapit (124 SCRA 741 (1983]) –
Examining the lawyer’s failure to give notice of an adverse decision to her
client, the court found that such error may be traced to the lawyer’s
inexperience. Considering that this was
the first error committed by the respondent, the court resolved to
merely admonish her instead of suspending her for one month as recommended by
the Solicitor General, the same being too harsh and severe.
3) Munar v. Flores (122 SCRA 448 [1983])
– Respondent, through his malpractice and gross misconduct in office committed
a most serious breach of public trust which under other circumstances could
well result in the forfeiture of his privilege and license as a member of the
Philippine Bar. Taking into
consideration, however, the respondent’s submission in effect to the report and
recommendation of the Solicitor General and his manifestations of remorse and finally,
considering that this happened to be his
first offense, the Court was inclined
to extend to the respondent a measure
of liberality and approved the Solicitor General’s recommendation
for only six (6) months suspension.
There, are likewise instances such as those involving Judges
entitled to full retirement benefits, where the Court has acted with compassion
for the sake of the wife or widow and the children of the respondent.
I submit that we should apply the reformative and not the
punitive principle in the instant case.
For the sake of the respondent’s obviously bright future, the fair name
and honor of his family and the prospective service that he could render to the
judiciary and the nation, the Court should help the respondent redeem himself.
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, I vote to impose a penalty of FORTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) fine and a most severe
warning that a repetition of the same offense shall be accorded the highest,
penalty within the Court’s power to impose.