AUGUSTIN GRACILLA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, FULLER PAINT MANUFACTURING CO., (PHIL) INC. AND REPUBLIC PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENTS.

A procedural due process question is before us in this appeal by
certiorari from a judgment of respondent Court of Industrial Relations.  Petitioner, objecting to his dismissal as
security guard of respondent Fuller Paint Manufacturing Co. (Phil.) Inc. and
seek­ing reinstatement, filed a complaint dated March 12, 1963, with respondent
court, praying further that he be paid for his unpaid services for Sundays and
legal holidays during the whole period of his employment, that he be given
additional compensation for night services, and that he be credited with his
earned vacation and sick leave pay as well as back wages from the date of his
illegal dis­missal up to the time he is actually reinstated.  He would thus hold liable jointly and
severally for the aforesaid money claim not only respondent Fuller Paint
Manufacturing Co. (Phil.) Inc., but likewise the Republic Protection Agency,
where he was connected long before his services were availed of by the former.

Petitioner was not successful, the decision of the Presiding
Judge, the Honorable Arsenio I. Martinez, of
respondent court of October 5, 1964, dismissing his complaint for lack of
merit.  It added further; “For
humanitarian reason, however, complainant Gracilla
should be afforded preferential opportunity by respondent Republic Protective
Agency, for assignment [to] any place other than the Puller Paint Manufacturing
Co. (Phil.), Inc.; else, it is suggested
that he be extended separation fee.”^[1]

The above monetary claims, apparently, did not merit any consideration
at all.  They were completely
ignored.  A motion for reconsideration
was filed with the respondent court alleging that, through oversight, his
claims for unpaid services for Sundays and legal holidays during the whole
period of his employment, for additional compensation for his night services,
again during such period, were not considered. 
In the memorandum in support of his motion for reconsideration,
reference was likewise made to his being
entitled to differential pay of P15.00 a month from November, 1952 to October
26, 1962.  Respondent court, again,
through its Presiding Judge, was not impressed with his motion for
reconsideration, the resolution denying it stating:  “After a close perusal of the records as
well as the written arguments in support of said motion, the Court en banc
fails to find sufficient justification for altering or modifying the aforesaid
Decision.”^[2]
There was, how­ever, a concurring and dissenting opinion by Judge Amando C. Bugayong of respondent
court.

Hence, this appeal by certiorari with the stress rightfully laid
on the failure to accord petitioner all that procedural due process requires,
his monetary claims apparently having been overlooked in the decision.  The appeal is meritorious, the decision of
respondent court must be set aside.

It is not that respondent court was unaware of the importance
attached by petitioner to the aforesaid monetary claims.  As noted in the opinion of the decision of
October 5, 1964, which was affirmed by respondent court en banc:  “Commencing November 1952, claimant Augustin Gracilla, thru counsel,
asserts, that he was in the employ as
watchman of the Republic Protective Agency. 
After July 14, 1959, however, he actually performed his duties as such in
the premises of respondent Fuller Paint
Manufacturing Co. (Phil.) Inc. 
During the entire period of this employment, petition further reads, claimant was likewise required
to work during night time, Sundays and legal holidays without additional
compensation, until his illegal dismissal on October 27, 1962.  Reinstatement, payment of his services on
Sundays and legal holidays and additional compensation for night services are
therefore prayed for.”^[3]

There was justification, therefore, for this ground for dissent
by Judge Bugayong: 
“I dissent, however, in the dismissal of the case solely on the
basis of the finding that the petitioner was dis­missed for cause because there
are issues in the complaint that are not resolved in the decision, namely, (a)
claim for payment of services rendered on Sundays and legal holidays; (b) claim
for additional compensation for services rendered at night time; and (c) claim
for salary differential of P15.00 every month of service from date of
employment up to illegal dismissal on October 27, 1962.”^[4]

Did such a failure to rule on the above monetary claims
constitute a denial of due process?  That
is the issue.  The answer must be in the
affirmative.

So it must be if deference be paid to the holding in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations,^[5]
where, as Justice Laurel correctly noted: 
“The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose
functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act
No. 103).  It is more an administrative
board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation.  It is not intended to be a mere receptive
organ of the Government.  Un­like a court
of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is
invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties
litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear
from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic.  It not only exercises judicial or
quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions are far more comprehen­sive and extensive.”^[6]

Nonetheless, he was careful to point out that, freed as
respondent court is “from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements”, it cannot ignore or disregard “the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in trials and in­vestigations of an
administrative character.^[7]
He mentioned what he considered “cardinal primary rights” which must
be respected, otherwise the dictates of due process are not complied with.  One of such due process requirements is
relevant here:  “The Court of
Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.  The performance of this duty is inseparable
from the authority conferred upon it.”^[8]

The failure of respondent court, then, to pass upon the monetary
claims raised by petitioner, amounted to a disregard of such a cardinal right
embraced in due process, namely, that the issues raised by a party should not
be ignored or left un­decided. 
Especially so, should it be in this case, where the monetary claims were
timely raised and insisted upon at all stages of the proceeding.

Serrano v. Public Service Commission, decided less than a month
ago, is relevant.^[9]
While the administrative agency involved in that case is the Public Service
Commission, the analogy holds as there was likewise a failure to respect the
cardinal primary right of petitioner there to have his application decided in
such a manner as to inform him, not only of the issues involved, but the reason
for the decision, which necessarily would require a finding of fact.

We had occasion to state there: 
“The gravity of such a failing is underscored not only by
deprivation of a right to which petitioner is entitled, but also by the
obstacle placed on the responsibility entrusted to us of reviewing decisions
and orders of the Public Service Commission. 
* * * It is all the more essential then that each and every application
should be considered strictly on its merits and the relevant facts in support
of an order, ruling or decision be carefully inquired into and clearly set
forth.  Otherwise, the exercise of the
power of review by this Court might be condemned to futility.”

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of October 5, 1964, as
sustained by the resolution of the respondent court of January 29, 1965, is set
aside, and the case remanded for respondent court to consider the matter anew,
without neglecting to inquire into and pass
upon the monetary claims of petitioner. 
Without pronounce­ment as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.

Dizon and
Zaldivar, JJ., on official
leave.

^[1]
Annex C, Petition.

^[2]
Annex F, Petition

^[3] Annex C, Petition.

^[4]
Annex F-1, Petition.

^[5] 69 Phil. 635 (1940).

^[6] Ibid, pp. 639-640.  That was so under
Com. Act No. 103. While its power is less under Rep. Act No. 875, the above characterization in the main holds
good.

^[7] Ibid,
p. 641-642.

^[8] Ibid,
p. 644.

^[9]
L-24165, August 30, 1968.