S/SGT. JOSE SANTIAGO, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. LT. COL. CELSO ALIKPALA, ET. AL., RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.

The validity of a court-martial proceeding was challenged in the lower
court on due process grounds to show lack of jurisdiction.  Petitioner, a sergeant in the Philippine Army
and the accused in court-martial proceeding, through a writ of certiorari and
prohibition, filed on April 17, 1963, with the lower court, sought to restrain
respondents, the officers, constituting the court-martial, that was then in the
process of trying petitioner for alleged violation of two provisions of the
Articles of War, from continuing with the proceedings on the ground of its
being without jurisdiction.  There was
likewise a plea for a restraining order, during the pendency
of his petition, but it was
unsuccessful.

No response, either way, was deemed necessary by the then
Presiding Judge of the lower court, now Justice Nicasio
Yatco of the Court of Appeals, as petitioner had, in
the meanwhile, been convicted by the court-martial.  The lower court verdict, render on September
16, 1963, was one of dismissal, as in its opinion, “this case had already
become moot and academic * * *.”

An appeal was taken to us, the same due process objections
raised.  We think that the question
before us is of such import significance that an easy avoidance through the
technicality of the “moot and academic” approach hardly
recommendation itself.  For reasons to be
more fully set forth, we find such court-martial was not lawfully convened, and, consequently devoid of
jurisdiction.  Accordingly, we reverse
the lower court.

There was a stipulation of facts submitted to the lower court on
July 10, 1963, to the following effect: 
“That the arraignment petitioner on December 17, 1962 was for the
purpose of avoiding prescription pursuant to Article of War 38 of one of the
offenses with which the accused is
charged since, as charged, same was allegedly
committed on or about December 18, 1960; That prior to the said arraignment, no written
summons or subpoena was issued addressed to the petitioner or his
counsel, informing them of said arraignment; that instead of said written
summons or subpoena Col. Eladio Samson,
Constabulary Staff Judge Advocate called up First Sergeant Manuel Soriano at the Headquarters II
Philippine Constabulary Zone, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang,
Laguna on December 16, 1962 by telephone with instructions to send the
petitioner to HPC, Camp Crame, Quezon
City, under escort, for arraignment and only for arraignment; That upon
arrival in HPC, the petitioner was directed to proceed to the PC Officer’s
Clubhouse, where a General Court-Martial composed of the respondents, created
to try the case of ‘People vs. Capt. Egmidio Jose,
for violation of Articles of War 96 and 97′, pursuant to paragraph 10, Special
Order No. 14, Headquarters Philippine Constabulary, dated 18 July 1962, * * *,
was to resume, as scheduled, the trial of People vs. Pfc. Numeriano
Ohagan, for violation of Articles of War 64, 85, and
97′; That it was only at the time (December 17, 1962) that petitioner learned
that he will be arraigned for
alleged violation of Articles of War 85 and 97, after being informed by one of
the respondents, Capt. Cuadrato Palma as Trial Judge
Advocate why he was there; That prior to that arraignment on December 17, 1962
there was no special order published by
the Headquarters Philippine Constabulary creating or directing the
General Court-Martial composed of the respondents to arraign and try the case
against the petitioner, there however was already an existing court trying
another case; That the respondents relied on the first indorsement
of the Acting Adjutant General, HPC, Camp Crame, Quezon City, dated December 14, 1962 and addressed to the
Trial Judge Advocate, of the General Court-Martial * * * directing the said Trial Judge Advocate to refer the case
against petitioner to the above-mentioned court, * * *; That the above
paragraph 10, Special Order No. 14
dated 18 July 1962, does not contain the phrase ‘and such other cases
which may be referred to it’, but however said orders were amended only on 8
January 1963, to include such phrase.  *
* *”^[1]

It was further stipulated that petitioner’s counsel did object to
his arraignment asserting that a general court-martial then convened was
without jurisdiction, as there was no
special order designating respondents to compose a general court-martial
for the purpose of trying petitioner, as petitioner was not furnished a copy of
the charge sheet prior to his arraignment as required in the Manual for
Court-Martial, except on the very day thereof, and as there was no written
summons or subpoena served on either the petitioner, as accused, or the
counsel.  Respondents, acting as the general
court-martial, overruled the above objections, and the Trial Judge Advocate was
then ordered to proceed to read the charges and specifications against
petitioner over the vigorous objections of counsel, it was shown, likewise, in
the stipulation of facts, that the case, having been postponed to February 21,
1963, petitioner’s counsel had in the meanwhile complained to the Chief of
Constabulary against the proceedings on the ground of its nullity, and sought
to have respondents restrained from continuing with the trial of petitioner due
to such lack of jurisdiction but the Chief of Constabulary ruled that he could
not act on such complaint until the records of the trial were forwarded to him
for review.  With such a ruling, and with
the denial of two other motions by petitioner upon the court-martial being
convened anew on February 21, 1963, one to invalidate his arraignment on
December 17, 1962, and the other to quash the complaint based on the denial of
due process and lack of jurisdiction, the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition was filed with the lower court.^[2]

As above noted, the lower court dismissed the petition due to its
belief that, petitioner having been convicted in the meanwhile, there being no
restraining order, the matter had become moot and academic.  As was set forth earlier, we differ, the
alleged lack of jurisdiction being too serious a matter to be thus summarily
ignored.

The firm insistence on the part of petitioner that the general
court-martial lacks jurisdiction on due process grounds, cannot escape
notice.  The basic objection was the
absence of a special order “designating respondents to compose a general
court-martial to convene and try the case of petitioner; * * *”.  It was expressly stipulated that the
respondents were convened to try the case of a certain Capt. Egmidio Jose and not that filed against petitioner.  As a matter of fact, the opening paragraph of
the stipulation of facts made clear that he was arraigned on December 17, 1962
by respondents as a general court-martial appointed precisely to try the above
Capt. Jose solely “for the purpose of avoiding prescription pursuant to
Article of War 38 of one of the offenses with which the accused is charged * *
*”.

Is such a departure from what the law and regulations^[3]
prescribe offensive to the due process clause? 
If it were, then petitioner should be sustained in his plea for a writ
of certiorari and prohibition, as clearly the denial of the constitutional right would oust respondents of
jurisdiction, even on the assumption that they were vested with it
originally.  Our decisions to that effect
are impressive for their unanimity.

In Harden v. The Director of Prisons,^[4]
Justice Tuason, speaking for the Court, explicitly
announced that “deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional
rights” justify a proceeding for habeas corpus on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction.  Abriol v. Homeres^[5]
is even more categorical.  In that case,
the action of a lower court, denying the accused the opportunity to present proof
for his defense, his motion for dismissal failing, was held by this Court as a
deprivation of his right to due process. 
As was made clear by the opinion of Justice Ozaeta:  “No court of justice under our system of
government has the power to deprive him of that right.  If the accused does not waive his right to be
heard but on the contrary – as in the instant case – invokes the right, and the
court denies it to him, that court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed; it
has no power to sentence the accused without hearing him in his defense; and
the sentence thus pronounced is void and may be collaterally attacked in a
habeas corpus proceeding.”^[6]

A recent decision rendered barely a month ago, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals,^[7]
is even more in point.  Here, again, habeas
corpus was relied upon by petitioner whose
constitutional rights were not
respected, but, in addition, the special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus were likewise
availed of, in view of such consequent lack of jurisdiction.  The stress though in the opinion of Justice
Sanchez, was on habeas corpus. 
Thus:  “The course which petitioner takes is correct.  Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ.  It is traditionally considered as an
exceptional remedy to release a person
whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused’s constitutional rights are disregarded.  Such defect
results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invali­dates
the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right
was violated.  That void judgment of
conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the
function of habeas corpus. 
This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by
the defendant.”

The due process concept rightfully referred to as “a vital and living force in our
jurisprudence” calls for respect
and deference, otherwise the governmental action taken suffers from a fatal infirmity.  As was so aptly expressed by the then
Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion:  “*
* * acts of Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can deny due process
only under pain of nullity, and judicial proceedings suffering from the same
flaw are subject to the same sanction, any statutory provision to the contrary
notwithstanding.^[8]

The crucial question, then, is whether such failure to comply with the dictates of the applicable law insofar
as convening a valid court martial is concerned, amounts to a denial of due process. 
We hold that it does.  There
is such a denial not only under the broad standard which delimits the scope and
reach of the due process requirement, but also under one of the specific elements of procedural due
process.

It is to be admitted that there is no controlling and precise definition of due process
which, at the most furnishes a standard
to which governmental action should conform in order to impress with the stamp
of validity any deprivation of life, liberty or property.  A
recent decision of this Court, in Ermita-Malate
Hotel v. Mayor of Manila,^[9]
treated the matter thus:  “It is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of
justice.  Negative­ly put, arbitrariness
is ruled out and unfairness avoided.  To
satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardoso, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in
sheer oppression.  Due process is thus
hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness.  Correctly has it been identified as freedom
from arbitrariness.  It is the embodiment
of the sporting idea of fair play.  It
exacts fealty ‘to those strivings for justice and judges the act of officialdom
of whatever branch ‘in the light of
reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic]
traditions of legal and political thought.’”

Nor is such a reliance on the broad reach of due process the sole
ground on which the lack of jurisdiction of the court-martial convened in this
case could be predicated.  Recently,
stress was laid anew by us on the first requirement of procedural due process,
namely, the existence of the court or tribunal clothed with judicial, or
quasi-judicial, power to hear and determine the matter before it.^[10]
This is a requirement that goes back to Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca; a
decision rendered half a century ago.^[11]

There is the express admission in the statement of facts that
respondents, as a court-martial, were not convened to try petitioner but
someone else, the action taken against petitioner being induced solely by a desire
to avoid the effects of prescription; it would follow then that the absence of
a competent court or tribunal is most marked and undeniable.  Such a denial of due process is therefore
fatal to its assumed authority to try petitioner.  The writ of certiorari and prohibition should
have been granted and the lower court, to repeat, ought not to have dismissed
his petition summarily.

The significance of such an insistence on a faithful compliance
with the regular procedure of convening court-martials in accordance with law
cannot be over-emphasized.  As was
pointed out by Justice Tuason in Ruffy
v. The Chief of Staff, Philippine Army:^[12]
“Courts-martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the
authorities ‘for the ordering of courts-martial has been held, to be attached
to the constitutional functions of the President as Commander in Chief, in­dependently of legislation.’
(Winthrop’s Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition, p. 49.) Unlike courts of
law, they are not a portion of the judiciary.” Further on, his opinion
continues:  “’Not belonging to the
judicial branch of the government, it follows that courts-martial must pertain
to the executive department; and they are in fact simply instrumentalities of
the executive power, provided by Congress for the President as Commander in
Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing
discipline therein, and utilized under
his orders or those of his authorized
military representatives.’”^[13]

It is even more indispensable, therefore, that such
quasi-judicial agencies, clothed with the solemn responsibility of depriving
members of the Armed Forces of their liberties, even of their lives, as a
matter of fact, should be held all the more strictly bound to manifest fidelity
to the fundamental concept of fairness and the avoidance of arbitrariness for
which due process stands as a
living vital principle.  If it were
otherwise, then, abuses, even if not intended, might creep in, and the
safeguards so carefully thrown about the freedom of an individual, ignored or
disregarded.  Against such an
eventuality, the vigilance of the judiciary furnishes a shield.  That is one of its grave responsibilities.  Such a trust must be lived up to; such a task cannot be left undone.

WHEREFORE, the order of respondent Court of September 16,
1963, dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition, is reversed, and
the writ of certiorari and prohibition granted, annul­ling the proceedings as
well as the decision rendered by respondents
as a court-martial and perpetually restraining them from taking any further action on the matter.  Without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Sanchez, Angeles, and
Capistrano, JJ., concur.

Castro, J., concurs in a
separate opinion.

Dizon and
Zaldivar, JJ., on
official leave.

^[1]
Stipulation of Facts, paragraphs 1 to 7.

^[2]
Ibid, paragraphs 8 to 13.

^[3]
Cf. Arts. 8 and 12, Com. Act No. 408
(1938)

^[4]
81 Phil. 741 (1948).

^[5]
84 Phil. 525 (1949).

^[6]
Ibid, p. 534.

^[7]
L-29169, August 19, 1968.

^[8]
Cuaycong v. Sengbengco,
L-11837, November 29, 1960.

^[9]
L-24693, July 31, 1967.

^[10]
Macabingkil v. Yatco,
L-23174, September 18, 1967.

^[11]
37 Phil. 921 (1918).  Cf. Roxas v. Papa, L-13459, April 29, 1960.

^[12]
75 Phil. 875, 884 (1946).

^[13]
Ibid, p. 884.

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