THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FEDERICO CUISON Y PRESTOZA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

It is manifest even from a
cursory reading of the record and the evidence that this is one of the cases
where the automatic review of death sentences by this Court is more than
justified.  It is a necessity.  Such an observation becomes even more
warranted considering the comprehensive and scholarly thirty-three page
manifestation of Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza,^[1] on behalf of the People of the Philippines,
with the categorical plea that the judgment of conviction finding appellant Federico Cuison guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing him to
death be reversed.  Considering that in
the past year, only in People v. Andag,^[2] did he make such a recommendation, although
in five other decisions^[3] this Court likewise acquitted the accused,
it becomes even more evident why the judgment should be reversed and the
accused set free.^[4]

Had there been a greater awareness of the compelling force of the
constitutional presumption of innocence^[5]
on the part of the then trial judge, now Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals, Onofre Villaluz,
the sentence certainly should have been one of acquittal.  It is the submission of the brief for
appellant:  “The records of this
case will show that the prosecution never presented a witness or witnesses
pointing to the accused as the one who killed the victim.  Neither did the prosecution establish the
possible motive or reason why the accused-appellant should kill the victim, who
is his compare.  This is significant and
highly relevant.  The prosecution merely
relied on the extra-judicial confession of the accused-appellant, which as
earlier said has never been corroborated by other evidence and which confession
was secured by means of threat and intimidation.  The trial court should have acquitted the
accused of the charge of murder and should have ordered the filing of the
appropriate criminal complaint of murder against Magtanggol
Emeterio, Ricardo Vidana
and Baltazar Vidana, in the
light of the uncontradicted testimony of the accused,
Nelia Coronia, the
surviving wife of the victim and the victim’s uncle, Mr. Fabian Manahan, that
the three have the most possible reason or motive to kill the victim.  Magtanggol Emeterio had reason or motive to kill the victim in the
face of the undeniable existing illicit relationship of his wife with Rosendo Coronia, Jr.  To avenge his honor, Magtanggol
Emeterio had to eliminate or kill Rosendo
Coronia, Jr., to stop once and for all that amorous
relationship his wife had with the victim.”^[6]
It may be said that necessarily the
appellant is expected to deny his guilt and to make light of whatever evidence
may be presented against him.  That is
true although in this particular case, portions of the testimony cited in the brief, from the widow as well as the father of the deceased, did
cast grave doubt on the guilt of appellant. 
What has an effect, conclusive in character, is the submission in the
exhaustive manifestation of Solicitor General Mendoza, with full support from
the evidence on record, that the testimony of accused-appellant of what
transpired, judged in the light of the evidence coming from prosecution
witnesses, is entitled to greater credence and belief, being more
“reasonable and believable.”^[7]

Such a conclusion is
based on the following propositions: 
“First:  To begin with, there
appears to be no sufficient motive for appellant to kill his kumpadre Rosendo Coronia, Jr. Instead, the three suspects, namely:  Magtanggol Emeterio, Ricardo Vidania and Baltazar Vidania had strong
motive to kill the victim. * * * Second: 
The nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by the victim,
as testified to by prosecution witness Dr. Gajardo,
numbering about seven, and located on the different parts of the body of the
deceased, inexorably indicate that two or three, not only one,
assailants attacked the victim and inflicted the said wounds sustained by the
latter, one of which was a fracture of the parietal or temporal (back) part of
the skull * * *.  The cause of the
victim’s death is ‘cardio respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage as a
result of the fracture of the skull’ * * *. 
Dr. Gajardo concluded rightly that hard
instruments or objects were used in hitting the victim, like club, stick,
stone, bamboo club if hard, and that it was possible that two or three persons
might have assaulted and killed the victim. * * * Third:  Appellant’s ‘flight’ to Pangasinan
and his inaction or silence before and after having witnessed the felonious
death of his kumpadre Rosendo
Caronia Jr. were
satisfactorily explained by him. * * * Fourth: 
The extrajudicial confession of appellant was secured from him by the San Mateo police investigators
under circumstances showing deceit, duress, violence, intimidation and
involuntariness, while appellant was in
a state of fear and quandary; hence the same should be rejected as void
and inadmissible. * * * Fifth: 
Subsequent develop­ments in this criminal case only serve to demonstrate
the innocence of the appellant of the crime charged against him. * * *
Sixth:  The prosecution’s evidence
judicially confirms the truth of the appellant’s claim of non-participation in
the commission of the crime in question and his charge against the three
suspects, namely:  Magtanggol
Emeterio, Ricardo Vidania
and Baltazar Vidania as the
real culprits or killers of the deceased Rosendo Coronia, Jr.”^[8]

It is difficult to understand how, in the light of the above, the
accused was convicted.  The explanation,
but certainly not the justification, lies in the acceptance of the version of
the prosecution.  As narrated in the
decision:  “The prosecution presented
evidence to prove that on April 29, 1978, at around 9:00 o’clock in the
morning, at Barrio Ampid, San Mateo, Rizal, a certain Ricardo Vidana,
also of the same barrio, unearthed a dead man from a well (balon);
that Ricardo Vidana reported the matter to Patrolmen Basilio San Jose and Eduardo
Ano, and when the policemen reached the place
they instructed Ricardo Vidana to take out the body
of the victim and they recognized the latter as that of Rosendo
Coronia, Jr., who had been missing since April 20, 1978
in the evening; that the policemen investigated the surroundings and there they
saw a piece of bamboo and a big stone (malaking bato) near a hut not far from the place where they
unearthed the body of the victim; that they learned that the owner of the said
hut (kubo) was Federico Cuison,
a friend and kumpadre of the victim; that said
Federico Cuison was not in his house, neither was he
in any part of San Mateo, but they were informed that he left for Pangasinan, his hometown; that Patrolman Ano, together with Patrolman Gonzalo Dandalo
went to Pangasinan and there they found Federico Cuison; that outright, Federico Cuison
admitted having killed Rosendo Coronia,
Jr., and burying his body not far from his hut on the 20th of April, 1978, at
11:30, more or less in the evening; that upon reaching San Mateo, Rizal, the accused Federico Cuison
executed an extra-judicial statement before Patrolman Ano,
at the Police Headquarters, stating the following:  ‘inaamin ko po naman
na ako ang
pumatay kay Rosendo Coronia, Jr.’ * * *; that
Renato Donato, a resident
of Bo. Ampid, San Mateo, Rizal,
knows the victim, Rosendo Coronia,
Jr., and testified that on the
night of April 20, 1978, between the hours of 9:00 and 10:00 o’clock, he saw
the victim and the accused together enjoying a drink at Aling
Vita’s Store of said barrio and he was offered a glass of gin; that after
drinking, he left and promised
to be back after taking home the two women companions; that he returned as
promised but on the way he met the victim and the accused going out of the
store, so they walked all together until they reached the approach of the
bridge (puno ng tulay) of Ampid where he
separated from the two and the latter entered the way to Pag-asa
Compound leading to the hut of the accused Cuison; that
after that incident he did not see the victim any­more and he was informed that
the victim was missing since that evening of April 20, 1978, together with the
accused; that later, on April 29, 1978, he learned and saw the body of Rosendo Coronia, Jr., dug out from a well (balon).”^[9]

Reference is made anew to
what was stated in the brief for accused-appellant.  The two prosecution witnesses, the two
closest relatives of the victim, the widow and the
father, absolved the accused-appellant of the crime imputed to him.  Moreover, the private prosecutor, Attorney Eleazar Castillano, moved for the
dismissal of the case.  Thus:  “Immediately after the defense rested
its case, private prosecutor Atty. Castillano orally
moved for the dismissal of the case and the acquittal of the accused Federico Cuison of the crime charged, stating that the antecedent
facts and circumstances as revealed by the evidence adduced during the trial
point clearly to the three
persons, namely:  Magtanggol
Emeterio, Ricardo Vidania
and Baltazar Vidania as the
real malefactors who feloniously killed the victim, Rosendo
Coronia, Jr.; that the three suspects have a motive
to kill the victim; while the accused Federico Cuison
had none; and that the accused Federico Cuison is a
victim of frame-up * * *.  This time,
Fiscal Angeles opposed the manifestation and motion of private prosecutor Atty.
Castillano, for being made without his prior
permission, and he insisted on the conviction of the accused based on the
evidence adduced by the prosecution * * *, but he did not touch on the evidence
introduced by the prosecution which tended to absolve the accused of the crime
charged.”^[10]

Had there been greater
care shown by the trial judge, certainly the judgment could not have been one
of conviction, much less one
imposing the death penalty.  To reiterate
what was set forth at the beginning, such judgment must be reversed and the
accused acquitted.

1. To repeat, the constitutional presumption of innocence had not
been overcome.  That is to view the
actuation of the trial judge as well as of Fiscal Zosimo
Angeles charitably.  There is need to
stress anew that both the prosecuting arm of the government and, equally so,
trial courts should be ever alert lest in their desire to see that a crime be
properly punished, the wrath of the law falls on one whose offense had not been
duly proved and therefore convicted without due process of law.^[11]
As so well put in the Manifestation of the Solicitor General:  “We have shown above that the prosecution
witnesses themselves, no less than the widow, father and uncle of the victim,
testified to an incident wherein Magtanggol Emeterio almost caught both the deceased Rosendo Coronia, Jr. and his (Emeterio’s) wife in love tryst at the house of the
appellant, thus proving that the three suspects have a strong motive to kill
the victim pursuant to their criminal conspiracy to make the victim pay for his
misdeed (atraso), while a co-detainee of the
appellant testified to the continuing threat of Baltazar
Vidania against appellant to kill him and his family
if ever he would squeal on them as the killers of his kumpadre
* * *.  The foregoing declarations of
said prosecution witnesses, which are adverse to the prosecution’s cause,
confirm the version of the defense as to how Rosendo Coronia, Jr. was killed feloniously by the above-named
three suspects, as testified to by appellant * * *, which he further explained
in detail in his second written statement given to Pat. Ernesto Garcia, police
investigator of the San Mateo Police Department,
on July 28, 1978
* * *.  It should be noted that the trial
fiscal, State Prosecutor Zosimo Angeles, who was
present throughout the proceedings of this criminal case in the court below,
never objected to the presentation of the above-named four prosecution witnesses
and to their adverse declarations in court. 
And there is no showing why their declarations in open court may be
doubted or vitiated.  Such being the
case, the prosecution is bound by the declaration of its own witnesses which
tended to absolve appellant of the crime charged, thus rendering the
prosecution’s cause, as tes­tified to only by Pat. Ano,
weak and unavailing.  As a matter of
fact, private prosecutor Atty. Eleazar Castillano, after the defense rested its case, found the
prosecution’s evidence weak and doubtful that there and then in open court he
orally moved for the dismissal of the criminal case or for the acquittal of the
appellant of the crime charged, stating that the evidence adduced during the
trial clearly reveal that three persons, namely:  Magtanggol Emeterio, Ricardo Vidania and Baltazar Vidania are the real
malefactors who conspired in killing the victim Rosendo
Coronia, Jr.; that the three suspects have the strong
motive, while appellant has none, to kill the victim; and that appellant is a
victim of a frame-up * * *.  While it is
true that the private prosecutor did not have the prior permission or authority
from the trial fiscal to make the manifestation and motion to dismiss or to
acquit the appellant * * *, yet the trial fiscal, in opposing the private
prosecutor’s motion, did not touch on the evidence introduced by the
prosecution which tended to absolve the appellant of the crime charged.”^[12]

It suffices to recall
People v. Dramayo.^[13] Thus: “Accusation is not, according to
the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. 
It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability
lies.  Appellants were not even called
upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. 
Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof
necessary for conviction be in existence. 
Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt.  To such a standard, this Court has always
been committed.  There is need therefore,
for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and
documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused.  Only if the judge below and thereafter the
appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been
committed precisely by the person on
trial under such an exacting
test should the sentence be one of conviction. 
It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be
duly taken into account.  The proof
against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not
be permitted to sway judgment.  The
conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the
responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act
but that it amounted to a crime.  What is
required then is moral certainty.”^[14]

2. The trial judge, in arriving at the sentence of conviction,
made much of the alleged extra-judicial confession by the accused.  Reference to the manifestation of the
Solicitor General is enough to demonstrate why such should not have been the
case.  The extrajudicial confession in
legal contemplation is worthless.  Again,
there is need to stress that both the prosecuting arm and trial judges must not
disregard the authoritative pronouncements of this Tribunal on the matter.  On this point, the manifestation of the
Solicitor General had this to say: 
“It should be stressed here that Pat. Ano
was also not telling the truth when he declared that appellant verbally
admitted to them while they were still in Pangasinan
that he killed his kumpadre Rosendo
Coronia, Jr. Pat. Ano could
not decide when appellant made the verbal admission:  whether on the occasion immediately when they
found him inside a house at San Jacinto, Pangasinan
or inside the jeep during their trip back to San Mateo from Pangasinan
* * *. Pat. Ano himself admitted in his testimony
that appellant, despite their asking questions why he killed his kumpadre, merely begged of them:  ‘ang sabi niya sa
Headquarters daw siya magpapa­liwanag‘ * * *; thus appellant did not make any
verbal admission at that time.  Instead,
he told the police investigators who found him in Pangasinan
that he did not kill his kumpadre, and that he could
not tell them the real culprits at that time because Baltazar
Vidania (who made the threat to kill him and his
family if he would squeal on them) was present, who came along with the police
investigators to Pangasinan * * *.  The truth of the matter, therefore, is that
appellant merely pleaded with the police investigators who saw him in Pangasinan that he be allowed to explain at the police
headquarters in San Mateo, Rizal, the reasons why he
came to and hid in San Jacinto, Pangasinan after he
had witnessed the felonious killing of his kumpadre
in the late evening of April 20, 1978 in Bo. Ampid, San
Mateo, Rizal.  But when they arrived at San Mateo, Rizal on that day, April 29, 1978, Baltazar
Vidania was always seen with the police investigators
when the latter were questioning him * * *. 
Thus, appellant decided to remain tight-lipped regarding the
circumstances surrounding the death of his kumpadre.  On May
5, 1978 when he was being questioned by the police investigators,
he refused to admit having something to do with the killing of his kumpadre.  According
to the appellant, police investigators Pat. Eduardo Ano
and Pat. Ernesto Garcia inflicted acts of violence upon his body (binugbog), which caused him to make the verbal admission
that he killed his kumpadre * * *.  This is perhaps the verbal admission referred
to by Pat. Ano in his testimony.  Then came the day, May 6, 1978, for the taking of appellant’s
extrajudicial confession.  Earlier during
the said day, appellant was warned by Baltazar Vidania when the latter went to the former’s
cell at the municipal jail of San Mateo, reminding him of his previous threat *
* * And even before the formal investigation could start, appellant saw Baltazar Vidania inside the
investigation room at the police headquarters, together with the police
investigators, and Baltazar Vidania
approached him and whispered to him that if he would squeal or point on them as
the killers of his kumpadre, the three of them would
kidnap him * * *.  Besides the presence
of Baltazar Vidania,
appellant had the misfortune of being assisted by a lawyer whose interest was
adverse to his (appellant’s) cause.  Pat.
Ano declared that appellant had a lawyer by the name
of Atty. Juan Moreno of San Mateo, Rizal, during the investigation; that he saw Atty. Moreno
and the appellant talk to each other three times; that it was Atty. Moreno,
after talking to the appellant, who announced that they could start the
investigation; and that he was sure Atty. Moreno was assisting the appellant
during the investigation as the latter’s counsel * * *.  But Atty. Juan Moreno, testifying as a
defense witness, declared that he was the private prosecutor during the
preliminary investigation before the municipal court of the very criminal
complaint against appellant for the murder of Rosendo
Coronia, Jr. * * *.  According to Rosendo
Coronia, Sr., father of the said deceased, testifying as a prosecution witness, Atty. Juan Moreno
was their lawyer involving the case of the felonious death of his son before
the municipal court, and that Atty. Moreno was already handling the case of his
son when he (Atty. Moreno) went to the police headquarters of San Mateo * *
*.  Despite this conflict of interest,
Atty. Moreno admitted in open court that he used to visit the appellant at the
jail of San Mateo during the time he was the private prosecutor of the case
against the appellant * * *.  Pat. Ano claimed that all his questions asked of the appellant,
which became the basis of the latter’s extrajudicial confession * * *, were
freely answered by the appellant in the presence of Atty. Moreno * * *.  But Atty. Moreno contradicted or debunked
Pat. Ano’s claim, saying that he (Atty. Moreno) was
present only before the formal investigation started.  He admitted having talked to the appellant
who told him (Atty. Moreno) that he (appellant) preferred to declare before the
judge in open court; hence, he left the investigating room.  He was not, Atty. Moreno maintained,
present when appellant’s extrajudicial confession was being reduced to writing.
* * * Under the foregoing circumstances, appellant then had no alternative but to
make his forced, but still qualified confession, * * *.  More revealing are certain features of the
extrajudicial confession * * * which render the same of doubtful validity.  With the clear and emphatic answer of the
appellant to the third question, wherein he pleaded that he be allowed instead
to tell everything before a judge or court, the police investigators should
have stopped there and then the taking of his written confession.  But the police investigators insisted on
making him say something about the verbal admission appellant had made the
previous day after he was subjected to bodily harm.  Thus, the fourth question was asked, and the
appellant, still nurturing the fear of the threats from the suspects and the
bodily harm that may again be inflicted
upon him by his police tormentors, reiterated his previous short verbal
admission, if only to put a stop or end to the investigation right there and
then * * *.  Since there is no eyewitness
to the killing, if they have zeroed their suspicion upon the appellant as the
culprit, the police investigators should have asked from the appellant and
included in the said extrajudicial confession, the background and surrounding
circumstances, motive, and other facts involving the felonious death of Rosendo Coronia, Jr. and
appellant’s flight to Pangasinan.  Appellant’s extrajudicial confession * * *
lacks the details of the killing of the victim as well as the burying of the
latter’s dead body.  Even the joint
police affidavit or report of police investigators Pat. San Jose and Pat. Ano * * *
is absent of these important and necessary details.  By itself, the extrajudicial confession * * *
does not provide the reasons and circumstances to convince a magistrate with an
impartial mind to conclude that appellant is guilty of the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt.”^[15]
A confession of that character, to repeat, is not deserving of any
credence.  The reliance of the trial
judge therefore on such an alleged admission was misplaced.  He failed to accord deference to what has
been the unbroken rule in this jurisdiction from the case of United
States v. delos Santos,^[16]
a 1913 decision.  A later case, People v.
Bagasala^[17]
speaks to this effect:  “Certainly,
however, where the confession is involuntary, being due to maltreatment or
induced by fear or intimidation, there is a violation of this constitutional
provision.  Any form of coercion, whether
physical, mental, or emotional thus stamps it with inadmissibility.  What is essential for its validity is that it
proceeds from the free will of the person confessing.”^[18]
What was said later in the opinion is quite appropriate for the manner the
trial judge discharged his function: 
“It is unfortunate that the lower court failed to abide by the
authoritative doctrines that ban the use of involuntary confessions in
accordance with the constitutional provision against self-incrimination which,
in the language of Justice Sanchez, should be ‘mandatory’, being ‘a valuable
and substantial right.'”^[19]
Then, too:  “The above testimony
notwithstanding, the lower court could still look upon such confession as free
of any infirmity.  Clearly, that was
error, as pointed out by appellant.  The
constant course of decisions of this honorable Tribunal, true to the meaning of
the self-incrimination clause, forbids the admission of any confession obtained
under such circumstances.  It would be to
render nugatory a valuable constitutional right if judges of the courts of
first instance display less than full sensitivity to its command.  A conviction resting on such proof, and such
proof alone, certainly cannot be allowed to stand.”^[20]

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court dated February 16, 1979, is reversed, and
the accused, Federico Cuison y Prestoza,
is acquitted.  This decision is
immediately executory, and he is therefore to be set
free forthwith, unless he is held for some other valid charge or charges in
accordance with law.  Let a copy of this
decision be furnished the Ministry of Justice for its information and guidance
insofar as an investigation of the true facts of this gruesome killing is
concerned with reference to the following-named individuals, Magtanggol Emeterio, Ricardo Vidana and Baltazar Vidana referred to, its attention being particularly
invited to their alleged participation. 
No costs.

Makasiar, Aquino,
Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,
concur.

Barredo, J., concurs and suggests that the policemen involved in the taking of the
appellant’s supposed confession be also investigated.

Teehankee, J., no part.

^[1]
He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo
and Solicitor Deusdedit B. Quijano.

^[2]
L-43618, March 31, 1980, 96
SCRA 861.

^[3]
Cf. People v. Pampaluna, L-33805-09, March 31,
1980, 96 SCRA 787; People v. Arciaga, L-38179,
June 16, 1980, 98 SCRA 1; People v. Alindog,
L-35914, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 258; People v. Bardaje,
L-29271, August 29, 1980; People v. Galvez,
L-26944-45, December 5, 1980.

^[4]
Counsel de officio Teofilo F. Manalo is equally deserving of commendation for the able
analysis of the evidence in his thirty-seven page brief for appellant.

^[5]
According to Article IV, Sec. 19 of the Constitution:  “In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, im­partial, and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf.  * * *”

^[6]
Brief for the Accused-Appellant, 29-30.

^[7]
Manifestation, 11.

^[8]
Ibid, 11-12, 14, 15, 16, 23 and 25.

^[9]
Decision of the Lower Court
dated February 16, 1979, 2–3.

^[10]
Manifestation of June 5, 1981,
7.

^[11]
According to Article IV, Section 17 of the Constitution:  “No person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law.”

^[12]
Manifestation, 25-27.

^[13]
L-21325, October 29, 1971,
42 SCRA 59.

^[14]
Ibid, 64.  From People v. Molina,
L-30191, October 27, 1973,
53 SCRA 495, to People v. Laguisma, L-46297, June 19, 1980, 98 SCRA 69, at least
twenty cases may be cited where Dramayo was invoked.

^[15]
Manifestation, 16-20; 21-22.

^[16]
24 Phil. 358.

^[17]
L-26182, May 31, 1971, 39
SCRA 236.

^[18]
Ibid, 241-242.

^[19]
Ibid, 243.

^[20]
Ibid, 244. 
Cf. People v. Buscato, L-40639, November
23, 1976, 30 SCRA
30.