FRANCISCA ALCAIDE, TITO VICERA AND IGNACIO PALCON, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE EUFROCINIO S. DELA MERCED, MUNI­CIPAL JUDGE PEDRO J. CALLEJO JR. AND CESARIO BENEDITO, RESPONDENTS.

The promulgation of the decision by respondent Judge Pedro Callejo Jr. of the Municipal Court of Brookes Point, Palawan and the appeal thereafter taken by defendants, now
petitioners,^[1]
resulted in this certiorari and mandamus proceeding being moot and
academic.  The inclusion of respondent
Judge Eufrocinio dela Merced
of the Court of First Instance of Palawan became
necessary as he dismissed a certiorari petition assailing the issuance
by respondent Municipal Judge of a preliminary mandatory injunction without
hearing defendants, present petitioners, in a forcible entry case filed by
private respondent Cesario Benedito.

In the comment of
respondent Municipal Judge, he admitted the allegation of petitioners that the
preliminary mandatory injunction referred to by him as a restraining order
compelled petitioner to vacate the land in question on the very same day the
forcible entry case was filed.  He would
justify what he did, however, by the assertion that he conducted “a
summary ex-parte investigation” before doing so.^[2] The truth of what did transpire became even
more evident from this paragraph of the comment of private respondent Benedito:  “That undersigned Respondent admits that
part of the allegations of paragraph 3 of the petition to the effect that
respondent Municipal Judge Pedro J. Callejo Jr.
issued the restraining order on the very day of the complaint in Civil Case No.
219 was filed, but specifically denies that no kind of hearing was held, the
truth being that a summary hearing ex-parte was
conducted whereat the undersigned respondent and his witness, Hernando Baptista, testified.”^[3] On the other hand, respondent Court of First
Instance Judge admitted that a certiorari petition was filed with his
court but was not given due course for not being accompanied by a certified
true copy of the judgment or orders subject thereof together with the copies of
all pleadings and documents as prescribed by the Rules of Court.^[4] To the allegation that such order as well as
the other pleadings and
documents were included as annexes, this was his answer:  “That the respondent admits a portion of
the allegation in paragraph 12 but denies vehemently the latter part of the
paragraph, the truth of the matter is that when the motion for reconsideration
was filed, there were no annexes attached to the said motion.  This is borne out of the fact that at the
hearing of the said motion for reconsideration on July 24, 1978, the court
noticed in the record that there were no annexes yet filed by the petitioner,
and considering that she has a telegram for the postponement of the hearing,
the consideration of the motion was finally reset to August 16, 1978. 
Likewise, when the said motion was heard on August 16, 1978, the court called the attention of the
petitioner Francisca Alcaide who appeared without
counsel, that there were not documents accompanying the said motion for
reconsideration received by the court. 
The motion for reconsideration was then denied.  It is true that in the motion for
reconsideration there were allegations of the fact that the annexes were
attached but the truth is that there were none at the time the court ruled on
the motion.”^[5]

A motion for reconsideration
having proved unavailing, petitioners filed this certiorari and mandamus
proceeding.  As noted at the outset a
moot and academic aspect has been imparted in this petition.  Nonetheless, it would not be amiss to call
attention to the failure of respondent Municipal Judge to yield obedience to
authoritative decisions of this Court and of respondent Court of First Instance
Judge to his deplorable insistence, in this case at least, on procedural
technicalities.

1.  Had the main case not
been decided by respondent Municipal Judge Callejo
Jr., certainly the action for certiorari to nullify the issuance of a
mandatory injunction, mistakenly referred to by him as a restraining order,
would have succeeded.  On the face of the
challenged order itself, respondent Municipal Judge noted that the title is in
the name of petitioner Francisca Alcaide, although he
did refer to it as the property of private respondent Cesario
Benedito.  At
the very least, he should have been put on his guard.  That way, his order would not have suffered
from what appears to be a congenital infirmity. 
Equally, the lack of validity of such order arose from his failure to
grant a hearing to petitioner Alcaide in violation of
procedural due process.  The admission of
private respondent that he and his witness were heard, but without mentioning
that it was an ex-parte proceeding, serves to reveal
the lack of candor of respondent Municipal Judge when he alleged that he
accorded now petitioners their day in court. 
In dela Cruz v. Febreo,^[6]
after referring to the leading case of Manila Electric Railroad and Light
Company v. Del Rosario,^[7]
a 1912 decision, thereafter cited with approval in the following cases of Villena v. Roque,^[8]
Morabe v. Brown,^[9]
Coronado v. Court of First Instance of Rizal,^[10]
Bautista v. Barcelona,^[11]
Commissioner of Customs v. Cloribel,^[12]
and National Marketing Corporation v. Cloribel,^[13]
there is this relevant excerpt:  “A
petition of this character would have been unnecessary had the Municipal Judge
of Kabankalan and respondent Judge displayed a
greater awareness of the demands of due process and familiarity with
controlling doctrines from this Tribunal. 
It does not speak well of members of the bench if they would be
susceptible to the charge that they are remiss in their obligation to be fully
acquainted with legal norms and precepts. 
Even on the assumption that they could accurately ascertain the facts,
they would not be in a position to apply the correct principles of law.  What is worse in this particular case, the
failure to respect the cardinal requirement of procedural due process did lead
to consequences that, to say the least, cast a reflection on the two
dignitaries concerned.”^[14]

2.  Now as to the Court of
First Instance Judge.  He was justified
in dismissing the petition for certiorari against respondent Municipal
Judge for failure on the part of now petitioners to submit a certified true
copy of the order as well as the copies of all pleadings and documents as
prescribed by the Rules of Court.  He
could not be found at fault if as a result of the motion for reconsideration
still not curing the defect, he would deny the same.  There is this admission, however, in his
comment filed with this Court: 
“Upon receipt, however, of this petition filed by the petitioner
with the Supreme Court, together with the order to comment on the said
petition, the record was retrieved from the files, and the respondent court
found several true copies of the orders of the respondent municipal court,
constituting the alleged annexes, stamped received by the clerk of the
respondent’s court on September 5, 1978, which was very much late when the
court ruled on the motion for reconsideration on August 16, 1978, denying the
same.  The annexes were just filed
without any accompanying motion and were just handed to the clerk of the
respondent’s court.”^[15]
Considering, as he pointed out that petitioner Alcaide
was without counsel and that thereafter the deficiency was cured with the
filing of the necessary order as well
as the pleadings as annexes, he ought to have set aside his order of
dismissal.  It is especially important
where a litigant pleading for justice, very likely because either of ignorance
or poverty, had resulted in her rights not being vindicated that a judge should
pay greater attention to the true facts of the case and see to it that justice
according to law is done.  Respondent
Court of First Instance Judge is not, therefore, free from blame.

WHEREFORE, the case is dismissed for being moot and
academic.  Respondent Municipal Judge
Pedro Callejo Jr. is censured for what would appear
as a clear disregard of the mandate of procedural due process.  Respondent Court of First Instance Judge Eufrocinio dela Merced is hereby
admonished to pay heed to the equally binding principles of the Constitution to
assure that every branch of the government and certainly the Judiciary most of
all, accords substantial justice, ignoring procedural technicalities in the
process.

Barredo, Concepcion,
Jr., Abad Santos, and
De Castro, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., concurs in the result with a separate opinion.

^[1]
In addition to Francisca Alcaide, her other
co-petitioners are Tito Vicera and Ignacio Palcon.

^[2]
Comment of respondent Municipal Judge Callejo Jr.,
par. 3.

^[3]
Comment of private respondent Cesario Benedito, par. 2.

^[4]
Comment of Court of First Instance Judge dela Merced,
par. 3 and Annex 7 of petition.

^[5]
Ibid, par. 4.

^[6]
L-33884, April 25, 1978, 82
SCRA 379.

^[7]
22 Phil. 433.

^[8]
93 Phil. 363 (1953).

^[9]
95 Phil. 181 (1954).

^[10]
96 Phil. 729 (1955).

^[11]
100 Phil. 1078 (1957).

^[12]
L-20266, January 31, 1967,
19 SCRA 234.

^[13]
L-26585, March 13, 1968, 22
SCRA 1033.

^[14]
L-33884, April 25, 1978, 82
SCRA 379, 384.

^[15]
Comment of Court of First
Instance Judge dela Merced,
par. 6.

Clean
Clean

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