JOSEFINA BORJA VDA. DE CLEMENTE, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND CITY OF MANILA (MANILA METROPOLITAN POLICE), RESPONDENTS.

Petition for review on certiorari^[1]
of the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission which reversed the
decision of the Hearing Officer in RO3-WC Case No. 12359.

The records show that Patrolman Ferdinand Clemente,
a member of the Manila Metropolitan Police, died in the morning of November 9, 1974 as a result of the
injuries suffered by him when the jeep he was driving in the discharge of his
duties as patrolman was hit and bumped by a Toyota Sedan in Moriones St., Tondo, Manila.  The Manila City Fiscal’s
Office filed the corresponding criminal action against the driver of the Toyota
vehicle, but the case was settled amicably by petitioner’s parents-in-law for
the sum of P15,000.00.

On March 31, 1975,
petitioner filed a claim for death benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act against her husband’s employer, the City of Manila.  Subsequently, the parties entered into the
following stipulation of facts:^[2]

“1.  That the claimant,
Mrs. Josefina Borja Vda. de Clemente, is the legal wife of
the deceased Patrolman Ferdinand Clemente, Exhibit “A” – Marriage Contract;

 2.  That
out of their lawful wedlock, they begot one (1) child by the name of Maria
Imelda Clemente, Exhibit “B” – Birth
Certificate;

 3.  That
the deceased, Patrolman Ferdinand Clemente, was a
member of the Manila’s Finest during his time, Exhibit “C” – Service
Record;

 4.  That
the deceased, Patrolman Ferdinand Clemente, died by
virtue of a vehicular accident in the course of his employment on November 9,
1974, Exhibit “D” – Police Report;

 5.  That
on November 9, 1974, the deceased died due to the vehicular accident, Exhibit
“F” – Death Certificate; and

 6.  That
the claimant herein, Mrs. Josefina Clemente, and her
daughter, Maria Imelda Clemente, were fully dependent
for support from the deceased during his lifetime, Exhibit “G” –
Affidavit of Dependency.”

The following facts were
elicited by counsel for the respondent City of Manila from the petitioner:^[3]

“1.  That the widow-claimant did not file any
claim for death compensation with any other branch of the government, for
example under the Police Act of 1966 known as the POLCOM;

 2.  That
the claimant did not claim any amount from the MEDICARE as a consequence of the
hospitalization of her husband;

 3.  That
the accident which caused the death of her husband involved another private
party because that alleged incident was a vehicular one and that a criminal
case had been filed in connection with that incident against that private
party;

 4.  That
the criminal case was settled and it was the parents-in-law who entered into an
amicable settlement and the insurance company of the car effected settlement
payment in the total amount of P15,000.00;

 5.  That the P15,000.00
was issued in three checks as follows:

1.  Mrs. Clemente
– – – – – – – – – P8,000.00

2.  Her in-laws – – – – – – –
– – – – – P5,500.00

3.  A Lawyer – – – – – – – –
– – – – –  P1,500.00

and that another
lawyer was likewise paid P1,500.00 by her mother-in-law.”

Accordingly, the Hearing Officer rendered a decision^[4]
as follows:

“In view thereof and pursuant to the provisions of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, the herein widow-claimant and her minor
daughter who are wholly dependent upon the deceased for support, should be
entitled to the following benefits:

1.  Under Section 8 of the Act, as amended, to
death compensation equivalent to FIFTY (50%) PERCENTUM of the
average weekly wage of the deceased for a period of 208 weeks.  FIFTY (50%) PERCENTUM of the average weekly
wage of the deceased employee (his last salary was P7,920.00 per annum, Exhibit
“C” – Service Record) which was P151.96 but, this should be
correspondingly reduced to P50.00 pursuant to the provisions of Section 12 of
the Act, equals P25.00 and for 208 weeks, they are entitled to receive the sum
of P5,200.00; and

2.  Under the same
Section, to reimbursement of burial expenses in the sum of P200.00.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the claimant and
respondent ordered to pay:

1.  To the claimant thru this Office, the total
sum of FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (P5,400.00) as
death compensation and reimbursement of burial expenses; and

2.  To this Office, the
sum of FIFTY THREE PESOS (P53.00) as administrative fee pursuant to the provisions
of Sec. 55 of the Act, as amended.  Bill
No. 3-2030-76 is hereto attached.

x x x“

On appeal by the respondent City of Manila
to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, the latter reversed the decision of
the Hearing Officer and absolved respondent City of Manila
from any liability under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended.

The issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the
amicable settlement of Criminal Case No. 19202 by the parents-in-law of
petitioner barred the latter from recovering benefits under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act.

Section 6 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act provides that –

“Sec. 6.  Liability of third parties.  – In case an employee suffers an injury for
which compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his
employer, it shall be optional with such injured employee either to claim
compensation from his employer, under this Act, or sue such other persons for
damages, in accordance with law; and in case compensation is claimed and
allowed in accordance with this Act, the employer who paid such compensation or
was found liable to pay the sum, shall succeed the injured employee to the
right of recovering from such person what he paid:  Provided, That in case the employer recovers
from such third person damages in excess of those paid or allowed under this
Act, such excess shall be delivered to the injured employee or any other person
entitled thereto, after deduction of the expenses of the employer and the costs
of proceedings.  The sum paid by the
employer for compensation or the amount of compensation to which the employee
or his dependents are entitled under the provisions of this Act, shall not be
admissible as evidence in any damage suit or action.”

The rule on this point
has been established by Us in quite a number of
cases.  Thus, in the case of La Mallorca (Operator of La Mallorca
Taxi) vs. WCC and Balbino Zuñiga,^[5] the Court, in upholding the employee’s right
to recover compensation from his employer, ruled that the filing of a criminal
complaint against the third person causing the injury arising out of and in the
course of employment is not such an election as would suffice to exempt an
employer from his liability under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.  The Court, speaking thru Senior Associate
Justice Fernando, affirmed the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission,
thus –

“It was not surprising at all then why respondent Workmen’s
Compensation Commission could not yield assent to such a plea.  According to the appealed decision:  ‘The contention of respondent that when
claimant filed the physical injury case against Jesus Pinto, with whom he had
an accident, claimant had elected to claim against Jesus Pinto and the monetary
settlement between them has the effect of releasing the respondent from liability,
cannot be sustained.  Nowhere in the
above-quoted section can we find or deduce that the filing of a criminal action
arising out of the injury caused by a third person as well as the settlement of
the same as an incident thereof would bar the recovery of compensation against
the employer.  It is our considered view
that the settlement between Jesus Pinto and the claimant cannot be deemed an
election within the meaning of Sec. 6. 
Thus in one case the Supreme Court ruled that the filing of a criminal
action does not bar recovery of a workmen’s compensation claim, and we
quote:  ‘As to the alleged “amicable
settlement,” it consists of an affidavit wherein, for the sum of 150
pesos, Mamador’s widow promised “to forgive Macunat for the wrong committed and not to bring him before
the authorities for prosecution.” Upon making such promise – petitioner
argues – she elected one of the remedies, (against the third person) and is barred from the other remedy
(against the employer).  The contention
may not be sustained, inasmuch as all the widow
promised was to forego the offender’s criminal prosecution.  She did not promise to waive the civil action
for damages.’

“In this appeal, petitioner, still unconvinced, would expect
us to reverse respondent Commission precisely for obedience to and compliance
with what we held.  That is optimism
carried to excess.  It is far from
warranted.  The matter has been fully considered by us, and we have
reached the conclusion that the filing of a criminal complaint is not such an
election as would suffice to exempt an employer from his liability.  We adhere to it.”^[6] (Underscoring supplied).

In Marinduque
Iron Mines Agents, Inc. v. WCC, 99 Phil. 480, 483 (1956), the Court, with
Justice and later Chief Justice Bengzon as ponente, ruled:

“It is the
petitioner’s contention that Criminal Case No. 1491 and its outcome
constituted an election by the employee (or his heirs) to sue the third person,
such election having the effect of releasing the employer.  However, the Criminal Case No. 1491 was not a
suit for damages against the third person, it being alleged, without
contradiction that the heirs did not intervene therein and have not so far
received the indemnity ordered by the
court.  At any rate, we have already
decided in Nava vs. Inchausti Co. that the indemnity
granted the heirs in a criminal prosecution of the
“other person” does not affect the liability of the employer
to pay compensation.” (Underscoring supplied).

The doctrine relied upon
in these cases of La Mallorca and Marinduque Iron Mines, supra, is in
line with the earlier cases decided by this Court in Victoria Taller Viuda de Nava vs. Ynchausti
Steamship Co.^[7] (decided on December 20, 1932) and Martha
Lumber Mill, Inc. vs. Lagradante, et al.^[8] (decided on June 27, 1956) wherein We held
that the obligation of the employer to compensate is unaffected by the
liability of the offender in the criminal case to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased employee which is “wholly distinct from the obligation imposed by
the Workmen’s Compensation Act and the latter is in no sense subsidiary to the
former.”

We are not unmindful of
the cases cited by the respondent Commission of Alfonso Esguerra
vs. Hon. Cecilia Muñoz Palma, et al.^[9] and Maria Paz S. Alba, etc., et al. vs.
Dr. Horacio Bulaong, et al.^[10] as authorities in reversing the award
of the Hearing Officer in favor of the petitioner.  In the Esguerra
case, the injured employee filed a claim for permanent partial loss of the use
of his right arm with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission and while these
proceedings were pending, he initiated a case in the Court of First Instance to
recover compensatory as well as moral and exemplary damages from the company
physician and the clinic nurse and to hold the employer subsidiarily
liable.  The injured laborer was
initially free to choose either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts
set by the Compensation Law or else, to prosecute an ordinary civil action
against the tortfeasor for higher damages.  The Court concluded that “having staked
his fortunes on a particular remedy, the injured employee is precluded from
pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior claim is rejected by
the Compensation Commission.”

In the Alba case,
five employees of the respondent employer suffered injuries and one died when
the tractor they were riding on collided with a Victory Liner bus and separate
claims were filed before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission against the
employer.  The latter claimed that the
claims had been extinguished by virtue of the money settlements which
the employees had concluded with the Victory Liner, Inc. after each of them had
executed a written release or waiver in favor of said Liner.  The waiver, however, reserved the right to
claim against the employer in accordance with and under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act.  In holding that the
employees were entitled to the award under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the
Court said:

“There is no question that the Liner was a “third
party” within the meaning of section 6. 
There is also no question that petitioners have not sued the Liner for
damages.  Wherefore they are not deemed
to have made the election specified in section 6.  However, the plain intent of the law is that
they shall not receive payment twice for the same injuries (from the third
party and from the employer).  Hence if
without suing they received full damages from the third party, they should be
deemed to have practically made the election under the law, and should be
prevented from thereafter suing the employer. 
Full damages means, of course, what they would have demanded in a suit
against the third party or what they would receive in a
compensation as complete settlement. 
Needless to say, where the injured employee is offered, by the third
party, compensation which he deems insufficient, he may reject it and thereafter
litigate with such third party.  Or
choose instead to complain against his employer.

“Nevertheless there is nothing in the law to prevent him from
accepting such insufficient compensation but expressly reserving at the same time his right to recover additional damages from his
employer.  x x x

“It is therefore our view that the moneys received from
Victory Liner, Inc. did not necessarily have the effect of releasing Dr. Bulaong.  Inasmuch as
the five men were his employees, and they were injured by reason of and in the
course of their employment, he must pay compensation to be fixed in accordance
with law.  Bearing in mind, however, the
law’s intention not to give double compensation, the amounts they have received
from the Victory Liner shall be deducted from the sums so determined.”

It is needless to differentiate, much less reconcile, the earlier
cases with the recent rulings of this Court on the basis of the manner or
procedure of bringing the action against the third party (whether by criminal
prosecution or civil action for damages) or as to who takes the initiative,
option or choice in selecting said action (whether by the claimant personally
or by his heirs).  Substantially, the
latest ruling in the La Mallorca case is a
boon to labor and We are not minded to deny or to
detract to the wage earners and laboring class such a gain already
recognized.  Hence, for the case at bar,
We reiterate the ruling enunciated in the said La Mallorca
case and so hold that the amicable settlement entered into by petitioner’s
parents-in-law does not constitute a bar as to prevent the recovery of benefits
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act for the reason that such an amicable
settlement may not be considered or deemed to be an election within the meaning
of Section 6 of the Act.

By reiterating this ruling, this Court once more stresses and
emphasizes the liberal construction and interpretation of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act in order to favor the laboring class and thus give to those
who have less in life more in law, to paraphrase the immortal words of a great
President.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
rendered setting aside respondent Commission’s decision and reinstating that of
the Hearing Officer.  The respondent City
of Manila is hereby ordered:

1.  To pay petitioner and her
minor daughter the sum of Five Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P5,200.00)
compensation benefits;

2.  To reimburse said
claimants the sum of Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) for burial expenses;

3.  To pay counsel for the
petitioner the amount of Five Hundred Twenty Pesos (P520.00) for and as
attorney’s fees; and

4.  To pay to the successor
of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission the sum of Fifty Three Pesos (P53.00)
as administrative fee.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Santos, and Fernandez, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Treated as special civil action in the resolution of June 30, 1976.

^[2]
WCC Records, p. 104.

^[3]
Ibid., at 103-104.

^[4]
Id., at 101.

^[5]
30 SCRA 613.

^[6]
Id., at 616-617.

^[7]
57 Phil. 751.

^[8]
99 Phil. 434.

^[9]
104 Phil. 582.

^[10]
101 Phil. 434 (1957).