ASSOCIATED TRADE UNIONS-ATU (ATU-KILUSAN), PETITIONER, VS. HON. CARMELO G. NORIEL, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, FEDERATION …

Apparently mindful of the state of the law on the subject,
petitioner Union, in this certiorari proceeding,
took pains in a rather elaborate pleading to justify its claim that there was a
denial of procedural due process when respondent Director of the Bureau of
Labor Relations affirmed the actuation of a Med-Arbiter ordering a
certification election.^[1]
Its labored effort, as will be shown, was none too successful.  It did try to impress on this Court that the
Med-Arbiter was quite arbitrary in granting respondent Union’s
plea for a certification election alleging that there was neither “prior
inquiry nor investigation of whatever kind.”^[2]
There was nothing in the order of such official, annexed to its petition, that would support such a contention.^[3]
Moreover, its main reliance was the operation of a contract-bar rule, but
unfortunately for petitioner, the Med-Arbiter ascertained that petitioner Union,
without waiting for the expiration of the existing contract, and with the end
in view of avoiding a certification election, was able to persuade management
to renew it.^[4]
It ought not to have been surprised, therefore, when respondent Director
affirmed the order for the holding of a certification election on appeal and at
the same time decertified the new collective bargaining contract which was
tainted by pre-maturity and, therefore, not entitled to respect.

The Comment of the public respondent, filed by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza,^[5]
objectively clarified the relevant facts in the following manner:  “On September 13, 1977, the local chapter of the Federation of
Free Workers (Synthetic Marketing and Industrial Corporation Chapter) filed a
petition for certification election among the regular rank and-file employees
of the Synthetic Marketing and Industrial Corporation.  The petition alleged, among others, that it
commands the great majority of the rank-and-file employees of the bargaining
unit, and that more than 30% of the total work force supported its petition,
attaching the signatures of said union members. 
The petition admitted the existence of another union in the
establishment, the Associated Trade Unions (ATU-KILUSAN) and the existence of a
CBA to expire on October 31, 1977.  It was further alleged that there has been no
certification election in the company for the last twelve months preceding the
filing of the petition.  Both the Company
and the Associated Trade Unions opposed the petition on the ground that it is
contract-barred by virtue of the existence of a duly registered CBA with the
BLR entered into between the parties on May
10, 1977.  Petitioning union,
on the other hand, assailed the validity of the said CBA on the ground that the
same had been executed five (5) months and twenty-one (21) days prior to the
expiration of the old CBA which was supposed to expire October 31, 1977 and was
not ratified by the members of the bargaining unit.  On January
9, 1977, the Med-Arbiter assigned to the case issued an Order
calling for a certification election * * *. 
From the aforesaid Order of the Med-Arbiter, the Associated Trade Unions
(ATU-KILUSAN) appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations.  In a resolution dated May 29, 1978, BLR
Director Carmelo C. Noriel
affirmed the Order of the Med-Arbiter calling for an election, at the same time
setting aside its certification of the CBA concluded between the Synthetic
Marketing and Industrial Corporation and the Associated Trade Unions * *
*.  Not satisfied with the last-mentioned
resolution of the BLR Director, the Associated Trade Unions (ATU-KILUSAN) filed
the instant petition for review with prayer for preliminary injunction.”^[6]

The lack of merit of this petition is thus quite manifest.  It calls for dismissal.

1. It is true that where the challenged order of labor officials
could be shown to be tainted by unfairness or arbitrariness, whether in the
procedural or substantive sense, a due process question arises.  Clearly, then, the corrective power of this
Tribunal to assure that an administrative agency adheres to such cardinal
primary right^[7]
comes into play.  It is equally
undeniable that this Court has never allowed itself to be a party to any
scheme, however ingeniously devised, to thwart the clear intendment of the New
Labor Code^[8]
to facilitate the holding of a certification election, the democratic means to
ascertain in a manner definitive and certain which labor organization will be
chosen to represent the workers in a collective bargaining unit.  It is quite futile then for petitioner Union
to hope that this Tribunal, contrary to a long line of decisions^[9]
notable for their unanimity, would now gratify an aspiration devoid of
legitimacy.  It ought to have been
cautioned likewise by a realization that the matter sought to be litigated as
to the requisite number of signatures being factual, its chances of having a
determination by the administrative agency concerned were less than minimal.^[10]

2. The point was likewise made that the contract-bar rule would
preclude a certification election.  That
was to ignore the decertification of the collective bargaining agreement which
was hastily and prematurely entered into precisely for the purpose of avoiding
the holding of the certification election. 
This aspect of the case was extensively gone into in the Comment of
Solicitor General Mendoza.  Thus:  “The only issue to be determined in the
instant case is whether or not the renewed CBA forged between the respondent
company and petitioner union constitutes a bar to the holding of a
certification election.  The record shows
that the old CBA of petitioner ATU-KILUSAN with respondent Synthetic Marketing
and Industrial Corporation was to expire on October 31, 1977. 
However, 5 months and 21 days before its expiry date, or on May 10, 1977, ATU-KILUSAN renewed the
same with the consent and collaboration of management.  The renewed CBA was then submitted to the Bureau
of Labor Relations for certification on July
8, 1977, or approximately 3 months prior to the expiration of the
outgoing CBA.  In the meantime, on September 13, 1977 (48 days before
the expiration of the old CBA on October
31, 1977), a petition for certification election was filed by
respondent union, the Federation of Free Workers.  Meanwhile, the renewed CBA between petitioner
ATU-KILUSAN and respondent company was certified on October 3, 1977 or twenty-eight days before their
old CBA was to expire.  From the
foregoing facts, it is quite obvious that the renewed CBA cannot constitute a
bar to the instant petition for certification election.  In the first place, the said GBA was
certified after the instant petition for certification had been filed by herein
respondent union, and its certification was conditioned upon the fact that
there was no pending petition for certification election with the Bureau of
Labor Relations * * *.  In the second
place, the new CBA was entered into during the lifetime of the old CBA which
was to expire on October 31, 1977.  Hence, said new CBA was not yet in existence
when the instant petition for certification election was filed on September 13, 1977.  Said new CBA was to become effective on November 1, 1977 after the old CBA
expires on October 31, 1977,
and this, if no representation issue had arisen in the
meantime, which is not the case. 
Clearly, therefore, the contract-bar rule does not apply to the case at
bar.  Finally, it is indubitably clear
from the facts heretofore unfolded that management and petitioner herein
proceeded with such indecent haste in renewing their CBA way ahead of the
‘sixty-day freedom period’ in their obvious desire to frustrate the will of the
rank-and-file employees in selecting their collective bargaining representative.  To countenance the actuation of the company
and the petitioner herein would be violative of the
employees’ constitutional right to self-organization.^[11]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is dismissed for lack of
merit.  The temporary restraining order
issued by resolution of this Court of August 7, 1978 is hereby lifted and
declared to be of no force and effect. 
The certification election should be conducted as soon as possible.  No costs.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino,
Concepcion, Jr., and
Santos, JJ., concur.

^[1]
The Federation of Free Workers and the Synthetic Marketing and Industrial Corporation
are the private respondents.

^[2]
Petition, par. 6.

^[3]
Ibid, par. 6, Annex E.

^[4]
Ibid.

^[5]
He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Reynato
S. Puno and Solicitor Jesus V. Diaz.

^[6]
Comment, 1-3.

^[7]
Cf. Ang Tibay v.
Court, 69 Phil. 635, 642 (1940).

^[8]
Presidential Decree No. 442.

^[9]
Cf. Federation Obrera v. Noriel,
L-41937, July 6, 1976, 72 SCRA 24; UE Automotive Employees and Workers
Union-Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services v. Noriel, L-44350, Nov. 25, 1976, 74 SCRA 72; Philippine
Labor Alliance Council v. Bureau of Labor Relations, L-41288, Jan. 31,
1977, 74 SCRA 162; Today’s Knitting Free Workers Union v. Noriel, L-45057, Feb. 28, 1977, 75 SCRA 450; Benguet Exploration Miner’s Union v. Noriel, L-44110, March 29, 1977, 76 SCRA 107; Kapisanan v. Noriel,
L-45475, June 20, 1977, 77 SCRA 414; Rowell Labor Union-Trade Unions of the
Philippines v. Ople, L-52270, July 29, 1977,
78 SCRA 166; Vassar Industries Employees Union v. Estrella,
L-44652, March 31, 1978; National Mines and Allied Workers Union v.
Luna, L-46722, June 15, 1978; General Textiles Allied Workers Association v.
Director of Bureau of Labor Relations, L-45719, July 31, 1978; Scout Ramos Albano Memorial College v. Noriel,
L-48347, October 3, 1978.

^[10]
Cf. Antipolo Highway Lines v. Inciong, L-38532, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 441; Jacqueline
Industries v. National Labor Relations Commission, L-37034, Aug. 29,
1975, 66 SCRA 397; Federation Obrera v. Noriel, L-41937, July 6, 1976, 72 SCRA 24; Kapisanan ng mga
Manggagawa v. Noriel,
L-45475, June 20, 1977, 77 SCRA 414; Monark
International, Inc. v. Noriel, L-47570-71, May
11, 1978.

^[11]
Ibid, 3-5.