PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. PROCOPIO CADERAO, ACCUSED, ASSOCIATED INSURANCE & SURETY CO., INC., DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

After his conviction for estafa
by the Court of First Instance of Surigao in Criminal Case No. 1317,
Procopio O. Caderao was, upon application admitted to bail. To secure
performance of the conditions of the bond, the Associate Insurance
Surety Co., Inc. filed a personal bail bond in the amount of P2,000.00.

On November 9, 1956, the said court issued the following order:

“The Assistant Provincial Fiscal, in his amended
motion dated September 28, 1956, the consideration of which was finally
set for November 3, 1956, together with the manifestation dated October
6, 1956 and petition for extension dated October 18, 1956, of the
counsels of the accused, asks that an order of arrest be issued fop the
apprehension of said accused and of confiscation of his appeal bond it
appearing that until now said accused has not complied with his promise
to surrender himself voluntarily to the prison authorities at the New
Bilibid Prisons at Muntinlupa, Rizal, while said accused in his said
manifestation and petition for further extension, prays that he be
allowed further time to prepare himself and wind tip his personal and
family affairs and that in his efforts to settle, as he did in fact
already settled, his civil liabilities to the complainant Filemon
Bullo, his surrender to the prison authorities to serve his term has
been delayed.

“The Court, after due consideration of the grounds stated in the said
amended motion of the fiscal, as well as the reasons alleged by the
accused in his said manifestation and petition for extension, believes
that the further extension asked by the accused may be granted in order
to avoid further expense on the part of the government and at the same
time, on human considerations, in order not to cause sufferings and
hardships on the other members of the family of the accused, as well as
to those to whom the accused is trying to settle his pending civil
obligations, with the understanding that no farther extension will be
granted and that, if upon the expiration of the period herein granted
said accused will still fail to voluntarily surrender himself to the
prison authorities at said New Bilibid Prisons, no further ceremony
will be allowed but that this Court, will immediately order his arrest
and the confiscation of his bond.

“Wherefore, based on all the foregoing considerations, the said amended
motion of the fiscal is denied in the meantime and said accused is
hereby given the last and final extension up to the end of December,
1956, within which to proceed and voluntarily surrender himself to the
prison authorities of the New Bilibid Prison Muntinlupa, Rizal, with
the understanding that no further, extension will be granted and that
upon notice that said accused fails to comply within the period herein
granted, his immediate arrest and confiscation of his bond will be
ordered without further notice to said accused and to his bondsmen who
are hereby ordered to bring the person, of said accused to said prison
authorities not later than December 31, 1956. The Clerk of this Court
is instructed to notify the parties and their counsels, as well as the
Director of Prisons of this order.”

Procopio Caderao failed to surrender himself on or before
December 31, 1956. The Surety company also failed to produce him as
required by the court. But on January 4, 1957, it effected the arrest
of the accused and on the same day surrendered him to the Bureau of
Prisons. Three days later, the said company, alleging that it had
already complied with its obligation, submitted a motion for
cancellation of its bond and for discharge from liability as surety.
The assistant provincial fiscal opposed the motion. On June 22, 1957,
the motion was denied and judgment was rendered on the bond for the
amount of P500.00.

Reconsideration of the judgment having, been also denied, the surety
company took the present appeal to the Court of Appeals insisting that
it had already complied with its obligation as surety and,
consequently, should be relieved of liability on its bond. The Appeals
Court forwarded the case to us after finding that there is no issue of
fact involved.

At the outset, it should be stated that the pleadings filed by the
parties and the orders issued, if any, during the period between
February 27, 1954, when the bail bond was filed, and November 9, 1956,
when the order above quoted was issued, are not included in the record
on appeal. It is readily apparent, however, from the said order, which
speaks of the last and final extension up to the end of December 31,
1956, that there were other orders issued prior thereto granting the
accused extensions of time within which to surrender himself to the
prison authorities.

A word about these extensions. We think that, under the circumstances
obtaining in this case, the trial court was quite lenient in extending
the provisional liberty of the accused on bail for more than two years
and eight months. For it appears that they were requested by the
accused for no other reason than to prepare himself and wind up his
personal and family affairs before serving sentence. The right to bail
after conviction is not absolute, and while the person convicted may,
upon application be bailed at the discretion of the court, that
discretion-particularly with respect to extending the bail-should be
exercised, not with laxity, but with caution and only for strong
reasons with the end in view of upholding the majesty of the laws and
the administration of justice (See 8 C. J. S. pp. 69-70).

Going now into the merits of the case, We find untenable the appellant
surety company’s contention that since the accused was granted by the
order of November 9, 1956 an extension until December 31, 1956 within
which to surrender himself, it was not under obligation to effect his
arrest on or before that date. It is to be noted that the dispositive
portion of said order, which required the surrender of the accused
until the end of year 1956, was addressed not only to the accused but
also to the surety. It decreed in no uncertain terms that the bondsmen
are ordered to bring the person of said accused to said prison
authorities not later than December 31, 1956.” Since the accused,
despite several extensions of time, failed to appear or surrender
himself on or before the date required, and appellant surety was not
able to produce or surrender him until January 4, 1957, it can not be
validly claimed that said appellant has complied with its obligation so
as to be exonerated completely from liability under the bond. It is the
bonding company’s responsibility to produce the accused whenever,
required, and its failure to do so indisputedly constitutes a breach of
the guaranty (People vs. Gantang Kasim and Luzon Surety Co., 108 Phil., 171).

Of course, as held in the case of People vs.
Tan (101 Phil., 324), cited by the appellant, the failure of a surety
to produce the principal at a date set by the court does not constitute
a complete and irrevocable breach of the bond. And neither is the order
of forfeiture nor even the judgment then rendered against the surety to
pay the amount of the bond, final and irrevocable. They, are merely
provisional in character; subject to the contingency that the surety
may finally secure the arrest of the principal and the production of
his person as required. This does not mean, however, that the mere
production or appearance df the accused after his failure to appear
when first required suffices to exonerate the surety from liability,
nor entitles it to release as a matter of right. It is still necessary
that it gives satisfactory reasons why the accused failed to appear
when first required to do so (Sec. 15, Rule 110; People vs. Sy Beng Guat and,Manila Surety Co., Inc., 105 Phil., 574.).

In its motion for cancellation of the bond and discharge as surety, as
well as during the hearing thereof, the surety, by way of explaining
its failure to produce the accused on the date set, argued that even if
it wanted to it was powerless to effect his arrest in view of the
extension granted him within which to surrender. The argument was not
given serious consideration by the trial court, and we think,
correctly, for the responsibility assumed by the bail may be terminated
by it at any time, and to effect this end, it may arrest the principal
at pleasure and surrender him into the hands of the law. Thus, section
16 of Rule 110 provides that, upon application filed with the court and
after due notice to the fiscal, the bail bond shall be cancelled and
the sureties discharged from liability where said sureties so request
upon surrender of the defendant to the court. For purposes of
surrendering the defendant, the bailor has the right to arrest him, and
that right is incidental to the engagement, the issuing of process not
being necessary to its exercise (U.S. vs.
Addison, 27 Phil., 563; Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1957
ed., Vol. 2, p. 724). This is so because upon the assumption of the
obligation to bail, the sureties become in law the jailers of their
principal. Their custody of him is the continuance of the original
imprisonment, and though they cannot actually confine him, they are
subrogated to all the rights and means which the government possesses
to make their control of him effective. (U.S. vs. Addison, supra; U.S. vs. Bonoan, 22 Phil., 1; People vs. Tuising, 61 Phil., 404; People vs. Gonzales, 105 Phil, 47; People vs.
Otiak Omal Luzon Surety Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-14457, June 30, 1961). As
already stated, the several extensions granted to the accused within
which to surrender and commence the service of his sentence, were not
quite reasonable. The surety, therefore, even before the granting of
the last extension, could have very well surrendered him to the court
and thereafter request that it be discharged from liability.

Again, appellant claims that it did not arrest the accused on or before
December 31, 1956 because the court did not act on its motion for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. If the court did not resolve, or pass
upon said motion, it was because it did not need any warrant of arrest
to apprehend the accused for whom it bound itself as surety (Section
17, Rule 110.).

With the above observations, we fail to see any valid reason to
interfere with the discretion of the lower court in holding the
appellant surety liable on its bond.

The Solicitor-General, alleging in his brief that the accused had
willfully jumped his bail, recommends that the amount of P500
confiscated on the bond be increased to at least P1,000, or one half of
its entire amount. There is, however, no clear showing that the accused
did willfully jump bail. At any rate, the determination of the
sufficiency of the explanation given by a surety for its failure to
produce the person of the accused when his appearance is required by
the court and the reduction of its liability are matters within the
discretion of the court. Furthermore, courts are generally liberal in
dealing with bondsmen in criminal cases in mitigating their liability
on the bonds already confiscated when the accused is presented or
produced without considerable delay (See People vs.
Daisin, 101 Phil., 228). In the circumstances, there is no sufficient
justification to amend the partial remission of appellant’s liability
as found by the court below.

Wherefore, judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.