G. R. No. L-16357. April 22, 1963
MAGDALENA ESTATE, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. FRANCISCO BANGILAN, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Petitioners here are the
respondents in case No. 1177-V in the Court of Industrial Relations,
which was filed by herein respondents Francisco Bangilan et al, with
two causes of action. Under the first cause of action it is alleged
that herein respondents were hired by petitioners on different dates
and in different capacities to work on the Roads Department of the
Magdalena Estate, Inc., that after the enactment in 1951 of the Minimum
Wage Law, Republic Act No. 602, they were each paid only P3.00 daily,
which was less than the statutory minimum; that it was only on or about
July 10, 1956 that their wages were increased to P4.00 in compliance
with the law; and that they are entitled to the salary differentials
covering the years 1953 to July, 9, 1956. The second cause of action
has for lone petitioner in the court below herein respondent Maximino
Bautista who, aside from the salary differentials claimed by him under
the first cause of action, also asks for separation pay on the ground
that he was unjustly dismissed from his employment in January 1959,
after having been in the service of the Magdalena Estate, Inc., for a
period of twelve (12) years.
On July 30, 1959 the respondents below, now
petitioners, moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the Court
of Industrial Relations had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
either or both of the two causes of action. The motion was denied in an
order of respondent court dated August 27, 1959, on the strength of our
decisions in Cayetano Monares vs. CNS Enterprises, et al., G. R. No. L-11749, May 29, 1959, and Reynaldo Gomez vs.
North Camarines Lumber Company Inc., G.R. No. L-11949, August 18, 1958.
A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied, this time on the
ground that the first order of denial was interlocutory in nature.
Hence this petition for certiorari and/or prohibition to prevent
respondent judges from proceeding with the case.
Since the question raised in the lower court and now
posed before us concerns its jurisdiction and therefore goes to its
very power or authority to proceed at all in the case, the fact that
the order denying the motion to dismiss is interlocutory in nature
should not, in our opinion, bar the instant petition from being, as it
has been, given due course so that it may be resolved on the merits.
Is an action (1) for recovery of underpayment under the
Minimum Wage Law, and (2) for the recovery of separation pay under
Republic Act 1052, as amended by Republic Act 1787 , within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations? With respect to the
first item, we are of the opinion that the proper court before which
the claim should be presented is the Court of First Instance and not
the Industrial Ccurt, particularly where, as in this case, there is no
labor dispute involved and the claim pertains exclusively to the past
and has nothing to do with current wages. In Teodora Donato vs. Philippine Marine Officers Association Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-12506, May 18, 1959, it is stated:
“Underpayment of the minimum wage or violation of
the Minimum Wage Law is not one of the acts of unfair labor practice
enumerated in Republic Act No. 875 particularly. Section thereof, and
the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court under Section 5 thereof
exclusively refers to the prevention of unfair labor practice, not of
having allegedly, underpaid Monales by giving him a salary below the
minimum wage fixed by Republic Act 602; so that in our opinion, it is
clear that the Industrial Court decided and resolved a point absolutely
outside the question and case presented before it and over which it had
no juridiction,“Moreover, only the Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction over
cases arising from the Minimum Wage Law. Section 16 of said law,
Republic Act 602, provides that the Court of First Instance shall have
jurisdiction to restrain violations of said act. In the case of Isidoro
Cebrero vs.
Jose Talaman, 103 Phil. 687. decided on May 16, 1958, involving among
other things underpayment by an employer to an employee we said,
through Mr. Justice Alex Reyes that under Republic Act 602, knewn as
the Minimum Wage Law, an employee is authorized to bring an action in
the regular courts for the recovery of unpaid wages. The Industrial
Court with it limited jurisdiction does not come under the category of
regular courts.”
Section 16 (a) of Republic Act No. 602, referred to in the decision just cited, provides:
“SEC. 16. JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS.—(a)
The Court of First Instance shall have jurisdiction to restrain
violations of this Act; action by the Secretary or by the employees
affected to recover UNDERPAYMENT may be brought in any COMPETENT Court,
which shall render its decision on such cases within fifteen days from
the time the case has been submitted for decision; in appropriate
instances, appeal from the decisions of these courts on any action
under this Act shall be in accordance with applicable law.
The present case falls under the
provision abovequoted. On the other hand, the Industrial Court has
jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 16, subsections (b) and (c), in the event a case . . . involves as sole issue or as one of the issues a dispute as to minimum wages above the applicable statutory minimum
. . .;” and “where the demands of minimum wages involve an actual
strike .” . . The case at bar does not fall under either of the two
categories.
The Monares case relied upon by respondent
Judges in the order complained of is not in point. The question there
involved, was not underpayment under the Minimum Wage Law, but
differential pay, overtime pay, reinstatement to employ and damages,”
which question was held to be within the jurisdiction of the Industrial
Court.
With respect to the claim for separation or terminal pay by respondent
Maximino Bautista, the same is not within the jurisdiction of the
Industrial Court either. It was so ruled in the case of Hacienda
Luisita Estate vs. Artemio Alberto, et al., G.R. No. L-12133, Oct. 31, 1958 where we said:
“Alberto’s petition, after relating the dates of employment and
separation, merely complained that ‘they were removed summarily or
separated without justifiable cause.’ It described on other concurring
or qualifying incidents or data in connection with the removal. The
controversy was therefore, a matter not within the scope of the power
of the Industrial Court.
The case of Gomez vs. North Camarines Lumber Co., supra,
sited in the order denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss, is not
applicable. It relates a claim not only for separation pay but also for
overtime compensation under ths Eight-Hour Labor Law, and since the
latter is within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court, we said that
it is more in consonance with the ends of justice that both causes of
action be cognizable and heard by only one court.
The
writ prayed for is granted and respondent Judges of the Court of
Industrial Relations are permanently enjoined from taking cognizance of
and proceeding with case No. 1177-V now before it. Costs against the
other respondents.
Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, and Regala, JJ., concur.