DIRECTOR EDMUNDO S. ANCOG, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE JOSE Z. TAN, RESPONDENT.

Ancog versus Tan

The Case

This is an administrative case filed with the Supreme Court by Director Edmundo S. Ancog of the Human Rights Commission against Judge Jose Z. Tan of the Municipal Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar. The charge is gross ignorance of the law: the judge allegedly issued a warrant of arrest on the strength of hearsay evidence, in violation of the Rules of Court, and a man was arrested and jailed for twenty-two days as a result. The case matters because it fixes the standard for a judge's duty when he issues a warrant of arrest, and it reminds every magistrate that a mistake in judgment is one thing, but a deliberate disregard of the procedure laid down by the Rules is quite another.

Procedural History

The case began as an administrative complaint filed directly with the Supreme Court by the Director of the Human Rights Commission, through a letter dated the fourteenth of January, nineteen hundred ninety-three. The Supreme Court required the respondent judge to comment, and he filed his comment in March of that year. The complainant filed a reply in July. Meanwhile, the Court approved the respondent's application for disability retirement, but held the payment of the money value of his benefits in abeyance because of the pending complaint. The respondent then moved for early resolution, and the Court referred the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report, and recommendation. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended a fine of ten thousand pesos, to be deducted from his terminal leave pay. The Court then decided the case on the pleadings.

Facts

On the fourteenth of March, nineteen hundred ninety-one, the Chief of Police of Catbalogan, Samar, filed with the Municipal Trial Court a complaint for estafa against Lito Mirelles, Joel Navarete, and a certain Jun. The subject was a tricycle valued at nine thousand five hundred pesos, belonging to Joselito Mate, which he had entrusted to Lito Mirelles. The complaint was supported by the sworn affidavit of Joselito Mate, subscribed before the respondent judge. In that affidavit, Joselito stated that he had allowed Lito to drive the tricycle on a boundary basis; that on the eleventh of March, Lito failed to return it at the agreed hour; that he found the tricycle, already without wheels, near the house of Joel Navarete; and that Lito's wife told him that Joel and Jun were Lito's companions when the wheels were removed.

Finding probable cause, the respondent judge issued a warrant of arrest on the same day and fixed bail at four thousand pesos each. On the fifteenth of March, Joel Navarete was arrested and detained. On the twenty-sixth of March, the Public Attorney filed a motion to quash the warrant, on the ground that it rested on the hearsay statement of Joselito Mate. In an order dated the third of April, the respondent judge dismissed the case against Joel Navarete and ordered his immediate release, observing that the records did not show that the wife of Lito Mirelles had executed any affidavit to prove Joel's participation.

In his comment, the respondent judge did not deny that he had inadvertently issued the warrant. He claimed that he had the honest impression that Joel was involved, because the tricycle was recovered near Joel's house with its wheels removed. He admitted that, due to preoccupation with the duties of a busy court, he might have overlooked the deficiency of the evidence, begged the indulgence of the Court, and informed it that he was about to apply for disability retirement, being on dialysis due to renal failure.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge is administratively liable for ignorance of the law in issuing the warrant of arrest against Joel Navarete on the basis of hearsay evidence.
• Whether or not the absence of malice, or the absence of an allegation that the accused was totally innocent, mitigates that liability.

Applicable Provisions

Section 6, paragraph (b), of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. -- (b) By the Municipal Trial court. -- If the municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a warrant of arrest.

This is the very provision the respondent judge disregarded, because he issued the warrant without the required written examination under oath of the complainant and his witnesses.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the respondent judge clearly disregarded Section 6, paragraph (b), of Rule 112. Although his order mentioned an examination of the complainant and his lone witness in the form of searching questions and answers, his later comment spoke only of a preliminary examination of government witnesses, and he did not attach any copy of the required written examination. In the light of his own admission of inadvertence, it was evident that he did not actually conduct such an examination. He merely relied on the sworn statement of Joselito Mate, which was taken by a policeman, not by the judge, and which showed on its face that Joselito did not see Joel remove the wheels; he was merely informed by the wife of Lito Mirelles, who never executed any sworn statement and was never examined by the judge. That statement was obviously hearsay, and it established no probable cause against Joel Navarete.

The Court drew a careful line. An error in the determination of probable cause is judgmental and, absent grave abuse of discretion or malice, may not by itself give rise to disciplinary action. But that error was overshadowed by the deliberate disregard of the procedure laid down in the Rules. The Court stressed that such an act deprives a person of the right to liberty guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and that every judge should strictly follow the procedure for the issuance of a warrant, lest the court become the violator instead of the protector of the Bill of Rights.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the suggestion of the Office of the Court Administrator that the liability be mitigated. The accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, so the absence of an allegation that he was totally innocent is no mitigation. Neither would the presentation of the wife of Lito Mirelles have cured the defect, for she cannot testify against her husband without his consent.

Doctrine

A warrant of arrest may issue only after the judge has personally conducted an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses, in the form of searching questions and answers, and has satisfied himself that probable cause exists. The judge may not rely on a sworn statement taken by a police officer, nor on hearsay relayed at second hand. An error in the determination of probable cause is judgmental and, without grave abuse of discretion or malice, does not necessarily warrant disciplinary action; but a deliberate disregard of the procedure prescribed by the Rules for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is ignorance of the law for which the judge is administratively liable. Every judge must strictly follow that procedure, because a warrant touches the right to liberty guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.

Disposition

The Court found the respondent judge administratively liable for ignorance of the law and imposed upon him a fine of ten thousand pesos, to be deducted from his terminal leave pay.

Remember This

Memorize the line: a mistake in the determination of probable cause is judgmental, but a deliberate disregard of the procedure for issuing a warrant of arrest is ignorance of the law. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between a judge's erroneous judgment and his disregard of the mandatory examination in writing and under oath required by Rule 112.