DIRECTOR EDMUNDO S. ANCOG, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE JOSE Z. TAN, RESPONDENT.

In a letter dated 14 January 1993, Director Edmundo S. Ancog of
the Human Rights Commission charged respondent Judge Jose Z. Tan of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Catbalogan, Samar, with gross ignorance of the
law in issuing an order for the arrest of one Joel Navarete on the basis of
hearsay evidence and in violation of Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court, as a consequence of which Joel Navarete was arrested and incarcerated
for twenty-two (22) days.

The records disclose that on 14 March 1991, P/Capt. Manuel B.
Calbes, Chief of Police of Catbalogan, Samar, filed with the MTC of Catbalogan
a complaint for estafa against Lito Mirelles, Joel Navarete, and a certain
Jun. Subject matter thereof is a
tricycle valued at P9,500.00 belonging to Joselito Mate which was allegedly entrusted
by him to Lito Mirelles. The latter,
allegedly in conspiracy with his co-accused, failed to return it to the owner
despite demand. The complaint was
supported by the affidavit of Joselito Mate which was subscribed and sworn to
before the respondent Judge on 14 March 1991. Joselito alleged therein that he is the owner of the tricycle; that he
had been allowing Lito Mirelles to drive it on boundary basis; that on 11 March
1991, Lito got the tricycle to be returned at 7:00 o’clock in the evening; that
unfortunately, Lito did not; that Joselito looked for and found the tricycle,
already without wheels, near the house of Joel Navarete in barangay
Guinsorongan; and that Lito’s wife told him that Joel and Jun were Lito’s
companions when Lito removed the wheels of the tricycle.

After having found probable cause against the accused, the
respondent Judge issued on 14 March 1991 a warrant of arrest against them and
fixed their bailbond at P4,000.00 each.

On 15 March 1991, accused Joel Navarete was arrested and
detained.

On 26 March 1991, Atty. Ediberto G. Morales, Public Attorney III
of the Catbalogan District Office of the Public Attorneys Office, filed on
behalf of Joel Navarete a motion to quash the warrant of arrest on the ground
that it issued on the basis of the hearsay statement of Joselito Mate that he
was told by the wife of Lito Mirelles that Lito, together with Joel Navarete
and a certain Jun, removed the tires of the tricycle; hence, the warrant of
arrest was issued in violation of Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure.

In his Order of 3 April 1991, the respondent Judge dismissed the
case against Joel Navarete and ordered his immediate release. The order is based on the following
observations:

“Upon scrutiny of the records of the case, the Court has found
that the basis for the inclusion of said accused in the complaint is on the
sworn statement of complainant Joselito Mate wherein it is alleged that said
accused had participated in the dismantling of the wheels of the tricycle owned
by said complainant as per information relayed to him by the wife of one Lito
Mirelles.

The records do not reveal that said wife of Lito Mirelles had
executed an affidavit to prove the fact of accused’s alleged participation in
removing the wheels of the tricycle.”

In his 2nd Indorsement dated 16 March
1993, submitted in compliance with our Resolution of 22 February 1993 requiring
him to comment on the complaint, the respondent Judge “does not deny to
have inadvertently issued the warrant of arrest against accused Joel Navarete.”
He alleges, however, that:

“In the preliminary examination conducted by respondent on the
persons of government witnesses, respondent was at first of the honest
impression that accused Joel Navarete was also involved in the commission of
the crime since the tricycle, subject of the case, was recovered near his house
at Brgy. Guinsorongan, Catbalogan, Samar, with its wheels already removed and
there existed a strong probability that the wheels of the tricycle were removed
by accused Joel Navarete as pointed out in the testimonies of government
witnesses.

If ever there was a mistake in the issuance of the warrant of
arrest, the same was an honest one and there was no intention on respondent’s
part of committing such a wrong. As a
matter of fact, after realizing to have committed a mistake, respondent had to
order the dismissal of the case against Joel Navarete. This is borne out by
the records of the case.

Respondent profoundly
regrets for having issued the wrong order that had caused the detention of Joel
Navarete. Due, perhaps, to respondent’s
preoccupation with his other Court duties since he is assigned to a busy court,
he might have overlooked the deficiency of the evidence against accused Joel
Navarete.”

He then begs for the indulgence of this
Court and “promises to avoid repeating the same act and to be more careful
in his official actuations” and informs the Court that “he is about
to apply for disability retirement considering that this is his 19th year in
the judiciary and he is now undergoing dialysis due to renal failure.”

In his 5 July 1993 reply to the comment which he submitted in
compliance with the Resolution of 3 May 1993, the complainant draws our
attention to the admission made by the respondent in his comment that he
(respondent) issued the warrant of arrest on the basis of his impression that
Joel was also involved in the crime and submits that Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court is so clear that it does not allow mere personal impressions. The complainant contends that the respondent
should have conducted searching questions and answers.

On 27 July 1993, upon recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator, this Court approved respondent’s application for disability
retirement under R.A. No. 910, as amended by R.A. No. 5095 and P.D. No. 1438,
effective upon approval, it appearing that respondent, who is over 62 years of
age with more than 21 years of government service, “is suffering from
Chronic Renal Failure, end stage secondary to bilateral staghorn calculus”
and that Dr. Raymundo Reyes, Medical Officer IV, with the concurrence of Dr.
Carmen C. Valero, Director II, and Dr. Cecilia C. Villegas, Director I, of this
Court’s Clinic recommended that he “be retired under a permanent and total
disability.” However, the payment of the money value of his benefits was
ordered held in abeyance in view of the pendency of this complaint.

On 18 August 1993, respondent filed a motion for the early
resolution of this case.

On 30 August 1993, we referred this case to the Office of the
Court Administrator for appropriate evaluation, report, and recommendation.

In the Memorandum of 9 September 1993, the Office of the Court
Administrator recommends that the respondent Judge “be fined in the amount
of P10,000.00 to be deducted from his terminal leave pay, it appearing that his
application for disability retirement (classified as permanent and total
disability) was approved on July 27, 1993 in A.M. No. 8090-Ret., but the
payment of the money value of his benefits was held in abeyance in view of the
pendency of this instant administrative case.” In support of its
recommendation for the imposition of the above penalty, the Office of the Court
Administrator opined that:

“The main thrust of this complaint is respondent’s failure to
observe his duty under Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as a consequence of which Joel Navarete was incarcerated. He was
released after 22 days when respondent’s error was brought to his
attention. There is no allegation of
malice in the issuance of the warrant for his arrest, nor allegations that the
said accused was totally innocent of the crime charged. On the other hand, had the wife of accused
Mate been presented before respondent during the preliminary investigation, this
complaint would have no leg to stand on. Thus, the extreme penalty for the deprivation of the liberty of the
subject person may not be imposed upon respondent.”

We shall consider the respondent Judge’s motion for early resolution as a motion to decide the
case on the basis of the pleadings. Indeed,
the facts in this case are simple and uncomplicated. Respondent Judge openly admits that he “inadvertently issued
the warrant of arrest” or “committed a mistake” in issuing it
and that such issuance was based on his “honest impression” that
accused Joel Navarete “was also involved in the commission of the
crime.”

We see here a clear disregard by the respondent Judge of Section
6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:

“SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. —

x x x

(b) By the Municipal Trial court. — If the municipal trial judge conducting
the preliminary investigation is satisfied
after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a
necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a warrant of arrest.”

While it may be true that his Order of 14 March 1991 made mention
of the “examination of the complainant and his lone witness in the form of
searching questions and answers,” yet his 2nd Indorsement of 16 March
1993, speaks only of the “preliminary examination conducted x x x on the person of government
witnesses.” He did not attach to the 2nd Indorsement a copy of the examination in
writing and under oath of
the complainant and his witness as required
by the aforequoted paragraph (b) of Section 6, Rule 112. In the light
of his admission of “inadvertence” or “mistake” in the issuance of the arrest warrant, it
is evident that he did not actually conduct such an examination. If one had been made, he would have attached
a copy thereof to his compliance. What
seems clear to us is that the respondent Judge merely relied on the sworn
statement of the complainant, Joselito Mate, which was subscribed and sworn to
before him. That was not enough, for
said sworn statement, although in “question and answer” form, was
taken by Patrolman Jose Marlon Refuncion of the Catbalogan Police Station with
the questions being propounded by the latter; it is obvious therefrom that
Joselito did not see Joel Navarete and his co-accused remove the wheels of the
tricycle. Joselito was merely informed
by the wife of Lito Mirelles — the principal accused to whom the tricycle was
entrusted — that Joel and one Jun were with Lito when the latter removed the
wheels. The wife of Lito did not
execute any sworn statement and was not examined by the respondent Judge. Since it is clear from the face of Joselito’s
sworn statement that there is nothing against Joel except the alleged statement
of the wife of Lito — which is obviously hearsay — the respondent Judge
should not have issued the warrant of arrest. Indeed, the sworn statement of Joselito establishes no probable cause
against Joel Navarete. That none exists
was frankly admitted by the respondent Judge when he issued the Order of 3
April 1991 dismissing the case against Joel Navarete and ordering his immediate
release from detention. To us, however,
the error or mistake in the determination that there was probable cause which
is judgmental and which, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or malice,
may not necessarily give rise to disciplinary action is overshadowed by the
deliberate disregard of the procedure laid down in the Rules regarding the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. Considering that such an act deprives a person of the right to liberty
solemnly guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, every Judge should strictly follow
the procedure for its issuance, lest by his act or omission, the court would
become the violator instead of the protector of the Bill of Rights.

The administrative liability then of the respondent Judge for
ignorance of law is beyond dispute. We
do not agree with the implied suggestion of the Office of the Court
Administrator that such liability may be mitigated by the absence of any
allegation in the complaint that accused Joel Navarete was totally innocent of
the crime charged for he is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved by
the prosecution. Nor do we agree with
it that “had the wife of accused Mate been presented before respondent
during the preliminary investigation, this complaint would have no leg to stand
on.” In the first place,
Mate is not an accused in the estafa case but the complainant. The wife referred to is the wife of accused
Lito Mirelles who, however, cannot testify against her husband without his
consent. (Section 22, Rule 130, Revised
Rules of Court).

WHEREFORE, for ignorance of the law governing the issuance
of a warrant of arrest, the Court hereby imposes upon respondent Judge JOSE Z.
TAN a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to be deducted from his terminal
leave pay.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Bellosillo, and
Quiason, JJ., concur.

Griño-Aquino, J., on official
leave.