JOSE B. LINGAD, AS COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS AND PEDRO PACIS, AS ACTING COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MANILA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. HIGINIO B. MACADAEG AND AGRO INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT, INC., …

Petition for a writ of certiorari to set aside a preliminary
mandatory order issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila on
August 13, 1962, in its Civil Case No. 471659, the dispositive part of
which is of the following tenor:

“In view of the foregoing, by way of supplementing
this Court’s preliminary mandatory order of January 22, 1962 and in
accordance with the Implementation Agreement of the parties of June 7,
1962, the Commissioner of Customs and his deputy the Collector of
Customs for the Port of Manila, and all their subordinates and
employees and all persons acting under them, are hereby ordered to
effect the immediate transfer of the tobacco importation of Agro
Industrial Products Inc., excepting the first 1/6 being cleared for
release, to each customs officials and may be acceptable to the said
importer’s bank.

SO ORDERED.”

For a background, it is to be recalled that this Supreme Court, by a
final decision rendered on April 18, 1962, in its Civil Case G. R. No.
Lr-19440, entitled “Climaco, et al. vs. Macadaeg, et al.,”
upheld the right of the Agro Industrial Products, Inc. (Agro for short)
to import in 1961 21,618 hogsheads of Virginia tobacco (9,353,471
kilos) under terms and conditions set by the then President of the
Philippines, Carlos P. Garcia, overruling the opposition of the Customs
authorities and others. Pending resolution of a motion for
reconsideration and clarification, the parties in that case, the
Commissioner and the Collector of Customs, the Central Bank of the
Philippines, the ACCFA (Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing
Administration), and the importer, Agro Industrial Products, Inc.
entered into an “Agreement for the Implementation of the Supreme Court
decision” on 7 June 1962, whereby the Agro Industrial company’s tobacco
shipments would be gradually released by i/6 parts upon compliance by
the importer of certain specified formalities and conditions. Paragraph
6 of the implementation agreement (Rec, page 20) recited the following:

“6. As to Agro’s request for immediate transfer of
the imported tobacco from the piers to such customs bonded warehouses
that the Collector may designate and acceptable to Agro’s banks,
pending resolution of the motion for clarification by the Supreme
Court, it is tentatively agreed in principle that Agro may do so after
the tobacco is weighed, examined and the taxes paid or secured to be
paid; and that the said tobacco is, after such transfer, insured,
including the taxes and duties due thereon, against loss by fire,
theft, flood or any other calamity; and upon compliance with pertinent
customs rules and regulations on such transfers to the aforesaid
customs bonded warehouses.”

Over one month after the implementation agreement was executed, i.e., on July 31, 1962, the Supreme Court resolved^[1]
that, in view of Agro’s tender import entries and customs duties in
1961, improperly rejected by petitioner Customs authorities, the
customs duties due and collectible from Agro on account of its tobacco
importation were those duties in force in 1961, and not the increased
ones in force in 1962; and that Agro’s export of filler tobacco was not
a condition for its importation. In View or this resolution, Agro asked
the Customs authorities to release the 1/6 of its import upon tender of
1961 duties, as per agreement, and to allow the transfer of the
remaining 5/6 to Customs bonded warehouses to forestall additional
customs storage charges which are four times more than those of bonded
warehouses, and to provide adequate storage facilities for the
tobacco. As the Customs authorities delayed answer, Agro filed an
urgent motion in the Court of First Instance, where the import case was
pending. According to the petition in this case before us (par. XI)
(Rec, pp. 4-5) :

“XI

During the hearing of the Urgent Motion on August
18, 1962, before the respondent Judge, the Hon. Higinio B. Macadaeg,
the herein petitioners did not object to the transfer of the remaining
6/6 of the shipment to customs bonded warehouses with the following
conditions:—(1) that Agro should file the warehousing entry in
accordance with Section 1906 of the Tariff and Customs Code (R.A. No.
1937); (2) that before the transfer of such remaining shipment to
customs bonded warehouses, the shipment should first be examined and
weighed by the Appraisers’ Division and when the duties, taxes and
other charges had been determined a bond equivalent to one and one-half
times the amount thereof conditioned upon the withdrawal of the
articles within the prescribed period and for the payment of any
duties, taxes and other charges to which the articles shall be subject
in accordance with the provisions of Section 1904 of Republic Act 1937;
(3) that after the transfer to such customs bonded warehouses which the
Collector may designate and acceptable to Agro’s bank, said tobacco is
insured, including the taxes and duties due thereon, against loss by
fire, theft, flood or any other calamity; and (4) that after the
transfer and before the Collector of Customs Anally releases such
tobacco to Agro from the customs bonded warehouses, the corresponding
duties, taxes and other charges due therefrom must first be paid upon
presentation of the corresponding release certificate from the Central
Bank. The foregoing conditions interposed by the Collector for the
release of the tobacco are in accordance with customs rules and
regulations and pursuant to the provisions of Section 1906 of the
Tariff and Customs Code, and the Implementation Agreement (Par. 6,
Annex “I” attached to Annex C of this petition)”

In the challenged order of August 1«J, 1962, the respondent Judge
Macadaeg of the Manila Court overruled Customs objections, and held
that (Rec, pp. 38-39)—

“* * * it would avoid delay and needless expenses
and considering that the total shipments consist of approximately 7000
hogsheads, for tobacco shipments stored in the piers to be now weighed
and examined and thereafter transferred to bonded warehouses where they
will remain under customs custody, so that they may be ready for
release and delivery upon completion of the first 1/6 shipment in
accordance with the implementation Agreement of the parties. While
Atty. Coronel of the Bureau of Customs manifested, upon advice of
Solicitor Rosete, that even if Agro should file warehousing entries for
the said shipments, the rate of duties that would be collected thereon
would be the 1961 rates as held by the Supreme Court and not be the
present year’s rates at the time of the withdrawal ns provided by the
Tariff and Customs Code for such warehousing entries, the Court holds
that it is a superflous technically to require the filing of
warehousing entries, which the Customs’ legal counsel candidly admits
might give rise to such technicalities. This was not a condition in the
parties’ Implementation Agreement and the Supreme Court has upheld the
entry papers as offered by Agro in 1961. Technicalities should not
stand in the way of the expeditious release of the tobacco, which has
already caused considerable damage and injury as held by the Supreme
Court.”

and granted Agro’s motion. Their motion for reconsideration having
been denied, the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs
for Manila, Cesar Climaco and Teotimo Roja, resorted to this Court,
charging abuse of discretion and asking certiorari. In June of 1964,
they were substituted by petitioners Jose 6. Lingad, as present
Commissioner of Customs, and Pedro Pads, as present Collector for the
Port of Manila. ‘

The main burden of the petitioners’ complaint is that the challenged
order allegedly violates the Tariff Code (Rep. Act No. 1937), section
1906, because said order would, in effect, compel the Customs
authorities to permit the transfer of imported merchandise to bonded
customs warehouses upon consumption entries filed by Agro, instead of
warehousing entries, as allegedly contemplated by law.

The trouble with the petitioners’ stand, and one that makes it
untenable, is that petitioners seek to ignore that the original entries
for consumption covering these goods and tendered by Agro in 1961 have
been held valid by the Supreme Court in the previous case (G.R. No.
L-19440), and said entries were declared improperly rejected by the
Customs authorities. Such being the case, Customs officers can no
longer require new customs entries for the very same goods; the law
does not demand or authorize any such duplication of customs entries
for the identical merchandise. If in the instant case five-sixths
(5/6ths) of the tobacco is to be warehoused, it is not because of any
requirements of the Customs and Tariff Code but because the
implementation agreement (of 7 June 1962) so provides (par. 6,
previously quoted). The court below, therefore, correctly held that the
demand upon Agro to file warehousing entries, notwithstanding the ones
filed in 1961, was a superfluous technically that would serve no useful
purpose.

It may be added that by insisting on the retention of the tobacco in
the Customs premises, where storage charges are four times higher than
those of bonded warehouses, the petitioners are practically penalizing
the importer for having obtained this Court’s decision in its favor.

The petitioning Customs officers stress that the implementation
agreement stipulates that the transfer to the bonded customs warehouses
was to be “upon compliance with pertinent customs rules and
regulations”. These words, however, can not be understood to include
the filing of new customs entries, since the previous entries already
filed in 1961 have been recognized as valid and binding by the Supreme
Court; otherwise, the agreement cf June 7, 1962, if construed to
require new customs entries, would invalidate those of 1961; it would
not then be in implementation of the decision in Case G. R. No. L-19440
but would be one to evade or shortage its effects. Petitioners would be
incredibly naive if they believed or expected that courts would permit
them to circumvent a final decision of the highest tribunal of the
land, when their duty is to comply with it in all honesty and good
faith.

Since the prerogative writ of certiorari does not lie except to correct, not every misstep, but a grave abuse of discretion, i.e., a capricious arbitrary or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction⁽¹⁾,
and since the contested order is in pursuance of the decision and
resolution of this Supreme Court in G. R. No. L-19440, and in full
accord with the intent and spirit thereof, we are left with no
alternative but to dismiss this petition.

Wherefore, the writ of certiorari prayed for is denied. No costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Resolution on Motion to Reconsider, G.R. No. L-19440.

⁽¹⁾ Abad Santos vs. Province of Tarlac, 67 Phil., 480; Tavera-Luna, Inc., vs. Nable, 67 Phil., 340; Tan vs. People, L-4260, April 27, 1951; Hamoy vs. Sec. of Agriculture, L-13456, January 20, 1960.