G.R. No. L-19795. July 30, 1964
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. BIENVENIDO VILLARIN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
a complaint against Bienvenido Villarin before the Justice of the Peace
Court of Malimono, Surigao, for acts of lasciviousness with consent of
the offended party. After trial, the court found Villarin guilty as
charged, and, taking into account the aggravating circumstances of
disregard of respect due the offended party and of dwelling, sentenced
him to suffer 4 months and 15 days of arresto mayor, to be served in the provincial jail of Surigao, and to pay P5.00 as costs. Villarin appealed to the court of first instance.
After conducting a preliminary investigation, the provincial fiscal
filed with said court an information against Villarin for corruption of
minor in violation of Article 340 of the Revised Penal Code, and upon
being arraigned under said information he pleaded not guilty. Before
the case could be heard, his counsel filed a motion to quash on the
ground that the information does not allege facts constituting the
crime charged, which motion was opposed by the fiscal. In an order of
March 22, 1960, the court resolved to dismiss the case, whereupon,
after his motion for reconsideration was denied, the liscal took the
present appeal.
The government argues that this case having originated in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Mali mono, Surigao upon a complaint filed
by the offended party and having been tried therein on the merits,
resulting in the conviction of the accused, the filing of an
information on appeal is not necessary for the same could have been
prosecuted on the strength of the same information. Nevertheless, the
fiscal filed a new information changing the nature of the crime charged
from acts of lasciviousness with consent to that of corruption of minor
which, it is argued, the fiscal cannot do. Yet, the court a quo allowed
the filing of a new information, only to dismiss the case later upon
motion of the accused. The government finally contends that the accused
cannot now set up the plea of double jeopardy for the reason that such
plea is based upon an invalid information.
We find correct this observation of the government for the rule is
well-settled that when an appeal is perfected from a judgment of the
justice of the peace or municipal court the judgment is vacated and the
case is tried de novo in the court of first instance as if it
were there origindlly instituted. No new information need be filed in
the latter court hi order that it may acquire jurisdiction to try and
decide the case. True, the prosecution may choose to stand on the
information filed in the justice of the peace court, or file a new
information in the court of first instance, but if it chooses to file a
new information it cannot change the nature of the offense charged in
the information filed with the justice of the peace court, for if the
prosecution file3 a new case unrelated to the appeal the court could
not act on the strength of its appellate jurisdiction.[1]
It could only proceed to act if it has the approval or consent of both
the prosecution and the accused. This consent not having been obtained,
the court a quo erred in acting on the new information filed
herein, and more so in dismissing it after the accused had given a plea
of not guilty.
But this error cannot now be remedied by setting aside the order of
dismissal of the court a quo and by remanding the case to it for
further proceedings as now suggested by the prosecution considering
that the case was dismissed without the express consent of the accused
even if it was upon the motion of his counsel, for to do so would place
the accused in double jeopardy. The only exception to the rule on the
matter is when the. dismissal is with the consent of the accused, and
here this consent has not been obtained.[2]
It should, however, be stated here that the complaint filed by the
offended party before the Justice of the Peace Court of Malimono,
Surigao, for acts of lasciviousness with consent does not substantially
disagree with the new information filed by the fiscal before the court a quo
even if it added allegations showing that the offense could also be
considered as one of corruption of minor as defined in Article 340 of
the Revised Penal Code, for in both said complaint and information the
essential allegations constituting acts of lasciviousness clearly
appear. Thus, in both said complaint and information it is alleged that
the accused with lewd designs or to satisfy his own lust
induced the offended party to massage his private part to the annoyance
of said offended party, which clearly indicate that, while the
information iharges the accused with the offense of corruption of
minors, it likewise charges him with acts of lasciviousness as to which
he could have been tried by the court a quo on appeal without need of
dismissing the Case, as was erroneously done by it. Verily, with this
dismissal, tho court a quo committed a mistake which could have been
avoided had it exercised more diligence in the performance of its
duties. But, as already stated, this error is now beyond relief.
Wherefore, this appeal is hereby dismissed. No costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
[1] People vs. Carreon, L-17920, May 30, 1962; People vs. Co Hiok, 62 Phil, 501; Crisostomo vs. Director of Prisons, 41 Phil., 368; Andres vs. Wolfe, 5 Phil., 60.
[2] People vs. Tacneng, et. al., L-12052, April 30, 1959; People vs. Robles, 105 Phil., 1016; People vs. Bao, 106 Phil, 243.