ASSOCIACION DE AGRICULTORES DE TALISAY-SILAY, INC., TRINO MONTINOLA, FERNANDO CUENCA, EDUARDO LEDESMA, EMILIO JISON, NILO LIZARES, NICOLAS JALANDONI AND SECRETARY OF LABOR, PLAI…

Motion for reconsideration signed by Attorney Camilo
L. Sabio on his own behalf and on behalf of the law
firm of Attorneys Montemayor & Dimaano as “counsel for the laborers” involved in
this case, but not joined by any attorney of the Ministry of Labor, for the
reconsideration, for the grounds therein discussed, of the decision of this
Court dated February 19, 1979.

Brushing aside as of secondary importance the issue of whether or
not private counsel who has signed the subject motion for reconsideration and
whose authority to appear for the Minister of Labor was not affirmed by the
Minister when asked to do so by the Court, has the personality to appear in
this case as counsel of record, and attending instead to the grounds vehemently
and lengthily expounded in said motion in order that no argument as to the merits
of the cause of the laborers involved herein may not remain unresolved, the
Court has opted to take up the points raised by counsel Sabio
which, to be sure, are not really new.

In synthesis, the basic argument advanced by counsel is that in
effect Republic Act 809 enjoins that, first, contracts between the millers and
the planters in all sugar milling districts entered into subsequent to June 22,
1952, the date of its effectivity, may not be taken
into account in determining whether or not there was a majority of planters in
the district with written milling contracts with the central during the crop
years material to this case, for purposes of the Act’s application, and,
second, that should any such contracts be entered into, the rate of sharing
between the miller and the planters should not be less than that prescribed in
Section 1 of the Act.  As may be seen in Our decision, the Court has already fully considered the
points raised by counsel and has found them to be insufficiently persuasive,
albeit quite impressive and to a certain degree plausible.  We are fully convinced, however, that the
language of the pertinent provisions of the Act, notwithstanding the individual
opinions of certain members of Congress quoted by counsel, does not evince a
definite intent to deny to the planters and millers the freedom of contract to
the extent indicated in the motion.  Such
a sacred fundamental right of the parties may be denied only expressly or by
indubitable implication from the terms and tenor of the statute itself and not
in the light of the arguments of particular legislators during the debates in
the course of its enactment, which can be inconclusive.  To Our mind, the provision of Section 1 to
the effect that “the unrefined sugar … as well as by-products”
produced in the district “shall be divided between the central and the
planters” in the proportions therein prescribed “in the absence of
written milling agreements between the majority of planters and the millers”
unequivocally means that when there are such written milling agreements, the
section would not apply.  Notably, this
language does not distinguish between contracts in force at the time of the
enforcement of the Act, on the one hand, and contracts to be executed
thereafter, on the other.  To construe
said provision as contemplating only the contracts then in existence and about
to expire to the exclusion of new ones to be executed later is to read into the
law something it does not suggest at all, considering particularly that in the
contrary sense, it would be tantamount to an injunction against the execution
of new contracts, which would be violative of the
fundamental right of freedom of contract as distinguished from the
constitutional prohibition against impairment of contractual obligations.  The Court cannot see its way clear to the
adoption of such a construction, much as it feels that any doubt, if any
exists, must be resolved in favor of giving labor the maximum benefit derivable
from social legislations, such as Republic Act 809 should be deemed to be.  Indeed, if social justice is to remain a
noble and worthy ideal, it must be practiced without unnecessary infringement
of the inalienable liberties consecrated in the fundamental law of the land for
the promotion of the general welfare, unless there is clear and unmistakable
warrant for the exertion of state power. 
We have said in Our decision that in appropriate instances social
justice may be more compelling and imperious than police power where labor is
involved, but the basis for such occasions must be definite not equivocal, to
avoid the imbalance of rights and opportunities which it is precisely the aim
of social justice to equalize for the protection of the poor and the underprivileged
to which the working class belongs.

Moreover, We take judicial notice of the
fact that in actuality, contracts have been entered into with rates of sharing
different from those prescribed in Section 1 in practically all the milling
districts in the Philippines
after the passage of Republic Act 809.  Such
contemporary construction of the law in actual practice, if indeed challenged
by labor in some instances, only proves that the construction proposed by
counsel is not commonly accepted by the others concerned, much less
indubitable.

As regards the plaint that under the terms of Our judgment,
payment of money corresponding to the laborers should be made to the Asociacion or the planters who in turn are sentenced to pay
the laborers, instead of said money being paid directly to the laborers thru
the Minister of Labor, all that needs be stated is that under Section 1 of the
Act, the primary distribution is between the miller and the planters, and the
requirement in Section 9 thereof that “any increase in the participation
granted the planters … shall be divided between the planter and his
laborer” in the proportion therein fixed is evidently predicated on the
fact that as the employer, the planter is the one supposed to pay the laborers,
albeit it is provided that such payment must be done under the supervision of
the Minister of Labor pursuant to such orders for the enforcement of the said
provision as he may issue, obviously to insure the due identity of and full
payment to all the laborers concerned.  To
avoid, however, that the money paid to the Asociacion
or the planters purportedly for the share of the laborers fixed in the law may
serve its purpose, it is understood that no part of the 60% of the money to be
paid to the planters shall be available to the planter concerned until after
the Ministry of Labor shall have certified that all his laborers entitled
thereto have been fully paid.

In view of the foregoing, the Court resolved to DENY the
motion for reconsideration aforementioned, and in
order to terminate once and for all this litigation of more than a quarter of a
century, We hereby declare this DENIAL to be FINAL, and Our decision may now be
executed.  Accordingly, with the same
finality, We hereby DENY the motions of the Asociacion, the CENTRAL and the amicus curiae
Attorneys Tañada, Sanchez, Tañada
and Tañada, for extension of time to file their own
respective motions for reconsideration.

Castro, C.J., Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., in the result.

Teehankee, Aquino, and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., did not take
part.

Abad Santos, J., on leave.