JAMES JOSEPH, MIGUEL ROMULO, ANTONIO SANTA-MARIA, RAMON IGNACIO MORAN, EUGENIO LOPEZ III, AND JAIME CLAPAROLS, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ONOFRE VILLALUZ, AS JUDGE PRESIDING OVE…

This is a petition for prohibition, certiorari and mandamus
with preliminary injunction and/or petition for habeas corpus seeking the
following relief:

“WHEREFORE, petitioners respectfully pray that writs of
prohibition issue commanding respondents to desist from further prosecution of
Criminal Cases Nos. CCC-VII-1750-51 of the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, of certiorari annulling the
orders of February 7 and 28, 1977 and June 10, 1977 of respondent judge in said
criminal cases denying petitioners’ demurrers to the evidence and motion for
separate trial of each accused, and of mandamus commanding respondents
to render a judgment of acquittal of petitioners from the said criminal
charges.  Or, at the very least, they
respectfully pray that the lower court be ordered to grant each petitioner
separate trials.  In the alternative,
they also pray for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus which extends to the
continued restraint on petitioners’ liberty when petitioners are entitled to
acquittal from the criminal charges by force of their constitutional rights.

Immediately, they respectfully apply for the issue ex-parte of a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents judge and fiscal to desist from continuing with the trial and
proceedings of the aforesaid criminal cases, followed by such writ of
preliminary injunction to the same tenor and effect, petitioners offering a bond
executed to the parties enjoined in an amount, to be fixed by the Court, to the
effect that petitioners will pay to such parties all damages which they may
sustain by reason of the injunction if the Court should finally decide that
petitioners were not entitled thereto.

They pray for such other remedy as the Court may deem just and
equitable in the premises.

Manila, June 14, 1977.”^[1]

As prayed for, the respondents were “RESTRAINED from
continuing with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. CCC-VII-1750-51 which are
pending before the Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial District at Pasig, Metro Manila, and from further proceeding with the
case until further orders from this Court.”^[2]

The petitioners, James Joseph, Miguel Romulo,
Antonio Santamaria, Ramon Ignacio Moran, Eugenio Lopez III, and Jaime Claparols
Jr., were charged by Noemi L. Garcia with the crime
of multiple rape in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.  The complaint was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 20380 but upon transfer to the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, the same was docketed as
Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-1750-Rizal.^[3]

The petitioners Jaime Claparols, Jr.
and Ramon Ignacio Moran were also charged with another offense of multiple rape
by the same complainant before the Court of First Instance of Rizal.  The complaint
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 20381 but upon transfer to the Circuit
Criminal Court, the same was docketed as Criminal CAse
No. CCC-VII-1751-Rizal.^[4]

Upon arraignment, the accused-petitioners entered a plea of not
guilty in both cases.  A joint trial on
the merits of both cases of all the accused was commenced and the prosecution
presented its evidence.

After the prosecution had completed the presentation of its
evidence in chief, the petitioner Claparols, Jr.
filed a motion to dismiss dated November 19, 1976; the petitioner Lopez filed a
motion to acquit dated November 19, 1976; the petitioners Romulo,
Santamaria and Joseph filed a motion to dismiss dated
November 22, 1976; and the petitioner Moran filed a motion to dismiss dated
November 22, 1976.

The respondent judge, Hon. Onofre Villaluz, then heard the oral arguments of the movants in amplification of their formal motions to
dismiss/acquit and the oral arguments of the prosecution in support of their
opposition thereto.

The respondent judge denied the motions in an order dated February 7, 1977 which reads:

“After a thorough perusal of the records and considering the
allegations of the issues raised and arguments adduced in the Motion to Acquit
and/or Dismiss filed by the respective counsels of the accused, together with
the opposition thereto; and considering further the exhaustive oral argument of
the parties which lasted for almost eight (8) hours, the Motion to Dismiss
and/or Acquit is hereby Denied.

WHEREFORE, let the hearing on the presentation of evidence for the
defense be set on February 9, 1977
at 9:00 o’clock in the morning.

SO ORDERED.

Pasig,
Metro Manila, February 7, 1977.

(Sgd.) ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ

Judge”^[5]

The motion for reconsideration of the petitioners of the order
denying the Motions to Dismiss/Acquit was likewise denied by the respondent
Judge in an order dated February 28, 1977 on the ground that “the issues
raised and arguments adduced in the Motion for Reconsideration together with
the opposition thereto were the same grounds adduced in the Motion to Dismiss
and/or Acquit were virtually covered by the extensive arguments of both parties
x x x.”^[6]

Thereafter, the petitioners, Antonio Santamaria,
Ramon Ignacio Moran, Eugenio Lopez III and Jaime Claparols, Jr. filed a motion dated June 7, 1977 asking for
separate trial for each accused on the ground that:

“x x x The
defenses of the accused are individual and separate from each other, because –

(a)    Technically, none of the accused need defend
himself against charges which allegedly occurred before they respectively
arrived at the Romulo house.

(b)    At the Romulo
home, no evidence in fact was presented that any of the accused participated in
the rape committed by any one of them.

(c)    They should not therefore be prejudiced by
any evidence presented by such of the other accused on those charges allegedly
committed before their respective arrivals at the Romulo
home and in which they are not even said to have participated.”^[7]

This motion was denied by the respondent
judge on June 10, 1977.  The said petitioners’ verbal motion for
reconsideration of the order of denial was denied.

The respondent Judge then reset the joint trial of the two cases
for reception of the evidence for the defense on September 22, 24, 27 and 29,
1977.  The trial did not proceed in view
of the restraining order issued by this Court pursuant to its resolution of June 21, 1977.

The petitioners assail the order of the respondent judge denying
their Motions to Dismiss/Acquit on the following grounds:

“Respondent judge had consistently and invariably denied in
all criminal cases heard by him demurrers to the evidence (motions to dismiss
after close of the evidence of the prosecution on the ground that it did not
amount to proof beyond reasonable doubt) on the opinion that the Rules of Court
in omitting provisions for a demurrer to evidence in criminal cases prohibited
it.  This opinion denies petitioners
their following rights under the Constitution, i. e.,
‘In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved x x x’ and ‘no person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself.’ Therefore, the continued
prosecution of petitioners without a just resolution of their demurrers to
evidence should be prohibited.  The
denial of constitutional rights is reviewable on
habeas corpus proceedings at the very least.”^[8]

The submission that the petitioners were deprived of their
constitutional right to be presumed innocent and the right against
self-incrimination by the denial of their Motions to Dismiss/Acquit by the
respondent Judge has no merit.  The
respondent Judge made a thorough perusal of the records of the cases and
considered the exhaustive arguments of the parties which lasted for almost
eight (8) hours before resolving the Motions to Dismiss/Acquit.  The motion for reconsideration of the order
denying the Motion to Dismiss/Acquit was denied because said motion contained
the same grounds adduced in petitioners’ Motions to Dismiss/Acquit.  There is no showing that the respondent Judge
denied the Motions to Dismiss/Acquit allegedly because of his opinion that the
Rules of Court in omitting provisions for a demurrer to evidence in criminal
cases prohibited it.

The petitioners are not precluded from presenting their
evidence.  In fact, the continuation of
the hearing of both cases was set on September 22, 24, 27 and 29, 1977 for the
reception of the evidence for the defense.

It is true that an accused is presumed innocent until his guilt
is shown beyond reasonable doubt. 
However, after the prosecution has adduced evidence, the constitutional
presumption of innocence must yield to what has been so amply and persuasively
demonstrated.^[9]

The respondent Judge did not disregard any constitutional right
of the petitioners.  Said respondent
Judge is presumed to have considered the evidence adduced by the prosecution
when he denied the Motion to Dismiss/Acquit of the petitioners.

The Court cannot decide in this special civil action whether or
not the evidence adduced by the prosecution has established beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of the petitioners.  It
is now petitioners’ duty to neutralize the evidence of the State in order to
maintain the presumption of their innocence of the crime of which they are
charged.

In the absence of a clear showing that the respondent Judge has
committed a grave abuse of discretion or acted in excess of jurisdiction, this
Court will not annul an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss a
criminal case.  Appeal is the proper
remedy of the petitioners in order to have the findings of fact of the
respondent judge reviewed by a superior court.^[10]

The petitioners’ application for separate trial is
meritorious.  Section 8, Rule 119,
Revised Rules of Court provides:

“SEC. 8.  Trial of joint
defendants.  – When two or more defendants
are jointly charged with any offense, they shall be tried jointly, unless the
court in its discretion upon motion of the fiscal or any defendant orders separate
trials.  In ordering separate trials, the
court may order that one or more defendants be each separately tried and the
others jointly tried, or may order that several defendants be jointly tried in
one trial and the others jointly tried in another trial or trials, or may order
that each defendant be separately tried.”

The foregoing provision does not state when the application for
separate trial may be made.  As a matter
of law, the granting of a separate trial when two or more defendants are
jointly charged with an offense is discretionary with the trial court.^[11]

Considering the established circumstances, the cause of the State
would not be jeopardized by the granting of separate trials to the
accused.  Inasmuch as the petitioners are
charged with capital offenses, great care should be taken that the evidence of
one should not prejudice the others.  It
appears that they have different defenses which may be antagonistic to each
other.  In the interest of justice, this
Court holds that a separate trial may be granted even after the prosecution has
finished presenting its evidence in chief. 
It is understood, however, that the evidence in chief of the prosecution
shall remain in the record as evidence against all the petitioners.  It is not necessary for the prosecution to
adduce all over again its evidence in chief in each separate trial of the
accused.  In the separate trial of the
accused, only the accused presenting evidence has to be present.

WHEREFORE, the orders of the respondent judge denying the
Motion to Dismiss/Acquit of the petitioners are hereby affirmed and the
petition to prohibit the continuation of the trial of Criminal Case No.
CCC-VII-1750-Rizal and Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-1751-Rizal and to compel the
respondent judge to acquit the petitioners is denied.  The petition for habeas corpus
is also denied.

However, the order dated June
10, 1977 denying petitioners’ motion for lifting of consolidation
of trial and/or separate trial is set aside and the petition for separate trial
for each accused is hereby granted.  The
evidence to be adduced by each accused-petitioner should not be considered as
evidence against the other accused-petitioners. 
Only the accused presenting evidence is obliged to attend the
trial.  The prosecution does not have to
adduce all over again its evidence in chief which shall be considered against
all the petitioners, without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to
present rebuttal evidence in each separate trial.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad
Santos, and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.

Barredo, J., reserves his vote.

Melencio-Herrera, J., inhibiting herself for personal reasons.

Fernando, J., took no part, one of the counsel, Attorney Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother in law.

Aquino and
Santos, JJ., did not take part.

^[1]
Petition, Rollo, pp. 43-45.

^[2]
Resolution of June 21, 1977
and Temporary Restraining Order.

^[3] Rollo, pp. 47-48.

^[4] Rollo, pp. 49-50.

^[5] Rollo, p. 67.

^[6] Rollo, p. 72.

^[7] Rollo, pp. 69-70.

^[8] Rollo, p. 7.

^[9]
People vs. Andal, G. R. No. L-39763, March 8, 1976, 70 SCRA 30.

^[10] Manalo vs. Mariano, et al., G. R. No. L-33850, January 22, 1976, 69 SCRA 80.

^[11]
People vs. Go, 88 Phil. 203, 211.