SOUTHERN LUZON EMPLOYEES’ ASSOCIATION, PLAINTIFF, VS. JUANITA GOLPEO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS; AQUILINA MALOLES, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES; ELSIE HICBAN, ET AL.…

The plaintiff, Southern Luzon Employees’ Association, is composed of
laborers and employees of Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., and Batangas
Transportation Company, and one of its purposes is mutual aid of its
members and their dependents in case of death. Roman A. Concepcion was
a member until his death on December 13, 1950. The association adopted
on September 17, 1949 the following resolution:

“RESOLVED: That a family record card of each member
be printed wherein the members will put down his dependents and/or
beneficiaries.

“BE IT RESOLVED, FURTHER, that a member may,
if he chooses, put down his common-law wife as his beneficiary and/or
children had with her as the case may be; that in case of a widower, he
may put down his legitimate children with the first marriage who are
below 21 years of age, single, and may at the same time, also name his
common-law wife, if he has any, as dependents and/or beneficiaries; and

“BE
IT RESOLVED: That such person so named by the member will be the sole
persons to be recognized by the Association regarding claims for
condolence contributions.”

In the form required by the association to be accomplished by its
members, with reference to the death benefit, Roman A. Concepcion
listed as his beneficiaries Aquilina Maloles, Roman M. Concepcion, Jr.,
Estela M. Concepcion, Rolando M. Concepcion and Robin M. Concepcion.
After the death of Roman A. Concepcion, the association was able to
collect voluntary contributions from its members amounting to P2,505.
Three sets of claimants presented themselves, namely, (1) Juanita
Golpeo, legal wife of Roman A. Concepcion, and her children; (2)
Aquilina Maloles, common law “wife of Roman A. Concepcion, and her
children, named beneficiaries by the deceased; and (3) Elsie Hicban,
another common law wife of Roman A. Concepcion, and her child. The
plaintiff association was accordingly constrained to institute in the
Court of First Instance of Laguna the present action for interpleading
against the three conflicting claimants as defendants. Marcelino and
Josefina Concepcion, children of the deceased Roman A. Concepcion with
Juanita Gulpeo, intervened in their own rights, aligning themselves
with the defendants Juanita Golpeo and her minor children. After
hearing, the court rendered a decision, declaring the defendants
Aquilina Maloles and her children the sole beneficiaries of the sum of
P2,505.00, and ordering the plaintiff to deliver said amount to them.
From this decision only the defendants Juanita Golpeo and her minor
children and the intervenors Marcelino and Josefina Concepcion have
appealed to this court

The decision is based mainly on the theory that the contract between
the plaintiff and the deceased Roman A. Concepcion partook of the
nature of an insurance and that, therefore, the amount in question
belonged exclusively to the beneficiaries, invoking the following
pronouncements of this Court in the case of Del Val vs. Del Val, 29
Phil, 534:

“With the finding of the trial court that the
proceeds of the life-insurance policy belongs exclusively to the
defendant as his individual and separate property, we agree. That the
proceeds of an insurance policy belong exclusively to the beneficiary
and not to tho estate of the person whose life was insured, and that
such proceeds are the separate and individual property of the
beneficiary, and not of the heirs of the person whose life was insured,
is the doctrine in America. We believe that the same doctrine obtains
in these Islands by virtue of section 428 of the Code of Commerce,
which reads:

” ‘The amounts which the underwriter must
deliver to the person insured, in fulfillment of the contract, shall be
the property of the latter, even against the claims of the legitimate
heirs or creditors of any kind whatsoever of the person who effected
the insurance in favor of the former.’

“It is claimed by the
attorney for the plaintiffs that the section just quoted in
subordinated to the provisions of the Civil Code as found in article
1035. This article reads:

” ‘An heir by force of law
surviving with others of the same character to a succession must bring
into the hereditary estate the property or securities be may have
received from the deceased during the life of the same, by way of
dowry, gift, or for any good consideration, in order to compute it in
fixing the legal portions and in the account of the division.’

“Counsel
also claims that the proceeds of the insurance policy were a donation
or gift made by the father during his lifetime to the defendant and
that, as such, its ultimate destination is determined by those
provisions of the Civil Code which relate to donations, especially
article 819. This article provides that ‘gifts made to children which
are not betterments shall be considered as part of their legal
portion.’

“We cannot agree with these contentions. The contract of life
insurance is a special contract and the destination of the proceeds
thereof is determined by special laws which deal exclusively with that
subject. The Civil Code has no provisions which relate directly and
specifically to life-insurance contracts or to the destination of
life-insurance proceeds. That subject is regulated exclusively by the
Code of Commerce which provides for the terms of the contract, the
relations of the parties and the destination of the proceeds of the
policy.” (Supra, pp. 540-541.)

It is argued for the appellants, however, that the Insurance Law is
not applicable because the plaintiff is a mutual benefit association as
defined in section 1628 of the Revised Administrative Code. This
argument evidently ignores the fact that the trial court has not
considered the plaintiff as a regular insurance company but merely
ruled that the death benefit in question is analogous to an insurance.
Moreover, section 1628 of the Revised Administrative Code defines a
mutual benefit association as one, among others, “providing for any
method of accident or life insurance among its members out of dues or
assessments collected from the membership.” The comparison made in the
appealed decision is, therefore, well taken.

Appellants also contend that the stipulation between the plaintiff
and the deceased Roman A. Concepcion regarding1 the specification of
the latter’s beneficiaries, and the resolution of September 17, 1949,
are void for being contrary to law, moral or public policy.
Specifically, the appellants cite article 2012 of the new Civil Code
providing that “Any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation
under article 739 cannot be named beneficiary of a life insurance
policy by the person who cannot make any donation to him, according to
said article.” Inasmuch as, according to article 739 of the new Civil
Code, a donation is void when made “between persons who are guilty of
adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation,” it is alleged
that the defendant-appellee, Aquilina Maloles, cannot be named a
beneficiary, even assuming that the insurance law is applicable.
Without Considering the intimation in the brief for the
defendants-appellees that appellant Juanita Golpeo, by her silence and
actions, had acquiesced in the illicit relations between her husband
and appellee Aquilina Maloles, appellants’ argument would certainly not
apply to the children of Aquilina, likewise named beneficiaries by the
deceased Roman A. Concepcion. As a matter of fact the new Civil Code
recognizes certain successional rights of illegitimate children.
(Article 287.)

The other contentions advanced rather exhaustively by counsel for
appellants, and the citations in support thereof, are either negatived
or rendered inapplicable by the decisive considerations already stated.
In this connection it is noteworthy that the estate of the deceased
Roman A. Concepcion was not entirely left without anything legally due
it, since it is an admitted fact that the sum of P500 was paid by
Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., employer of the deceased, to the appellants
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

Wherefore, the appealed decision is affirmed, and it is so ordered without costs.

Bengzon, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

Padilla and Reyes, A., JJ., concur in the result.

---

CONCURRING

REYES, J. B. L., J.:

I concur in the result for the reason that the contract here
involved was perfected before the new Civil Code took effect, and hence
its provisions cannot be made to apply retroactively. Concepcion and

Montemayor, JJ., concur.