G.R. No. L-6301. October 30, 1954
THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. CHOAN HUAT & CO., INC., DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
PADILLA, J.:
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to expropriate
pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 267 a parcel of land
containing an area of 12,068 square meters, situated in barrio
Calaanan, municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, owned by Choan
Huat & Co., Inc., the corporate stock of which belongs mostly to
Chinese citizens. The parcel of land is known as lot No. 2468,
Cadastral Case No. 28, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 2577, for which
transfer certificate of title No. 68756/T-223 was issued in the name of
the corporation.
The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
Republic Act No. 267 does not apply to small parcels of land as the one
sought to be expropriated invoking the rule laid down in the case of
Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration,[*]
47 Off. Gaz., 1848; that the persons for whose benefit this proceedings
is instituted are intruders who unlawfully and forcibly entered upon
the parcel of land and through stealth and strategy ousted the owner’s
care taker therefrom; that an action for forcible entry was filed in
the justice of the peace court of Caloocan against the intruders; that
after hearing judgment was rendered against them which was being
executed; that the delay in the execution of the judgment was due to
dilatory tactics resorted to by the defendants; and that this
expropriation proceedings was commenced for the purpose of frustrating
the execution of the judgment in said case.
The Court entered an order dismissing the complaint with costs, on the strength of the rule laid down in the case of Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration, supra.
A motion to set aside the order of dismissal was filed on the ground
that the defendant corporation being owned by aliens is disqualified to
acquire and hold title to lands under the rule laid down in the case of
Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds,[*]
44 Off. Gaz., 471. The Court set aside the order of dismissal and
ordered the parties to submit the names of commissioners to be
appointed to appraise the value of the land in accordance with the
Rules of Court. After hearing, the commissioners submitted their report
against which no opposition was filed. The Court disregarded the
commissioners’ report that found from P10 to P30 to be the reasonable
market value of the different parts of the parcel of land and fixed at
P5 per square meter as the market value of the parcel of land sought to
be expropriated and held it sold in eminent domain to the plaintiff. No
costs were taxed. From this judgment the defendant corporation has
appealed.
Although the appellant discussed in its brief under the second
assignment of error the unreasonableness of the market value fixed by
the Court of the parcel of land sought to be expropriated, yet it did
not waive its objection to the expropriation thereof under the rule
laid down in the case of Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration, supra. In that case this Court held:
There are indeed powerful considerations, aside from
the intrinsic meaning of section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution,
for interpreting Act No. 539 in a restrictive sense. Carried to
extremes, this Act would be subversive of the Philippine political, and
social structure. It would be in derogation of individual rights and
the time-honored constitutional, guarantee that no private property
shall be taken for private use without due process of law. The
protection against deprivation of property without due process of law
and against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation occupies the forefront positions (paragraphs 1 and 2) in
the Bill of Rights (Article III). The taking of private property for
private use relieves the owner of his property without due process of
law; and the prohibition that “private property should not be taken for
public use without just compensation” (section 1 [par. 2], Article III,
of the Constitution) forbids by necessary implication the appropriation
of private property for private uses (29 C. J. S., 819). It has been
truly said that the assertion of the right on the part of the
legislature to take the property of one citizen and transfer it to
another, even for a full compensation, when the public interest is not
promoted thereby, is claiming a despotic power, and one inconsistent
with every just principle and fundamental maxim of a free government.
(29 C. J. S., 820.)* * * In. paving the way for the breaking
up of existing large estates, trusts in perpetuity, feudalism, and
their concomitant evils, the Constitution did not propose to destroy or
undermine property rights, or to advocate equal distribution of wealth,
or to authorize the taking of what is in excess of one’s personal needs
and the giving of it to another. Evincing much concern for the
protection of property, the Constitution distinctly recognized the
preferred position which real estate has occupied in law for ages.
Property is bound up with every aspect of social life in a democracy as
democracy is conceived in the Constitution. The Constitution realizes
the indispensable role which property, owned in reasonable quantities
and used legitimately, plays in the stimulation of economic effort and
the formulation and growth of a solid social middle class that is said
to be the bulwark of democracy and the. backbone of every progressive
and happy country.The promotion of social justice ordained
by the Constitution does not supply paramount basis for untrammeled
expropriation of private land by the Rural Progress Administration or
any other government instrumentality. Social justice does not champion
division of property or equality of economic status; what it and the
Constitution do guaranty are equality of opportunity, equality of
political rights, equality before the law, equality between values
given and received, and equitable sharing of the social and material
goods on the basis of efforts exerted in their production. * * *. In
reality, section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution is in harmony
with the Bill of Rights. Without that provision the right of eminent
domain, inherent in the government, may be exercised to acquire large
tracts of land as a means reasonably calculated to solve serious
economic and social problems. * * *.In a broad sense,
expropriation of large estates, trusts in perpetuity, and land that
embraces a whole town, or a large section of a town or city, bears
direct relation to the public welfare. The size of the land
expropriated, the large number of people benefited, and the extent of
social and economic reform secured by the condemnation, clothes the
expropriation with public interest and public use. The expropriation in
such case tends to abolish economic slavery, fendalistic practices,
endless conflicts between landlords and tenants, and other evils
inimical to community prosperity and contentment and public peace and
order. Although courts are not in agreement as to the tests to be
applied in determining whether the use is public or not, some go so far
in the direction of a liberal construction as to hold that public use
is synonymous with public benefit, public utility, or public advantage,
and to authorize the exercise of the power of eminent domain to promote
such public benefit, etc., especially where the interests involved are
of considerable magnitude. * * *.The condemnation of a small
property in behalf of 10, 20 or 50 persons and their families does not
inure to the benefit of the public to a degree sufficient to give the
use public character. The expropriation proceedings at bar have been
instituted for the economic relief of a few families devoid of any
consideration of public health, public peace and order, or other public
advantage. What is proposed to be done ia to take plaintiff’s property,
which for all we know she acquired by sweat and sacrifice for her and
her family’s security, and sell it at cost to a few lessees who refuse
to pay the stipulated rent or leave the premises.No fixed
line of demarcation between what taking is for public use and what is
not can be made; each case has to be judged according to its peculiar
circumstances. It suffices to say. for the purpose of this decision
that the case under consideration is far wanting for those elements
which make for public convenience or public use. It is patterned upon
an ideology far removed from that consecrated in our system of
government and embraced by the majority of the citizens of this
country. If upheld, this case would open the gates to more oppressive
expropriations. If this expropriation be constitutional, we see no
reason why a 10-, 15-, or 25-hectare farm land might not be
expropriated and subdivided, and sold to those who want to own a
portion of it. To make the analogy closer, we find no reason why the
Rural Progress Administration could not take by condemnation an urban
lot containing an area of 1,000 or 2,000 square meters for subdivision
into tiny Jots for resale to its occupants or those who want to build
thereon. Pp. 1850-1854.)
The parcel of land sought to be expropriated in the case just
mentioned had an area of 22,655 square meters. The rule laid down in
that case was reiterated in Commonwealth vs. Borja,[*]
G. R. No. L-1496, 29 November 1949, where the parcel of land involved
contained an area of 10,565 square meters; City of Manila vs. Arellano Law
School,[1] 47 Off. Gaz.,
4197, where the parcel of land involved comprised an area of 7,270
square meters; and Lee Tay & Lee Chay, Inc., vs. Choco,[2]
G. R. No. L-3297, 29 December 1950, where the parcel of land
comprehended an area of 900 square meters. In these cases this Court
held that the parcels of land involved therein could not ,be
expropriated for resale to the occupants, because the same do not come
within the purview of the constitutional provision which authorizes
“the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and
conveyed at cost to individuals.”[3]
a Even Republic Act No. 1162, approved on 18 June 1954, which
authorizes the City of Manila to expropriate lands, applies only to
landed estates or haciendas which have been and are actually
being leased to tenants. This last Act is a further indication of the
intent and purpose of Congress not to allow the expropriation of small
parcels of land. The fact that the parcel of land is owned by a
corporation the stock of which belongs mostly to Chinese citizens would
not authorize the exercise of the power of eminent domain under
Republic Act No. 267. If the corporation is disqualified to own land
under the rule laid down in the Krivenko case because of alienage of
the owners of its corporate stock, the exercise of the power of eminent
domain is not the proper proceedings to divest it of its title.
Besides, condemnation proceedings is brought upon the postulate that
the defendant owns the property to be expropriated. It is an
inconsistency to recognize and at the same time deny the ownership or
title of the person to the property sought to be expropriated. As the
municipal corporation that seeks to expropriate the parcel of land in
question has no authority to condemn it, the hearing held by the
commissioners to find out and determine its reasonable market value and
the order of the Court fixing such value at P5 per square meter are a
nullity and should be set aside.
The judgment appealed from declaring the parcel of land sold in
expropriation to the plaintiff municipal corporation and the setting
aside of the order of dismissal are annulled and the order of the Court
dismissing the complaint is revived, without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, and Reyes, J. B, L., JJ., concur.
[*] 84 Phil., 847.
[*] 79 Phil., 461.
[*] 85 Phil., 51.
[1] 85 Phil., 633. [2]87 Phil., 814.
[3] Section 4, Article XIII, Constitution of the Philippines.
DISSIDENTE:
PABLO M.:
El terreno que es objeto de la presente causa de expropiacion fue
obtenido en compra por Choan Huat Co., Inc. en 6 de enero de 1944 en la
cantidad de P55,000, papel moneda japonesa. Al tiempo de la
presentacion de la demanda el terreno estaba amillarado en P4,290 y,
despues de emplazada la demandada en 11 de enero de 1950, su valor
amillarado’ se elevo a P60,340. Esto denuestra que su valor se habia
inflado para algun fin; tal vez para obtener mejor precio en caso de
concederse la expropiacion.
Se contiende que no cabe la expropriacion del terreno siguiendo la
doctrina adoptada en la causa de Guido. No tiene aplicacion en el caso
presente, porque la extension superficial no es el unico factor
determinante; otras circumstancias deben tomarse en cuenta.[1]
Guido, la actual propietaria del terreno, lo habia heredado de, sus
padres y probablemente estos lo habran heredado de sus tatarabuelos; es
filipina y tiene derecho a poseer y adquirir bienes raices en
Filipinas: no existe ley que se lo impida. En cambio, el terreno en
cuestion fue adquirido en compra por Choan Huat Co., Inc. al tiempo en
que ya estaba en vigor la Constitucion de la Republica Filipina bajo el
regimen japones, que prohibia la venta de terreno a extranjeros. Del
capital de Choan Huat Co., Inc. P900,000 fueron suscritos y pagados por
ciudadanos chinos, y solamente la cantidad de P100 fue pagada por un
nlipino. Esta corporacion no puede comprar bienes inmuebles en
Filipinas, porque el 60% de su capital no es de la propiedad de
ciudadanos filipinos. La parte de la Constitucion del Commonwealth que
protege la propiedad inmueble continuaba en vigor durante el regimen
japones, porque esta considerado como ley local (vease disidencia en
Arambulo contra Cua y otro,[*] G.R. No. L-7196.) Bajo dicha ley tampoco podia la eorporacion adquirir el terreno.
El articulo 4, Titulo XIII, de la Constitucion del commonwealth y de
la verdadera Republica de Filipinas, dispone: “El Congreso podra
autorizar, mediante justa indemnizacion, la expropiacion de terrenos
para ser subdivididos en pequenos lotes y traspasados a precio de costo
a individuos particulares.” y, de acuerdo con esta disposicion, el
Congreso aprobo la Ley No. 267 que autoriza a los municipios a
expropiar, mediante justa compensacion, terrenos para ser revendidos a
los residentes de dichos municipios. El articulo 2 de dicha ley dice
asi:
“The home sites so acquired shall be subdivided
into lots not exceeding five hundred square meters each and sold on a
ten-year installment plan, at the same rate of interest paid by the
city or municipality for the loan used in acquiring the said home
sites, preference being given to Filipino bona fide occupants and to Filipino veterans, their widows, and their children.“No such lot shall be sold to any person who already owns a residential lot, and any sale made to such person shall be void.
“Before
full payment of the home site lot has been made, title therein shall
remain vested in the city or municipality concerned: Provided,
That no such lot, before full payment thereof, shall be transferred,
encumbered, or otherwise disposed of by the purchaser thereof without
the consent of the Mayor.” (Sec. 2, Rep. Act No. 267)
Es evidente el proposito de la Asamblea Constituyente y del Congreso
al disponer la expropriacion de terrenos para ser revendidos en
pequenos lotes de 500 metros cuadrados a sus ocupantes: quieren dar
oportunidad a los desheredados de la fortuna para adquirir un solar en
donde construir su hogar; no quieren ver la repeticion del triste caso
de Hongkong en que, por no tener casa, los naturales tienen que vivir
en “sampanes”. Si a los filipinos pobres no se less proporciona la
oportunidad de poseer un pedazo de terreno en que levantar su casucha,
tendran que remontarse y adoptar la vida nomada de los negritos y
tinguianes, o identificarse con los Huks, o trendran que vivir en
balsas sobre los esteros o en “barongbarongs” en loa parques o terrenos
del gobierno.
El regimen japones, de triste recordacion, nos proporciona un
ejemplo. Bajo aquel regimen, algunos, por imperiosas necesidades de
momento, tuvieron que vender sus terrenos, algunos su hogar, otros sus
animates de labor, y muchos sus muebles, alhajas, etc.; se
desprendieron de todo cuanto tenian para librarse del hambre. Los
extranjeros, que no podian ser acusados de traicion bajo el codigo
penal entonces vigente, se aliaron con los invasores y, por su posicion
ventajosa porque privaban en las alturas, acapararon todo cuanto podian
para dejar en la miseria a los nlipinos. Arroz, alimentoa en conserva,
ropa, medicinas, todo estaba concentrado en manos extranas. Los
naturales, que debian tener mejor derecho en su propia tierra que los
extranjeros sufrian miseria y hambre y morian como chinches. Bajo
aquella situacion dificil el terreno en cuestion habia sido adquirido
por la corporacion demandada. Si no se permite que expropie el terreno
el gobierno municipal de Caloocan, como no se permitio a los antiguos
duenos recobrar lo que vendieron en contravencion de la Constitucion,[1]
entonces la deduccion forzosa es que se protege a una corporacion
extranjera; se le permite por este Tribunal retener un terreno
anti-constitucionalmente adquirido; se frustra el proposito humanitario
de la Asamblea Constituyente y del Congreso de proporcionar un pedacito
de solar a los que no lo tienen para que puedan vivir como hombres
civilizados y no como los “coolies” de Hongkong, completamente
abandonados a su suerte.
No debemos permitir que se repitan amargas experiencias en el
pasado. Los filipinos deben tener dominio del suelo si quieren afrontar
la situacion con alguna ventaja: esa es la piedra angular sobre que
descansa la prohibicion de la Constitucion.
En Cuba y Puerto Rico estan tan arraigados los grandes intereses
extranjeros que en un momento dado pueden estrangular economieamente a
la nacion y a sus habitantes, como los grandes intereses extranjeros
estrangularon sin piedad a los filipinos bajo la egida japonesa.
Despues del embargo de las grandes explotaciones mineras y reventa
en pequenos lotes de los grandes latifundios, los mejicanos se sienten
mejor, ya estan Hbres del yugo economico extranjero y las convulsiones
sociales han desaparecido.
Los acontecimientos en Iran y Egipto tienden a restablecer a los
naturales en el dominio del suelo y de los recursos naturales. Cito
estos casos por su resultado y no por el procedimiento empleado. El
derecho natural triunfa, y el derecho de la fuerza cede paso al nuevo
ideal social.
Van a morir de hambre acaso los socios de la corporacion demandada
si se concede la expropriacion del terreno? No. En cambio, un solarcito
de 500 metros es cuestion de vida para los ocupantes; con esa pequena
huerta, pagadera en diez anos, cada familia trabajara para construir su
casita, procurara ahorrar para pagar su obligacion al gobierno, y se la
acostumbrara a una vida de orden, de paz y de trabajo honrado. Con el
sudor de su frente cada familia formara su hogar en un ambiente de
felicidad y, al sentirse dueiia de algoque no querra perder jamas,
desde ese momento aborrecera la doctrina absurda de la reparticion que
pregonan los comunistas. En adelante cada hogar sera una fortaleza contra las incursiones del descontento mal contenidb del comunismo y cada habitante de ese hogar sera un defensor de la democracia.
Se dice que proporcionar a los pobres un pedacito de solar signinca
paternalismo. Bajo las circunstancias actuales, el paternalismo estatal
es indispensable. Un solo individuo, aislado, no puede luchar contra
intereses bien establecidos. Si, bajo el actual desequilibrio
economico, se adoptara la teoria de la libre contratacion entre
patronos y obreros, estos, por ser pobres y estar sin proteccion
alguna, quedarian vencidos y aniquilados. El amo puede imponer un
jornal de 50 centimos al dia. ObMgada por el desempleo, la clase
laboral tendria que aceptar un jornal miserable en perjuieio de su
salud. De ahi que al estadista previsor adopta un sistema de jornal
minimo, prescribe el numero de las horas de trabajo, protege al iiino y
a la mujer, da asilo al anciano y desvalido, legaliza la negociacion
colectiva por las asociaciones obreras para que puedan reclamar mejores
condiciones de trabajo, castiga la usura y ordena la venta de pequenos
lotes a los pobres, pagadera a plazos faciles. El efecto bienhechor de
este paternalismo se manifiesta en el establecimiento del EDCOR: los
Huks, elementos anteriormente hostiles al Estado, viven hoy en paz en
su nuevo hogar, proporcionado por el gobierno; depusieron las armas,
repudiaron luego sus doctrinas subversivas y hoy, regenerados en un
nuevo ambiente, trabajan para si, para sus hijos y para su pais.
Pero aboliendo el paternalismo propugnado por el nuevo orden social,
los menesterosos continuarian rodando por la pendiente de la miseria
sin esperanza de redencion. Mientras pocos se enriquecen, a la mayoria
se la priva de los medios para rehabilitarse. El resultado no es
dificil de prever: huelga, descontento, miseria, hambre, caos, sangre.
La humanidad no porda continuar progresando con la aniquilacion de las
masas obreras. El trabajo debe ser lazo de armonia—en vez de arma de
lucha—entre los dos factores de produccion, patrono y obrero. El
paternalismo del Estado en el caso presente es indispensable para
producir una ciudadania libre de horrores de la miseria, una ciudadania
que puede sobrellevar la responsabilidad de educar y mantenar a sus
dependientes, una ciudadania que sepa cumplir las obligaciones y hacer
respetar sus derechos.
Una masa miserable, hambrienta, no puede forcnar ima nacion robusta:
a la larga esa masa amorfa y al parecer ductil, al saturarse de odio contra
los pudientes, tendra que estallar. Los grandes cataclismos sociales
fueron el resultado de la opresion del proletariado. No debemos olvidar
la leccion que nos da la historia. Debemos emplear todos ios recursos
legales antes de que el populacho se desborde.
El valor del terreno de P55,000, en papel moneda japonesa, reducido
de acuerdo con la escala Ballantine, es solamente P13,750. Indemnizando
a la corporation demandada de acuerdo con la decision del tribunal
inferior, en la cantidad de P60,340, a razon de P5.00 por metro
cuadrado, ella obtiene una ganancia de P46,590 o 346.10 por ciento. Que
clase de negocio puede dar ahora una ganancia tan fenomenal? La
corporacion apelante reclama en su alegato el precio de P10.00 a P30.00
por metro cuadrado. Si en Sta. Mesa, cerca de la carretera nacional
para San Juan, Gregorio Araneta Co., Inc. estaba dispuesta a vender en
1947 a la Rural Progress Administration lotes a razon de P7.00 por
metro cuadrado, como es que en Caloocan se puede exigir un precio de
P10.00 a P30.00 el metro cuadrado? Si se adOpta el precio de P30,00,
entonces la corporacion se Ilevaria una ganacia de P348,290.00 con un
capital de P13,750.00, o 2,533.00 por ciento.
Es absurda e inhumana la teoria de que una corporacion extranjera
puede permanecer en el terreno comprado en contravencion de la
Constitucion; que el dominio eminente del Estado es un mito contra
ella y que las veinte familias que viven en el mismo no tienen derecho
a la proteccion que les brinda la Constitucion y 3a Ley No. 267. Los
miembros de esas veinte familias nan nacido en Filipinas porque Dios
asi lo dispuso; tienen derecho inalienable a la vida.
Una corporacion no tiene alma; su existencia depende de la ley y de
la Constitucion; ni tiene entranas: solo tiene cajas de seguridad y
libros de contabilidad. No le mueve el sentido de justicia en que se
fundan las doctrinas del nuevo mundo social. Las veinte familias, a
cuyo favor desea el municipio de Caloocan expropiar el terreno, tienen
derecho a la vida. Para poder vivir desean obtener el terreno por medio
del dominio eminente del Estada. Para vivir es necesario alimentarse.
“Se entiende por alimentos todo lo que es indispensable para el
sustento, habitacion, vestido y asistencia medica, segun la posicion
social de la familia.” (Art. 142 del Cod. Civ. Antiguo y 290, Cod. Civ.
nuevo.)
El Papa Pio XII, dirigiendo la palabra a los Cardenales el 2 de
junio de 1948, les decia: “En el centro de las cuestiones del dia
estan, como bien se sabe, las reformas sociales, justas y necesarias, y
en especial la urgente necesidad de dar a las clases menos pudientes
casa, pan,y trabajo.” La “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”
propugna por que “that human rights should be protected by the rule of
law”; “to promote social progress and better standards of life in
larger freedom;”
“Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted
him by the constitution or by law.” (Art. 8)
“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food,
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social service,* *
*.” (Art. 25, Universal Declaration of Human Rights.)
El solarcito que reclama cada una de las veinte familias es un
elemento necesario para su vida. La corporacion lo reclama para medrar,
para fines de especulacion, y no para continuar viviendo. No tiene
derecho a retenerlo, ante la Constitucion y la ley, menos aun, ante la
conciencia universal.
Voto por la confirmacion de la decision apelada.
[1] The Rural Progress Administration contra Clemente G. Ileyes, ;G,R. No. L-4703, Octubre 8, 1953.
[*] 95 Phil., 749.
[1] Rellosa contra Gaw Chee Hun, 93 Phil., 827; Caoile contra Yu Chiao Peng, 93 Phil., 861; Bautista contra Uy Isabelo, 93 Phil, 843,