G.R. No. L-25499. February 18, 1970
VILLA REY TRANSIT, INC., PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, TRINIDAD A. QUINTOS, PRIMA A. QUINTOS, AND JULITA A. QUINTOS, RESPONDENTS.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Petitioner, Villa Rey Transit, Inc., seeks the review by certiorari of a decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming that of the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan. The basic facts are set forth in said
decision of the Court of Appeals, from which We quote:
“At about 1:30 in
the morning of March 17, 1960,
an Izuzu First Class passenger bus owned and operated
by the defendant, bearing Plate No. TPU-14871-Bulacan and driven by Laureano Casim, left Lingayen, Pangasinan, for Manila. Among its paying passengers was the deceased,
Policronio Quintos, Jr. who
sat on the first seat, second row,
right side of the bus. At about 4:55 o’clock a.m. when the vehicle was
nearing the northern approach of the Sadsaran Bridge on the national highway in
barrio Sto. Domingo, municipality of Minalin, Pampanga, it
frontally hit the rear side of a bullcart filled with
hay. As a result the end of a bamboo
pole placed on top of the hayload and tied to the
cart to hold it in place, hit the right side of the windshield of the bus.
The protruding end of the bamboo pole, about 8 feet long from the rear
of the bullcart, penetrated through the glass
windshield and landed on the face of Policronio
Quintos, Jr. who, because of the impact, fell from his seat and was sprawled on
the floor. The pole landed on his left
eye and the bone of the left side of his face was fractured. He suffered other multiple wounds and was
rendered unconscious due, among other causes to severe cerebral
concussion. A La Mallorca
passenger bus going in the opposite direction towards San
Fernando, Pampanga, reached
the scene of the mishap and it
was stopped by Patrolman Felino Bacani
of the municipal police force of Minalin who, in the
meantime, had gone to the scene to investigate.
Patrolman Bacani placed Policronio
Quintos, Jr. and three other injured men who rode on
the bullcart aboard the La Mallorca
bus and brought them to the provincial hospital
of Pampanga
at San Fernando for medical assistance. Notwithstanding such assistance, Policronio Quintos, Jr. died at 3:15 p.m. on the same day, March 17, 1960, due to traumatic
shock due to cerebral injuries.”
The private respondents, Trinidad, Prima
and Junta, all surnamed Quintos, are the sisters and
only surviving heirs of Policronio Quintos, Jr., who died single, leaving no
descendants nor ascendants. Said respondents herein brought this action
against herein petitioner, Villa Rey Transit, Inc.,
as owner and operator of said passenger bus, bearing Plate No.
TPU-14871-Bulacan, for breach of the contract of carriage between said
petitioner and the deceased Policronio Quintos, Jr., to recover the aggregate sum of P63,750.00 as damages,
including attorney’s fees. Said
petitioner – defendant in the court of first instance – contended that the
mishap was due to a fortuitous event, but this pretense was rejected by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals, both of which found that the accident and
the death of Policronio had been due to the
negligence of the bus driver, for whom petitioner was liable under its contract
of carriage with the deceased. In the
language of His Honor, the trial Judge:
“The mishap was not the result of any unforeseeable
fortuitous event or emergency but was the
direct result of the negligence of the driver of the defendant. The defendant must, therefore, respond for
damages resulting from its breach of contract for carriage. As the complaint alleged a total damage of
only P63,750.00 although as elsewhere shown in this decision the damages for wake
and burial expenses, loss of
income, death of the victim, and attorneys
fee reach the aggregate of P79,615.95,
this Court finds it just that said damages be assessed at total of only P63,
750.00 as prayed for in plaintiffs’ amended complaint.”
The dispositive part of the decision of
the trial Court reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant
to pay to the plaintiffs the amount of P63,750.00 as
damages for breach of contact of carriage resulting from the death of Policronio Quintos, Jr.”
which, as above
indicated, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the present petition
for review on certiorari, filed by Villa
Rey Transit, Inc.
The only issue raised in this
appeal is the amount of damages recoverable by private respondents herein. The determination of such amount depends,
mainly upon two (2) factors, namely: (1)
the number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be
computed; and (2) the rate at which the losses sustained by said respondents
should be fixed.
The first factor was based by the trial court – the view of which
was concurred in by the Court of Appeals – upon the life expectancy of Policronio Quintos, Jr., which
was placed at 33-1/3 years – he being over 29 years of age (or around 30 years
for purposes of computation) at the time of his demise – by applying the
formula (2/3 x [80-30] = life expectancy) adopted in the American Expectancy
Table of Mortality or the actuarial or Combined Experience Table of
Mortality. Upon the other hand,
petitioner maintains that the lower courts had erred in adopting said formula
and in not acting in accordance with Alcantara v. Surro[1]
in which the damages were computed on a four (4) year basis, despite the fact
that the victim therein was 39 years old, at the time of his death, and had a
life expectancy of 28.90 years.
The case cited is not, however, controlling in the one at
bar. In the Alcantara
case, none of the parties had questioned the propriety of the four-year
basis adopted by the trial court in making its award of damages. Both parties appealed, but only as regards the amount
thereof. The plaintiffs assailed the
non-inclusion, in its computation, of the bonus that the corporation, which was
the victim’s employer, had awarded to deserving officers and employees, based upon the profits earned less than two
(2) months before the accident that resulted in his death. The defendants in turn, objected to the sum
awarded for the fourth year, which was treble that of the previous years, based
upon the increases given, in that fourth year, to other employees of the
same corporation. Neither this objection
nor said claim for inclusion of the bonus was sustained by this Court. Accordingly, the same had not thereby laid
down any rule on the length of time to be used in the computation of
damages. On the contrary, it declared:
“The determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the heirs
of a deceased person has therefore no fixed basis. Much is left to the discretion of the
court considering the moral and material
damages involved, and so it
has been said that ‘(t)here can be no exact or
uniform rule for measuring the value of a human life and the measure of
damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculation, but the
amount recoverable depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each
case. The life expectancy of the
deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter, is an important factor.’ (25 C.J.S. 1241.) Other factors that are usually considered
are: (1) pecuniary loss to plaintiff or beneficiary (25 C.J.S. 1243-1250); (2)
loss of support (25 C.J.S., 1250-1251); (3) loss of service (25 C.J.S.
1251-1254); (4) loss of society (25 C.J.S. 1254-1255); (5) mental suffering of
beneficiaries (25 C.J.S., 1258-1259); and (6) medical and funeral expenses (25
C.J.S., 1254-1260).”[2]
Thus, life expectancy is, not only relevant, but, also, an important
element in fixing the amount recoverable by private respondents
herein. Although it is not the sole
element determinative of said amount, no cogent reason has been given to warrant
its disregard and the adoption, in the case at bar, of a purely arbitrary standard,
such as a four-year rule. In short, the
Court of Appeals has not erred in basing the computation of petitioner’s
liability upon the life expectancy of Policronio Quintos, Jr.
With respect to the rate
at which the damages shall be computed, petitioner impugns the decision
appealed from upon the ground that the damages awarded therein will have to be
paid now, whereas most of those sought to be indemnified will be suffered
years later. This argument is
basically true, and this is, perhaps, one
of the reasons why the Alcantara case points out the
absence of a “fixed
basis” for the ascertainment of the damages recoverable in litigations like the one at bar. Just the same, the
force of the said argument of
petitioner herein is offset by the fact that, although payment of the award in the case at
bar will have to take place upon the finality
of the decision therein, the liability of petitioner herein had been fixed at the rate only of P2,184.00 a year,
which is the annual salary of Policronio Quintos, Jr. at the
time of his death, as a
young “training assistant” in the Bacnotan
Cement Industries, Inc. In other words, unlike the Alcantara case, on which petitioner relies, the lower courts did not
consider, in the present case, Policronio’s
potentiality and capacity to increase his
future income. Indeed, upon the
conclusion of his training period,
he was supposed to have a better job and be promoted from time to time, and, hence,
to earn more, if not – considering the growing importance of trade, commerce
and industry and the concomitant rise
in the income level of officers and employees therein – much more.
At this juncture, it should be noted, also, that We are mainly
concerned with the determination of the losses or damages sustained by the
private respondents, as dependents and intestate heirs of the deceased, and
that said damages consist, not of the full amount of his earnings, but
of the support they received or would have received from him had he not died in
consequence of the negligence of petitioner’s agent. In fixing the amount of that support, We must reckon with the “necessary expenses of his own
living”, which should be deducted from his earnings. Thus, it has been consistently held that
earning capacity, as an element of damages to one’s estate for his death by
wrongful act is necessarily his net earning capacity or his capacity to
acquire money, ‘less the necessary
expense for his own living.“[3] Stated otherwise, the amount
recoverable is not the loss of the entire earning,
but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings which the beneficiary
would have received.[4]
In other words, only net earnings, not gross earning, are to be considered,[5]
that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income[6] and less living and other incidental
expenses.[7]
All things considered, We are of the opinion that it is fair and
reasonable to fix the deductible living and other expenses of the deceased at the sum of P1,184.00
a year, or about P100.00 a month, and that, consequently, the loss
sustained by his sisters may be roughly
estimated at P1,000.00 a year or P33,333.33 for the 33-1/3 years of his life
expectancy. To this sum of P33,333.33, the following should be added: (a) P12,000.00,
pursuant to Arts. 104 and 107 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article
2206 of our Civil Code, as construed and applied by this Court;[8] (b) P1,727.95,
actually spent by private respondents for medical and burial expenses; and (c)
attorney’s fees, which was fixed by the trial court, at P500.00, but which, in
view of the appeal taken by petitioner herein, first to the Court of Appeals
and later to this Supreme Court, should be increased to P2,500.00. In other
words, the amount adjudged in the decision appealed from should be reduced to
the aggregate sum of P49,561.28, with interest
thereon, at the legal rate, from December 29, 1961, date of the promulgation of the decision of
the trial court.
Thus modified, said decision and that of the Court of
Appeals are hereby affirmed, in all other respects, with costs against petitioner,
Villa Rey Transit, Inc.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
and Villamor, JJ., concur.
[1]
93 Phil. 472.
[2]
Underscoring ours.
[3]
Pitman v. Merriman, 117 A. 18, 19, 80 N.H. 295.
[4]
Lynch v. Lynch, 195 A. 799; Lockerman v.
Hurlock, 125 A. 482, 2 W.W. Harr. 479;
Lemmon v. Broadwater, 108 A. 273, 7 Boyce 472; Louisville & N.R.R.
Co. v. Reverman’s Adm’x,
15 S.W. 2d 300; Heppner v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.
Co., 297 S.W. 2d 497; Darnell v. Panhandle Co-op. Ass’n,
120 N.W. 2d 278 175 Neb. 40.
[5]
Meehan v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, D.C.N.Y.,
181, F. Supp. 594.
[6]
Frasier v. Public Service Interstate Transp. Co., C.A.N.Y., 244 F. 2d. 668.
[7]
Hanks v. Norfolk & Western Ry, Co., 52
S.E. 2d 717, 230 N.C. 179; Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., D.
C. Va. 221 F. Supp. 243, affirmed, C.A., 333 F. 2d 676; Meehan v. Central
R. Co. of New Jersey, D.C.N.Y., 181 F. Supp. 594; Frazier v. Ewell Engineering & Contracting Co., 62 So. 2d 51. See, also, 2 Cooley on Torts, 168-169.
[8]
People v. Pantoja, L-18793, Oct. 11, 1968;
People v. Sangaran, L-21757, Nov. 26, 1968; People
v. Gutierrez, L-25372, Nov. 29, 1968; People v. Buenbrazo,
L-27852, Nov. 29, 1968; People v. Bakang,
L-20908, Jan. 31, 1969; People v. Labutin,
L-23513, Jan. 31, 1969; People v. Acabado,
L-26104, Jan. 31, 1969; People v. Vacal,
L-20913, Feb. 27, 1969; People v. Gonzales, L-23303-04, May 20, 1969; People v.
Tapac, L-26491, May 20, 1969; People v. Aranas, L-27851, Oct. 28, 1969.