J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. THE LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE AUDITOR GENERAL, RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS.

In this special civil action for prohibition to nullify a
legislative act directing the expropriation of the Tatalon
Estate, Quezon City,^[1]
this Court is called upon to inquire further into how far the power of Congress
under the Constitution to authorize upon payment of just compensation the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to
individuals^[2]
may extend, the more so as this is the first time the judiciary is confronted
with such a challenge addressed to the validity of a statute specifically made
applicable to a particular piece of land, owned by petitioner J. M. Tuason & Co. In the leading case of Guido v. Rural
Progress,^[3]
decided in 1949, this Court in passing upon the scope of the power of the
President conferred by statute “to acquire private lands or any interest
therein, through purchase or expropriation, and to subdivide the same into home
lots or small farms for resale at reasonable prices and under such conditions
as he may fix to their bona fide tenants or occupants”^[4]
had occasion to delineate the contours of the above constitutional provision,
reconciling the undoubtedly broad grant of constitutional authority to Congress
with the right of property that might be adversely affected by its exercise.

The prevailing opinion in the later case of Republic v. Baylosis^[5]
tilted the balance in favor of property. In deciding this suit, filed with the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the lower
court, as was understandable, bowed to what it considered the compulsion such
an opinion carries and being unable to perceive any relevant ground for
distinction, declared the challenged statute invalid. The respondents, the Land
Tenure Administration, the Solicitor General and the Auditor General in this
prohibition proceeding, appealed. We are possessed undoubtedly of greater
discretion on the matter. Nor is it to be lost sight of, as above-mentioned,
that this is the first controversy where the expropriation of a particular
property authorized by Congress under the above constitutional provision is
assailed as beyond its power. The opportunity is thus here present of making
more definite the boundaries of such congressional competence.

As will hereafter be explained with some measure of fullness, we
cannot affix the stamp of approval to the judgment of the lower court; we reach
a different conclusion. There is to our mind no sufficient showing of the
unconstitutionality of the challenged act. We reverse.

On August 3, 1959,
Republic Act No. 2616 took effect without executive approval. It is therein
provided: “The expropriation of the Tatalon
Estate in Quezon City
jointly owned by the J. M. Tuazon and Company, Inc.,
Gregorio Araneta and Company, Inc., and Florencio Deudor, et al., is
hereby authorized.”^[6]  As noted in the appealed decision: “The
lands involved in this action, to which Republic Act No. 2616 refer and which
constitute a certain portion of the Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision, have a total
area of about 109 hectares and are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 42774 and 49235 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
(Quezon City) registered in the name of
petitioner.”^[7]

Thereafter, on November
15, 1960, respondent Land Tenure Administration was directed by the
then Executive Secretary to institute the proceeding for the expropriation of
the Tatalon Estate. Not losing any time, petitioner
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed before the lower
court on November 17, 1960
a special action for prohibition with preliminary injunction against
respondents praying that the above act be declared unconstitutional, seeking in
the meanwhile a preliminary injunction to restrain respondents from instituting
such expropriation proceeding, thereafter to be made permanent after trial. The
next day, on November 18, 1960,
the lower court granted the prayer for the preliminary injunction upon the
filing of a P20,000.00 bond. After trial, the lower
court promulgated its decision on January
10, 1963 holding that Republic Act No. 2616 as amended is unconsti­tutional
and granting the writ of prohibition prayed for.

Hence this appeal by respondents, one we find meritorious. With
the problem thus laid bare and with an exposition of the constitutional
principles that compel a result different from that arrived at by the lower
court, we cannot accept its holding that the statute thus assailed should be
annulled.

1. Respondents would interpose two procedural bars sufficient in
their opinion to preclude the lower court from passing on the question of
validity.^[8]  The first is the allegation that in effect
this special proceeding for prohibition is “actually a suit against the
State, which is not allowed without its consent.”^[9]
The second would require, on the assumption that the suit could proceed, that
the Executive Secretary, as the real party in interest, ought to have been impleaded. Neither objection suffices to preclude the lower
court from passing upon the question of validity of the statute in question.

As was held by this Court in the leading case of Angara v. Electoral Commission,^[10]
speaking through Justice Laurel, the power of judicial review is granted, if
not expressly, at least by clear implication from the relevant provisions of
the Constitution.^[11]  This power may be exercised when the party
adversely affected by either a legislative or executive act, or a municipal
ordinance for that matter, files the appropriate suit to test its validity. The
special civil action of prohibition has been relied upon precisely to restrain
the enforcement of what is alleged to be an unconstitutional statute.^[12]
As it is a fundamental postulate that the Constitution as the supreme law is
binding on all governmental agencies, failure to observe the limitations found
therein furnishes a sufficient ground for a declaration of the nullity of the
governmental measure challenged. The argument then that the government is the
adverse party and that therefore must consent to its being sued certainly is
far from persuasive. Moreover, it is equally well-settled that for the purpose
of thus obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, it is enough if the
respondents or defendants named be the government officials who would give
operation and effect to official action allegedly tainted with
unconstitutionality. As it cannot be denied that in 1959 the then Land Tenure
Administration as well as the Solicitor General were called upon to enforce the
statute now assailed, it would appear clear that the insistence on the
Executive Secretary being made a party lacks support in law.

It would be then to set aside and disregard doctrines of
unimpeachable authority if the plea of respondents on these procedural points
raised were to meet an affirmative response. That we are not
disposed to do.

2. Thus we reach the merits. It would appear, as noted at the
outset, that for the purpose of deciding the question of validity squarely
raised, a further inquiry into the scope of the constitutional power of
Congress to authorize the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small
lots and conveyed at cost to individuals^[13]
is indicated, if for no other purpose than to attain a greater degree of
clarity. The question is one then of constitutional construction. It is well to
recall fundamentals. The primary task is one of ascertaining and thereafter
assuring the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the
adoption of the Constitution.^[14]

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for
its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is
to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not
primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain
that it should ever be present in the people’s consciousness, its language as
much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus there are
cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.

This is one of them. It does not admit of doubt that the
congressional power thus conferred is far from limited. It is left to the
legislative will to determine what lands may be expropriated so that they could
be subdivided for resale to those in need of them. Nor can it be doubted either
that as to when such authority may be exercised is purely for Congress to
decide. Its discretion on the matter is not to be interfered with. The language
employed is not swathed in obscurity. The recognition of the broad
congressional competence is undeniable. The judiciary in the discharge of its
task to enforce consti­tutional commands and prohibitions is denied the
prerogative of curtailing its well-nigh all-embracing sweep.

Reference to the historical basis of this provision as
reflected in the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, two of the
extrinsic aids to construction along with the contemporaneous understanding and
the consideration of the consequences that flow from the interpretation under
consideration, yields additional light on the matter. The opinion of Justice Tuason, in the Guido case did precisely that. It cited the
speech of delegate Miguel Cuaderno, who, in speaking
of large estates and trusts in perpetuity, stated: “‘There has been an impairment of public tranquility, and to be sure a
continuous impairment of it, because of the existence of these conflicts. In
our folklore the oppression and exploitation of the tenants are vividly
referred to; their sufferings at the hand of the landlords are emotionally
pictured in our drama; and even in the native movies and talkies of today, this
theme of economic slavery has been touched upon. In official documents these
same conflicts are narrated and exhaustively explained as a threat to social
order and stability. ‘”^[15]
He invoked likewise what happened to the family of our national hero Jose Rizal: “‘But we should go to Rizal for inspiration and illumination in this problem of
the conflicts between landlords and tenants. The national hero and his family
were persecuted because of these same conflicts in Calamba,
and Rizal himself met a martyr’s death because of his
exposal of the cause of the tenant class, because he would not close his eyes
to oppression and persecution with his own people as victims.’”^[16]
Delegate Cuaderno closed with this appeal: “‘If
we are to be true to our trust, if it is our purpose in drafting our
constitution to insure domestic tranquility and to provide for the well-being
of our people, we cannot, we must not fail to prohibit the ownership of large
estates, to make it the duty of the government to breakup existing large
estates, and to provide for their acquisition by purchase or through
expropriation and sale to their occupants, as has been provided in the
Constitutions of Mexico and Jugoslavia. ‘”^[17]

The above address was delivered during the early days of the
convention on August 21, 1934.^[18]
Subsequently, the day before the above constitutional provision was voted on January 29, 1935 he reiterated what
was said by him in the above address. Thus: “Mr. President, this will be
my last speech in the Convention. And I just want to remind the Convention of
the first speech that I delivered – the first speech I delivered before this
Assembly. I believe, Mr. President, that one of the best provisions that this draft
of the Constitution contains is this provision that will prevent the repetition
of the history of misery, of trials and tribulations of the poor tenants
throughout the length and breadth of the Philippine Islands.”^[19]

This is not to say that such an appeal to history as disclosed by
what could be accepted as the pronouncement that did influence the delegates to
vote for such a grant of power could be utilized to restrict the scope thereof,
considering the language employed. For what could be expropriated are
“lands” not “landed estates.” It
is well to recall what Justice Laurel would impress on us, “historical
discussion while valuable is not necessarily decisive.”^[20]
It is easy to understand why.

The social and economic conditions are not static. They change
with the times. To identify the text of a written consti­tution with the
circumstances that inspired its inclusion may render it incapable of being
responsive to future needs. Precisely, it is assumed to be one of the virtues
of a written constitution that it suffices to govern the life of the people not
only at the time of its framing but far into the indefinite future. It is not
to be considered as so lacking in flexibility and suppleness that it may be a
bar to measures; novel and unorthodox, as they may appear to some, but
nonetheless imperatively called for. Otherwise, it might expose itself to the
risk of inability to survive in the face of complexities that time may bring in
its wake.

It would thus be devoid of the character of permanency, which is the
distinguishing mark of a constitution. Such was the conclusion deliberately
arrived at after extensive discussion in the Constitutional Convention that the
Consti­tution as adopted in 1935 would be good not only for the Commonwealth
but for the Republic, with all the vicissitudes that time and circumstance
would bring. Our people in signifying their adherence to the Constitution at
the plebiscite thereafter held were of a similar persuasion.

The continuing life of a constitution was stressed by one of the
chief architects of the Constitution, Manuel A. Roxas,
later to be the first President of the Republic. For him it is “the
essence [of such an] instrument.”^[21]
It was his view that the constitution to be adopted by the Constitutional
Convention of 1934 would “have an indefinite life, will be permanent,
subject of course, to revisions, amendments and other changes that may be
adopted constitutionally.”^[22]
That would be an assurance that constitutional guarantees “will be
maintained, property rights will be safeguarded and individual rights
maintained immaculate and sanctified. * * *.”^[23]
Another prominent delegate, Gregorio Perfecto, later a member of this Tribunal,
aptly noted that the transitory character is essentially incompatible with the
nature of laws, and necessarily so of a constitution, which is the supreme law
of a people and therefore must be impressed with such attribute of permanency,
much more than ordinary statutes passed under its authority.^[24]

It could thus be said of our Constitution as of the United States
Constitution, to borrow from Chief Justice Marshall’s pronouncement in M’Culloch v. Maryland^[25]
that it is “intended to endure for ages to come and consequently, to be
adapted to the various crisis of human affairs. ” It cannot be looked upon
as other than, in the language of another American jurist, Chief Justice Stone,
“a continuing instrument of government.”^[26]
Its framers were not visionaries, toying with speculations or theories, but men
of affairs, at home in statecraft, laying down the foundations of a government
which can make effective and operative all the powers conferred or assumed,
with the corresponding restrictions to secure individual rights and,
anticipating, subject to the limitations of human foresight, the problems that
events to come in the distant days ahead will bring. Thus a constitution, to
quote from Justice Cardozo, “states or ought to
state not rules for the passing hour, but principles for an expanding
future.”^[27]

To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution,
any constitution, is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically, for the
prescriptions therein contained, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not
mathematical formulas having their essence in their form, but are organic
living institutions, the significance of which is vital
nor formal. There must be an awareness, as with
Justice Brandeis, not only of what has been, but of what may be. The words
employed by it are not to be construed to yield fixed and rigid answers but as
impressed with the necessary attributes of flexibility and accommodation to
enable them to meet adequately whatever problems the future has in store. It is
not, in brief, a printed finality but a dynamic process.

3. The conclusion is difficult to resist that the text of the
constitutional provision in question, its historical background as noted in
pronouncements in the Constitutional Convention and the inexonerable
need for the Constitution to have the capacity for growth and ever be adaptable
to changing social and economic conditions all argue against its restrictive
construction. Such an approach was reflected succinctly in the dissenting
opinion of Justice J. B. L. Reyes, concurred in by the present Chief Justice,
in the Baylosis case. We find it persuasive.

His dissenting opinion opens thus: “I am constrained to
dissent from the opinion of the majority. The reasons set forth by it against
the validity of the proposed expropriation strike me as arguments against the
expropriation policies adopted by the government rather than reasons against
the existence and application of the condemnation power in the present
case.”^[28]
Then he stated: “The propriety of exercising the power of eminent domain
under Article XIII, section 4 of our Constitution can not be determined on a
purely quantitative or area basis.  Not
only does the constitutional provision speak of lands instead of landed
estates, but I see no cogent reason why the government, in its quest for
social justice and peace, should exclusively devote attention to conflicts of
large proportions, involving a considerable number of individuals, and eschew
small controversies and wait until they grow into a major problem before taking
remedial action.”^[29]

As to the role of the courts in the appraisal of the
congressional implementation of such a power, he had this to say: “The
Constitution considered the small individual land tenure to be so important to
the maintenance of peace and order and to the promotion of progress and the
general welfare that it not only provided for the expropriation and subdivision
of lands but also opened the way for the limitation of private land holdings
(Art. XIII, section 3).  It is not for this Court to judge the worth
of these and other social and economic policies expressed by the Constitution;
our duty is to conform to such policies and not to block their realization.
“^[30]

The above dissent, as well as that penned by the then Chief
Justice Paras with whom the then Justice Pablo was in
agreement, with Justice Alex Reyes writing a concurring opinion, resulted in
that the main opinion of Justice Montemayor, while
prevailing, failed to elicit the necessary majority vote of six.  If for that reason alone its re-examination
would not appear to be inappropriate. 
Moreover, it could not be considered as controlling the present suit, in
view of the fact that the exercise of the congressional authority to
expropriate land was not direct as in this case but carried out in pursuance of
the statutory authority conferred on the President under Commonwealth Act No.
539.

The absence of any controlling force of such prevailing opinion
can likewise be predicated on facts which would differentiate the present
situation from that found in the Baylosis case.  Thus Justice Montemayor
noted: “The evidence shows that both Sinclair and Cirilo
P. Baylosis at one time were willing to sell to some
of the tenants and occupants herein involved under certain conditions and
provided that they buy in groups, presumably to avoid subdivisions and the
problem of dealing with many individual buyers, but the tenants failed to
buy.  Naturally, they may not now compel
Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis
to sell to them through the Government by means of expropriation. Besides, the
bulk of the lands that Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis had formerly offered to them for sale which offer
they failed to take advantage of, has now been sold to others, the other
co-defendants herein, in small lots.”^[31]
Likewise, it was noted by him: “There is another point that merits
consideration.  The defendants claim and
correctly that many of the tenants and occupants now insisting on expropriation
have lands of their own.”^[32]

The more fundamental reason though why we find ourselves unable
to yield deference to such opinion of Justice Montemayor,
well-written and tightly-reasoned as it is, is its undue stress on property
rights.  It thus appears then that it
failed to take into account the greater awareness exhibited by the framers of
our Constitution of the social forces at work when they drafted the fundamental
law.  To be more specific, they were
seriously concerned with the grave problems of inequality of wealth, with its
highly divisive tendency, resulting in the generous scope accorded the police
power and eminent domain prerogatives of the state, even if the exercise
thereof would cover terrain previously thought of as beyond state control, to
promote social justice and the general welfare.

This is not to say of course that property rights are
disregarded.  This is merely to emphasize
that the philosophy of our Constitution embodying as it does what Justice
Laurel referred to as its “nationalistic and socialist traits discoverable
upon even a sudden dip into a variety of [its] provisions” although not
extending as far as the “destruction or annihilation” of the rights
to property,^[33]
negates the postulate which at one time reigned supreme in American
constitutional law as to their well-nigh inviolable character. This is not so
under our Constitution, which rejects the doctrine of laissez faire
with its abhorrence for the least interference with the autonomy suppose to be
enjoyed by the property owner.  Laissez
faire, as Justice Malcolm pointed out as far back as 1919, did not take
too firm a foothold in our jurisprudence.^[34] Our
Constitution is much more explicit. 
There is no room for it for laissez faire.  So Justice Laurel affirmed not only in the
above opinion but in another concurring opinion quoted with approval in at
least two of our subsequent decisions.^[35]
We had occasion to reiterate such a view in the ACCFA case, decided barely two
months ago.^[36]

This particular grant of authority to Congress authorizing the
expropriation of land is a clear manifestation of such a policy that finds
expression in our fundamental law.  So is
the social justice principle enshrined in the Constitution of which it is an
expression, as so clearly pointed out in the respective dissenting opinions of
Justice J. B. L. Reyes and Chief Justice Paras in the
Baylosis case. 
Why it should be thus is so plausibly set forth in the ACCFA decision,
the opinion being penned by Justice Makalintal.  We quote: “The growing complexities of
modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the
functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete.  The areas which used to be left to private
enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter
optionally, and only ‘because it was better equipped to administer for the public
welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals,’ continue to
lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that
the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the
increasing social challenges of the times. 
Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a
greater socialization of economic forces. 
Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a
national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle
concerning the promotion of social justice.”

It would thus appear that the prevailing opinion in the Baylosis case is far from compelling.  To the extent that the conclusion reached by
us in this suit proceeds from a different reading of the constitutional
provision in question, it must be deemed as being possessed of less than
decisive weight.

4. There need be no fear that such constitutional grant of power
to expropriate lands is without limit. As in the case of the more general
provision on eminent domain, there is the explicit requirement of the payment
of just compensation.  It is well-settled
that just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at
the time of its taking. Anything beyond that is more, and anything short of
that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for
the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain
would accrue to the expropriating entity. 
The market value of the land taken is the just compensation to which the
owner of condemned property is entitled, the market value being that sum of
money which a person desirous, but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing,
but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received
for such property.  There must be a
consideration then of all the facts which make it commercially valuable.  The question is what would be obtained for it
on the market from parties who want to buy and would give full value.
Testimonies as to real estate transactions in the vicinity are admissible. It
must be shown though that the property as to use must be of similar character
to the one sought to be condemned.  The
transaction must likewise be coeval as to time. 
To the market value must be added the consequential damages, if any,
minus the consequential benefits.  The assessed value of real property while constituting prima
facie evidence of its value in case of condemnation proceedings is not
conclusive.^[37]

Then, too, it is a prerequisite for the valid exercise of such a
congressional power that the taking be for the public use.  To quote from the Guido decision: “It
has been truly said that the assertion of the right on the part of the
legislature to take the property of one citizen and transfer it to another,
even for a full compensation, when the public interest is not promoted thereby,
is claiming a despotic power, and one inconsistent with every just principle
and fundamental maxim of a free government.”^[38]
It is on that account that we granted prohibition to restrain respondent Rural
Progress Administration from proceeding with the expropriation of petitioner’s
land, two adjoining lots, part commercial with a
combined area of slightly more than two hectares.  As was stressed by Justice Tuason in his opinion: “No fixed
line of demarcation between what taking is for public use and what is not can
be made; each case has to be judged according to its peculiar
circumstances.  It suffices to say for
the purpose of this decision that the case under consideration is far wanting
in those elements which make for public convenience or public use.”^[39]
Such is not the situation before us now. Nor are we disposed to dispute the
legislative appraisal of the matter.

5. The failure to meet the exacting standard of due process would
likewise constitute a valid objection to the exercise of this congressional
power.  That was so intimated in the
above leading Guido case.  There was an
earlier pronouncement to that effect in a decision rendered long before the
adoption of the Constitution under the previous organic law then in force,
while the Philippines was still an unincorporated territory of the United
States.^[40]

It is obvious then that a landowner is covered by the mantle of
protection due process affords.  It is a
mandate of reason.  It frowns on arbitrariness, it is the antithesis of any governmental act
that smacks of whim or caprice.  It
negates state power to act in an oppressive manner. It is, as had been stressed
so often, the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. In that sense, it
stands as a guaranty of justice.  That is
the standard that must be met by any governmental agency in the exercise of
whatever competence is entrusted to it.^[41]
As was so emphatically stressed by the present Chief Justice, “acts of
Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can deny due process only under
pain of nullity, * *.”^[42]

It is easily understandable then why the expropriation of lots
less than one hectare in City of Manila v. Arellano Law College,^[43]
Lee Tay v. Choco^[44]
and Republic v. Samia^[45]
and of lots less than two hectares in Commonwealth v. De Borja^[46]
and Republic v. Prieto^[47]
was not given the sanction of approval by this Court, the failure to meet the
due process requirement being quite evident.

6. It is primarily the equal protection guaranty though that
petitioner’s case is made to rest. The Constitution requires that no person be
denied “the equal protection of the laws.”^[48]
A juridical being is included within its terms.

The assumption underlying such a guaranty is that a legal norm,
whether embodied in a rule, principle, or standard, constitutes a defense
against anarchy at one extreme and tyranny at the other.  Thereby, people living together in a
community with its myriad and complex problems can minimize the friction and reduce
the conflicts, to assure, at the very least, a peaceful ordering of
existence.  The ideal situation is for
the law’s benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the
sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the
affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of
the very essence of the idea of law.

The actual, given things as they are and likely to continue to
be, cannot approximate the ideal.  Nor is
the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the
realities of the situation.  The
constitutional guaranty then is not to be given a meaning that disregards what
is, what does in fact exist.^[49]
To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a
regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property.  Those adversely affected may under such
circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the
governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the
common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least,
discrimination that finds no support in reason.

It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on
all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in
the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges
conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot
be allowed.  For the
principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person
under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous.  If law be looked upon in terms of burden or
charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion,
whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest.

It is precisely because the challenged statute applies only to
petitioner that he could assert a denial of equal protection.  As set forth in its brief: “Republic Act
No. 2616 is directed solely against appellee and for
this reason violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.  Unlike other laws which confer authority to
expropriate landed estates in general, it singles out the Tatalon
Estate.  It cannot be said, therefore,
that it deals equally with other lands in Quezon City or elsewhere.”^[50]
With due recognition then of the power of Congress to designate the particular
property to be taken and how much thereof may be condemned in the exercise of
the power of expropriation, it is still a judicial question whether in the
exercise of such competence, the party adversely affected is the victim of
partiality and prejudice.  That the equal
protection clause will not allow.

The judiciary can look into the facts then, no conclusiveness
being attached to a determination of such character when reliance is had either
to the due process clause which is a barrier against arbitrariness and
oppressiveness and the equal protection guaranty which is an obstacle to
invidious discrimination.

We start of course with the presumption of validity, the doubts
being resolved in favor of the challenged enactment.^[51]
As this is the first statute of its kind assailed, we should not stop our
inquiry there.  The occasion that called
for such legislation, if known, goes far in meeting any serious consti­tutional
objection raised.  We turn to the
Explanatory Note of the bill,^[52]
which was enacted into the challenged statute. 
It started with the declaration that it provides for the
“expropriation of the Tatalon Estate, Quezon City, and for the sale at
cost of the lots therein to their present bona fide occupants, authorizing therefor the appropriation of ten million pesos.” Then
it continued: “The Tatalon Estate has an area of
more than ninety-six hectares and the lots therein are at present occupied by
no less than one thousand five hundred heads of families, most of whom are
veterans of World War II.  It is the
earnest desire of this group of patriotic and loyal citizens to purchase the
lots at a minimum cost.” Why there was such a need for expropriation was
next taken up: “The population of Quezon
City has considerably increased.  This increase in population is posing a
serious housing problem to city residents. 
This bill will not only solve the problem but will also implement the
land-for-the-landless program of the present Administration. “

What other facts are there which would remove the alleged
infirmity of the statute on equal protection grounds? The brief for respondents
invited our attention to the social problem which this legislation was intended
to remedy.  Thus: “There is a vital
point which should have great weight in the decision of this case.  The petitioner led the occupants of Tatalon Estate to believe that they were dealing with the
representatives of the real owners, the Veterans Subdivision, in the purchase
of their lots.  The occupants believed in
good faith that they were dealing with the representatives of the owners of the
lots.  This belief was bolstered by the
fact that the petitioners herein even entered into a compromise agreement on March 16, 1953 with the Deudors, agreeing to give the latter millions of pesos in
settlement of their claim over the Tatalon
Estate.  The occupants, therefore,
purchased their respective portions from the Veterans Subdivision in good
faith.  The petitioner allowed the
Veterans Subdivision to construct roads in the Tatalon
Estate; it allowed said firm to establish an office in the Tatalon
Estate and to advertise the sale of the lots inside the Tatalon
Estate.  Petitioner admits having full
knowledge of the activities of the Veterans Subdivision and yet did not lift a
finger to stop said acts.  The occupants
paid good money for their lots and spent fortunes to build their homes.  It was after the place has been improved with
the building of the roads and the erection of substantial residential homes
that petitioner stepped into the picture, claiming for the first time that it
is the owner of the Tatalon Estate. Some of the
occupants had erected their houses as early as 1947 and 1948 * * *.”^[53]

The cutting edge of the above assertions could have been blunted
by the brief for petitioner.  This is all
it did say on the matter though: “Appellants alleged that appellee ‘led the occupants of Tatalon
Estate to believe that they were dealing with the representatives of the real
owners, the Veterans Subdivision, in the purchase of their lots’ * * *. There
is absolutely no evidence on record to establish this ludicrous
allegation.”^[54]
Only the alleged duplicity of petitioner was denied, leaving unanswered the
rather persuasive recital of conditions that could rightly motivate Congress to
act as it did. Clearly, there is no sufficient refutation of the seriousness of
the problem thus underscored by respondents, the solution of which is the aim
of the statute now under attack.

This is not to deny that whenever Congress points to a particular
piece of property to be expropriated, it is faced with a more serious scrutiny
as to its power to act in the premises. 
It would require though a clear and palpable showing of its having singled
out a party to bear the brunt of governmental authority that may be
legitimately exerted, induced, it would appear by a feeling of disapproval or
ill-will to make out a case of this guaranty having been disregarded.  If such were the case, then in the language
of Justice Laurel, it “will be the time to make the [judicial] hammer fall
and heavily.  But not until then.”^[55]
The most careful study of the matter before us however yields the conclusion
that petitioner was unable to sustain the burden of demonstrating a denial of
equal protection.

Moreover, there is nothing to prevent Congress in view of the
public funds at its disposal to follow a system of priorities.  It could thus determine what lands would
first be the subject of expropriation. 
This it did under the challenged legislative act. As already noted,
Congress was moved to act in view of what it considered a serious social and
economic problem. The solution which for it was the most acceptable was the
authorization of the expropriation of the Tatalon
Estate. So it provided under the statute in question.  It was confronted with a situation that
called for correction, and the legislation that was the result of its
deliberation sought to apply the necessary palliative. That it stopped short of
possibly attaining the cure of other analogous ills certainly does not
stigmatize its effort as a denial of equal protection.  We have given our sanction to the principle
underlying the exercise of police power and taxation, but certainly not
excluding eminent domain, that “the legislature is not required by the
Constitution to adhere to the policy of ‘all or none’.”^[56]
Thus, to reiterate, the invocation by petitioner of equal protection clause is
not attended with success.

7.  The other points raised
may be briefly disposed of.  Much is made
of what the lower court considered to be the inaccuracy apparent on the face of
the challenged statute as to the ownership of the Tatalon
Estate.  It could very well be that
Congress ought to have taken greater pains to avoid such imprecision.  At any rate, the lower court, unduly alarmed,
would consider it a deprivation of property without due process of law.^[57]
Such a fear is unwarranted.  In the
course of the expropriation proceedings, there undoubtedly would be a judicial
determination as to the party entitled to the just compensation.   As of now then, such a question would appear
at the very least to be premature. 
Reference is likewise made as to the effect of the authorized
expropriation on those purchasers of lots located in the Tatalon
Estate.  Again, on the occasion of the
expropriation, whatever contractual rights might be possessed by vendors and
vendees could be asserted and accorded the appropriate constitutional
protection.

8. What appears undeniable is that in the light of the broad
grant of congressional power so apparent from the text of the constitutional
provision, the historical background as made clear during the deliberation for
the Constitutional Convention, and the cardinal postulate underlying
constitutional construction that its provisions are not to be interpreted to
preclude their being responsive to future needs, the fundamental law being
intended to govern the life of a nation as it unfolds through the ages, the
challenged statute can survive the test of validity.  If it were otherwise, then the judiciary may
lend itself susceptible to the charge that in its appraisal of governmental
measures with social and economic implications, its decisions are characterized
by the narrow, unyielding insistence on the primacy of property rights, contrary
to what the Constitution ordains.  In no
other sphere of judicial activity are judges called upon to transcend personal
predilections and private notions of policy, lest legislation intended to bring
to fruition the hope of a better life for the great masses of our people, as
embodied in the social justice principle of which this constitutional provision
under scrutiny is a manifestation, be unjustifiably stricken down.  The appealed decision cannot stand.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of January 10,
1963 holding that Republic Act No. 2616 as amended by Republic Act No. 3453 is
unconstitutional is reversed.  The writ
of prohibition suit is denied, and the preliminary injunction issued by the
lower court set aside.  With costs against petitioner.

Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur in the opinion
of Justice Teehankee.

Makalintal, J., in the result.

Barredo, J., concurs in a separate opinion.

Teehankee, J., concurs and dissents in a separate opinion.

---

^[1]
Republic Act No. 2616 as amended (1959).

^[2]
Art. XIII, Sec. 4 provides: “The Congress may authorize, upon payment of
just compen­sation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots
and conveyed at cost to individuals.”

^[3] 84 Phil. 847.

^[4] Corn. Act No. 539 (1940).

^[5] 96 Phil. 468 (1955).

^[6]
Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 2616. The two succeeding sections follow: “Sec.
2. Immediately upon the appropriation of funds by the Congress of the Philippines
for the payment of just compensation for the said Tatalon
Estate, the Solicitor General, or any other proper Government authority shall
institute the necessary expropriation proceedings before the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City. Sec. 3.
After the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate as
provided in this Act, the lots therein shall be sold at cost to their present
bona fide occupants in not more than two hundred forty equal monthly
installments with interest of not more than six per centum per
annum on the unpaid balance.” The fourth section was thereafter
amended by Republic Act No. 3453 to read thus: “Sec. 4. Upon approval of
this amendatory Act, no ejectment proceedings shall
be instituted or prosecuted against the present occupants of any lot in said Tatalon Estate, and no ejectment
proceedings already commenced shall be continued, and such lot or any portion
thereof shall not be sold by the owners of said estate to any person other than
the present occupant without the consent of the latter given in a public
instrument. ” It was held in Cuatico v.
Court of Appeals: “It is, therefore, imperative that we declare, as we now
do, that Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3453 which prohibits the filing of an ejectment proceeding, or the continuance of one that has
already been commenced, even in the absence of expro­priation proceedings
offends our Constitution and, hence, is unenforceable.” (6
SCRA 595, 601 [1962]).

^[7]
Annex A, Brief for Respondents, pp. 31-32.

^[8]
Fourth and Fifth Assignments of Errors, Brief for Respondents, pp. 18-20.

^[9] Ibid, p. 18.

^[10] 63 Phil. 139 (1936).

^[11]
Article VIII, Sections 8 and 10, Constitution.

^[12] Aglipay v.
Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201 (1937); Co Chiong v. Cuaderno, 83 Phil. 242 (1949); Phil. Association of
Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil. 806
(1955); Macias v. Commission on Elections, 3 SCRA 1 (1961); Lopez v.
Roxas, 17 SCRA 756 (1966); Philippine Constitution Asso. v. Mathay, 18
SCRA 300 (1966); Lidasan v. Commission on
Elections, 21 SCRA 496 (1967).

^[13]
Art. XIII, Sec. 4, Constitution.

^[14] Cf. Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259
(1938).

^[15] Guido v. Rural Progress, 84 Phil. 847, 850 (1949).

^[16] Ibid, p. 850.

^[17] Ibid.

^[18] I Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Laurel ed., pp.
404-409 (1966). 

^[19]
VI, Ibid, p. 551.

^[20] Aglipay v.
Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201 (1937).

^[21] I Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Laurel ed., p.
566 (1966).

^[22] Ibid, p. 573.

^[23] Ibid, p. 574.

^[24] Ibid,
pp. 610-611.

^[25] 4 Wheat 316 (1819).

^[26]
United States v. Classic, 313 US 299 (1941).

^[27] The Nature of Judicial Process, p. 83 (1921).

^[28] 96 Phil. 461, 502 (1955).

^[29] Ibid.

^[30] Ibid, p. 504.

^[31] Ibid, p. 475.

^[32] Ibid, p. 477.

^[33] Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259, 270
(1938).

^[34] Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660.

^[35] Antamok
Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 70 Phil. 340
(1940) and Leyte Land Transp.
Co. v. Leyte Farmers’ & Laborers’ Union, 80 Phil. 842 (1948).

^[36]
ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions, L-21484, November 29, 1969.

^[37] Cf. Republic v.
Lara, 96 Phil. 170 (1954); Republic v. Garcellano,
103 Phil. 231 (1958); Municipal Govt. of Sagay v.
Jison, 104 Phil. 1026 (1958) and Alfonso v. Pasay City, 106 Phil. 1017 (1960).

^[38] Guido v. Rural Progress, 84 Phil. 847, 851 (1949).

^[39] Ibid, 854.

^[40] Visayan Refining
Co. v.
Camus, 40 Phil. 550 (1919).

^[41] Cf. Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel
Operators Association v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849 (1967); Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA
424 (1968); Santiago v. Alikpala, 25 SCRA 356 (1968); Tinio v. Mina, 26 SCRA 512 (1968).

^[42] Cuaycong v. Sengbengco,
L-11837, November 29, 1960.

^[43] 85 Phil. 663 (1950).

^[44] 87 Phil. 814 (1950).

^[45] 89 Phil. 843 (1951).

^[46] 85 Phil. 51 (1949).

^[47] 7 SCRA 1004 (1963). It would appear likewise that such
infirmity could have been the basis for not allowing the attempted
expropriation of lots less than five hectares in Urban Estates v. Montesa, 88 Phil. 348 (1951); Mun.
of Caloocan
v. Manotok Realty, 94 Phil. 1003 (1954); Mun. Govt. of Caloocan v. Choan Huat
and Co., 96 Phil. 88 (1954); Republic v. Prieto,
7 SCRA 1004 (1963); Republic v. Samia, 8 SCRA
197 (1963); and Phil. Realtors v. Santos, 12 SCRA
267 (1964).

^[48]
Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 1.

^[49] Cf. Tigner v. Texas, 310 US 141,
147 (1940), per Frankfurter, J. “The Constitution does not require things
which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were
the same.”      

^[50]
Brief for Petitioner, p. 29.

^[51]
This doctrine in American constitutional law dates back to Ogden
v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, decided in 1827, based on this principle:
“It but a decent respect due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the
patriotism of the legislative body, by which any law is passed to presume in
favor of its validity, until its violation of the Constitution is proved beyond
all reasonable doubt.”

^[52]
House Bill No. 3570.

^[53] Brief for the Respondents, pp. 13-14.

^[54] Brief for Petitioner-Appellee, pp. 2-3.

^[55] Zandueta v.
de la Costa, 66 Phil. 615 (1931).

^[56] Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148, 153
(1955). This portion of the opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, speaking
for the Court, continues: “As ruled in Minnesota ex rel.
Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 84 L. Ed. 744, ‘if the law
presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown
because there are other instances to which it might have been applied; and that
‘the legislative authority, exerted within its proper field, need not embrace
all the evils within its reach’ (N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp. 301 U.S. 1, 81 L. Ed. 893). “As to American cases, cf. Carroll v.
Greenwich, 199 US 401 (1905); Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 US 61 (1911); Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell,
222 US 225 (1911); Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 US 157
(1912); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 US 138
(1914); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 US 389 (1914); Keokee Consol Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 US 224 (1914);
Truax v. Raich, 239
US 33 (1915); Armour & Co. v. North
Dakota, 240 US 510 (1916); St. Louis I. M. and S.R. Co. v. Arkansas, 240
US 578 (1916); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 US 539 (1917); Merrick v.
N.W. Halsey and Co., US 568 (1917); Dominion Hotel Co. v. Arizona, 249
US 265 (1919); Perley v. North Carolina, 249
US 510 (1919); Farmers and M. Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 US 649
(1923); Whitney v. California, 274 US 357 (1927); Silver v.
Silver, 280 US 117 (1929); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 US 379
(1937); United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 US 144 (1938); Hiro­bayashi v. United
States, 320 US 81 (1943); United States v. Petrillo,
332 US 1 (1947); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 US
464 (1948); Railway Express Agency v. New York,
336 US 106
(1949); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 US
460 (1950); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 (1955); Morey v. Doud, 354 US
457 (1957); Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 US 582 (1961); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 US
184 (1964); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383, 301 (1966); Katzenbach
v. Morgan, 384 US
641 (1966).

^[57]
Decision of the lower court, Annex A, Brief for
Respondents, p. 29.

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