G.R. No. L-28805. August 10, 1981
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION SUPERVISORS’ UNION, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION EMPLOYEES & WORKERS ASSOCIATION, ATTY. SIMPLICIO S. BALCOS …
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
By this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction, petitioner seeks to annul the Orders issued by respondent
Judge on 6 February and 28 February 1968, in Case No. 81-IPA of the Court of
Industrial Relations (CIR) entitled “National Power Corporation Employees
and Workers Association vs. National Power Corporation”. The petitioner therein (Workers’ Union, for
short, but also called NPCEWA) is a labor union of rank and file employees of
respondent National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR, for brevity). There is also another labor union in NAPOCOR,
the petitioner union, composed of supervisors (Supervisors’ Union for short,
petitioner herein). In the questioned
Orders, respondent Judge, Arsenio Martinez, directed NAPOCOR to deduct from the
salary increases of all NAPOCOR employees, including supervisors,
members of the Supervisors’ Union, an amount corresponding to 20% thereof as
attorney’s fees payable to respondent Atty. Simplicio S. Balcos.
Sometime in January, 1968, a labor dispute between NAPOCOR and
the Workers’ Union was certified by the President of the Philippines to the
CIR, docketed as Case No. 81-IPA (the case below). It was set for hearing before respondent
Judge. The dispute stemmed from the
Workers’ Union’s demand to reopen negotiations for salary adjustment for
NAPOCOR employees.
On 5 January 1968, the Supervisors’ Union filed in the case below
a “Motion to Intervene and Admit Answer in Intervention” on the
principal ground that, as the labor union of supervisors duly recognized by
NAPOCOR as the exclusive representative of all supervisory personnel, and
invoking the provisions of their own collective bargaining agreement, it had
legal interest in the matter under controversy and that it stood to be
adversely affected in the resolution of the issues raised by the parties. No action was taken by respondent Judge on
that Motion.
On 8 January 1968, a “Supplementary Agreement to the
Existing Collective Bargaining Agreement Executed by and Between the NPC and
the NPCEWA” was submitted to the CIR for approval wherein NAPOCOR agreed,
among others, to grant salary increases to its rank and file employees. In an Order of the same date, respondent
Judge approved the Agreement and adopted it as its own award.
On 13 January 1968, respondent Atty. Simplicio S. Balcos, as
counsel for the Workers’ Union, filed a Motion seeking a grant of 20%
attorney’s fee on all amounts that may be due and payable to employees of
NAPOCOR by virtue of the Order dated 8 January 1968.
Two days later, or on 15 January 1968, the Workers’ Union also
filed a Motion asking for union assessment of 5% on the same award of 8 January
1968.
On 16 January 1968, the Supervisors’ Union again moved for the
resolution of its Motion for Intervention.
Without acting on the same, respondent Judge issued the assailed Order
of 6 February 1968, which directed NAPOCOR
“x x x to deduct 20% fee on all amounts that may be due and
payable to all NPC employees and/or workers by virtue of the January 8,
1968 order, and to pay the same to Attorney Simplicio S. Balcos. The company is likewise ordered to deduct
the 5% union assessment against all amounts to be received by virtue of the
same award and/or order of employees and/or workers covered by the collective
bargaining agreement with the NPCEWA”[1]
(Italics ours)
On 23 February 1968, NAPOCOR presented an “Urgent Motion for
Clarification” of the Order of 6 February 1968, particularly, on whether
or not the supervisors who belong to another appropriate bargaining unit
and whose salaries were likewise adjusted in accordance with other adjustments
extended to other personnel of the Corporation, as provided for under Section
2, Article XXI of the CBA executed by and between the Supervisors’ Union and
NAPOCOR on 24 July 1967, are included in the Order of 6 February 1968.
Resolving the Motion for Clarification, respondent Judge issued
the Order of 28 February 1968, also under question, which held that:
“The order of February 6, 1968 is indeed clear. It says ‘x x x The company is therefore
directed to deduct 20% on all amounts that may be due and payable to all NPC
employees and/or workers by virtue of the January 8, 1968 order, and to pay the
same to Attorney Simplicio S. Balcos. x
x x ‘ There is no question, therefore, if only for the sake of clarification,
that the order of February 6, 1968 refers to NPC employees and/or workers
embracing the rank and file employees as well as the supervisors of the
corporation who, by and large, have been benefited by the order of January 8,
1968. And again, needless to say that
the payment of attorney’s fees by union and non-union members, as long as they
are all employees of the corporation, has long been settled in this
jurisdiction. Incidentally, said order
of February 6, 1968 has already become final and executory”[2]
(Italics supplied)
Shortly thereafter, or on 4 March 1968, the Supervisors’ Union
filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion stating that it is not and was never a party to
the case in spite of its “Motion to Intervene and Admit Answer in
Intervention,” which remained unresolved, and praying that the Orders
dated 6 and 28 February 1968 be set aside in so far as they include the supervisors
of NAPOCOR in the payment of attorney’s fees to Atty. Balcos.
The Supervisors’ Union’s Urgent Motion to set the Omnibus Motion
for hearing, filed on 15 March 1968, also remained unresolved. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed with us on 20 March
1968.
We issued on 16 April 1968 a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, upon
the posting of a bond of P500.00, enjoining NAPOCOR from making any deductions
from the salary differentials of the supervisors of the NPC to cover the
20% attorney’s fee payable to respondent Atty. Simplicio S. Balcos, and
ordering respondent Judge to refrain from taking further proceedings in the
case in so far as it involves the Supervisors’ Union.
The issue for resolution is whether or not the NAPOCOR
supervisors could be legally compelled to pay to respondent Atty. Balcos, as
attorney’s fees, any part of the salary increases they obtained from NAPOCOR.
We rule in the negative and sustain the stand of the Supervisors’
Union.
The Supplementary Agreement that was approved by respondent Judge
in its Order dated 8 January 1968 was expressly “between the NPC and the
NPCEWA” alone. Furthermore, by
express terms and conditions of said Order the award made therein was not to
affect any collective bargaining agreement between the Supervisors’ Union and
NAPOCOR. In other words, the
Supervisors’ Union was treated as a completely separate bargaining unit. The pertinent portion of the Order reads:
“It is understood that this agreement, and approved as an
award by the Court, shall not in any manner affect, amend, alter, and much less
render academic, the certification election proceedings going on in the Court
which affect, include and involve the supervisors’ union, and shall not further
violate, change, alter or amend the existing collective bargaining agreement
between management and said supervisor’s union, including all such matters,
clarifications, modifications or interpretations arrived at on all conferences
where management, the supervisors’ union and the union of the rank-and-file
were present.”[3]
The exclusion of supervisors from the scope of the 8
January 1968 Order further finds reinforcement in the footnote appearing at the
bottom of page 2 of the Supplementary Agreement, which reads:
“Employees referred to herein are rank and file employees,
that is, all NPC employees except Department Chief and those other
employees who are supervisors according to law and jurisprudence and
competent courts”.[4]
(Italics supplied)
The transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing of
8 January 1968[5]
by no means supports respondent lawyer’s submission that the CIR had impliedly
resolved the Supervisors’ Union’s Motion for Intervention, but rather, explicitly
stated that the CIR had yet to act on said Motion.
Moreover, no special service was rendered nor any special effort
exerted by respondent lawyer in connection with the salary increases of the
supervisory personnel as could legally entitle him to attorney’s fees:
“x x x even assuming that the supervisory employees of Meralco
were actually granted by the company an increase in salary similar to the
salary increase due to its non-supervisory employees by virtue of Sec. 7 of the
CBA, the same could not have been due to said CBA nor to any special effort of
respondent but to a policy or concession of the management of Meralco, and, as
such, the supervisory employees could not be legally compelled to pay to
respondent Gaerlan as attorney’s fees any part of said salary increase”[6]
Respondents argue, however, that as the supervisors belonging to
their Union had been directly or indirectly benefited by the Order of 8 January
1968, they should also be made to pay attorney’s fee to be deducted from their
salary increases. This contention is
unfounded. Not only did the supervisors
belong to a different bargaining unit with their own collective bargaining
agreement, but also, the increases extended to the supervisory personnel by
NAPOCOR was not by virtue of what is termed a “distortion adjustment”
but was a management concession effected pursuant to the provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement executed by and between the Supervisors’ Union
and NAPOCOR on 24 July 1967 whereby NAPOCOR bound itself to continue adjusting
salaries of personnel covered by the agreement in accordance with other
adjustments extended to other personnel, and not by virtue of the Order dated 8
January 1968. This fact was admitted by
NAPOCOR in its Motion for Clarification filed on 23 February 1968 stating that:
“4. On February 23, 1968, respondent served
notice on the NPCSU that the NPC was adjusting the salaries of supervisors
in accordance with Section 2, Article XXI of the Agreement on July 24, 1967.”[7]
(Italics supplied)
Even granting, arguendo, that the members of the
Supervisors’ Union had, in one way or another, benefited from the services of
respondent counsel, there arises no obligation to compensate in the absence of
an express or implied contract.
“The persons benefited by an attorney’s service are not
obliged to compensate him when the same are rendered without their knowledge or
consent or against their protest.
“The true grounds upon which, in our opinion, the appellant
stands are that his services have resulted beneficially to the heirs and that
therefore they should compensate him for his labor. There has not been cited to us, neither do we
know of, a provision of the law in support of this contention. If we were to admit this contention the
theory of the law would be completely changed.
There would be no further need of contracts. It would result that anyone might impose
obligations upon another without his knowledge or consent, and even against his
protest as happened in the present case”[8]
Parenthetically, PD 1691 dated May 1, 1980, amending Article 222
of the Labor Code, now makes it unlawful for Union lawyers to collect or assess
fees from individual members of the contracting union based on benefits derived
from collective bargaining agreements.
Lastly, although by no means the least consideration, to allow
the questioned Orders to have binding effect upon the Supervisors’ Union, when,
notwithstanding its interest in the case, it was not allowed to intervene, nor
was it impleaded as a party, nor accorded any hearing, is patently violative of
the constitutional guarantee against deprivation of property without due
process of law.
“Where, as in the case at bar, petitioner was at no time named
a party in an ejectment case and could not therefore be heard on a matter
wherein her vital rights were involved, there was a denial of due process.
“Procedural due process is that which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after
trial. It contemplates notice and
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered affecting one’s person or
property.”[9]
WHEREFORE, this Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition is granted, the Orders of respondent Judge, dated 6 February and 28
February 1968, set aside in so far as petitioner, National Power Corporation Supervisors’
Union, is concerned, and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by this
Tribunal on 16 April 1968 hereby made permanent.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Acting C.J., Makasiar, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
[1]
p. 50, Rollo.
[2]
p. 57, Rollo.
[3]
p. 38, Rollo.
[4]
p. 40, Ibid.
[5]
“THE COURT
“And, of course you would
not deny me the right to go over the terms and conditions (of the supplementary
agreement) before I approve of the same; because just a while ago I made
mention of the fact that there has been filed a motion for intervention. Perhaps, under the belief that the agreement
might in one way or another prejudice or touch upon the proceedings going on
where the Supervisors Union is necessarily involved.
xxx xxx
“xxx In fact I have prepared a
collatilla to be included in the order of this Court if and when the Court
finds that the terms and conditions of the provisions of the agreement are in
consonance with public policy, law and morals, I will incorporate it in the
record. I propose the inclusion of this
condition: ‘It is understood that this
agreement and approved as such . . . rather approved as an award by the Court,
shall not in any manner affect, amend, alter, or muchless render academic the
certification election proceedings going on in the Court which affect, include
and involve the Supervisors’ Union; and shall not further violate, change,
alter or amend the existing collective bargaining agreement between the
management and with said supervisors’ union including all such matters,
modifications or interpretations arrived at on all conferences wherein the
management, the supervisors’ union and the union of rank and file were
present.’ This I intend to include, in order to preserve the status quo and to
prevent further any industrial dispute that would issue out of this agreement,
if the parties, more especially the supervisors’ union would feel that it has
been relegated to the background, because somehow the Court has to act on the
motion for intervention x x x ” (p. 80, Rollo).
[6]
Citing Pascual vs. Court of Industrial Relations, L-27856-57, February
28, 1979, 88 SCRA 645, Manila Electric Co. vs. Gaerlan 97 SCRA 840
(1980).
[7]
p. 52, Rollo.
[8]
Orozco vs. Heirs of Hernaez, 1 Phil. 78, 79 (1901).
[9]
Macabingkil vs. Yatco, 21 SCRA 151 (1967), citing Cruzcosa, et al. vs.
Hon. H. Concepcion, et al., 101 Phil. 147 (1957); Abuan vs. Valera, 72
SCRA 301 (1976).