A.M. No. 2507-CFI. August 10, 1981
RICARDO B. MOYA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE RICARDO TENSUAN, DISTRICT JUDGE, CFI, Q.C., RESPONDENT.
GUERRERO, J.:
It is not unusual that delay is the common cause of complaint in the
administration of justice. The Canons of
Judicial Ethics demand judges to be punctual in the performance of their
judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants, witnesses, and
attorneys is of value, and that if the judge is unpunctual in his habits, he
sets a bad example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction with the
administration of justice.
Delay in the disposition of Criminal Case No. Q-4882, entitled
“People of the Philippines vs. Flordeliza Ramirez,” is the grievance
of complainant Ricardo B. Moya against respondent Judge Ricardo P. Tensuan of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, Quezon City, in the instant
administrative proceeding.
In a letter complaint dated November 10, 1980, complainant
alleged that during the months of August, 1979, until March 1980, the
respondent judge has issued a certificate that he has no pending motions or
incidence or decisions when in truth and in fact, the aforementioned Criminal
Case No. Q-4882 remained unresolved until April 1980, in violation of the
provisions of Section 5 of the Judiciary Act.[1]
In his comment[2]
Judge Tensuan averred that Mr. Ricardo Moya was the complaining witness against
his wife in Criminal Case No. Q-4882 entitled “People of the Philippines
vs. Flordeliza N. Ramirez”, wherein a judgment of acquittal was rendered
under date of February 4, 1980. He
explained that said case was deemed submitted for decision on November 10, 1979
pursuant to an order dated October 12, 1979 giving defense counsel thirty (30)
days therefrom within which to submit his memorandum; that the rendition of the
Decision only on February 4, 1980 – which was the 86th day after the case was
submitted for resolution – could be attributed to the fact that the docket of
Branch IV is burdened with more than 1,000 pending cases; and that “due to
the suffocating number of pending cases before his sala, the undersigned has
indeed – as in Criminal Case No. Q-4882 subject of the complaint – rendered
decisions on the 84th, 86th, 88th or even the 90th day after the submission of
cases – BUT, most certainly never beyond the ninety (90) day period. Undoubtedly, when complainant Moya heard of
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, he thought of this devious way of
“getting back” at the Judge who refused to believe the charge he
filed against his own wife; for is it not true that in the impending
reorganization of the Judiciary, those Judges with pending administrative
cases will not be reappointed? . . . . . and never mind if the administrative
case had no basis – at least, it will be pending!”
In reply[3]
to the comment of respondent Judge, complainant asserted that:
“x x x EVEN AFTER FEBRUARY 4, 1980,
I together with a friend has been inquiring the status of the said case to the
said Respondent Judge Sala but everything were all in vain and that the clerks
and employees assigned therein, even up to April 18, 1980, all their answers
were in the NEGATIVE and still there was NO DECISION YET as allegedly rendered
on February 4, 1980.
That as early as March 21, 1980, the said
respondent Judge Ricardo P. Tensuan received my “EX-PARTE MANIFESTATION
AND MOTION” requesting that respondent Judge have me properly notified for
the promulgation of the decision for the same, and said motion is hereto
attached as Annex “A” of this reply.
That I still remember, that I was only
notified of the promulgation of his decision last April 28, 1980 setting the
date of his promulgation of the same but it was RESET to April 30, 1980 but it
was again RESET to another date on the request of accused Ramirez, after we
were confronted by the Respondent Judge Tensuan with his Chamber, and after we
were informed by said respondent Judge that our Case or our Court battle was very
closely like a “CRISPA-TOYOTA FIGHT.”
That I was only informed by the said Respondent
Court personnels that the decision was rendered/promulgated only on the first
week of May, 1980 in the subject Criminal Case, far BEYOND THE 90 DAYS
REGLEMENTARY PERIOD.”
It appears, after an inquiry[4]
by the Court Administrator as to when Criminal Case No. Q-4882 was considered
submitted for decision, decided and promulgated, that:
1.
On October 10, 1979, defense counsel filed an
urgent ex-parte motion praying that he be granted a period of thirty (30) days
within which to file a memorandum for the accused;
2.
On October 12, 1979, respondent Judge issued an
order granting the exparte motion of defense counsel to file within thirty
(30) days from October 10, 1979 to file his memorandum, with a warning that
should he fail, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution;
3.
The decision is dated February 4, 1980;
4.
On May 12, 1980, the decision was promulgated
after four (4) re-settings on the following dates: (1) April 28, 1980 -re-set for non-appearance
of counsel for accused; (2) April 30, 1980 – re-set to May 5, 1980 with notice
to accused, her counsel and complainant; (3) May 5, 1980 – re-set to May 7,
1980 with notice to accused, her counsel and complainant; (4) May 7, 1980 –
re-set to May 12, 1980, with notice to accused, her counsel and complainant.
In the light of the foregoing, it is intimated that “(w)hile
the decision in said case is dated February 4, 1980, Complainant Moya wants to
imply that the same was rendered much later but ante-dated so that the same
would appear to have been decided within the period allowed by law. On the other hand, respondent Judge contends
that at the time he had more than 1,000 pending cases and yet he was able to
render the decision even before the 90-day period; that the deep sense of
grievance on the part of the complainant stemmed from the acquittal of the
accused. In other words, respondent
argues that if the accused were convicted, he would have not filed this
administrative case; that because of the acquittal, he retaliated by filing
this case which may prejudice him in the impending reorganization of the
Judiciary.”[5]
The records do not show when the Clerk of Court received the
decision of the respondent Judge.
Whether or not the charge at bar arose from a suspicion as to the
partiality of the Judge, or as an act of retaliation to the acquittal of the
accused, the interest of justice would have been served and no complaint for
delay would have arisen had respondent Judge promptly set the promulgation of
his decision within the month of February after he had signed it on February 4,
1980, or even March, 1980. While it is
possible that because of the number of cases in his sala (1,000 pending cases)
respondent failed to direct the Clerk of Court to set immediately the case for
the promulgation of the decision, nevertheless, more care and punctuality in
the performance of his duties is required under the circumstances. Judges must be cautioned that it is not the
date of signing the decision but the date of receipt by the Clerk of Court
that must be reckoned from the date of submission of the case for decision in
order to comply with the ninety-day (90) period under Section 5 of the
Judiciary Act. A conscientious and
responsible effort should have been made and exerted to avoid delay.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Ricardo F. Tensuan is hereby
admonished to exercise the requisite circumspection, promptness and diligence
in the discharge of his duties. Let this
Resolution be noted in the personal record of the respondent Judge.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Acting C.J., Makasiar, Fernandez, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
[1]
Sec. 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. 296 as amended) requires judges to
decide civil and criminal cases submitted for decision within a period of
ninety (90) days from the date of their submission.
[2] Rollo,
pp. 3-4.
[3] Rollo,
pp. 10-11.
[4] Rollo,
p. 18.
[5]
Memorandum of the Court Administrator