ATANACIA M. CALING, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PROVINCIAL AUDITOR’S OFFICE, PROVINCE OF NUEVA ECIJA), RESPONDENTS.

Petition for review of the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission affirming the dismissal letter of the Chief, Workmen’s Compensation
Commission Unit, Regional Office No. III, Department of Labor, of the claim for
death benefits filed by the petitioner in RO3-WCC Case No. 10532.

Jose Caling, the deceased husband of
the petitioner, during his lifetime was employed as Section Chief in the
Provincial Auditor’s Office, Province
of Nueva Ecija,
with an average weekly salary of P110.00. 
During the time of his employment, he contracted an illness which was
diagnosed by his attending physician as myocardial infarction for which he was
treated at the Nueva Ecija General Hospital.  However, he succumbed to said illness on December 23, 1971.

On June 23, 1974 or about two years thereafter, petitioner filed
a claim for death benefits (WCC Form No. 4) with Regional Office No. III of the
Department of Labor at San Fernando,
Pampanga, attaching therewith, the Physician’s Report
of Sickness or Accident and her affidavit of dependency (WCC Form No. 7).

On June 17, 1974,
the respondent Republic of the Philippines
(Provincial Auditor’s Office, Province
of Nueva Ecija)
thru the office of the Solicitor General, was required by the Regional Office
of the Department of Labor to accomplish and submit within ten (10) days the
Employer’s Report of Accident or Sickness. 
However, this requirement was not complied with.  In the meantime, no schedule of hearing was
set for the case.

On November 11, 1975,
the Chief, Workmen’s Compensation Unit, RO3, issued a letter stating that the
claim of petitioner is being dropped from the calendar of activities of said
office.  On December 1, 1975, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the letter of dismissal. 
Because of said motion, the entire record of the case was elevated to
the Workmen’s Compensation Commission for review.

On January 14, 1976,
the Workmen’s Compensation Commission rendered its decision the dispositive portion of which, reads:

“WHEREFORE, the dropping of the instant case from the calendar
of the Regional Office should be, as it is hereby AFFIRMED.  The claim is dismissed for lack of
merit.”

Petitioner now assails said decision contending that:

1.  The Chief, Workmen’s Compensation Unit,
Regional Office No. III, in his letter dismissal dated November 11, 1975 and
the Workmen’s Compensation Commission in its decision dated January 14, 1976,
which affirmed the letter dismissal, seriously erred and committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when they decided the case
without hearing and notice, hence, depriving herein petitioner her
constitutional right to due process of law.

2.  The Chief, Workmen’s Compensation Unit,
Regional Office No. III and the Commission seriously erred and committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing
petitioner’s claim being contrary to law and evidence on record.

We find merit in the claim of the petitioner.  To begin with, the dismissal of petitioner’s
claim by the Regional Office of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission on the
ground that it was filed after the lapse of two years from the death of her
husband is erroneous.  While it is true
that under Section 24 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act a claim for
compensation shall be made not later than three months after death,
nevertheless, a delay in the filing of the claim is considered as a
non-jurisdictional defect unless it is shown that the employer has been
prejudiced thereby.^[1]
In the case of Operators vs. Cacatian^[2] this
Court speaking through Justice Fernando, said:

“It is much too late in the day to complain about the long
delay in instituting the claim here of seven years.  This court in 1965 categorically declared
that failure to file a claim within the statutory period does not affect the
jurisdiction of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission (Manila Railroad Co. vs.
Perez, L-21071, June 29, 1965).  Such a
doctrine found mention in a 1968 decision, Pampanga
Sugar Mills vs. Vda. de Espeleta
(22 SCRA 325), citing two cases decided the year before (Nat. Dev. Co. vs. Ayson, 20 SCRA 192 and Nat. Dev. Co. vs. Rongavilla, 20 SCRA 1172). In the first, it took the
claimant eight years and in the second, nine years before the right to compensation
was sought to be enforced.  Its
non-jurisdictional character was stressed anew in Victorias
Milling Co., Inc. vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, announced less than
two months later (22 SCRA 1215).  To the
same effect are later cases likewise of 1968 vintage (Surigao
Consolidated Milling Co. vs. WCC, 23 SCRA 820; Manila Railroad Co. vs. Rivera,
23 SCRA 922; San Miguel Brewery vs. Vda. de Joves, 23 SCRA 1093). 
We have had occasion this year to rule similarly (Victorias
Milling Co. vs. Dadivas, 27 SCRA 413).”

The ruling in the case of Pioneer
Ceramics vs. Samia,^[3]
likewise, bears the same effect.  Since
there is nothing in the record to show the contrary, We see no possible
prejudice that could have been suffered by the respondent Republic due to the
late filing of petitioner’s claim.  The
circumstances do not warrant its dismissal.

In its decision, the Workmen’s Compensation Commission went
further by stating that the dismissal of petitioner’s claim should be affirmed
as the only evidence submitted by the latter is the attending physician’s
report which is not verified and therefore, not a convincing proof that the
sickness which caused the deceased’s death is service connected.  We disagree. 
Under Section 1, Rule 12 of the Rules of the Commission in relation to
Section 49 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, “reports of attending and/or
examining physicians and hospital records in relation to the case”, among
others, constitute admissible evidence provided the other party shall be given
the opportunity to examine and rebut the same by further evidence (Sec. 2, Rule
12, supra).  Moreover, notwithstanding
the failure to submit them formally as such, they may still be considered as
evidence provided that they were previously submitted with the claim and
already part of the record.^[4]
Hence, the non-verification of the physician’s report is not such a fatal
defect as would totally make the same devoid of evidentiary value.  In the case at bar, no evidence was ever
presented by the respondent Republic rebutting the physician’s report submitted
by the petitioner with the claim.  The
physician’s report shows that the deceased, Jose Caling,
died of myocardial infarction and at the time of his death, he was still in the
service of the respondent Republic.  The
only issue then that remains to be resolved is whether or not the illness that
caused the death of petitioner is service connected.  Well settled is the rule that once the
illness has supervened in the course of employment, there exists a rebuttable presumption^[5]
that the same arose out of or was at least aggravated by such employment and
the burden to overthrow said presumption shifts to the employer.^[6]
It is undisputed that Jose Caling died of an illness
that supervened during the time of his employment.  The presumption therefore, of causation or
aggravation prevails in the premises considering that herein respondent
Republic of the Philippines
as employer, failed to discharge the burden of overthrowing the same by not
presenting any evidence to the contrary. 
Besides, the Workmen’s Compensation Act being a social legislation
should be liberally construed in favor of and for the benefit of employees and
their dependents and all doubts as to the right of compensation resolved and
all presumptions indulged in their favor.^[7]

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered reversing that of
the respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission and awarding to the petitioner
the sum of P6,000.00, as death compensation benefits, P200.00 as burial
expenses; to her lawyer P600.00 as attorney’s fees and P61.00 as administrative
fee.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Makasiar,
Antonio, and Muñoz
Palma, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Central Azucarera Don Pedro vs. WCC,
L-24987, July 31, 1968; NDC vs. WCC, L-14936, April 20, 1964; Century
Ins. Co. vs. Fuentes, L-16039, Aug. 31, 1961.

^[2] L-26173,
Oct. 31, 1969.

^[3] L-28719,
June 23, 1970.

^[4] Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 40 O.G.
7th. Supp. 29.

^[5]
SEC. 44.  Presumption. – In any
proceeding for the enforcement of the claim for compensation under this Act, it
shall be presumed in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary –

1. That the claim comes within the
provisions of this Act;

x    
x     x     x     x

^[6]
Pros vs. WCC, L-43348, Sept.
29, 1976, citing Magalona vs. WCC,
21 SCRA 1199, citing Itemcop vs. Florzo, L-21969, Aug.
31, 1966; Vda. de Acosta vs. WCC,
L-19772, Oct. 31, 1964; Maria Cristina Fertilizer Co. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA
228; Talip vs. WCC, L-42575, May 31, 1976;
Mercado vs. WCC, L-42451, July 30, 1976; Reynaldo vs. Republic,
L-43108, June 30, 1976; Simon vs. Republic, L-42510, June 30, 1976; Abana vs. Quisumbing,
L-21849, March 27, 1968; Justiniano vs. WCC,
L-22774, Nov. 21, 1966, citing Agustin vs. WCC, L-19957, Sept. 29, 1964;
Cabinta vs. WCC, L-42639, July 30, 1976; Galang vs. WCC, L-41893, Aug. 27, 1976; Camarillo vs.
WCC, L-42831, Oct. 21, 1976.

^[7]
Francisco vs. Consing, 63 Phil. 354; Vergara vs. Pampanga Bus
Co., 34 O.G. 635; Caro vs. Rilloraza
and WCC, L-1969, Sept. 30, 1957; Bautista vs. Murillo, L-13374, January
31, 1962; Madrigal Shipping Co. vs. Melad,
L-17362, L-17367-69, February 13, 1963.