FELIX MONTEMAYOR, PETITIONER, VS. ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, JUAN SALCEDO, JR., TOMAS DAVID, MARTIN CELINO, MARCELO AMIANA, AS MEMBERS OF THE PANEL OF INVESTIGATORS, MEMBERS…

The protection to labor mandate is more of a reality with the
present Constitution expressly providing for security of tenure.^[1]
Moreover, for a university professor, aptly referred to as a tiller in the
vineyard of the mind, there is the guarantee of academic freedom.^[2]
Nonetheless, for cause duly shown, there may be a forced termination of his
services.  It is essential though that
prior to his removal, procedural due process be observed.  The grievance alleged by petitioner in this
case, a university professor, was that there was a failure to comply with such
a requisite.  When therefore respondent
Secretary of Labor granted a clearance to the private respondent, the Araneta University Foundation,^[3]
for his dismissal for immorality, he instituted this certiorari
proceeding.  A thorough and exhaustive
comment, considered as the answer, filed by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza^[4]
with full support from the record, negates such a contention.  There is no basis for a reversal.  Certiorari does not lie.

It is undisputed that petitioner Felix Montemayor
was a full-time professor of respondent Araneta
University Foundation, serving as head of its Humanities and Psychology
Department.  Previously, he was on the
faculty of other educational institutions. 
There was, on April 17, 1974,
a complaint for immorality lodged against him by the Chaplain of the Araneta University Foundation for alleged immorality.  Its then President, Dr. Juan Salcedo, Jr., created a committee to investigate such
charge.  The first hearing, which took
place on April 24, 1974,
was attended by petitioner as well as complainant with his two witnesses.  One of them, Leonardo de Lara, submitted an affidavit.  Petitioner sought the postponement of the
investigation to May 3, 1974.  It was granted.  On that occasion, he was furnished a copy of
the affidavit of the other witness, Macario Lacanilao.  The
accusation centered on conversations on sex and immoral advances committed
against the person of Leonardo de Lara. 
There was cross-examination by petitioner of the witnesses against
him.  With the assistance of counsel, he
filed on May 28, 1974 a
motion to dismiss or to hold the hearing in abeyance.  He likewise filed an affidavit to sustain his
defense on June 17, 1974.  The report and recommendation of the
investigating committee came on July 8,
1974.  It was adverse to
petitioner, who was found morally responsible for the act complained of.  The recommendation was for his demotion in
rank by one degree.  The then President
Juan Salcedo, Jr., on August 5, 1974, adopted such
recommendation and thereafter referred the same to the Board of Trustees of
private respondent for appropriate action. 
Subsequently, on November 8,
1974, with new charges being filed by Professor Luis R. Almazan, one Jaime Castañeda, and
Jesus Martinez against petitioner for conduct unbecoming of a faculty member,
another committee was appointed.  Then
came his preventive suspension, ordered to last until the administrative
investigation was concluded.  There was a
motion by petitioner for the postponement of the hearing set for November 18
and 19, 1974, but the same was denied. 
The hearing proceeded in his absence. 
There was testimony by Professor Luis Almazan
and Jaime Castañeda. 
Thereafter, on December 5, 1974,
the Committee submitted its report finding the charges against petitioner to
have been sufficiently established and recommending to the President and the
Board of Trustees of the Araneta University
Foundation his separation from the University, in accordance with Sections 116
and 351 of the Manual of Policies of the University.  The Committee found as established:  “1. 
That immoral advances on several occasions have been made by respondent
[herein petitioner] on Prof. Luis Almazan; 2.  That immoral advances have also been made by
respondent on Jaime Castañeda, a student-employee of
the University on several occasions; 3. That said immoral advances were
frustrated because both Professor Almazan and Mr. Castañeda had refused to accept them; 4. That both
witnesses and victims of said immoral advances have declared that the behavior
of respondent was detrimental [and] prejudicial to the moral and educational
standards of the Araneta University Foundation;
5.  That because of said behavior,
respondent should not continue as Professor in the University; and 6.  That the acts of respondent complained of are
offensive to good morals [and] inimical to the welfare of students and greatly
prejudicial to [the] interest and educational objectives of the University,
hence the same are highly reprehensible.”^[5]
His dismissal was then ordered on December
10, 1974, effective November
15, 1974, the date of his preventive suspension.  The University, on December 12, 1974, filed with the National Labor
Relations Commission a report of his suspension and application for clearance
to terminate his employment.  Meanwhile,
on November 21, 1974,
petitioner in turn lodged a complaint with the National Labor Relations
Commission against private respondents for reinstatement and payment of back
wages and salaries, with all the privileges, benefits and increments attendant
thereto.  There was a motion to dismiss
on the part of the latter.  Both the
labor arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission found in favor of
petitioner.  He was ordered reinstated to
his former position with back wages and without loss of seniority and other
privileges.  Petitioner’s complaint for
unfair labor practice was, however, dismissed. 
Private respondents appealed to respondent Secretary of Labor who, on July 14, 1976, set aside the
Commission’s order for his reinstatement. 
He found petitioner’s dismissal justified.  Nor was he persuaded by the plea that there
was denial of due process.  He was
satisfied with the procedure followed by private respondent.  Moreover, he could not have ignored the fact
that the controversy between the parties was passed upon and the parties heard
on their respective contentions in the proceedings before the labor
agencies.  Respondent
University was however, required to
pay complainant the amount of P14,480.00 representing the latter’s accrued back
wages which the former voluntarily offered to extend him.  Dissatisfied with the Secretary’s decision,
petitioner filed this instant petition for certiorari.

1.   The present Constitution, as noted, expanded
the scope of the protection to labor mandate by specifying that the State shall
assure the right of workers to security of tenure.  This Court, as stressed in Philippine Air
Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Air Lines Employees Association^[6]
is called upon to manifest “fealty to a constitutional command.”^[7]
Subsequently, in Almira v. B. F. Goodrich Philippines,^[8]
it was the ruling of this Tribunal that even where disciplinary action against
an employee is warranted, “where a penalty less punitive [than dismissal]
would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed ought not to be visited with
a consequence so severe.”^[9]
An instructor or member of a teaching staff of a university was held, in the
leading case of Feati University V. Bautista,^[10]
to be an employee.  As such, he is
entitled to that security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution.  The explicit pronouncement in Feati University
v. Bautista was foreshadowed by Far Eastern
University v. Court of Industrial
Relations,^[11]
a 1962 decision.  While a faculty member
such as petitioner maybe dismissed, it must be for cause.  What is more, there must be clearance from
the Secretary of Labor.  So it is
provided in the Labor Code.^[12]

2.   The stand taken by petitioner as to his being
entitled to security of tenure is reinforced by the provision on academic
freedom which, as noted, is found in the Constitution.  While reference therein is to institutions of
higher learning, it was pointed out in Garcia v. The Faculty Admission
Committee^[13]
that academic freedom “is more often identified with the right of a
faculty member to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter
to make known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that
retribution would be visited on him in the event that his conclusions are found
distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the political,
economic, or academic establishments. 
For the sociologist, Robert MacIver, it is ‘a
right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to
interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions without being
subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalization because these
conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the
institution.'”^[14]
Tenure, according to him, is of the essence of such freedom.  For him, without tenure that assures a
faculty member “against dismissal or professional penalization on grounds
other than professional incompetence or conduct that in the judgment of his
colleagues renders him unfit” for membership in the faculty, the academic
right becomes non-existent.^[15]
Security of tenure, for another scholar, Lovejoy, is “the chief practical
requisite for academic freedom” of a university professor.^[16]
As with Maclver, he did not rule out removal but only
“for some grave cause,” identified by him as “proved
incompetence or moral delinquency.”^[17]

3.   The charge leveled against petitioner, that
of making homosexual advances to certain individuals, if proved, did amount to
a sufficient cause for removal.  The
crucial question therefore is whether it was shown that he was guilty of such
immoral conduct.  He is thus entitled to
the protection of procedural due process. 
To paraphrase Webster, there must be a hearing before condemnation, with
the investigation to proceed in an orderly manner, and judgment to be rendered
only after such inquiry.  As far back as
1915, the American Association of University Professors adopted the principle
that “every university or college teacher should be entitled before
dismissal or demotion, to have the charges against him stated in writing, in
specific terms and to have a fair trial on these charges before a special or permanent
judicial committee of the faculty or by the faculty at large.  At such trial the teacher accused should have
full opportunity to present evidence.”^[18]
Thus the phrase, academic due process, has gained currency.  Joughin referred to
it as a system of procedure designed to yield the best possible judgment when
an adverse decision against a professor may be the consequence with stress on
the clear, orderly, and fair way of reaching a conclusion.^[19]

4.   The procedure followed in the first
investigation of petitioner, conducted in June of 1974, did satisfy the
procedural due process requisite.  The
same cannot be said of the November, 1974 inquiry when the petitioner had to
face anew a similar charge of making homosexual advances.  As admitted in the exhaustive comment of the
Solicitor General:  “On November 16,
1974, Montemayor, through counsel, moved for the
postponement of the hearing set for November 18 and 19, 1974 but the same was
rejected by the committee.  The hearing
proceeded as scheduled in the absence of Professor Montemayor
and his counsel.  In said hearing, Prof.
Luis Almazan and Jaime Castañeda
testified.  On December 5, 1974, the Committee submitted its
report finding the charges against Montemayor to have
been sufficiently established and recommending to the President and the Board
of Trustees of the Araneta University Foundation his
separation from the University, in accordance with Sections 116 and 351 of the
Manual of Policies of the University.”^[20]
It does appear therefore that the members of such investigating committee
failed to show full awareness of the demands of procedural due process.  A motion by petitioner for postponement of
the hearing, apparently the first one made; was denied.  What is worse, in his absence the matter was
heard with the committee losing no time in submitting its report, finding the
charges against petitioner to have been sufficiently established and
recommending his removal.  If that were
all, respondent Secretary of Labor cannot be sustained.  Certiorari would lie.  But such deficiency was remedied, as pointed
out in the same comment of the Solicitor General, by the fact “that
petitioner was able to present his case before the Labor Commission.”^[21]
Then he continued:  “Thus, the record
discloses that at a mediation conference held on December 9, 1974, the parties appeared and, after all
efforts at conciliation had failed, they agreed to submit their dispute for
compulsory arbitration.  Several hearings
were conducted by Labor Arbiter Atty. Daniel Lucas, Jr., wherein petitioner
submitted his evidence supported by his affidavit impugning the regularity of
the proceedings before the investigating committees and assailing the legality
of his removal.  The entire record of the
administrative proceedings, including the transcript of the stenographic notes
taken therein, was elevated to the Labor Commission for review.  Petitioner herein, thru counsel, moved for
reinstatement during the pendency of the case.  In another motion, he prayed for the
consolidation and joint hearing of his complaint for unfair labor practice
against herein private respondents (NLRC Case No. R-IV-1060-74) with that of
the application for clearance filed by the University to terminate Montemayor’s employment. 
On the other hand, the University moved to dismiss the complaint for
unfair labor practice against its officials on the ground that they were not
complainant’s employers and that their participation in the administrative case
against the latter was official in nature. 
Respondent University
also presented the affidavit of Thomas P. G. Neill, Dean of the Institute
of Agricultural Business Administration
and Chairman of the Committee created to investigate the charges of immorality
against petitioner attesting to the regularity of the proceedings and the
validity of the dismissal.”^[22]
The legal aspect as to the procedural due process having been satisfied was
then summarized by the Solicitor General thus: 
“All the foregoing clearly shows that petitioner was afforded his
day in court.  Finally, and more
significant, is the fact that petitioner claims denial of due process in the
proceeding had before the investigating committees and not in the proceedings
before the NLRC wherein, as shown heretofore, he was given the fullest
opportunity to present his case.”^[23]

5.   The comment of the Solicitor General was submitted
on January 4, 1977.  The memorandum for petitioner was submitted
on April 25.  What immediately calls
attention is that no attempt was made to refute specifically such recital of
the Solicitor General, of decisive significance as far as the due process issue
is concerned.  Instead, the emphasis was
on the alleged commission of an unfair labor practice by private
respondent.  Inasmuch as the Arbiter as
well as the National Labor Relations Commission absolved private respondent
from the charge of unfair labor practice, it would appear that the emphasis of
counsel for petitioner was misplaced. 
Accordingly, there is nothing in the record that would militate against
the contention of the Solicitor General that there was an observance of
procedural due process.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
dismissed.  No costs.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino,
and Martin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr., J., on leave.

^[1]
According to Article II, section 9 of the Constitution:  “The State shall afford protection to
labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of
sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and
employers.  The State shall assure the
rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of
tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. 
The State may provide for compulsory arbitration.”

^[2]
According to Article XV, section 8, par. (2) of the Constitution:  “All institutions of higher learning
shall enjoy academic freedom.”

^[3]
The other private respondents are Juan Salcedo, Jr.,
Tomas David, Martin Celino, Marcelo Amiana, as members of the panel of investigators, members
of the Board of Trustees, and Fr. Romeo Pelayo.

^[4]
He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Reynato
S. Puno and Solicitor Jesus V. Diaz.

^[5]
Comment of the Solicitor General, 3-4.

^[6] L-24626,
June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 489.

^[7] Ibid,
496.

^[8] L-34974,
July 25, 1974, 58 SCRA 120.

^[9] Ibid,
131.  Cf. Biboso
v. Victorias
Milling Co., L-44360, March 31, 1977.

^[10]
L-21278, December 27, 1966,
18 SCRA 1191, per Zaldivar, J.

^[11]
116 Phil. 235, per Concepcion, J., later C. J.

^[12]
According to Article 280 of the Labor Code: 
“In case of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this
Title.  An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and to payment of back wages computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his reinstatement.”

^[13]
L-40779, November 28, 1975,
68 SCRA 277.

^[14]
Ibid, 283-284.  MacIver’s
opus is entitled, Academic Freedom in Our Time (1955).  The excerpt quoted is found on page 6 of that
work.

^[15] MacIver, op. cit., 242.

^[16]
Lovejoy, Academic Freedom, I Encyclopedia of Social Sciences 384, 386 (1929).

^[17] Ibid.

^[18] Ibid.

^[19]
Cf. Loughin, Academic Due Process, in Baade and Everett, eds., Academic Freedom, 143-171 (1964).

^[20]
Comment of the Solicitor General, 3.

^[21] Ibid,
10.

^[22] Ibid,
11-12.

^[23] Ibid,
12.