PHILIPPINE AIR LINES EMPLOYEES’ ASSOCIATION (PALEA), PETITIONER, VS. PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC. AND THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS.

The petitioner, Philippine
Air Lines Employees’ Association (PALEA), seeks a review of two orders issued
by Judge Ansberto P. Paredes
of respondent Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) on October 7 and 10, 1970,
respectively, in Case No. 101-IPA (A) being tried before him,
and of the resolution of the same Court en banc dated
October 19, 1970.

PALEA, as the bargaining
representative of the employees of respondent Philippine Air Lines,
Inc., (PAL) presented a set of demands to the latter, among them increases in
pay.  Voluntary conciliation proceedings
between the parties followed, through the mediation of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, and when no settlement was agreed upon PALEA went on strike on September 30, 1970.  On October 3, 1970 it was joined by the Air Line Pilots Association
(ALPAP).

Pursuant to Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 875 the President certified the dispute to the CIR on October
3, 1970, enumerating some of the essential services, being rendered by PAL and
pointing out that “the suspension of (its) operations will jeopardize the
national interest, national defense, air transportation of passengers and
cargoes, which include newspapers and general merchandise.” Judge Paredes called union and management to a conference to be
held at the court session hall on October 6 through October 10.  On October 7, 1970, after the parties had
conferred for two days, the trial Judge concluded that since the vital issue common to both the
striking unions involved their economic demands and since its resolution would
require an examination of the books of respondent PAL concerning its financial
capacity, which examination would take time, and on the other hand, “that
public as well as national interests have been unduly prejudiced and
jeopardized by the week-old strike,” he granted immediate provisional
increases in pay and at the same time issued a return-to-work order on October
7, 1970.  The pertinent portion of the said order reads as follows:

“PALEA and ALPAP, their officers and members, and all
employees who have joined the present strikes which resulted from the labor
disputes certified by the President to the Court, or who have not reported for
work as a result of the strikes, are hereby ordered forthwith to call off the
strikes and lift the picket lines … and return to work not later than Friday,
October 9, 1970, and manage­ment to admit them back to work under the same
terms and conditions of employ­ment existing before the strikes, in­cluding
what has been earlier granted herein.

“PAL is ordered not to suspend, dismiss or lay-off any
employee as a result of these strikes. 
Read into this order is the provision of Section 19, of C.A. No. 103, as
amended, for the guidance of the parties.

x        x          x

“Failure to comply with any provision of this Order shall
constitute contempt of court, and the employee fail­ing or refusing to work by October 9, 1970, without justifiable
cause, shall immediately be replaced by PAL, and may not be reinstated without
prior Court order and on justifiable grounds.”

On October
8, 1970 PALEA filed
with the CIR en banc a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration of the foregoing order, supporting the motion with a memorandum
filed the next day.

On October 10, 1970
the trial Judge, having been informed that the strikes had not been called off,
issued another order directing the strikers to lift their pickets and return to
work, and explaining that his order of October 7 partook of the nature of a
mandatory injunc­tion.

On October
19, 1970 the CIR en
banc, acting on the motion for clarification and/or reconsideration,
issued a resolution affirming the basic return-to-work order of Judge Paredes.

After PALEA received a copy of the said resolution it filed a
motion informing the CIR that after the order of October 10, 1970 was issued
its members reported back for work but that PAL “converted their
employment status to provisional workers, such that many refused such status
and preferred to wait for the outcome of the motion for reconsideration;”
that after the resolution en banc of October 19, 1970 the employees
again reported for work and while the majority of them were admitted some were
refused employment, consisting mostly of the officers of the union and
numbering 21 in all, according to a list subsequently submitted.

The grounds relied upon
by the petitioner in support of its petition are as follows:

“A.  Respondent CIR erred when it affirmed in its
resolution of October 19, 1970 the orders of the Trial Judge Hon. Ansberto P. Paredes of October 7
and 10, 1970 holding that the return-to work order was immediately executory and failure to comply with the same constitutes
contempt of court, not­withstanding the motion for reconsidera­tion and/or
clarification of said orders of October 7 and 10, 1970 filed with the
respondent CIR en banc;

“B.  Respondent CIR acted with grave abuse of
discretion which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction when it affirmed the
orders of the Trial Judge, Hon. Ansberto P. Paredes without fixing the cut-off date for the striking
employees to return to work on a date after the issuance of its resolution of
October 19, 1970;

“C.  Respondent CIR acted with grave abuse of
discretion and in a manner contrary to jurisprudence, when it ordered the
strikers to return to work without first deter­mining the issue of the legality
of the strike raised by respondent PAL;

“D.  Respondent CIR acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it failed to order respondent PAL to reinstate all the striking
employees after having been informed that some of them were refused employment,
pending the final determination of the issue of the legality of the strike and
the motion for contempt of court;

“E.  Respondent CIR acts with grave abuse of
discretion which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction when it continues to
hear the motion to hold some strikers, particularly the officers of herein
petitioner PALEA, in contempt of court for having failed to return to work on
October 9, 1970 notwithstanding that the notice of appeal has been filed with
it on November 2, 1970;”

On December
9, 1970 we gave due
course to the peti­tion and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondent CIR “from continuing with the contempt proceedings in this
case, effective immediately and until further orders from this Court.”

On the first issue it has
been held by this Court in several cases that a return-to-work order such as
that in question here is immediately effective and executory, notwithstanding the fact that a motion for
its reconsideration has been filed.  It
should be noted that this is a certified case, the reason for the presidential
certification being that the suspension of the operations of PAL would
jeopardize the national interest.  As
stated by this Court in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. vs. Free
Telephone Workers Union, 22 SCRA 1013, 1018: 
“The power to issue a return-to-work order is precisely given to
the Court of Industrial Relations under Section 19 of Commonwealth Act 103 in a
case certified thereto by the President, in which it acts under broad powers of
compulsory arbitration (Bach­rach Transportation Co.
vs. Rural Transit, L-26766, July 25, 1967.)” The executory
character of the return-to-work order issued in that case was, as we there
said, not affected by the pendency of a motion for
reconsidera­tion thereof.  The failure to
comply with a similar order issued by the trial Judge in another case (Phil­ippine
Association of Free Labor Unions vs. Joaquin M. Salvador, et al., 25 SCRA 393)
was condemned by this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Enrique M. Fernando,
in no uncertain terms.  The very nature
of a return-to-work order issued in a certified case lends itself to no other
construction.  The certification attests
to the urgency of the matter, affecting as it does an industry indispensable to
the national interest.  The order is
issued in the exercise of the court’s compulsory power of arbitration, and
therefore must be obeyed until set aside. 
To say that its effectivity must await affirmance on a motion for reconsideration is not only to
emasculate it but indeed to defeat its import, for by then the deadline fixed
for the return to work would, in the ordinary course, have already passed and
hence can no longer be affirmed insofar as the time element is concerned.

The foregoing considerations dispose of the second issue raised
by the petitioner.  Inasmuch as the order
of Judge Paredes was immediately executory,
the CIR en banc
committed no abuse of discretion in not fixing a “cut-off date for the
striking employees to return to work” after the resolution of October 19, 1970.

The third issue – whether or not the return-to-­work order was
properly issued when the question of the validity of the strike, raised by
respondent PAL in another proceeding (Case No. 43 IPA), had not yet been
resolved – is governed by the principle laid down by this Court in Feati University vs. CIR, G. R. No. L-21278,
L-21462 and L-21500, Dec. 27, 1966; Maritima Co. of the Phil. et al., vs. CIR et al., G. R. No.
L-24811, March 3, 1967; and Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Co., vs. Free Telephone Workers Union, supra.

In the last-mentioned
case we said:

“The present case involves a labor dispute certified by the
President to the Court of Industrial Relations as affecting an industry
indispensable to the national interest. 
As such, the rule that reinstatement of strikers should not be ordered
where the strike’s legality is still to be resolved, enuncia­ted in Philippine
Can Company vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 87 Phil. 9; and Latex Products
v. Court of Indus­trial Relations, 93 Phil. 1024, does not apply.  As this Court itself
stated in the Philippine Can case: ‘In such cases, pending determination of the
conflict especially where public interest so requires or when the court cannot
promptly decide the case the strikers are ordered back to work.'”

The fourth issue raised
by the petitioner has to do with the failure of the CIR to order PAL to
reinstate some 21 employees notwithstanding that they had offered to return to
work.  There is nothing in the orders here
under review which shows that the respondent Court has definitely ruled against
the reinstatement of said employees. 
Since they offered to return to work only after the resolution of the
CIR en banc of October 19, 1970 was issued, affirming the order of the trial
Judge dated October 7, 1970, their situation falls under the following
portion thereof:

“Failure to comply with
any provision of this order shall constitute contempt of court, and, the
employee failing or refusing to work by October
9, 1970, without justi­fiable
cause, shall immediately be
replaced by PAL, and may not be reinstated without prior court order and on
justifiable grounds.”

In other words, the
burden is upon the petitioner to show before the respondent court that
reinstatement of the employees concerned is justified in spite of their failure
to comply strictly with the return-to-work order, or that the refusal of PAL to
reinstate them constitutes
unjust discrimination, as they
now claim.  These particular questions,
as well as the charge of contempt against some of the strikers, should be
ventilated before the respondent court, where in fact they are now
pending.  Any ruling on the merits of
these incidents by this Court at
this stage of the case would therefore be premature.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, and the
restraining order issued by this Court is lifted, with costs against the petitioner.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.