G.R. No. L-31259. March 31, 1971
MANILA TRADING & SUPPLY CO, (MANTRADE AUTOMOTIVE CORP.), PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND JULIANA VDA. DE TEOFILO, RESPONDENTS.
CASTRO, J.:
By this petition for mandamus, certiorari and
prohibition against the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, the herein
petitioner Manila Trading & Supply Company, Inc. (hereinafter referred to
as the MANTRADE) seeks a review of the order of the Commission dated November
12, 1969 in RO4-WC Case
The essential facts are not disputed.
On July 31, 1968,
the MANTRADE was adjudged liable for the payment of workmen’s compensation
benefits in RO4-WCC Case 6947 by a referee of the respondent Workmen’s Compensation
Commission. On September 25, 1969, this adverse decision was
affirmed by one of the commissioners of the Commission; a copy of the decision
of the commissioner was received by the MANTRADE on September 30, 1969. Influenced by the belief that under section
49 of Act 3428, as amended, it had fifteen (15) days or until October 15, 1969 to move for a
reconsideration of the commissioner’s decision, the MANTRADE, on October 14, 969, filed with the
Commission a “Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for
Reconsideration and Review by the Commission En Banc.” This
motion and two other similar motions subsequently filed by the MANTRADE were
denied.
Hence, the present recourse.
The Commission’s repeated denial of the MANTRADE’S motions for
reconsideration appears to be premised upon its conviction that it could not
acquire appellate jurisdiction over the aforesaid case because the said motions
were filed well beyond the period of ten (10) days allowed by section 1 of Rule
17 of the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. This particular section reads:
“SEC. 1. Motion or
Petition for Reconsideration. – Any
party in interest may seek the reconsideration of the decision or order of a
member of the Commission by the Commission en banc by filing a
motion or petition for reconsideration within ten (10) days from receipt of
said decision or order.” (effective December 29, 1964)
It likewise was the Commission’s opinion that, the period of
fifteen (15) days mentioned in section 49 of Act 3428, as amended, within which
a petition for review or motion for reconsideration may be filed, “refers
to orders, awards or decisions of the referees and not to decisions or orders
of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission as an appellate body.”
The pertinent portion of section 49 of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act, upon which there is a basic conflict of opinion between the parties before
us, provides:
“SEC. 49. Procedure. … Any party in interest who is dissatisfied
with the order entered by the referee may petition to review the same and the
referee may re-open said case, or may amend or modify said order, and such
amended or modified order shall be a final award unless objection be made
thereto by petition for review. In case
said referee does not amend or modify said order, he shall refer the entire
case to the Commissioner, who shall thereupon review the entire record in said
case, and, in his discretion, may take or order the taking of additional
testimony, and shall make his findings of facts and enter his award
thereon. The award of the Commissioner
shall be final unless a petition to review the same shall be filed by an
interested party. Every petition for
review shall be in writing and shall specify in detail the particular errors
and objections. Such petition must be
filed within fifteen days after the entry of any referee’s order or award of
the Commissioner unless further time is granted by the referee or the
Commissioner within said fifteen days.
All parties in interest shall be given due notice of entry of any referee’s
order or any award of the Commissioner, and said period of fifteen days shall
begin to run only after such notice …”
There would appear to be ample logic in the position assumed by
the MANTRADE. Nevertheless, section 49
should not be analyzed or appreciated in isolation. This section should be construed in relation
to the history of the Act and identified with the rest of the provisions
thereof to harmonize it with the law as a whole.
In our view, the subsequent historical development of Art 3428
provides the clue to the appearance, retention and meaning of the word
“Commissioner” in the aforementioned section 49.
In 1952, Congress incorporated, by way of R.A. 772, several
far-reaching amendments to the Workmen’s Compensation Act. This statute, however, aside from modifying
various provisions, added several new sections, including sections 7-A and 43
to 55.
Section 7-A, in particular, as inserted by R.A. 772, reads as
follows:
“SEC. 7-A. Workmen’s
Compensation Commissioner, Appointment.
– There is hereby created in the Department of Labor the Office of the
Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, hereinafter designated the Commissioner,
who shall be assisted by a Deputy Workmen’s Commissioner. The Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner
shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines
…”
By virtue of the foregoing provision, the Office of the Workmen’s
Compensation Commissioner was established and to it was given the
administration of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.[1]
In consonance with this purpose, the amendatory law also prescribed that the
Commissioner shall hear claims for compensation under the Act; that after the
hearing of a case by the Commissioner, his deputy or any referee, the same
shall be decided on its merits; that fifteen (15) days after the promulgation
of the decision the same shall become final, unless previously appealed;[2]
and that the decision of the Commissioner shall be subject to appeal to the
Supreme Court, in the same manner and within the same period as provided by law
and by the Rules of Court for an appeal from the Court of Industrial Relations
to the Supreme Court.[3]
On June 9, 1954,
however, Congress passed a law, not directly amending any provision of the
workmen’s compensation statute, but providing for the creation of a Government
Survey and Reorganization Commission (or GSRC) that would re-structure the
entire governmental administrative network to make it refund more adequately
and reliably to the expanding needs of the country. This law was R A. 997, otherwise known as the
Reorganization Act of 1954 (amended on June
9, 1955 by R.A. 1241).
Sometime in 1956, the GSRC came out with Reorganization Plan
20-A, a certain portion of which, as later implemented by Executive Order 218,
s.1956, established, in lieu of the Office the Workmen’s Compensation
Commissioner, a 3-member Workmen’s Compensation Commission. Purely administrative functions were, under
the plan, given to the Bureau of Workmen’s Compensation which was also
constituted.[4]
On April 15, 1957,
the Commission published its Rules in the Official Gazette,[5]
pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article III of the Plan which provides, inter
alia:
“Except as otherwise provided in this Article, the powers and
duties pertaining to the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Workmen’s
Compensation are transferred to and shall be assumed and exercised by the
Commission, which body is authorized to delegate the same to the extent that it
shall remain an appeal source with corresponding duties of promulgating related
rules and regulations. … The
Commission may promulgate rules and regulations governing its internal
functions as a quasi-judicial body including the power of each member to decide
appealed cases from a Regional Office, allowance for appeal from the decision
of an individual member to the Commission en banc, and other
allied matters. …”
It is noteworthy to mention in this connection that these rules
provided that aggrieved parties shall have a period of ten (10) days within
which to seek a reconsideration of a decision of a member of the Commission
with the Commission en banc, and a similar period of time within
which to appeal from the decision of the Commission en banc to
the Supreme Court.
But soon after the Commission began to function, cases were
brought to this Court directly from individual members of the Commission
instead of being reviewed first by the Commission en banc. In all these cases, this Court ruled that a
party aggrieved by a decision of an individual commissioner should first seek a
reconsideration thereof with the Commission en banc before an
appeal could be brought to this Court.[6]
It thus appears that as early as in 1957 we already sanctioned
the authority of the Commission, by virtue of the reorganization plan, to
promulgate rules and regulations for the review of a decision or order of an
individual member by the Commission en banc before the same could
be elevated to this Court for review. In
effect, then, this Court stamped its approval on the interpretation of the
Commission that a distinction should be made between itself as a collegiate
body and its members as individual commissioners, insofar, at least, as the availment of remedies under the set-up established under
the reorganization plan was concerned.
Then, on June 20, 1964,
a new statute amending Act 342, as amended, took effect. The new law, R.A. 4119, introduced several
important modifications. And, as if to
allay all doubt then apparently prevalent among the members of the bench and
the bar regarding the lawful authority of the Commission (as established under
the reorganization plan) to adjudicate compensation claims under the Act, this
statute expressly provided, in an amendment to section 7-A of the Act, that the
Commission “as constituted and organized under the provisions and
authority of Republic Act Numbered Nine hundred ninety-seven, as amended by
Republic Act Numbered Twelve hundred forty-one, shall continue to exercise the
powers, functions and duties under Act Numbered Thirty-four hundred and
twenty-eight, as amended.”
Shortly after the passage of R. A. 4119, the Commission published
in the Official Gazette, on December 14, 1964, its Rules relative to the processing
and adjudication of workmen’s compensation claims. This new set of rules took effect on December 29, 1964.
When the Commission was first established under the
reorganization plan, a procedural distinction was made between review of the
award or order of a member of the Commission and review of a decision of the
Commission en banc. This
distinction received the implicit but clear approval of this Court. Then, in 1964, when R.A. 4119 was passed, the
law not only expressly provided that the said Commission as then constituted
shall continue to exist, but as well reproduced paragraph 12 of Article III of
Reorganization Plan 20-A, to the effect that “Except as otherwise
provided [t]herein, the jurisdictions, powers and duties [t]heretofore
pertaining to the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner … shall be assumed and
exercised by the Commission, which body is authorized to delegate the same to
the extent that it shall remain an appeal source with corresponding duties of
promulgating related rules and regulations.”
R.A. 4119 likewise provided, in the same way as the
reorganization plan, that “The Commission may promulgate rule and
regulations governing its internal functions as a quasi-judicial body including
the power of each member to decide appealed cases from a referee, allowance
for appeal from the decision of an individual member to the Commission en
banc, and other allied rules covering jurisdiction to review, modify, or
affirm all rules and regulations prepared by the Bureau.”
The re-enactment, in R.A. 4119, of all the powers and duties
given to the Commission under the reorganization plan, such as the power of
each member to hear and adjudicate workmen’s compensation cases and the power
to promulgate rules for appeal from the decision of an individual member to the
Commission en banc, indicate indubitably Congress’ intention to
preserve the practices of the Commission in the matter of the review of the
orders and decisions of its individual members and allied matters. This practice, as we said earlier, had
already been sanctioned by this Court even before R.A. 4119 became a law.
The only possible explanation that can be given for the retention
of the term “Commissioner” in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, even
with the enactment of R.A. 4119, appears to be that this latter statute did not
modify all, but only some of, the sections added to the Act by R.A. 772, such
as the disputed sections 49. From a
reading of the amendments made by R.A. 4119, it can be safely concluded that
had R.A. 4119 touched those sections, the proper corresponding changes would
have been made.
A perceptive analysis of R.A. 4119 which modified or amended
those sections or provisions incorporated into the Act by R.A. 772 will
unfailingly disclose that where the latter and used the word
“Commissioner,” the former substituted either the word
“Commission” or “Bureau.” Consequently, it will be found
that it is solely in those sections added to the Act by R.A. 772, but not
touched in any manner by R.A. 4119, where the word “Commissioner”
still remains.
We thus find that it is the clear and obvious legislative design
to identify the term. “Commissioner” as referring to the Commission en
banc, as distinguished from the individual commissioners or members
thereof.
Considering the totality of these circumstances and the obvious
intention of the law as expressed in section 7-A of the Act, we cannot accept
the view in the absence of a clear and overriding indication of legislative
intent to the contrary, Congress did not mean to give the Workmen’s
Compensation Act a consistent and uniform design and phraseology. Indeed, the nature and structure of our legal
and judicial system demand that this Court infuse into our statutes such
symmetry and evenness in construction and meaning to the end that no one may
doubt what the law really is.
We therefore hold that the period of time within which appeal
(motion for reconsideration) should be made to the Commission en banc
from the decision or order of an individual Commissioner is ten (10) days from
official receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party.[7]
Consequently, the appeal (Motion for reconsideration) by the MANTRADE to the Commission
en banc having been filed out of time, the decision in the case
at bar has become final and executory.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is dismissed, at petitioner’s
cost. Immediate execution of the final
decision in RO4-WC case 6947 is hereby ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
[1]
Section 47(a) of the Act provides that the “Commissioner shall have full
power and authority to take charge of the administration of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act.”
[2]
Section 50, WCA.
[3]
Section 46, WCA.
[4]
Of no relevance to this case are the rulings of the Supreme Court (a)
“that it was not the intention of Congress, in enacting R.A. 997, to
authorize the transfer of powers and jurisdiction granted to the courts of
justice, from these to the officials to be appointed or offices to be created
by the Reorganization Plan” [20-A], and (b) “the Commission was not
authorized … to take away from these [courts of justice] their jurisdiction
and transfer said jurisdiction to the officials appointed and created under the
Reorganization Plan.” (Corominas, Jr. vs.
Labor Standards Commission, L-14837; Manila Central University vs. Calupitan, L-15483; Wong Chun vs. Carlim, L-13940 and Balrodgan
Co., Ltd. vs. Fuentes, L-15015, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 721; Pastoral vs.
WCC, L-12903, July 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 850.)
[5]
53 O.G. 2112 (April 15, 1957).
[6]
Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs. N. Baens del
Rosario, L-15521, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 462; National Shipyards and Steel
Corporation vs. Arca, L-12249, May 6, 1957;
Madrigal Shipping Co. vs. Del Rosario, L-13130, October 31, 1959;
Republic vs. Inciong, L-14298, April 29, 1960.
[7]
See Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission (effective December 29, 1964).
“SEC.
1. When and with Whom Filed. – Any party in interest who is dissatisfied
with the decision or order of the referee may within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of notice thereof file with the referee a petition for the review or
reconsideration of said decision or order.” (Rule 15)
“SEC.
1. Motion or Petition for Reconsideration. – Any party in interest may seek the reconsideration
of the decision or order of a member of the Commission by the Commission en
banc by filing a motion or petition for reconsideration within ten (10)
days from receipt of said decision or order.” (Rule 17)
“SEC.
1. Time of Appeal. – Any party in interest may appeal from any
decision or order of the Commission en banc to the Supreme Court
within ten (10) days from receipt of said decision or order in the manner
provided for under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.” (Rule 18)