CONRADO MONTALBAN, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. MATEO CANONOY, RESPONDENT.

An administrative complaint against then Judge Mateo Canonoy of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch III, now Justice of the Court of Appear,
charging said respondent with (1) favoritism and partially, (2) ignorance of
the law, (3) vindictiveness, and (4) incompetence and dereliction of duty.

Notwithstanding that even on its face the complaint failed to
state a clear and strong basis for any disciplinary action, We opted to make
the respondent  answer, considering that
complainant is al­leged to be the offended party in a case of adultery against
his wife whom respondent had acquitted and the Court felt that it was best to
have more information about the allegation of complainant that such acquit­tal
was part of a series of acts of respondent betray­ing bias, partiality,
vindictiveness and ignorance of the law. 
When the respondent filed his answer denying the charges and disclosing
more details surrounding his questioned actuations, We
resolved to give com­plainant an opportunity to file a reply, which he
did.  After going over the said
pleadings, and evaluating the allegations thereof, We
do not consider it necessary to conduct any hearing for the reception of evi­dence,
since practically all the material facts are undisputed.

On the charge of favoritism and partiality, it is claimed by
complainant that it is strange that all three cases wherein Mrs. Hiltruda Gacusan Montalban is a party opposite the complainant, her husband,
came to be assigned by raffle to the respondent; that practical­ly all of
complainant’s motions and petitions in said cases were either denied or totally
ignored by respond­ent whereas those of his wife were all expeditiously and
promptly granted; and that complainant’s wife used to see respondent in his
chamber before the hearings of their cases and in fact, she used to boast that
she had all her cases in the sala of respondent
“sewed up”.  In his answer,
respondent denied having done anything to cause all the mentioned cases to be
assigned to his sala. 
As regards complainant’s allegation that his wife used to see the
respondent in his chamber, respondent has made part of his denial of such
allegation, the af­fidavits of the court stenographer and the court inter­preter
attesting to the fact that they work respective­ly inside the chamber of the
judge and near the door thereof and during the considerably long periods they
have so worked, the respondent never entertained liti­gants
in his chambers “socially” and, with particular reference to Mrs. Montalban, they never saw her enter said chambers except on
occasions when both parties went there together with their respective lawyers,
for the purpose of discussing attempts to amicably settle their
differences.  Said answer also attaches
an affi­davit of the Clerk of Court stating that the raffling of the cases
aforementioned was always regular.

Under these circumstances, We cannot
find suffi­cient ground for Us to take action against respondent in relation to
the first charge.  Complainant’s sus­picion
about the assignment of the three cases between him and his wife to the sala of respondent lacks basis, such coincidence not being
really as unusual as complainant pretends, particularly when We
consider the affidavit of the Clerk of Court, which is not contra­dicted,
attesting to the regularity of the raffling of the cases in question.  Anent Mrs. Montalban’s
alleged visits with the respondent in chambers, We are more inclined to believe
the sworn denials of respondent, supported by the affidavits, as already
stated, of the court stenographer and the court interpreter, if only because
from a consideration of the contents of the decision of respondent acquitting
Mrs. Montalban as well as the decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming the orders of respondent awarding to Mrs. Montalban support together with the custody of her children
and the possession of the conjugal house, it is evident that there was
absolutely no need for the respondent to be talked to in order for him to
acquit her or to issue the order upheld by the Court of Appeals, all of them
being clearly in accordance with law.

The charge of ignorance of the law is predicated on:

“(1) That in Civil Case No. R-9731
for Support and Custody of the Children, on motion of his said wife, without
affording complainant and one Amadeo Castañeda, lessee of a conjugal residential house, their
day in court respondent Judge, with total disre­gard of the rights of
complainant and the said Amadeo Castañeda,
ordered the delivery of the said conjugal dwelling to complainant’s wife, the
said Hiltruda Ga­cusan“;

(2) That when complainant took the orders men­tioned in No. (1)
above, to the Court of Appeals, the respondent lost no time in filing an answer
as re­spondent, when he is not called upon to do so under the Rules of Court;
and

(3) That in the judgment of acquittal of Mrs. Montalban,
respondent included therein an express re­servation for her to be able to file
a civil action for the recovery of attorney’s fees.

As to complainant’s first contention, respond­ent has brought to Our attention the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.
R. No. 44404-R, the very case which arose from the questioned orders of the
respondent, in which the appellate court refused to disturb said orders and
held:

“On his part, petitioner Castañeda
contends that the respondent court acquired no jurisdiction over him for the
reason that he is not a party to Civil Case No. R-9731, and that the respondent
court in issuing the order re­quiring him to deliver the Montalbans‘
conjugal house to re­spondent Gacusan-Montalban de­nied
him his day in court and impaired his contractual rights under the lease
agreement enter­ed into by him and petitioner Montalban.

“Petitioner Castañeda’s con­tention
is patently without me­rit.  Courts are
not left with­out power to compel obedience to their orders, writs and
processes.  The power to punish persons
for contempt is inher­ent in all courts and essential to the preservation of
order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of their lawful or­ders
and decisions (In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595). 
Without the pow­er to punish for contempt courts would be impotent to
maintain orderly administration of just­ice and compel observance to their
lawful mandates.  Where the attendant
circumstances of a case warrant, all persons who interfere with the proper exer­cise
of a court’s judicial func­tions, whether parties or stran­gers, may be
punished for con­tempt of court (17 C.J.S. 47), especially so when they are in
conspiracy (Ferrer vs. Rodriguez, 5 SCRA 854).  The charge against petitioners is willful
refusal to surrender custody of the children and possession of the conjugal
house to respondent Gacusan-Mon­talban.  Willful refusal to de­liver custody of minor
children (Villacorta vs. Palma, 1 C.A.R. (2s) p. 815)
and possession of real property (Sec. 2-a, Rule 71, Rules of Court) when there
is a standing order to do so consti­tute indirect contempt.  The procedural requirements in pro­ceedings
for indirect contempt are:  first, a
complaint in writ­ing which may either be a motion for contempt filed by a
party or an order issued by the court re­quiring a person to appear and
explain; and second, an opportu­nity for the person charged to appear and
explain his conduct (People vs. Viray, CA-G.R. No.
21107-R, February 7, 1963; Tor­res vs. Teodoro, 101
Phil. 422; People vs. Venturanza, 98 Phil. 211; Lopez
vs. Agrava, CA-G. R. No. 34536-R,
May 27, 1965).  In the proceedings below,
respond­ent Gacusan-Montalban filed on October 2, 1969, a motion for the
issuance of an order direct­ing the Sheriff to obtain pos­session of the child,
Desiree, from petitioner Castañeda and requiring the
latter to appear in court and show cause why he should not deliver the conjugal
house to said respondent.  On November 22, 1969, the respond­ent
court issued an order requir­ing petitioner Castañeda
to ap­pear in court on November 26,
1969, and explain why he has cus­tody of Desiree and why he occu­pies
the conjugal house.  This order was
received by petitioner Castañeda.  It is clear, there­fore that the first
procedural requisite has been complied with. 
By the order of November 22,
1969, which specifically required peti­tioner Castañeda
to appear in court on November 26,
1969, and explain, the respondent court fully accorded petitioner Castañeda an opportunity to be heard.  As a matter of fact, Castañeda
appeared in court on November 26,
1969, and testified explaining why he has custody of Desiree and
pos­session of the conjugal house.  Again
clearly, the second procedu­ral requisite has been complied with.  Upon service of the order of November 22, 1969, on petition­er Castañeda, the respondent court acquired jurisdiction over
the person of said petitioner.  And when
the respondent court accorded said respondent the opportunity to be heard, he
evidently was given his day in court and he cannot be heard to complain before
us now that he was denied thereof.  We
find, therefore, that the respond­ent judge has jurisdiction to is­sue the
order of November 26, 1969.”

We believe the above findings of the
Court of Appeals sufficiently dispose of the accusation of complainant in
paragraph (1) above.

Regarding the filing by respondent in the Court of Appeals of his
own answer in the above-mentioned case, We consider satisfactory the
explanation of respondent that while he agrees that ordinarily, under Sec. 5 of
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a judge whose order is challenged in an
appellate court does not have to file any answer or take active part in the
proceeding, in this particular case, he had to file an answer in order to belie
personal attacks of ignorance of the law and of bias, prejudice, favoritism, vindictiveness
and other base motives.  Indeed, when the
actuations of a judge are assailed on grounds other than legal ones, and
imputing to the judge personal motives, the judge cannot be blamed if he takes
personal interest in try­ing to disprove the imputations.  Neither can We find
fault in his promptness in filing said answer, since that is precisely to be
encouraged in all litigations in order to speed up the administration of
justice.

Respondent justifies the reservation in favor of Mrs. Montalban in the judgment acquitting her thus:

“As for the reservation granted the accused
to recover reasonable attorney’s fees in a proper action, it is respectfully
submitted that it is not against any law or jurisprudence.  Certainly, the Re­spondent Court could not con­demn Mr. Montalban
to pay the same in the criminal case be­cause, the
parties there are the People of the Philippines versus Mrs. Montalban.  She should file a civil action to recover
said attorney’s fees; and said civil action is open to defenses which Mr. Montal­ban may set up. 
Again, it is respectfully submitted that lawyers can honestly differ
from each other over the issue; and it is unkind to cast the label of ignorance
upon a non­conformist.  The Respondent
Judge answered the criticism of Mr. Montalban and his
law­yer in his Rejoinder to Memo­randum of Petitioner’s Counsel.  (Par. 2 b) of Annex K) Refer­ence is hereby
made to said pa­ragraph to avoid prolixity and repetition.” (pp. 8-9,
Answer)

“b) As for the
reservation given to accused Gacusan of her right to
recover reasonable at­torney’s fees (while the issue of its correctness or
legality should not be raised and deci­ded here), the undersigned Judge begs
leave to cite the new Civil Code in its
Arts. 290-­293 (regarding mutual support owing by the spouses
one to ano­ther) and Art. 2208, pars. (3) and
(11) as authority for the respondent Court to reserve the right to attorney’s
fees in fa­vor of the wife to defend her­self in proper cases as in Cri­minal
Case No. V-12772 in which she was acquitted from the charge
of adultery filed by her husband. 
The respondent Judge did not find how much attorney’s fees the innocent
spouse is en­titled to recover and did not order the complaining husband to pay
the same in the criminal case, but left the matter for her to file the
corresponding claim in the proper forum.” (pp. 2 – 3, Annex K)

While it is true that such a reservation is not ordinarily made
in judgments of acquittal, particularly in the absence of any counterclaim for
attorney’s fees of the accused, assuming such a counterclaim could be made, We
are not prepared to make here a finding that respondent is guilty of ignorance
of the law merely be­cause he made the reservation in question.  On the other hand, if said reservation may
indicate, as com­plainant contends, concern on the part of respondent that Mrs.
Montalban should be able to recover damages, still We cannot consider it as culpable there being
no convincing showing of partiality in the basic judgment of acquittal.  It could be that respondent felt that Mrs. Montalban’s prosecution was so baseless that her accuser
should be made to indemnify her somehow. 
In any event, from the legal standpoint the reservation complained of
has no legal effect or significance, it being clear that with or without it,
the possibility of Mrs. Montalban being able to claim
damages of any kind has not been in anyway affected; if she has a right
thereto, the absence of such reservation would not be a bar to it; if she is
not entitled to it, a thousand reservations would not help her.

Complainant charges as vindictiveness the sud­den setting for
hearing by respondent of the case of adultery, against Mrs. Montalban
and his subsequent acquittal of her soon after the Court of Appeals is­sued a
preliminary injunction against respondent’s orders in the case mentioned in the
first and second charges.  Respondent
categorically denies the imputa­tion and pleads that he only accorded Mrs. Montalban her right to speedy trial, considering that by
that time, the prosecution had already rested. 
We have read, as already stated, respondent’s decision of acquittal as
well as the decision of the Court of Appeals upholding respondent’s orders, and
We cannot glean therefrom
any indication that could serve as basis for the conclusion of vindictiveness
which com­plainant charges.  In other
words, there would have been some reason for complainant to complain, if there
were a showing that Mrs. Montalban’s acquittal was
more or less unjustified and that the questioned orders which favored her have
no basis in fact and in law; it appearing, however, from the judgment of
acquittal that the prosecution had miserably failed to make out even a prima
facie case, and, incidentally, complainant has made it clear that he is
not interest­ed in the correctness or incorrectness of said deci­sion, and,
furthermore, that the Court of Appeals has found that the attack against the
orders of respond­ent brought to said appellate court in the above-men­tioned
CA-G. R. No. 44404-R “is patently without me­rit”, and this decision
has not even been appealed to Us by complainant, We cannot see Our way clear to
agreeing with the complainant that respondent acted with vin­dictiveness in the
premises.

Inasmuch as the charges of incompetence and dereliction
constitute only a summation of the other char­ges discussed above, it follows
that they cannot stand.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, We do not find suf­ficient
cause to take any disciplinary action against respondent,
much less recommend his dismissal by the President.  It is resolved that the complaint in this
case be as it is hereby DISMISSED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.