FLORENTINO TAMAYO, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS. MANILA CORDAGE WORKERS UNION, ETC., AND MANILA CORDAGE COMPANY, DEFENDANTS, MANILA CORDAGE WORKERS UNION, ETC., DEFENDANT-AP…

This appeal by the Manila Cordage Workers Union from the judgment
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XI, in its Civil Case No.
57480, was originally taken to the Court of Appeals, which cer­tified the case
to this Court on the grounds that on­ly questions of law are raised and the
constitutionality of a law is in issue.

Plaintiffs-appellees, sixteen in
number, are employees of the defendant Manila Cordage Com­pany (hereinafter
referred to as the Company), and were already working there at the time the
Collec­tive Bargaining Agreement which is in question in this case was executed
on December 6, 1962.  They became members
of defendant-appellant Manila Cordage Workers Union (hereinafter referred to as
the Union) in December 1962 by reason of the Union
Security Clause of the said bargaining agreement.  On December
26, 1962, they resigned from the Union on
the ground that the religious sect to which they belong – the Iglesia Ni Cristo –
prohibits them from joining, or affiliating with, any labor organization or
union.  In their letter addressed to the
Union President, plain­tiffs-appellees stated that in
resigning from the Union they were merely exercising the right granted them by
Section 4(2-4) of Republic Act No. 875, as amended by Republic Act No. 3350,
which took effect on June 18, 1961, and which reads:

“(4)    Provided,
That nothing in this Act or in any Act or statute of the Republic of the
Philippines shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor
organ­ization to require as a condition of employ­ment membership therein, if
such labor organ­ization is the representative of the employees as provided in
Section twelve, but such agree­ment shall not cover members of any religious
sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization.” (Under­scoring supplied.)

On June 6, 1964,
the Union President wrote a let­ter to the Company asking the latter to
terminate plain­tiffs-appellees‘ employment for
alleged breach of Sec­tion 1, Article II of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, which provides:

“Employees of the Company on regular status who are members of
the Union shall maintain their membership in the Union
du­ring the term of this Agreement as a con­dition of continued employment in
the Com­pany.”

Acting on the said letter, the Company on
June 15, 1964, sent a
letter to each of plaintiffs-appellees informing him
of the demand by the Union of his dismissal and fur­nishing
him a copy of the Union’s letter.

In their complaint, which was filed on June 22, 1964, the plaintiffs alleged, among
others, that the Company dismissed them illegally for failure to maintain their
membership in the Union; and they prayed the court to
issue a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the defendants from
dismissing them, and, after trial, to make the injunction permanent.  The prayer for preliminary injunction was,
however, sub­sequently withdrawn because the Company did not effect the
plaintiffs’ dismissal.

The defendants filed their respective answers.  The Company, alleging that it might be
exposed to suits for damages and unfair labor practice by the plaintiffs should
it dismiss the latter from the service, and, on the other hand, that it might
be faced with union retaliation and charged with contractual breach if it
should refuse to ac­cede to the Union’s demand for the plaintiffs’ dismissal,
prayed the court to declare the rights and obligations of the parties under
Article II of the Collective Bargaining Agreement in light of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 875, as amended by Republic Act No. 3350.  The defendant Union
attacked the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350, and, as affirmative
defenses, alleged that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the person of
the Union and the nature of the suit and that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action.

On March 2, 1965,
after a pre-trial proceeding at which the issues were clarified and the parties
entered into a stipulation of facts, the trial court rendered judgment
enjoining the defendant Company from enforcing the union shop agreement against
the plaintiffs because of their resignation from the Union.  The court was of the opinion that the case is
properly cognizable by it since it does not involve an unfair labor practice;
and that since the plaintiffs were already employees of the Company even before
the latter’s entry into the Collective Bargain­ing Agreement in question, and
Republic Act No. 3350 be­came effective prior to the execution of the said
agree­ment, the plaintiffs’ rights to their employment could not be prejudiced
by the operation of the union shop clause embodied in the said agreement.  The court skirted the issue of
constitutionality on the ground that it was not absolutely necessary for a
determination of the case.  Only the
defendant Union has appealed.

Just recently, we had occasion to hold that a case involving the
question whether employees who are members of a religious sect which prohibits
affiliation of their members in any labor organization may be dismissed from
their employment for severing their membership in a labor union despite a
closed shop or union security shop clause in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, is an unfair la­bor practice case, hence, it falls under the
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations, not of a regular court.  We refer to Lakas
Ng Manggagawang Makabayan
(LMM) vs. Abiera, etc., et al., L-29474, December 19, 1970, 36 SCRA 437,
441-443, where this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Enrique Fernando, said:

“1.  It does not admit of doubt that the collective
bargaining contract between peti­tioner and the Marinduque
Mining and Industrial Corporation of 1967 must be deemed to have incorporated
within its terms the 1961 amendment of the Industrial Peace Act exempting from
the operation of a closed shop or a union security shop agreement ‘members of
any religious sects which pro­hibit affiliation of their members in any such
labor organization.’ If it were not so, then the collective bargaining
agreement itself could be properly assailed as the freedom of contract
recognized by the Civil Code while it empowers the parties to establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem con­venient is
limited by the requirement that they should not be ‘contrary to law’.  The principle is thus well-settled that an
exist­ing law enters into and forms part of a valid contract without the need
for the parties expressly making reference to it.  Only thus could its validity insofar as some
of its provisions are concerned be assured. 
On the assumption then that private respond­ents could lay claim to the
protection of the above exemption provision, the funda­mental question, the
only one before this Court, is whether such a statutory right could be
vindicated in an ordinary court as was done here or in the Court of Indus­trial
Relations?

“2.  There can be no dispute as to the answer.  Under the Industrial Peace Act, it is made an
unfair labor practice for a labor organization, such as petitioner here, ‘[t]o
cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in
violation of subsection (a) (4) or to discriminate against an employee with
respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated
on some ground other than the usual terms and conditions under which membership
or continuation of member­ship is made available to other members.’ Reference
is thus made to an earlier sub­section of said act making it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to discri­minate in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization. 
There is this proviso which as originally worded when the measure was
enacted in 1953 reads thus:  ‘That
nothing in this Act or in any other Act or statute of the Republic of the
Philippines shall preclude an employ­er from making an agreement with a labor
organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if
such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in
section twelve.’ Then, as was set forth at the outset of this opinion, came the
1961 amendment with members of religious sects as beneficiaries and thus
entitled to exemption from a closed shop or a union security shop.  It is an integral part of the section on what
constitutes an unfair labor practice.

“Under the next section of the Industrial Peace Act, the
jurisdiction over an unfair labor practice case, whether on the part of
management or of a labor union, is vested with the Court of Industrial Rela­tions.  Thus: 
‘The Court shall have juris­diction over the prevention of unfair labor
practices and is empowered to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair
labor practice.  This power shall be
exclusive and shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or
prevention that has been or may be established by an agreement, code, law or otherwise.’ This Court then ever since the effectivity of such Act has no choice but to adhere to the
view that the Court of Industrial Re­lations and not a court of first instance,
is vested with jurisdiction over every kind of an unfair labor practice
case.  Peti­tioner must thus be
sustained.”

The foregoing ruling is dispositive of
the issue of jurisdiction in this case, which was brought up by one of the
defendants in the court below, and which, although not raised in this appeal,
we raise on our own.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgment appealed from is hereby
reversed and set aside, without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Dizon, J., in the result.