JUAN VERA, EXPEDITO SERRANO AND ROMEO PLANTADO, PETITIONERS, VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, COURT OF APPEALS AND COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAMARINES SUR, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioners Juan Vera, Expedito Serrano
and Romeo Plantado, in this special proceeding for
certiorari, would have this Court set aside, for being null and void, the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals of February 13, 1969 finding them guilty of the crime of
homicide and thus affirming, with modification, the judgment of conviction
rendered by the respondent Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur dated July
25, 1966.  The People of the Philippines
was likewise named respondent.  The
alleged nullity of the two above decisions is predicated on the fact that as of
the time the decision of the respondent Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur was promulgated and
read to petitioners on August 23, 1966, the judge who rendered and signed it,
the Honorable Jose T. Surtida, had ceased to hold
office as of July 31, 1966.  Petitioners
would thus rely on Jimenez v. Republic^[1]
as well as the earlier case of People v. Court of Appeals^[2]
as authority for the view that a decision promulgated by the judge who prepared
it after he had left the bench could have no binding effect.

In our resolution of November
18, 1969, we required respondents to answer the above petition for
certiorari filed four days earlier.  In
the meanwhile, Alfredo Oliveros, who was himself likewise
an accused in the above criminal case and likewise convicted in the same
decision of respondent Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur, as affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals,
filed on December 17, 1969 a motion for leave to intervene, joining the other
petitioners in nullifying and setting aside such judgment of conviction.  After several extensions, respondents filed a
manifestation on January 20, 1970
to the effect that they shared the view of the petitioners that the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction complained of was null and void, and
prayed that they be relieved from filing an answer to this petition which, in
their opinion, “is meritorious.” Two days thereafter, they again
manifested the same view insofar as the motion of intervenor
Alfredo Oliveros was concerned.  In the light of the above, this petition is
now ripe for resolution.

It is to be admitted that petitioners’ stand, considered purely
from the legal question raised, is not without doctrinal support.  As was held in People v.
Court of Appeals:  “We have then
that, legally, the decisions of Judge Mañalac were
promulgated on July 3, 1954.  Wherefore, because he had left the Bench
before that date, his decisions have no binding effect.”^[3]
Jimenez v. Republic, the other case cited by petitioners, quoted extensively
from Ong Siu v. Paredes,^[4]
including the following decisive portion of the opinion:  “Here, in the present case, when the
notice for the promulgation of the decision was sent out, the judge who signed
the decision was no longer the judge of the court, and no copy of the judgment
of acquittal was delivered to the appellants. 
With more reasons, therefore, is there no judgment validly entered in
this case.”^[5]

If, therefore, the disposition of this case were made to depend
solely on the above principle thus enunciated by us, petitioners’ efforts would
not be in vain.  There is a decisive fact, however, that removes this case from its
operation.  After the decision by the
respondent Court of First Instance dated July 25, 1966, at a time when the then
Judge Surtida still could validly render judgment,
although promulgated on August 23, 1966 after his retirement, an appeal was
taken to respondent Court of Appeals. 
The brief for petitioners Juan Vera and Expedito
Serrano assigned five errors as having been committed by the respondent Court
of First Instance of Camarines Sur.  No jurisdictional question was included among
such alleged errors committed.  A
separate brief was filed by intervenor Alfredo Oliveros, one of the accused likewise convicted by the
respondent Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, He
imputed five errors as having been committed. 
Again, he did not raise the issue of jurisdiction.  Petitioner Romeo Plantado
likewise appealed and on his part sought the reversal of the lower court
decision by alleging that three errors vitiated it.  Again, there was no attack on its validity
based on the ground that in the meanwhile, before promulgation,
the judge who penned it had retired.

Then came the decision of respondent
Court of Appeals on February 13, 1969.  It is understandable why respondent Court of
Appeals was not called upon to discuss any juris­dictional question.  Thereafter, the present petitioners,
including the intervenor Alfredo Oliveros,
filed a petition for certiorari before us on July 2, 1969 to review the aforesaid decision of
respondent Court of Appeals.^[6]
Three legal questions were raised in such petition.  Thus: 
“1.  May the Court of Appeals
allow the filing by a private prosecutor of another appellee’s
brief which is contrary to the recommendation of the Solicitor General in an
appealed criminal case?  2.  May the trial court properly block the
presentation by the accused of evidence for his valid defense?  3.  May
a judgment of conviction rest on proof not beyond reasonable doubt? “What
is clearly noticeable is the absence of any allegation that the decision of the
lower court suffered from a jurisdictional defect as Judge Surtida
had retired prior to its promulgation. 
On July 9, 1969 the aforesaid petition for certiorari was denied
according to the following resolution issued by us:  “Considering the allegations of, and the
issues raised in, the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals referred to therein, [the Court resolved] to deny the
petition, there being no sufficient showing that the decision sought to be
reviewed is not supported by
substantial evidence.” Two motions for reconsideration were thereafter
filed, one on behalf of all the petitioners and the other on behalf of intervenor
Alfredo Oliveros alone, but as before, there was no
objection interposed as to the lower court
decision suffering from jurisdictional infirmity.  In our resolution of August 26, 1969, we denied both
motions for reconsideration.

In the light of the above facts, the question that presents
itself is whether petitioner and intervenor could
still raise the question that Judge Surtida having
retired previous to the promulgation of the sentence, it must be declared
null.  We hold that they cannot.  This conclusion finds support in the doctrine
announced in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,^[7]
the opinion being penned by Justice Dizon.  Thus: 
“The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a
quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved
which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts.  It
failed to do so.  Instead, at several
stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the
Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the
merits.  It was only after an adverse
decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise
the question of jurisdiction.  Were we to
sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless
all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19,
1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more.  The inequity and unfairness of this is not
only present but revolting.”^[8]

Subsequently, three other decisions were rendered by us in
reliance on the above Tijam doctrine:  Carillo v. Allied
Workers’ Association of the Phil.;^[9]
Tolentino v. Hon. Escalona;^[10]
and Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals.^[11]
As a matter of fact, in an even earlier case, Francisco v. City of Davao, a 1964 decision,^[12]
this Court, speaking through the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion, already served notice on litigants that after a
certain stage, if it would result in a failure of justice, a jurisdictional
question, even on its face meritorious, would not necessarily be accorded the
decisiveness that it might ordinarily possess.  Thus: 
“The ends of justice would not be served, if we now dismiss the
case – over nine (9) years after it had been initiated – and bade the
plaintiffs to start all over again, following thee procedure that the
defendants had asked the lower court, but which the latter refused, to
require.  At any rate, since the legal
question raised in the pleadings has reached this Court, and the assessment
complained of is manifestly violative of the clear
and express provision of the law, it is best that we decide said question,
instead of further deferring its resolution.”^[13]

Nor is the conclusion reached by us open to the objection that
the principle we deem controlling was announced in suits civil in
character.  Of itself, such a distinction
does not suffice to call for a different result.  What would constitute an insuperable obstacle
to its application to a criminal prosecution and the judgment thereafter
rendered is if thereby, to paraphrase the present Chief Justice, the ends of
justice would not be served.  For, if
such were the case, a due process question would undoubtedly arise.  There would be a disregard of this
constitutional safeguard if the governmental action taken is found offensive to
a principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental.^[14]
In criminal proceedings due process would require that the accused be informed
as to why he is proceeded against and what charge he has to meet, with his
conviction being made to rest on evidence that is not tainted with falsity
after full opportunity for him to rebut it and the sentence being imposed in
accordance with a valid law.

It is assumed, of course, that the court that renders the
sentence is one of competent jurisdiction. 
It is an admitted fact in this case that respondent Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur,
presided by the then Judge Jose T. Surtida, was
vested with jurisdiction to try and decide the case against petitioners.  As admitted in this very petition, the
decision reached by him, thereafter affirmed with modification by respondent
Court of Appeals, was “duly rendered and signed” on July 25, 1966 at
a time before his retirement.  Had it
been promulgated then and there, this particular question raised in this
petition would not have arisen.  What
gave it plausibility, as above noted, was that it was not until after his
retirement on August 23, 1966 that such a sentence was read to petitioners.  Considering all the circumstances detailed
above and the Tijam doctrine on which reliance could
be had, it cannot be said that injustice was thereby committed against
petitioners.

The canons of fairness are
not thereby set at naught.  Petitioners
cannot rightfully complain of having been the victims of arbitrary governmental
action.  They were given all the
opportunity to defend themselves not only before the respondent Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur
but likewise before respondent Court of Appeals.  They tried to have this Court, in an earlier
petition for certiorari, to review the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals,
but they did not meet with success because of their inability to demonstrate
that they failed to receive the protection that due process accords every
accused.  What was said by Justice Cardozo fits the occasion: 
“The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a
defendant charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of
an opportunity to defend.  Privileges so
fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be
acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of
incriminating proof.  But justice, though
due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. 
The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament.  We are to keep the balance true.”^[15]

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari filed by Juan Vera,
Expedito Serrano and Romeo Plantado
is dismissed, and the motion for leave to intervene and file an attached
petition in intervention of Alfredo Oliveros is denied.  Without pronouncement as to
costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Teehankee,
and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., did not take part.

^[1]
L-24529, 22 SCRA 622 (1968).

^[2]
99 Phil. 786 (1956).

^[3]
Ibid., p. 790. 
In the opinion of the then Justice, later Chief Justice Bengzon, the following cases were likewise cited:  Luna v. Rodriguez, 37 Phil. 186
(1917); Garchitorena v. Crescini,
37 Phil. 675 (1918); and Rodriguez v. Commission, 84 Phil. 368 (1949).

^[4]
L-21638, 17 SCRA 661 (1966).

^[5]
Ibid., pp. 665-666.

^[6]
L-30591, July 9, 1969.

^[7]
L-21450, 23 SCRA 29 (1968).

^[8]
Ibid, pp. 36-37.

^[9]
L-23689, 24 SCRA 566 (1968).

^[10]
L-26556, 26 SCRA 613 (1969).

^[11]
L-29264, 29 SCRA 419 (1969).

^[12]
L-20654, 12 SCRA 628.

^[13]
Ibid, p. 634.

^[14]
Cf. Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 US 97 (1934).

^[15]
Ibid, p. 122.