FELIXBERTO C. STA. MARIA, PETITIONER, VS. SALVADOR P. LOPEZ, THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIP­PINES, AND NEMESIO CERALDE, RESPONDENTS.

Directly under attack in this an original action for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus is the validity of the transfer of petitioner  Felixberto C. Sta.
Maria from his post of Dean, College of Educa­tion, University of the
Philippines (UP), to the Office of respond­ent UP President Salvador P. Lopez,
there to become Special assistant in charge of public information and
relations.

Petitioner, a professor of English and Comparative Litera­ture
(formerly Dean of the UP College in Baguio),
was elected Dean of the College of Education
on May 5, 1967 by the Board
of Regents, on nomination of the UP President. 
His appointment as such Dean was for a five-year term, “effective
May 16, 1967 until May 17, 1972, unless sooner terminated, with all the rights
and privileges as well as the duties and obligations attached to the position
in accordance with the rules and regulations of the University and the
Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Phil­ippines.”

The issues in this case can be better understood if framed in its
proper setting, viz:

As far back as February 11, 1969, the graduate and under­graduate
students of the UP College of Education presented to President Salvador P.
Lopez a number of demands having a bearing on the general academic program^[1]
and the physical plant and services,^[2]
with a cluster of special demands.^[3]
In response, President Lopez created a committee composed of eight graduate
students, two undergraduate students, and four faculty members.  This committee met 9 times with Dean Sta.
Maria in February and March 1969.  On March 17, 1969, Dean Sta. Maria gave
President Lopez a written summary of the dialogues he had with the committee
and enumerated in connection with the demands, the steps taken,^[4]
the steps being taken,^[5]
and the steps to be taken in consultation with the faculty.^[6]
He also recommended to the UP President the following:  a more adequate budget responsive to the
needs of the college, taking into account its expanding graduate program;
improve­ment of the library service in terms of a better book collection and
more adequate space and reading rooms, particularly for graduate students;
appointment of more faculty members on the senior level to handle the large
graduate program, and to meet the acute need for more graduate advisers, critics,
and committee members; improvement of the water system of the college;
improvement of the physical plant of the college, in­cluding its classrooms,
offices, toilets, sidewalks and sur­rounding landscape; and construction of a
graduate students’ dormitory.

But the students were not to be appeased.  For, Dean Sta. Maria, according to them, did
not act on some of their demands. 
Respondents herein have stressed that in the meet­ings of the education
graduate committee, Dean Sta. Maria neither included in the agenda nor
consulted the faculty about the students’ demands on “foreign language
proficiency examination” and on “research and thesis writing
procedures”.  They have brought out
the fact that many members of the faculty shared the students’ grievances on
the absence of definite standards and procedures on academic work, including
teaching load, adminis­trative and committee assignments, faculty evaluation,
and favori­tism and discrimination.

On July 16, 1969,
Adelaida E. Masuhud,
President of the UP Graduate Education Student Organization, led a group who
visited President Lopez and submitted to him a progress report on the students’
demands taken up with Sta. Maria since March
26, 1969.  She acknowledged
that the dean had granted ten demands^[7]
but deplored the fact that the dean had ignored the following:  submission to the faculty for decision, of
the demand for abolition of foreign language requirements and Comprehensive
examinations; fixing the criteria for selection, admission, appointment and promotion
of faculty members; formulation of clear-cut policies on thesis advising,
faculty teaching load, and faculty membership on standing committees; and
appointment of a permanent director for the Graduate Education Studies of the
SPED Program.  She thus stated:  “I appreciate the efforts of the Dean in
acting on some of our demands.  However,
the Dean has failed to take further action on the demands that have far
reaching implications for the students, faculty and the College as a
whole.  As a consequence problems,
confusion and demoralization of students and faculty have cropped up anew in
the college.”

The students threatened to boycott their classes the next day,
July 17.  President Lopez asked that they
desist, suggested that they instead attend a student-faculty meeting the next
day in his office.

But on July 17, the Education Graduate Student Organiza­tion
boycotted their classes just the same. 
The President met the striking students’ representatives and the faculty
members of the College of Education.  Charges of favoritism were allegedly hurled
by some of the faculty members against Sta. Maria.  On the other hand, the dean offered to sit
down with the students.  The latter,
however, refused to enter into a dialogue unless he (the dean) were first ousted.

In a separate development, the faculty members of the College
of Education convened in the
afternoon of July 22.  They resolved,
amongst others, to recognize the right of a college dean to his position from
which he cannot be removed unless for cause (44 in favor, 2 abstained), and not
to endorse the students’ demand for the forced resignation of Sta. Maria (36 in
favor, 5 against, 3 abstained).

The boycott fever infected other colleges.  On July
22, 1969, the newly installed members of the UP Student Council
voted to support the education students’ strike.  The next day, July 23, the main avenues
leading to the university gates were barricaded, buses denied entrance, and
students cajoled into joining the strike. 
It was thus on that day that all academic activity in the university
came to a complete standstill.  In the
morning of July 23, at 10:00 o’clock,
the UP President called a meeting of the faculty of the College
of Education.  Those present gave him a vote of con­fidence
(40 in favor, 7 abstained) to resolve the issue on hand as he sees fit.

Armed with the vote of confidence of the education faculty, on
the same day, July 23, 1969, President Lopez issued the transfer order herein
challenged, Administrative Order 77. 
That order, addressed to Dean Sta. Maria, reads:

“By special authority vested in me by the Board of Regents and
pursuant to the Civil Service Law and the University Code, you are hereby trans­ferred
from the College of Education
to the Office of the President as Special Assistant^[8]
with the rank of Dean, without reduction in salary, in the interest of the
service.

This transfer involves your administrative position only and in no
way affects your status as professor of the University.

This order shall take effect immediately.”

Simultaneously, President Lopez appointed ad interim
Professor Nemesio R. Ceralde
as “acting Dean of the College
of Education, without additional
compensation, effective July 23, 1969”.

President Lopez was to explain in a press statement of July 23,
1969 that he “cannot permit the continued disruption of the academic life
of the institution”; that the transfer order was made “[i]n the interest of the service” and “as an
emergency measure” because the meetings with the faculty, students, Sta.
Maria and the UP President had “proved fruitless in the face of the
refusal of the College of Education students to discuss any further their
demands unless and until Dean Sta. Maria resigns his position”; and that,
therefore, “the complete shut-down of classes in the Diliman
campus has compelled” him to “transfer Dean Sta. Maria to other
duties”.

Having received the transfer order on the same day, July 23, Sta.
Maria forthwith wrote a letter, which he himself hand carried to President
Lopez, requesting that “(a) a formal investigation be conducted by the
Board of Regents on the circumstances which led to the promulgation of the
above order, and on the basis thereof; and (b) said order be reconsidered and
set aside for being manifestly unjust, unfair, unconstitutional, and contrary
to law, and, therefore, null and void.”

The next day, July 24, Sta. Maria announced to the education
students and faculty, through Memorandum 17, that the transfer order “is
now the subject of a pending request for recon­sideration x x
x and, for this reason, its effectivity
is necessarily suspended”, and that he shall continue “to be the Dean
x x x pur­suant to his
appointment as such for the period from January 1, 1968 to May 15, 1972.”

On July 25, 1969,
the education faculty signed a “Decla­ration of Concern” stating,
amongst others, that when they gave President Lopez a vote of confidence, they
“did so in the belief and confidence that he x x
x will uphold the democratic processes in the
solution of the problem and will respect the fundamental rights of the
individual.” Similar declarations of concern came from the faculties of
law, medicine, arts and sciences, and nursing.

At President Lopez’ request, a special meeting of the Board of
Regents was held on July 25, 1969.  President Lopez there reported Dean Sta.
Maria’s transfer and Professor Ceralde’s ad interim
appointment as Acting Dean of the College
of Education.  He told the board that because of
“failure of leadership in the College of Education, a crisis of confidence
emerged in that institution”; that the ultimate result was the boycott of
classes by the students “starting on July 17, 1969 in protest against the
inaction of Dean Sta. Maria on their demands submitted months ago”; and
that this situation impelled him to issue Administrative Order 77 “as
demanded by the prevailing crisis.”

The board confirmed Dean Sta. Maria’s transfer and Professor Ceralde’s appointment, considered as premature Sta. Maria’s
Memorandum 17 heretofore mentioned, but gave due course to his plea for
reconsideration and granted him a chance to be heard at the next board meeting
on July 29, 1969.

In the said meeting of July 29, Sta. Maria did not per­sonally
appear.  He sent his counsel who manifested
that Sta. Maria was not recognizing the board’s jurisdiction unless, without
further hearing, the board first revoke the transfer order.  The board resolved:  “x x x to take cognizance and consider as a new petition
of Dean Sta. Maria, submitted through counsel, his decla­ration that the
efficacy of the President’s Administrative Order No. 77 transferring him should
first be suspended by the Board and held in abeyance as a prerequisite for the
hearing being prayed for.  In this
connection, Dean Sta. Maria will be asked to file a Memorandum with the Board
in support of his new petition.”

The foregoing had been the developments when Sta. Maria filed the
present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in this Court on July 31, 1969 against respondents
Salvador P. Lopez, the Board of Regents and Nemesio
R. Ceralde.

The case is now ripe for decision.

1.  Discussion of the issues
herein involved necessarily has to start with the examination of the terms of
employment, the covenant which binds petitioner with the university.  The contract, it bears repeating, stipulates
that the dean’s five-year term is qualified by the clause:  “unless sooner terminated, with all the
rights and privileges as well as the duties and obli­gations attached to the
position in accordance with the rules and regulations of the University and the
Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines.” The authority
for this appointment is found in Article 79 of the university code providing
that “[t]he term of office of all deans x x x shall be five years from the date of their appointment
without prejudice to reappointment and until their successors shall have been
appointed.”

We first look into the meaning of the phrase “unless sooner
terminated” embodied in the contract of employment.  Right at the start, it would seem to us that
the term “unless sooner terminated” cannot be equated or tied up with
some such terms as “terminable at will”, or “removable at
pleasure”.

A number of reasons there are why petitioner may not be removed
at pleasure before the expiry of his term. 
First.  Petitioner’s
contract of employment has a fixed term of five years.  It is not an appointment in an acting
capacity.^[9]
Nor is petitioner’s designation that of an officer-in-charge as it is known in
administrative practice.  Second.  Nothing in the rules and regulations of the
university or its charter would indicate that a college dean appointed with a
term can be separated with­out cause.  On
the contrary, reason there is to believe that the university policy points
quite to the contrary.  An instance is
the resolution of the Board of Regents of June 14, 1961, fixing the term of office of the UP
President.  It was there stated that
“uncertainty of tenure and frequency of change in the incumbent of the
position are not for the best interests of the University.” This concept
is self-evident.  Third.  Again, there is nothing either in the UP
charter or code empowering the UP President or the Board of Regents to insert
such a clause – unless sooner terminated – as would authorize dismissal at
will.  Fourth.  As this Court, in Lacson
vs. Roque, 92 Phil. 456, 463, ruled,
“strict construction of law relating to suspension and removal, is the
universal rule.” Petitioner, with a definite term of employment, may not
thus be removed except for cause.  The
reasons being that the removal was not expressly declared to be exercisable at
pleasure or at will; and that the fixity of the term of office gives rise to
the inference that he may be removed from office only for misbehavior as to
which he shall be entitled to notice and hearing.  As was well pointed out in Lacson
vs. Roque, [a]n inferential
authority to remove at pleasure can not be deduced, since the existence of a
defined term, ipso facto negatives such an inference and implies
a contrary presumption, i.e., that the incumbent shall hold office to the end
of his term subject to removal for cause.”^[10]

The foregoing paves the way for the consideration of what we
believe is the overriding question:  Was
Sta. Maria removed?

2.  Respondents stand on the
premise that Sta. Maria was not removed; he was just temporarily assigned to
another position.

We may well start with the statement that a dean of a UP college
holds a non-competitive or unclassified civil ser­vice position.^[11]
As such, and upon the provisions of his con­tract of employment, he is
protected by constitutional and statu­tory provisions on security of term.^[12]
He cannot be removed during the term except for cause and after prior hearing
and in­vestigation.^[13]
Which requisites are also embodied in the university Charter^[14]
and in the university code.^[15]

But is there really need for a formal prior hearing?  No need, respondents say.  For, the Civil Service Law requires prior
hearing only in cases of removal, dismissal or suspension. Sta. Maria,
respondents underscore, was not suspended, dismissed or removed; he was merely
transferred to another position without reduction in salary or rank in the
interest of public service.^[16]
Respondents proceed to aver that the transfer was neither discipli­nary nor
punitive.^[17]
A promotion, so they claim, because in the new position he would be an officer
of the university not just of one college;^[18]
he would enjoy a rank at par with senior college deans;^[19]
and that he would be in line for one of the vice-presidencies of the
university.^[20]
Respondents also say that such transfer was an emergency measure to stave off a
crisis that gripped the campus – the paralyzing disruption of classes.^[21]
They emphasize that there was an urgent and genuine need for petitioner’s
talents and services in the newly created Public Affairs and University
Relations Office.

Quite interesting it is to inquire whether Dean Sta. Maria was
transferred, promoted, demoted, or removed without his consent.

3.  A transfer is a
“movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level
or salary, without break in ser­vice.”^[22]
Promotion is the “advancement from one position to another with an
increase in duties and responsibilities as author­ized by law, and usually
accompanied by an increase in salary.”^[23]

A transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advance­ment or
reduction^[24]
or a transfer that aims to “lure the em­ployee away from his permanent
position”, cannot be done without the employee’s consent.^[25]
For that would constitute removal from office. 
Indeed, no permanent transfer can take place unless the officer or
employee is first removed from the position held, and then appointed to another
position.^[26]

When an officer is reduced in rank or grade and suffers a big cut
in pay, he is demoted;^[27]
and when he is demoted, he is removed from office.^[28]
But a demotion means something more than a reduction in salary; there may be a
demotion in the type of position though the salary may remain the same.^[29]
A transfer that aims by indirect method to terminate services or to force
resignation also is removal.^[30]

4.  Concededly, transfers
there are which do not amount to removal. 
Some such transfers can be effected without the need for charges being
preferred, without trial or hearing, and even without the consent of the employee.

The clue to such transfers may be found in the “nature of
the appointment.”^[31]
Where the appointment does not indicate a specific station, an employee may be
transferred or reassigned provided the transfer affects no substantial change
in title, rank and salary.  Thus, one who
is appointed “principal in the Bureau of Public Schools” and is
designated to head a pilot school may be transferred to the post of principal
of another school.^[32]

And the rule that outlaws unconsented
transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only to an officer who is
appointed – not merely assigned – to a particular station.^[33]
Such a rule does not prescribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute
that empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassign the employees and
officers in order to improve the service of the agency.^[34]
The use of approved techniques or methods in personnel management to harness
the abilities of employees to promote optimum public service cannot be objected
to.^[35]
Neither does illegality attach to the transfer or reassignment of an officer
pending the determination of an administrative charge against him;^[36]
or to the transfer of an employee from his assigned station to the main office,
effected in good faith and in the interest of the service pursuant to Section
32 of the Civil Service Act.^[37]

5.  The next point of
inquiry is whether or not Administrative Order 77 would stand the test of
validity vis-a-vis the principles just
enunciated.

That the university is vested with corporate powers exer­cised by
the board of regents and the President is a proposition which is not open to
question.^[38]
The board, upon recommendation of the President, is clothed with authority to
hire and fire after investigation and hearing.^[39]
The President, on the other hand, may fill vacancies temporarily,^[40]
transfer faculty members^[41]
from one department to another,^[42]
and make arrangements to meet emergencies occurring between board meetings so
that the work of the university may not suffer.^[43]

To be stressed at this point, however, is that the appointment of
Sta. Maria is that of “Dean, College
of Education, University of the Philippines.”
He is not merely a dean “in the university” His appointment is to a
specific position; and, more importantly, to a specific station.

A line of distinction must be drawn between the office of dean
and that of professor, say, of English and Comparative Lite­rature.  A professor in the latter capacity may be
assigned to handle classes from one college to another or to any other unit in
the uni­versity where English is offered. 
He may even be transferred from graduate school to undergraduate
classes.  He cannot complain if such was
done without his consent.  He has no
fixed station.^[44]
As for him, it can always be argued that the interests of the service are
paramount.

But a college dean holding an appointment with a fixed term
stands on a different plane.  He cannot,
without his consent, be transferred before the end of his term.  He cannot be asked to give up his post.  Nor may he be appointed as dean of another
college.  Much less can he be transferred
to another position even if it be dignified with a dean’s rank.^[45]

6.  We now come to the
problem of whether or not peti­tioner’s transfer from the College
of Education to the Office of the
President as special assistant with the rank of dean without reduction in
salary was permanent.  Facts there are
which would show that far from being a temporary measure, petitioner’s trans­fer
was in fact a removal.

Respondent university president himself admitted that the
transfer order was an ad interim appointment.  That the transfer was a removal has been
confirmed by the UP President’s reference to Sta. Maria’s deanship of the College
of Education as his “former
position”.  This plainly indicates
that Sta. Maria ceased to be dean of the college.  Thus:

“The validity of Dean Sta. Maria’s designa­tion or appointment
as Special Assistant to the President rests upon two acts:

(a)  The transfer order of July 23, 1969, which operates as an ad interim
appointment under Art. 44(e) of the Revised U.P. Code; and

(b)  The confirmation on such appointment by
the Board of Regents in its special meeting on July 25, 1969.”^[46]

And again:

“The position of Special Assistant to the President with the
rank of Dean carries equal, if not higher, rank than the position of Dean of
the College of Education.  As Special Assistant to the President, Dean
Sta. Maria has become an officer of the University while in his former
position, he was merely an officer of the college in the Univer­sity.”^[47]

Not that the foregoing stand alone.  The reasons advanced by respondents to
justify such transfer are quite revealing. 
They pictured Sta. Maria as a bungling administrator, incompetent, inef­ficient,
unworthy, a miscast.  They averred that
he did not act on the petitions and grievances of graduate students; that he
caused widespread dissatisfaction amongst faculty members and students because
of his “inaction”, his “lack of sincerity and candor in
dealing” with them; that he was guilty of “inflexible, arrogant
attitude and actuation” as dean; that he miserably failed to avert a
boycott that was caused by a “crisis of confidence” and “failure
of leadership” in his college; that he abandoned his post when he was most
needed; that he refused to accept solutions even as he failed to advance his
own to mitigate the crisis; that in sum, he was a miscast in the College of
Education.^[48]
Of course, these are merely charges.  But
they collectively reflect the thinking of respondents toward petitioner.  In the picture thus presented, it would not
be unreasonable to say that Sta. Maria’s transfer was with the character of
permanence to take him away from his duties and responsibilities as dean, in
all of which allegedly he was a failure.

And if more were needed to show that the transfer of Sta. Maria
was permanent, there is the fact that Nemesio Ceralde was appointed “ad interim” acting dean of
the College of Education.  And, Ceralde’s
appointment was confirmed by the Board of Regents on July 25, 1969. 
Again, there is respondents’ averment that peti­tioner’s new position as
special assistant to the President could be a stepping-stone to a higher
position – that of Vice Presidency of the university.  Were his appointment but temporary, there
would be no occasion to say that he could be elevated to another position of a
higher category.

More than this, the transfer was a demotion.  A demotion, because:  First. 
Deanship in a university, being an academic posi­tion which requires
learning, ability and scholarship, is more exalted than that of a special
assistant who merely assists the Pre­sident, as the title indicates.  The special assistant does not make
authoritative decisions.  Second.  The position of dean is a line posi­tion
where the holder makes authoritative decisions in his own name and
responsibility.  A special assistant does
not rise above the level of staff position. 
Third.  The position of
dean is created by law, the university charter, and cannot be abolished even by
the Board of Regents.  That of special
assistant, upon the other hand, is not so provided by law; it was a creation of
the university president.

It will not avail respondents any to say that Sta. Maria retained
“the rank of Dean”.  In actual
administrative practice, the term “with rank of” dean is
meaningless.  He is no dean at all.  He of course, basks in the trappings of the
dean.  A palliative it could have been
intended to be.  But actually he is a
dean without a college.

7.  Respondents nonetheless
insist that the “interest of the service” is the primary reason for
the transfer.  They say that there was an
urgent need to bring the academic life of the university back to normal and
Sta. Maria’s transfer was the only feasible solution.  They point to the need for petitioner’s
services in the Office of Public Affairs and University Relations purportedly
“to improve the relations of the University with its various
constituencies.” They cling to the principle of “least
sacrifice”.^[49]
They urge that only three options were left to the university, namely:  to keep Sta. Maria at all costs and risk an
indefinite paralysis of the university life; to give due course to the charges
filed against Sta. Maria, preventively sus­pend him during the investigation,
and after hearing dismiss him if the evidence so warrants; and to transfer him
as a non-discip­linary measure in the interest of the service.  Respondents claim that the first option was out
of the question.  The reason they give is
that the university could not afford an indefinite disruption of academic
life.  To respondents, the second was
feasible but distasteful – the administration was in no mood to prejudice Sta.
Maria through a proceeding that would reflect on his record.  So the university administration opted for
the third method, a solution said to be the most convenient and expeditious and
based on the principle of “least sacrifice”.

Implicit in the university’s stand is that Dean Sta. Maria had to
be uprooted from his position as a price to buy the peace of the students and
induce them to return to their classes. 
Such could have been an easy way to climb out of difficulties.  But transfer could be but a ploy to cover
dismissal.  And dismissal cannot be
justified on grounds of expediency. 
Appropriately to be remem­bered here is that due process is associated
with the sporting idea of fair play;^[50]
it shuns oppression and eschews unfair dealing; it obeys the dictates of
justice and is ruled by reason.  The
Scrip­tures no less remind us to hear before we condemn.^[51]
Fidelity to this cardinal principle must have impelled Congress, just recently,
to clarify the authority to transfer subordinate officers and employ­ees, an
authority so often misused and abused to ride roughshod over hapless civil
servants.  As amended, the Civil Service
Law provides that “if the employee believes that there is no justification
for the transfer, he may appeal his case x x x and pending his appeal and decision thereon, his transfer
shall be held in abeyance.” This was intended to fortify the protective
wall built around the employee’s right to security of tenure, to guard against
unbridled encroachments masquerading in the “interest of the
service”.  And, to think that this
amendment came just a few days after Sta. Maria was transferred without prior
hearing.

The current climate of activism of the young people, recognized
to be worldwide, whether on or off campus, is a phenomenon in this country that
commands attention.  Demonstrations and
boycotts which are manifestations of such activism are constitutionally
protected.  But there are limits.  A funda­mental precondition to the exercise
of such rights, we perceive, is that the activity should not impair the rights
of others whose roots are as deep and as equally protected by iron-clad guaran­tees.  A high regard to a man’s dignity is the
hallmark of our law.

The students demanded Sta. Maria’s ouster.  The Presi­dent of the university acceded to
their demand.  But Sta. Maria’s right to
be removed only, in the words of the law, “after due process” was
disregarded.  That Sta. Maria’s right
alone was impaired is not justification for the action taken against him.  Unless, of course, justice be replaced by
collective action as the test for validity. 
And, unless we admit that arbitrariness is permissible if it comes from
an impersonal multitude.

Nor may it be assumed that emergency could justify dis­regard of
constitutional rights.  It would seem
pertinent to observe that a fundamental charter is for all times and for all
conditions.  Eloquent are these passages
from the declaration of concern from the College
of Law faculty:

“We, the faculty of the College
of Law, University of the Philippines,
view with the utmost concern the removal of Felixberto
Sta. Maria from his position as Dean of the College
of Education by the President of
the University of the Philippines.

As members of the academic community that is the University, as
members of the Philip­pine Bar, and as citizens of our Republic, we speak out
in protest against this violation of the Rule of Law in our midst and the clear
disregard of the fundamental rights of one of our colleagues.

A member of the faculty of the University of the Philippines,
pleading for his day in court, asking to be heard in his defense, desirous to
confront his accusers, and appealing for a hearing by a dis­interested body,
has been summarily condemned without trial. 
He has been punished without evidence formally presented.  He has been stripped of his powers and
prerogatives as Dean, in violation of that most basic and fun­damental right –
that no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property without due
process of law and in accordance with the regularly established procedures.

Our concerns has nothing to do with the merits of the case against Felixberto Sta. Maria. 
We protest the procedure that was followed in disregard of due
process.  Under a legal system like ours,
there are established procedures to settle disputes.  The arbitrary rule of one or the mob rule of
the many are alien to our free institutions. 
Under existing univer­sity rules and practice, charges against students,
no matter how minor, are formally investigated. 
Why should a dean be entitled to less?

We are aware that the action against Dean Sta. Maria was
denominated a transfer to other duties in the University without reduction in
rank or salary.  This thin veneer of
legalism, this transparent attempt to follow the letter but not the spirit of
the Constitution, the University Charter, the U.P. Revised Code, the Civil Ser­vice
Law, and the Civil Service Rules and Regu­lations deceives no one.  Who can, in good conscience, honestly say
that Dean Sta. Maria has not been reduced in rank, privileges and
prerogatives?  Who can discount his moral
anguish and suffering?

The vote of confidence given by the faculty of the College
of Education notwithstanding, the
President of the University remains bound by and can act only in consonance
with, the Rule of Law.

We agree with the President that there should be no disruption of
the academic life of the community.  Like
him, we want peace, but not at any price. 
Peace secured at the expense of Consti­tutional principles is no peace
at all; and the peace just now obtained is no more than a transitory lull, a
precarious interlude that could lead to even more serious disorders and
disregard of fundamental rights.

We also regard with alarm this action against Dean Sta. Maria
because of its consequences on the morale of the faculty.  The exercise of independent judgment the
performance of academic responsibilities is imperilled
where the force of numbers can replace the rational solution to a controversy.

Believing that the action taken against Dean Sta. Maria is not
irreversible, we submit to the President of the University this declaration of
concern, urging him to reconsider his action.”^[52]

8.  The argument that the
transfer of Sta. Maria was made in the interest of public service has dwindled
in strength on the face of the circumstances. 
Of course, the university is under compulsion to bring normalcy to the
campus, to end the boycott of classes. 
The decision to transfer could really refract the temper of the
times.  We do say, however, that emotion
or muscle need not displace reason.

Nor do we believe it too difficult for the UP authorities to hew
to the line drawn by the due process clause, to cause charges to be formalized,
Sta. Maria suspended, and given a fair chance to defend himself.  This procedure does not neces­sarily bring
about humiliation.  On the contrary, it
exudes the spirit of fairness.

The baneful effects of Sta. Maria’s transfer were easily and
promptly felt.  The professors in
different faculties were alarmed. 
Obviously they felt that to compel a professor to give up his
constitutional right is beyond tolerance. 
A declaration of concern was expressed not only by the faculty of the College
of Law as aforesaid but also the
Colleges of Education, Arts and Sciences, Medicine and PGH School of Nursing,
all of the UP.

More than these, such transfer undermined the integrity of
UP.  The university buckled under strain,
yielded where it should have upheld its commitment to the rule of law.  Peace may not be secured at the expense of
consecrated constitutional principles.  A
contrary rule could lead to more serious disorders.

9.  Respondents urge that
“the traditional concepts and requirements of due process could not be
made to apply to every kind of administrative action, without the consequent
inefficiency and frustration of legislative purpose.” They argue that
certain types of administrative action may be taken without prior hearing and
still satisfy the requirements of due process. 
The existence of a public emergency, they insist, would suffice to
justify summary action.  To prop up their
stand, respondents cite such summary administrative actions as distraint of a delinquent taxpayer’s property;^[53]
abatement of a nuisance per se;^[54]
can­cellation of a passport of one who absconds to another country to evade
criminal prosecution.^[55]

No question that a summary administrative action is appropriate
in the cases cited.  Examples can be
multiplied.  Thus, without providing for
a prior hearing, a bank conservator may seize a distressed bank;^[56]
the Food and Drug Adminis­trator may confiscate harmful drugs whose Labels are
allegedly misleading;^[57]
the Civil Aeronautics Board may suspend a letter of registration;^[58]
and the Securities and Exchange Commission may suspend the license of a
securities dealer to deal in small offerings.^[59]
In all these cases, the courts have uniformly ruled that due process does not
require judicial inquiry as a condition to the exercise of administrative
discretion. “It is sufficient, where only property rights are concerned,
that there is at some stage an opportunity for a hearing and a judicial
determination.”^[60]

We can go on citing cases where regulatory agencies, in a manner
of speaking, shoot first before asking questions without offending against due
process.  But it is pointless to cite
them here, much less rely upon them to support Sta. Maria’s unconsented
trans­fer.  For central to those cases is
that they involve the exercise of regulatory authority pursuant to a delegated
police power.  The reason these agencies
are given such summary powers is that they come to grip with issues that are
mostly scientific and technical, issues that are “perhaps not readily
reducible to the simple question-and-answer method so dearly beloved by law­yers.”^[61]
Hence, in place of a formal hearing they resort to inspection, examination and
testing – techniques regarded as sufficient substitutes upon which to base an administrative
action.^[62]
Whether poultry is putrid, or drug is harmful, or a ship is unseaworthy,
are matters better left to scientific analysis or technical inspection without
the need of a formal hearing.  Based on
such examination and inspection, summary orders for condemnation or
confiscation may follow.

But the UP President’s decision to summarily take the deanship
away from Sta. Maria cannot, by any stretch of imagi­nation, be cast in the
same type of administrative actions that regulatory agencies exercise under a
delegated police power.  The UP
President’s action here is unlike that, for instance, of the Central Bank in
removing the officers of a floundering bank in order to take over its
management.^[63]
Not even the so-called emergency situation in the campus could be invoked to
firm up his summary action.  Seemingly,
the decision to transfer Sta. Maria was dictated by the howling protest of
demonstrating students who wanted to muscle in their demands for curriculum
changes.  But precisely, it is in situations
such as this that one should be on guard lest reason and justice be overwhelmed
by excitement and passion.

10.  Again, respondents cite
the so-called “crisis of con­fidence” and “failure of
leadership” in the College of Education.  Allegedly, these factors caused the student
boycott which UP tried to avert by the expedient of banishing Sta. Maria from,
and effectively depriving him of his deanship, of the College of Education.

The boycott, we are made to understand, was called because Sta.
Maria resisted the pressures exerted by the grad­uate students.  He refused to give in to their demands –
demands that sought to eliminate or influence the direction of curricular
requirements, specifically those which pertain to foreign languages and
comprehensive examinations.  The graduate
students, it is alleged, considered these requirements as “obsolete
vestiges of colonial education, x x x activities which do not in any way add to the learning
activity of the student.”^[64]

Of course, students are entitled to petition school adminis­trators
for change in curriculum, faculty, and school regulations.^[65]
Elders should listen to what they say, and respond to their plea for university
instructions that have relevance in their educa­tion.^[66]

This is a fast changing age of ferment and activism.  Every day new discoveries change man’s life,
morals, and atti­tude.  The university
therefore cannot remain aloof to the con­temporary scene.^[67]
Perhaps the Wilsonian description of the ideal
university as a place where “calm science” sits “not know­ing
that the world passes”, a place where past and present are discussed
“with knowledge and without passion”, a place “slow to take
excitement” and unlike the world outside “in its self-pos­session x x x“^[68]
would now appear to be anachronistic.

The students are “probably right in much of what they say,
however wrong their prescriptions for righting matters.”^[69]
When they protest whether against the college administration or against the
Establishment, they should be accorded the full scope of the constitutional
protection to free speech and assembly.^[70]
On the other hand, any decision or action to give in to their demands must not
be dictated solely by their “readiness x x x to shout down and in other ways to stifle the free
expression of opinion of those with whom they disagree.”^[71]
Otherwise, the probability exists that a minority group of students may succeed
in their attempt to impose, by disruptive action, their views or their will on
the majority.  What indeed is deplorable
is “when we are confronted only with violence for violence’s sake, and
with attempts to frighten or intimidate an administration into doing things for
which it can itself see neither the rationale nor the electoral mandate; when
we are offered, as the only argument for change, the fact that a number of
people are themselves very angry and excited; and when we are presented with a
violent objection to what exists, unaccompanied by any constructive concept of
what, ideally, ought to exist in its place.”^[72]

Compelling is the need to adhere to the traditional democratic
processes and procedures to secure action and redress.  Decisions that are prodded by ultimatums and
tantrums are gen­erally regarded with apprehension.

It was in the face of student revolt that the university
officials buckled under and gave in to the students’ protest against the
continued presence of Dean Sta. Maria in the College
of Edu­cation.

11.  And yet, a close look
into the so-called unfulfilled demands – abolition of foreign language and
comprehensive examination – would reveal that Dean Sta. Maria could not have
unilaterally granted them.

On the foreign language requirement, the students manifested that
it is –

“x x x
absurd and obsolete.  Foreign students
fulfill this requirement by an examination in their language.  Many of us take Spanish for the sake of
completing the requirements.  We
understand that these requirements in other universities equip the students for
his research.  So if a student is doing
research on Spanish laws governing the educational system and would need to use
Spanish, therefore he has to have a reading knowledge of Spanish.  Such is not the case with us.  We demand that this requirement be abolished
in the graduate’s level.”^[73]

On the comprehensive examination requirements, the students say:

“x  x
x The present practice is by subject, excluding the
cognates.  Graduate students believe that
they are taking another final examination in a subject they have already
passed.  We question the absence of
policy as to who should give comprehensive examination.  We demand that the College consider the use
of qualifying examination aside from the Dean’s proposed admissions test.”^[74]

These requirements, we believe, are aimed at the development of
the student’s depth of insight and breadth of view.  This, after all, is an end that a university
education strives to attain:  Foreign
languages, should be conceded, widen a man’s world.  Spanish, in particular, is one of the links
to our past.  We can but surmise that
Dean Sta. Maria had cogent reasons to sidetrack the demands.  It is within the realm of probabilities that
the dean wanted to preserve the high standards of professional scholarship in
the college.  Perhaps he was loathe to
turn his college into a factory for half-baked graduates.  The University of the Philip­pines,
we must remember, has set a standard and established a tradition for learning
and leadership.

Consider, too, the fact that the education students are the
future mentors of the youth.  Necessarily,
they are expected to come through college with as thorough and extensive prepa­ration
as possible if they are to serve as educational leaders and models for
scholarship.

 On top of all, Dean Sta.
Maria cannot single-handedly do away with these requirements.  The responsibility for fixing the academic
requisites for graduation and the receiving of a degree is lodged not in the
dean but in the university council, composed of the President of the university
and all faculty members from assistant professor to full professor.^[75]
The Dean may only recommend proposals affecting courses of study.^[76]

But Dean Sta. Maria had not been remiss in his duties.  Truth to tell, the students admit that Dean
Sta. Maria was not after all unreasonably inflexible, intransigent.  He sympatheti­cally listened to them, and
broadly satisfied those demands that were within his power as Dean to give,
short of compromising the academic standards of the university.  Indeed, the President of the Education
Graduate Student Organization appreciated the Dean’s efforts to meet “some
of our demands”.  But Dean Sta.
Maria could go no further.  He went along
with the students as far as the limits of his power and discretion would allow
him to go.  Only the University Council
and the Board of Regents could recast the academic requirements in the way the
students wanted them to be.  If so, why
did they not act on the issue to avert the crisis?  But perhaps the university administration
would not want to risk the downgrading of the university’s academic standards.

The editor of the Philippine Collegian, writing the vale­dictory
editorial, said:

“We criticized an administration which seemed to sway to the
tune of student power as a sheer force. 
The administration cannot act only because of a show of might; it must
have reasons for any act.  And it must
make these reasons known, acting because of them without waiting for the
prodding of power.

No decision of the President should be forced by emergency, or
consideration of expe­diency.  If
emergency, or expediency, or the fear of student power muscle are the only
reasons for a decision, then the decision should not be taken at all.

On the other hand, if a decision is impending, and is going to be
taken anyway, then the decision-makers should not wait to be forced into the
decision by an emergency situation.  They
should decide, and avert that situation which is so costly in terms of class
hours and the integrity of the decision. 
And then, in terms of the reaction of the people involved by that
dubiously-taken decision.

Because we cannot allow it to appear that the University is being
ruled by the considerations of expediency, or by the dictates of
emergency.  The University must be guided
by things less base and more basic.  It
must be ruled by reason, by justice, by the search for truth.  This should always be made clear, and always
be respected.  The University can be
neither a self-designed social instrument nor an institution ruled by force.  It is there, if anywhere, that we must be
true to reason.”^[77]

It is because of all the foregoing that we are left under no
doubt that petitioner Felixberto Sta. Maria is
entitled to be restored to his position as Dean of the College
of Education.

12.  Just as we are about
to draw this opinion to a close, our attention is drawn to the alleged non-exhaustion
of adminis­trative remedies.  A
sufficient answer would be that Dean Sta. Maria asked that he be restored to
his position pending investi­gation of any charge against him.  But the board refused.  Instead, it confirmed the ad interim
appointment of respondent Prof. Nemesio Ceralde as “acting Dean” in place of Sta.
Maria.  Virtually the door was
closed.  Nothing was left for Sta. Maria
to do but go to Court.^[78]

Of course, Sta. Maria stood pat on his right to keep his position
as Dean.  This is perfectly
understandable.  Hindsight now reveals
that further pursuit of administrative remedy before the Board of Regents would
be but an act of supererogation.  At any
rate, there is no compelling reason to resort to this remedy.^[79]
Here, the claimed right is the constitutionally protected due pro­cess.  Mandamus will lie.^[80]

For the reasons given, the writ of certiorari and
prohibition prayed for is hereby granted; the transfer of petitioner Felixberto C. Sta. Maria from his position as Dean of the
College of Education, University of the Philippines, to the position of Special
Assistant to the President, University of the Philippines, as well as the ad
inte­rim appointment of Prof. Nemesio Ceralde “as acting Dean” of the College of
Education, University of the Philippines, are hereby set aside and declared
null and void; the writ of mandamus prayed for is hereby granted, and the
President and the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines are
hereby ordered to restore said petitioner Felixberto
C. Sta. Maria to his position of Dean, College of Education, University of the
Philippines.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Dizon, Zaldivar,
and Teehankee,
JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., and Makalintal, J., took no part.

Ruiz Castro and Fernando,
JJ., concur in separate  opinions.

Reyes, J.B.L., J., did not take
part.

Barredo, J., concurs and dissents in a separate opinion.

Villamor, J., joins Justice Barredo in his separate concurring and dissenting opinion.

---

^[1]
Specifically, they are:  (a) Inadequacies
of the Education lib­rary; (b) Student representation in the board of editors of
the Education Quarterly; (c) Inadequate information to graduate students
regarding policies affecting their academic work; (d) Inadequate guidelines and
policies regarding thesis advising and other aspects of faculty work, which
prejudice students; (e) Restrictions on enrollment in certain graduate courses;
(f) Abolition of foreign language requirements; (g) elimination of topic panel
for research courses; (h) Super­fluity of comprehensive examinations for
graduate students; (i) Reexamination of agreements
with the Bureau of Public Schools towards standardization of terms of
scholarships; and (j) Student representation in college committees.  Answer, p. 10.

^[2]
These are:  (a) Contributions from
students for preparation of hand-outs; (b) Deterioration of facilities in the
College; (c) Opening of the graduate office during regular hours; (d) Orientation
program for new graduate students and new faculty members; and (e) Dormitory
for graduate students.  Answer, pp.
10-11.

^[3]
These are:  (a) Protest against
assignment of Prof. Rionda to teach a subject not in
her area of specialization; (b) As­sessment of procedures on faculty
assignments and faculty competencies; (c) Need for coordinator in the Special
Education Program (SPED); (d) Recruitment of more instruc­tors for the SPED
Program; (e) Facilities for practicum supervisors; (f) No threat of court suits
against complain­ing students; (g) Information to teacher students on grading
system and values; (h) Re-evaluation of a grade should extend to all
requirements of the course, not merely the final exam­ination; (i) Board review of the fusion of a special education and
programmed instruction into one department; and (j) Possible institution of a
separate Department of Filipino in the College of Arts and Sciences.  Answer, p. 11.

^[4]
To meet the students’ demands, he took the following steps:  (a) Issued Memorandum No. 20 on monetary
contributions; (b) Issued Memorandum. No. 22 on the revised hours of the
College library; (c) Issued Memorandum No. 26 on consultation hours and the final
examination schedule; (d) Issued Memorandum No. 21 assigning a temporary
officer-in-charge of the Special Education Program; (e) Secured a car for the
urgent practicum assignment of the Special Education supervisors; (f) Sent a
letter to the President requesting for the services of a janitress, and
subsequently secured one, who started working on March 17, 1969; (g) Sent a
letter to the President recommending the relocation of non-education offices,
such as the Community Development Re­search Council and the Department of
Psychology; (h) Sent a letter to the President urging the equitable settlement
of the water and electric bills of the College; (i)
Sent recom­mendations for permanency of status and adjustment of sala­ries of
deserving academic and non-academic personnel; (j) Mediated between the
students and Miss Carolina Rionda, who was complained
against by students in Education 124. 
The students agreed to meet face-to-face with Miss Rionda
in an amicable settlement of the dispute. 
Miss Rionda agreed to accommodate the students
in most cases.  Annex 2, Answer.

^[5]
These steps are:  (a) Inclusion of two
student representa­tives (one graduate and one undergraduate) in the editorial
board of the Education Quarterly, upon nomination by the students; (b)
Reiteration of the recommendation of the College
of Education for the organization
of a Graduate Studies program with a director, to help solve many problems in
the graduate program.  Original proposal
was made on August 15, 1968, but deferred by the Board of Regents in its
meeting on October 24, 1968; (c) Holding a formal orientation program, both
undergraduate and grad­uate students, at the beginning of each academic year;
(d) Abolition of the topic panel in graduate work; (e) Rep­resentation of the
students, both graduate and undergraduate, in college committees which concern
them.  (Examples:  Curriculum Committee, Student-Faculty
Relation Committee, Library Committee, Social and Cultural Com­mittee); (f)
Replacement of the classroom chairs (initial delivery of 600 chairs expected
within two weeks).  Original request for
these chairs was made on September 24,
1968; a previously approved requisition in 1967 was cancelled.  Annex 2, Answer.

^[6]
These are:  (a) Recommendation to review
the foreign lan­guage requirement in the graduate program.  Sentiment is for substituting other
requirements for the formal language requirement on the master’s degree
level.  Student represen­tatives will be
invited during the discussion of this particular item in the curriculum committee
meeting as well as the faculty meeting, if necessary; (b) Recommendation to
review the com­prehensive examination requirement for work on the master’s
degree level. Sentiment is to retain this particular require­ment, but
excluding the part on cognates; (c) Recommendation to institute a system of
faculty evaluation by students, using an appropriate instrument; (d)
Recommendation for an appropriate faculty committee to look into instruction
practices, with students’ opinion taken into account in the meetings of the
student-faculty relations Committee; (e) The institution of a Graduate Record
Examination for admission to candidacy on the master’s level and admission to
the doctoral program; (f) The issuance of a brochure or an equivalent guide to
clarify the procedures to be followed in graduate work in both the masteral and doctoral levels.  Annex 2 of Answer; Annex B of Reply.

^[7]
The demands which had been granted by Dean Sta. Maria were:  (a) Longer library hours; (b) Employment of a
janitress for the ladies comfort room; (c) Purchase of new chairs; (d)
Installation of proper lighting facilities; (e) Repainting of classrooms; (f)
Cleaner corridors, classrooms and surroundings; (g) Free choice of thesis
advisers and organization adviser; (h) Abolition of topic panel; (i) Temporary appointment of coordinator for SPED Program;
and (j) Representation of students in the college standing committees.

^[8]
Annex 11, Answer.

^[9] Austria
vs. Amante, 79 Phil. 780, 784(1948).

^[10] Supra,
at p. 467, citing State ex rel. Gallaghar vs. Brown, 57 Mo. Ap.,
203, expressly adopted by the Supreme Court in State ex rel.
vs. Maroney, 191 Mo. 548; 90 S.W., 141; State vs.
Crandell, 269 Mo. 44; 190 S.W. 889; State vs. Salval, 450, 2d. 995; 62 C.J.S., 947.

^[11] Tapales vs. President of the University of the Philippines,
L-17523, March 30, 1963, 7
SCRA 553, 557.  Also Article II,
Section 5(e), Republic Act 2260, Civil Service Act of 1959, which states:  “The following specific officers and
employees shall be embraced in the non-competitive or unclassified
service:  x x x (e) Members of the various faculties and other teaching
force of the University of the Philippines and other government colleges
offering courses in the collegiate level, including the business directors and
registrars of said institution.”

^[12] Lacson vs. Romero, 84 Phil. 740(1949); Garcia vs.
Lejano, L-12220, August 8, 1960; Santos
vs. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289(1950); Rodriguez vs.
Del Rosario, 93 Phil. 1070 (1953).

^[13]
Section 4, Article XII, Constitution: 
“No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law.” Section 32, Article VII,
Civil Service Act of 1959:  “Disciplinary
Action.  – No officer or employee in
the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as pro­vided
by law and after due process:  Provided,
That a transfer from one position to another without reduction in rank or
salary shall not be considered disciplinary when made in the interest of public
service:  Provided, further,
That no complaint against a civil service official or employee shall be given
due course unless the same is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by the
complainant:  And provided,
finally, That the respondent shall be entitled to a formal investigation
if he so elects in which case he shall have the right to appear and defend
himself at said investigation in person or by counsel, to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses against him, and to have the attendance of
witnesses and production of docu­ments in his favor by compulsory process of
subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.”

^[14]
Section 6(e), Act 1870.

^[15]
Article 263, UP Revised Code.

^[16]
Answer, p. 27, paragraph c; Annex 18, Appendix A-1.

^[17]
Answer, p. 27, paragraph e.

^[18]
Answer, p. 20, paragraph 5; Annex 15.

^[19]
Answer, p. 20, paragraph 6.

^[20]
Answer, p. 21, paragraph 7.  Press
statements would indicate that of late the UP President appointed four Vice
Presidents.  Sta. Maria was not one of
them.

^[21]
Answer, p. 25, paragraphs 1-3; Annex 18 and Appendix A-1.

^[22]
Section 1, Rule V-F, Civil Service Rules.

^[23]
Section 1, Rule VII, id.

^[24]
Reed vs. City Council of City Of Roseville,
141 Pac. 2d. 459, 463.

^[25]
Garcia vs. Lejano, L-12220, August 8, 1960.

^[26] Lacson vs. Romero, supra; Nicolas vs.
Alberto, 51 Phil. 370, 377 (1928), reversed in 73 L. ed. 642; Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil. 323, 328 (1921); Branin vs. Township
of Delaware, 3 A 2d. 806.

^[27]
47 Am. Jur., p. 394.

^[28] Branin vs. Township
of Delaware, supra;
McNeal vs. Avoyelles Parish School Board, 7 So. 2d 165, 167; McCarthy vs.
Stein­keeler, 270 N.W. 550, 554.

^[29]
Reed vs. City Council of City of Roseville, supra.

^[30]
State vs. Montoya, 386 Pac. 2d. 253, 257. See
also:  Mitchell vs. Board
of Trustees of Visalia Union High School, 42 Pac. 2d.
397; State ex rel. Ging vs.
Board of Education of City of Duluth,
7 N.W. 2d. 544, 561; Neal vs. Board of Education, 181 S.E. 541, 542;
White vs. Board of Education, 184 S.E. 264, 268; State vs.
Yoakum, 297 S.W. 2d. 635.  These cases
recognize the power of the Board of Education to assign teachers to particular
classes provided that the power is exercised in good faith and for the best
interest of the school district and is based upon actually existing conditions
and not for the purpose of compelling a teacher’s resignation.

^[31] Hojilla vs. Mariño,
L-20574, February 26, 1965,
13 SCRA 293, 296.

^[32] Brillantes vs. Guevarra,
L-22586, February 27, 1969,
27 SCRA 138, 143.

^[33] Ibañez vs. Commission on Elections, L-26558, April
27, 1967, 19 SCRA 1002, 1012, citing Miclat vs.
Ganaden, L-11459, May 30, 1960; Jaro
vs. Valencia, L-18352, August 30, 1963, 8 SCRA 729, See also:  Suarez vs. Commission on Elections,
L-26605, July 27, 1967, 20 SCRA 797; Co vs. Commission on Elections,
L-27121, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 761; Real vs. Commission on Elections,
L-27266, September 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 331; Amponin vs.
Commission on Elec­tions, L-27420, September 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 389, 391.

^[34]
Section 12 of the Tax Code:  “The
Collector of Internal Revenue may, with the approval of the Secretary of
Finance, assign internal revenue agents and other officers and employees of the
Bureau of Internal Re­venue without change in their official character or
salary to such spe­cial duties connected with the administration of laws as the
best inte­rest of service may require.”

^[35]
Castro vs. Hechanova, L-23635, August 31, 1966, 17 SCRA 1023, 1028.

^[36] Subido vs. Gopengco,
L-25618, March 28, 1969, 27
SCRA 455, 461.

^[37]
Garcia vs. Teehankee, L-29113, April 18, 1969,
27 SCRA 937 and Garcia vs. Teehankee, L-28747,
April 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 1142, a Court Stenographer reassigned to the main
office to enable her to transcribe her notes of cases on appeal; Quiocho vs. Abrera,
L-22260, August 20, 1967, 20 SCRA 1151, a cost accountant reassigned from the Iligan Plant to Manila.

^[38]
Section 5, Act 1870.

^[39]
Section 6(e), Act 1870; Articles 160-171, 263-265, UP Revised Code.

^[40]
Article 43, UP Revised Code.

^[41]
Faculty members include the deans and directors, Article 71, UP Revised Code.

^[42]
Article 44(g), Up Revised Code.

^[43]
Article 43, id.

^[44] Brillantes vs. Guevarra, supra.

^[45] Lacson vs. Romero, supra; Borromeo vs. Mariano, supra.

^[46]
Annex J, Reply, Rollo, pp. 149, 164.

^[47]
Annex J, Reply, Rollo, pp. 149, 165.

^[48]
Annex K, Reply of Petitioner; Memorandum for Respondent, pp. 54-57; Answer of
Respondents, pp. 6-8.

^[49]
Respondents’ Memorandum p. 58.

^[50] Alzate vs. Mabutas (CA),
51 O.G. 2451, 2462, citing Frankfurter, Justice Holmes and the Supreme
Court, pp. 34, 47.

^[51]
The Gospel according to St. John, 7:51: 
“Does our Law judge a man unless it first give him a hearing, and
know what he does?” Also, Deut, 1:17,
17:8, and 19:15.  See also:  The King vs. The Chancellor, etc., 1
Strange 557, 567:  “Besides, the
objection for want of notice can never be got over.  The laws of God and man both give the party
an opportunity to make his defence, if he has
any.  I remember to have heard it
observed by a very learned man upon such an occasion, that even God himself did
not pass sentence upon Adam, before he was called upon to make his defence.  Adam (says
God) where art thou?  Hast thou not eaten
of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst
not eat?  And the same ques­tion was put
to Eve also.” Loc. cit. 
Gellhorn and Byse,
Adminis­trative Law, Fourth Edition, p. 711.

^[52]
Annex H of the Petition, Rollo, pp.
32-33.

^[53] Cornejo vs. Gabriel, 41 Phil. 188, 193.

^[54]
Iloilo Ice and Cold Storage Company vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo, 24
Phil. 471, 475; Sitchon vs. Aquino, 98 Phil. 458, 466; Halili
vs. Lacson, 98 Phil. 772, 775; also
City of Manila vs. Garcia, L-26053, February 21, 1967, 19 SCRA 413, 420.

^[55] Suntay vs. People, 101 Phil. 833, 838, citing
Bauer vs. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445; Nathan vs. Dulles, 129 F.
Supp. 951; and Schachtman vs. Dulles, 225 F.
2d. 938.

^[56]
Fahey vs. Mallonee, 91 L. ed. 2030; State
Savings and Com­mercial Bank vs. Anderson,
132 Pac. 755; Greater Delaware
Valley Fed. Savings & Loan Ass’n. vs. Federal Home Bank Board, 262 F. 2d. 371,
374.

^[57]
Ewing vs. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 94
L. ed. 1088; also North American Cold Storage Co. vs. Chicago, 53
L. ed. 195; Reduction Company vs. Sanitary Works, 199 U.S. 306-352, 50
L. ed. 205; Adams vs. Milwaukee, 57 L. ed. 971; Balch
vs. Glenn, 110 Pac. 67; Lemmon vs. Rumsey,
150 S.E. 725; Flem­ing vs. Florida Citrus Exchange, 358 U.S. 153.

^[58]
Standard Airlines vs. Civil Aeronautics Board, 177 F. 2d. 18; also
State Board of Examiners vs. Weiner, 172 A. 2d. 661, where it was held
that a medical board may suspend a license pending formal hearing.

^[59]
R.A. Holman & Co. vs. SEC, 299 F. 2d. 127.

^[60] Ewing
vs. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., supra,
at p. 1094. See also: 
People vs. Diamond, 135 N.E. 200, temporary seizure pending
judicial action; Mehlos vs. City of Milwaukee,
51 L.R.A. NS 1009, stopping a public dance without a hearing.

^[61] Gellhorn & Byse,
Administrative Law, Cases and Comments, 4th ed., p. 729.

^[62] Davis,
Treatise on Administrative Law, Vol. I, Sec. 7.09, p. 447. See also:  North American Cold Storage Co. vs.
Chi­cago, 53 L. ed. 195 (destruction of poultry, without prior hearing, after
it was found to be putrid upon inspection); Lawton vs. Steele, summary
destruction of fishnets, 38 L. ed. 385; People ex rel.
Cupcutt vs. Board of Health, 35 N.E. 320;
State vs. Schriber, 205 Pac. 2d. 149,
destruction, without advance hearing, of animals suffering from infectious
diseases; U.S.
ex rel. Johnson vs. Shaugh­nessy,
93 L. ed. 1054; Scalarides vs. Shaughnessy, 180 F. 2d. 687, where a board of special
inquiry was held bound by the certification of the medical board under a
statute calling for medical examina­tion of an alien for mental defect; Wyant vs. Figy, 66 N.W.
2d. 240, destruction of bees.

^[63] See:  Rural Bank of Lucena,
Inc. vs. Arca, L-21146, September 20, 1965.

^[64]
A Call to Action, Manifesto II, Annex 9 of Answer.

^[65] Cf.
American Civil Liberties Union-Academic Freedom and Academic Responsibility,
Emerson and Haber, Political and Civil Rights in the United
States, 2d. ed., p. 1006.

^[66]
Clark Kerr, The New Involvement with Society, Dialogue, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 34,
43.

^[67]
George F. Kennan, Democracy and the Student Left,
Dialogue, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 13.

^[68] Ibid.

^[69]
Daniel D. Moynihan, The New Left and Liberal Values, Dialogue, Vol. 2, No. 3,
pp. 71, 77.

^[70]
Baldwin, George D., Justice Fortas on Dissent and
Civil Dis­obedience, Wisconsin Law Review, No. 1 (1969), p. 221.

^[71]
Steven Kelman, A Slightly Skeptical View, Dialogue,
Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 48.

^[72]
George F. Kennan, Democracy and Student Left, supra.

^[73]
Annex 1, p. 2 of Answer.

^[74]
Annex 1, p. 3 of Reply.

^[75]
Section 6, Act 1870:  “The Board of Regents
shall x x x (f) approve the
courses of study and rules of discipline drawn up by the University Council x x x.” Also, Section 9.

Chapter 2,
Section 1, Article 19, University Code: 
“The Council shall have the following powers:  (a) To prescribe the courses of study and
rules of discipline, subject to the approval of the Board of Regents.”

^[76]
Chapter 6, Section 2, Article 93, University Code:  “The Dean or Director shall transmit,
with his comment or recommendation, all proposals affecting courses of study,
instructions, scholarships, x x x
as well as his own proposals on the aforesaid matters, to the President for
whatever action the latter may deem proper)”.

^[77]
The Philippine Collegian, Thursday,
July 31, 1969.

^[78]
State vs. Yoakum, 297 S.W. 2d. 635; Currie vs. Weld, 40 N.W. 561;
Regan vs. Babcock, 247 N.W. 12.

^[79]
National Development Co. vs. Collector of
Customs, L-19180, October 31, 1963,
9 SCRA 429, 434; Alzate vs. Aldana, 107 Phil. 298, 301-302.

^[80]
Gleason vs. University of Minnesota,
116 N.W. 650.

---

Normal
150
Clean
Clean

6 pt
6 pt
0
3

MicrosoftInternetExplorer4

st1:*{behavior:url(#ieooui) }

/* Style Definitions */
table.MsoNormalTable
{mso-style-name:”Table Normal”;
mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;
mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;
mso-style-noshow:yes;
mso-style-parent:””;
mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt;
mso-para-margin:0in;
mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt;
mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:”Times New Roman”;}