GERVACIO LUIS QUE, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH IX, QUEZON CITY, LINO DIZON, GREGORIO DIZON, LUZ MOJARES DIZON, EMILIA DIZON SEGISMUNDO, REMEDIOS DIZ…

Appeal from the Order dated July 1, 1969 issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon
City, Judge Lourdes P. San Diego, presiding, in Civil
Case No. Q-12845 entitled “Gervacio Luis Que, Plaintiff, versus Lino Dizon, et al., Defendants” for Declaration of Nullity
and/or Rescission of Contract, dismissing the complaint filed therein on a
motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint states no cause of
action.  Petitioner also appeals from the
order dated December 16, 1969
issued by the same Judge denying the motion for reconsideration.

It appears from the records that on February 18, 1969, petitioner filed the complaint with
application for writ of preliminary attachment in Civil Case No. 12845
alleging, among others, the following material and relevant allegations:

“4. That on June 10, 1961, plaintiff herein brought an action
against the now deceased Maria Villanueva Dizon and
defendant Lino Dizon in the
Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 47265, for the
purpose of compelling the said Maria
Villanueva Dizon to surrender Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 20799 or any other Transfer Certificate of Title issued in lieu
thereof to the plaintiff so that the latter may effect the segregation of two
(2) hectares of land which the late Maria Villanueva Dizon,
with the marital consent of defendant Lino Dizon, sold to the plaintiff on September 30, 1944, as
shown by the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the spouses Lino
Dizon and Maria Villanueva Dizon
in favor of the plaintiff.  A true copy
of said Deed of Absolute Sale is hereto attached, marked as Annex
“A”, and made integral part hereof;

5. That without the knowledge of the plaintiff, a new Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 8848 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon
City was subsequently issued solely in the names of the late Maria Villanueva Dizon and defendant Lino Dizon for that parcel of land originally embraced in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 20799 of the Registry of Rizal,
including the unsegregated two (2) hectares thereof
pertaining to the plaintiff;

6. That on June 22, 1961, while the said Civil Case No. 47265 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila was pending, the spouses, defendant Lino Dizon and the now deceased
Maria Villanueva Dizon surreptitiously, fraudulently,
and without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff, mortgaged to the
Philippine National Bank several parcels of lands, including plaintiff’s unsegregated two (2) hectares of land embraced in the new
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8848 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City, to secure a loan of P360,000.00, more or less;

7. That thereafter, the action commenced by the plaintiff in the
Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 47265, was
dismissed on the ground of improper venue;

8. That on May 23, 1962,
plaintiff filed another complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, against defendant Lino Dizon and the now deceased Maria Villanueva Dizon, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 7143, for the
same purpose as in the case of the first complaint originally filed in the
Court of First Instance of Manila.  A
true copy of the Complaint filed in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal is hereto attached
as Annex “B”, and made integral part hereof;

9. That on August 11, 1965, the defendants, with
full knowledge of the pendency of Civil Case No. 7143
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale whereby all or nearly all of the properties of the
spouses Maria Villanueva Dizon and defendant Lino Dizon were transferred to
defendants herein.  A true copy of said
Deed of Absolute Sale is hereto attached, marked as Annex “C”, and
made an integral part hereof;

10. That by virtue of the said Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex
“C”), Transfer Cer­tificate of Title No. 8848 of the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City was cancelled, and in lieu thereof
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 107110, Book No. 539, Page 110 of the
Register of Deeds for Quezon City was issued in tne names of defendant Gregorio Dizon,
married to Luz Mojares, Emilia
Dizon, married to Jose R. Segismundo,
Remedios Dizon Perez,
married to Amador Perez, Rosenda Dizon,
and Lilia Quitangon, married to Augusto
Quitangon.  A xerox copy of said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 107110
is hereto attached as Annex “D”, and made integral part hereof;

11. That the said Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex “C”) also
included plaintiff’s unseg­regated two (2) hectares
of land embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8848 of the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City, which were then the subject of
Civil Case No. 7143 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal;

12. That less than a month after the execution of the said Deed of
Absolute Sale (Annex “C”), Maria Villanueva Dizon,
one of the parties thereto, died;

13. That on July 7, 1966,
or almost eleven (11) Months from its date of execu­tion, the said Deed of
Absolute Sale was finally registered in the Office of the Registry of Deeds for
Quezon City;

14. That on October 21,
1966, or about two and one-half (2-1/2) months from date of
registration of said Deed of Absolute Sale, a decision
was rendered in said Civil Case No. 7143 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in favor
of the plaintiff.  A true copy of said
decision is hereto attached as Annex “D”, and made integral part
hereof;

15. That the said
Deed of Absolute Sale is absolutely simulated and/or fictitious, and entered
into by defendants and the late Maria Villanueva Dizon,
for the purpose of evading the payment of estate and inheri­tance taxes;

16. That even if plaintiff fails to prove that the said Deed of
Absolute Sale (Annex “C”) is absolutely simulated and/or fictitious,
the same is still void and/or recissible;

17. That the said Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex “C”) is
exclusively between parents and children, the deceased Maria Villanueva Dizon and defendant Lino Dizon, on the one hand, and defendants Gregorio Dizon, Emilia Dizon
Segismundo, Remedios Dizon Perez, Rosenda Dizon, Felicidad Dizon Noble, and Lilia Dizon Quitangon, on the other hand;

18. That the consideration of the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale, if
there be any, is grossly inadequate compared to the
real value of all the properties fraudulently transferred to the defendants;

19. That the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex “C”)
was undertaken in fraud of creditors, and in contemplation of the impeding
death of the late Maria Villanueva Dizon;

20. That the reasonable value of plaintiff’s property fraudulently
included in the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex “C”) is
reasonably estimated to be P80.00 per square meter, more or less;

21. That in order to place beyond the reach of herein plaintiff the
latter’s two (2) hectares of land fraudulently included in the alleged Deed of
Absolute Sale, defendants have increased the original obligation secured by the
real estate mortgage constituted over the property embraced in Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 107110 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City;

22.     That due to the
fraudulent transfer of all or substantially all of the properties (including
plaintiff’s unsegregated two (2) hectares of land) of
defendant Lino Dizon and
the now deceased Maria Villanueva Dizon to the other
defendants, under the guise of a supposed Deed of Absolute Sale, said Decision
(Annex “D”), can­not be executed notwithstanding the Order of Special
Execution issued in said Civil Case No. 7143 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

x x x.”

In the Prayer,
“plaintiff respectfully prays that:

1. Pending litigation, a writ of preliminary attachment be immediately issued against the properties of defendants
as security for whatever judgment that might be recovered by the plaintiff
against the defendants;

2. After due hearing,
judgment be rendered:

(a) Declaring the nullity or, or annulling the Deed of Absolute
Sale (Annex “C”);

(b) Ordering defendants jointly and seve­rally to effect the
release of the mort­gage lien and other encumbrances on the two (2) hectares of
land presently em­braced in TCT No. 107110 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, and to execute the necessary conveyance
thereof in favor of the plaintiff within one (1) month from finality of
judgment; and if defen­dants should fail to effect the release of the existing
lien thereon, and to execute the necessary conveyance thereof to the plaintiff,
within the period al­lowed by this Honorable Court, the same be ordered done at
the expense of the defendants, by ordering the proper court officer to sell so
much of defendants’ properties as may be necessary for that purpose;

(c) In the
alternative, if it is not possible in any manner to effect the release of the
existing liens over the two (2) hectares of land embranced
in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 107110 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City, and to make the necessary conveyance thereof
to the plaintiff, defendants be ordered jointly and severally to pay to the
plain­tiff the fair market value of said two (2) hectares of land prevailing at
the time judgment has become final and executory;

(d) Ordering defendants
jointly and solidarily to pay to the plaintiff the
fol­lowing:

(i)       
Such amount as may be reasonably
assessed by this Honorable Court as and by way of moral damages;

(ii)     
Such amount as may be reasonably
determined by this Honorable Court as and for exemplary or corrective damages;

(iii)     The amount equivalent to 35% of the two (2) hectares of land embraced
in TCT No. 107110 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon
City, as and for attorney’s fees; plus

(iv)    The costs of the suit.

PLAINTIFF further prays for such other remedy as may be just and
equitable in the premises.

Manila, Philippines, February 7, 1969.”

On March
14, 1969, defendants
therein with the exception of the spouses Jose R. Segismundo
and Emilia Dizon Segismundo and Rosenda Dizon filed Motion to Dis­miss Complaint on the ground
“that the complaint states no cause of action.” (Section 1(g), Rule
16, Rules of Court).  The argument of the
defendants, now the private respondents herein, in support of the Motion to
Dismiss stresses that:

“The action alleged in the complaint filed by the plaintiff in
the above-entitled case is based primarily on the annulment of the Deed of
Absolute Sale (Annex “C”) of Lot 937-8-2 of
the subdi­vision plan Psd-22014, GLRO Rec. No. __, situated in Quezon City, now covered by T.C.T. No. 107110 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City, executed by spouses Lino
Dizon (herein defendant) and Maria Villanueva Dizon (now deceased) on August 11, 1965 in favor of the
other defendants in this case.  In filing
the said action, plaintiff has anchored his right on a “Deed of Absolute
Sale” (Annex “A”) said to have been executed by Maria Villanueva
Dizon (now deceased), with the conformity of herein
defendant Lino Dizon, on
September 30, 1944 of a parcel of land (Lot 937 of the subdivision plan
Psd-2118, Piedad Estate, GLRO Record No. 6975) and
covered by T.C.T. No. 20799 in the Re­gistry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal.

Plaintiff, in his complaint filed in the above-entitled case, has
alleged that on May 23, 1962 he filed an action in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 7143,
entitled:  Gervacio
Luis Que, vs. Lino Dizon and Maria Villanueva Dizon
for the segregation of 1/2 of the land said to be purchased by the plaintiff
from said defendant (as appearing in Annex “A”) and to surrender its
title to plaintiff; that in the said case, the said defendants asserted that
the transaction between them and the plaintiff was not sale but a loan, which
has been paid and that the action has already prescribed; that the plaintiff
therein won in the said court of first instance but the decision was appealed
to the Court of Appeals; that the appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals
for failure of the defendants (appellants) to show the data that the appeal was
made on time (Sec. 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; but the defendants filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court to review the said
dismissal; and that the said petition has been given due course and is now
pending before the Honorable Supreme Court. 
It is, therefore, respect­fully submitted that the question presented
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil
Case No. 7143 – wherein the issue joined is whether the deed (Annex
“A”), upon which the herein plaintiff claims his right over the
afore-described parcel of land is a sale or a loan, is not yet untimely decided
because of the pendency of the petition before the
Honorable Supreme Court, which is fully known by plaintiff.

There is a cause of action, according to our jurisprudence, when
the legal right of the plaintiff has been violated by the act or omission of
the defendant.

In the case at bar, the legal right which the plaintiff asserts
over the above-stated parcel of land, has not been ultimately decided because
of the pendency of the petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court by the herein defendants Lino Dizon and the heirs
of Maria Villanueva Dizon.  It can therefore be said that the alleged
legal right of the plaintiff over the pro­perty in question has not yet been
ultimately decided, so the action brought in the case at bar is still
premature.  An action prematurely
commenced should be dismissed.  x x x“

We quote hereunder the
Order of Judge Lourdes P. San Diego dated July 1, 1969, subject of the present appeal:

” O R D E R

This is an action wherein the plaintiff seeks, pending the
litigation of this case, a writ of preliminary attachment; to declare the Deed
of Absolute Sale (Annex “C”) of the complaint) null and void; to
release the mortgage lien and other encumbrances on the two (2) hectares of
land annotated in TCT No. 107110 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City; and in the alternative to pay the plaintiff
moral and exemplary or corrective damages, and the amount equivalent to 35% of
the two (2) hectares of land against defendants for allegedly having simulated
and fictitiously transferred the property subject of this litigation by virtue
of an Absolute Deed of Sale.  The same
action is the subject of the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants Lino Dizon, Gregorio Dizon, Luz Mojares Dizon, Remedios Dizon Perez, Felicidad Dizon Noble, Manuel Noble, Lilia Dizon
Quitangon and Augusto Quitangon.  After
plaintiff had filed his opposition and above-named de­fendants had replied
thereto, the incident were submitted for resolution.

In their motion to dismiss the defendants advance the ground that
the plaintiff’s complaint states no cause of action.

The movants claim that the plaintiff’s
cause of action was based on the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex
“C” of the Complaint), executed by spouses Lino
Dizon (defendant herein) and Maria Villanueva-Dizon (now deceased) on August 11, 1965 in favor of the
other defendants in this present case, that the plaintiff on May 23, 1962 filed
an action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
entitled:  Gervacio
Luis Que vs. Lino Dizon and Maria Villanueva Dizon
for the segregation of one half
of the land which plaintiff purchased from defendant Maria Villanueva Dizon and to surrender its title to plaintiff; that said
Court rendered de­cision in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants;
that the defendants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals but the same
was dismissed on the ground that the defendants failed to show that
the appeal was made on time; that the defendant filed a petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court to review the dismissal of the appeal; and that plaintiff’s
legal rights over the property subject of this action has not been ultimately
decided due to the pendency of the petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court, therefore, the action brought in the present case is
premature.

x x x

It appears from the motion to dismiss not contradicted by the
plaintiff that there is a cause pending in the Supreme Court between the same
parties for segregation of one half of the land the very title of which is
sought to be declared null and void in the present suit.  To entertain this suit at this time when the
Supreme Court has as yet not rendered any judgment on the litigation before it
would be most improper on the part of this Court.

WHEREFORE, this case is hereby dismissed without pronouncement as
to costs.”

We hold that the dismissal of the complaint in the Order quoted
above is proper and correct, the same being in
accordance with law and jurisprudence.

The rule is well-established that in considering a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action, the
insufficiency must appear on the face of the complaint.  Only the facts alleged in the complaint and
no other should be considered.  The
motion to dismiss must admit hypothetically the truth of the facts alleged in
the complaint, and the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in a
complaint, to constitute a cause of action, is whether or not, admitting the
facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment
in accordance with the prayer of said complaint.

From the allegations of the complaint filed in C.C. Q-12845 and
now under review, We find that the decision in C.C. No. 7143 dated October 21,
1966 referred to in paragraph 14 of
said complaint, had not become final and executory.  This can be inferred from the allegation in
paragraph 22 thereof that “said decision (Annex “D”) cannot be
executed notwithstanding the Order of Special Execution issued in said Civil
Case No. 7143 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.”

The right of the plaintiff, now the petitioner, to the two (2)
hectare land having been questioned by the defendants Dizon
spouses in C.C. 7143 who claim that the transaction between them was a loan and
not a sale and that the loan had already been paid, the appeal interposed by
the Dizon spouses to the Court of Appeals and
ultimately to the Supreme Court in certiorari proceedings had not
resolve finally the right of the petitioner to the land in question.  In other words, the filing
of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-12845 was premature.  The action presented by petitioner in his
complaint below is groundless and should be dismissed, there being no final and
conclusive judicial pronouncement that the legal right of the petitioner had
been violated by the act or omission of the private respondents.

“It is a rule of law to which there is, perhaps, no exception,
either at law or in equity, that to recover at all there must be some cause of
action at the commencement of the suit. 
As observed by counsel for appellees, there
are reasons of public policy why there should be no needless haste in bringing
up litigation, and why people who are in no default and against whom there is
as yet no cause of action should not be summoned before the public tribunals to
answer complaints which are groundless.  We
say groundless because if the action is immature, it should not be entertained,
and an action prematurely brought is a groundless suit.” (Justice Laurel
in Surigao Mine Exploration Co. vs. C. Harris, et
al., 68 Phil. 113, 120-121).

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING,
the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-12845 as ordered by
respondent Court in its Orders of July
1, 1969 and December 16,
1969 is hereby AFFIRMED.  No
costs.

Petition denied.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, De
Castro, and Escolin,
JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., no part.