SABINO RIGOR, RODOLFO AQUINO AND SIMEON ANTICAMARA, COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, LEGAL OFFICER AND CHIEF OF THE PORT AND WATER PATROL DIVISION, RESPECTIVELY, BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, PORT OF…

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
respondent court’s decision declaring null and void the decision of the
Collector of Customs in an administrative case “Seizure Identification No.
70­027” entitled “RP vs. LCT-759 Together With 103 Pieces of Logs Aboard Same Vessel”.

The case originated from the issuance by the petitioner,
Collector Sabino Rigor, of a Warrant of Seizure and
Detention in accordance with the provisions of Sections 2301 and 2205, in
relation to Sections 2530(g), 906 and 908 of Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise
known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, against the vessel
LCT-759 and its cargo, consisting of 103 pieces of logs for failure to pre­sent
a manifest for the said logs within the period prescribed by the Code.

A notice of hearing was
issued by petitioner Rodolfo M. Aquino, Investigation
Hearing Officer, on the Warrant of Seizure and Detention.  The parties who were
duly notified and represented, voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the
respondent Collector of Customs for the Port of Davao.

After hearing the
parties, the respondent Collector of Customs rendered a decision ordering the
seized logs forfeited in favor of the government to be disposed of according to
law.  In the same decision, the
respondent Collector imposed a P10,000.00 fine against
the vessel in accordance with the provisions of Section 2521 of Republic Act
No. 1937.

Instead of appealing the
Collector’s decision to the Commissioner of Customs, the private respondents
filed an original petition for certiorari with the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Branch II, praying that the
Collector’s decision in Seizure Identification No. 70-027 be annulled for
having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.

In their answer, herein
petitioners, in turn, pointed out the court’s lack of jurisdiction.

In their reply, the
private respondents averred that Section 2530 of the Tariff and Customs Code,
which gives the petitioners the power to seize and to declare forfeitures,
refers to imported articles which should be covered by manifest and since the
logs in question were not imported nor smuggled articles from a foreign
country, the petitioners had no business collecting customs duties thereon nor
did they have the power to seize and to declare the same forfeited.

After requiring the
parties to submit supplementary pleadings and subsequent to the petitioners submission of a “Memorandum of Evidence
with Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings”, the respondent court
promulgated the judgment now subject of this petition, reversing and
declaring null and void the decision of the Collector of Customs in Seizure
Identification No. 70-027.  The court
further directed the withdrawal of the proceeds of the sale of the 103 pieces
of seized logs from the Philippine National Bank for delivery to the private
respondents.

Their motion for
reconsideration having been denied, the petitioners filed the present petition.

At issue in this petition
is the jurisdiction of a Court of First Instance to review the decision of a
Collector of Customs in seizure and detention proceedings under the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 1937).

The petitioners argue
that the respondent court’s review of the decision in Seizure Identification
No. 70-027 was devoid of validity as under Section 2313 of the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines, the Collector of Customs’ decision should
have been brought on appeal to the Commissioner of Customs, not before the
Court of First Instance of Davao.  The decision of the Commissioner of Customs,
on the other hand, would have been appealable to the
Court of Tax Appeals pursuant to Section 2402 of the Code and Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 1125.  Since the Court
of First Instance of Davao, Branch II, did not
validly acquire jurisdiction over Special Civil Case No. 7114, the proceedings
taken therein and the decision rendered by the respondent court were a nullity
which cannot be validly enforced nor effectively executed.

Private respondents on
the other hand, contend that their petition before the Court of First Instance
was not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari under
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court where the court may review the records and the entire
proceedings conducted by the petitioners.

The private respondents
try to make out a case of the administrative authorities having acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion to justify their
invocation of judicial power which is, of course, available whenever administrative
officials transgress the bounds of the jurisdiction or the powers given to them
by law.

The respondents’
arguments have no merit.

The provisions of the
Tariff and Customs Code empowering the customs authorities to act as they did
are:

‘Sec. 2203.  Persons Having Police
Authority.  – For the enforcement
of the customs and tariff laws, the following persons are authorized to effect
searches, seizures and arrests conformably with the provisions of said laws:

“a.          Officials of the
Bureau of Customs, collectors, assistant collectors, deputy collectors,
surveyors, security and secret-service agents, inspectors, port patrol officers
and guards of the Bureau of Customs.

“b.          Officers
of the Philippine Navy when authorized by the Commissioner.

“c.          Any
person especially author­ized in writing by the Commissioner.

“d.          Officers
generally empowered by law to effect arrests and execute processes of courts,
when acting under the direc­tion of the Collector.

“e.          Any person especially author­ized by a
Collector, subject to the restrictions stated in the next succeeding section.

x x x

“‘Sec. 2530.  Property Subject to For­feiture Under Tariff and Customs Laws.  – Any vessel or aircraft, cargo, articles and
other objects shall, under the following conditions, be subject to forfeiture:

x        x          x          x

“‘g. Unmanifested article found on
any vessel or aircraft, if manifest therefor is
required.’

x        x          x          x

“‘Sec. 906.  Requirement of Manifest in
Coastwise Trade.  – Manifests
shall be required for cargo and passengers trans­ported from one place or port
in the Philippines to another only when one or both of such places is a port of
entry.’

x        x          x          x

“‘Sec. 908.  Manifests Required Prior to Unloading at Port
of Entry.  – Within twenty-four hours
after the arrival at a port of entry of a vessel engaged in the coastwise
trade, and prior to the unloading of any part of the cargo the master shall
deliver to the Collector or other proper customs official complete manifests of
all the cargo and passengers brought into said port, together with the
clearance manifests of cargo and passengers for said port granted at any port
or ports of entry from which said vessel may have cleared during the
voyage.”‘

Contrary to the stand of
the private respondents, articles subject to seizure do not have to be goods
imported from a foreign country.  The
provisions of the Code refer to unmanifested
articles found on vessels or aircraft engaged in the coastwise trade.  The customs authorities do not have to prove
to the satisfaction of a court of first instance that the articles on board a
vessel were imported from abroad or are intended to be shipped abroad before
they may exercise the power to effect customs’ searches, seizures, or arrests provided by law and to continue with the
administrative hear­ings on whether or not the law may have been violated.

Regarding the nature of
the port of origin and the port of destination, it is enough if one of the
ports is a port of entry.  In the
instant case, Daliao, Toril,
Davao City
is included in the Davao
port of entry.  The respondent court’s
finding that “port of entry” must be limited to the wharves of Sta.
Ana and Sasa where the customs house is located and
not extended “to every inch of the City of Davao” would unduly hamper if
not cripple the effective enforcement of customs and tariff laws.  Customs officials cannot stand by helplessly
for want of jurisdiction simply because a restrictive interpretation of
“port of entry” would enable coastwise vessels to load or unload unmanifested goods with impunity outside of the specific
area where the wharves and the customs house are located.

The records also show
that the requirements on cargo manifest were not followed.

But more important than
our sustaining the correctness of the findings and conclusions made by the
customs’ officials is to state clearly their authority under the law to make
the initial determination on the limits of their administrative jurisdiction,
to act speedily and to make decisions on the basis of that determination, and
to have such act or decision reviewable only in the
manner provided by the Customs and Tariff Code.

It is our consistent
ruling that the Collector’s decisions are appealable
to the Commissioner of Customs, whose decisions, in cases involving seizure,
detention or release of property, may in turn be reviewed only by the Court of
Tax Appeals.

We ruled in Señeres v. Frias
(39 SCRA 536) that:

“The collector’s decision may be appealed to the commissioner
of customs, whose decision, inter alia,
in cases involving seizure, detention or release of
property affected, may in turn be reviewed only by the Court of
Tax Appeals under the exclusive appellate jurisdiction conferred on said court
under section 7 of Republic Act 1125.

xxx    xxx       xxx

“As held by the Court in the 1966 leading case of Pacis vs. Averia,
18 SCRA 907, – where the court empha­sized the need of the cooperation of all
branches of the Government for the success of the law enforcement agencies in
curbing smuggling — by virtue of the enactment of the Tariff and Customs Code
(Rep. Act 1937) as well as the Court of Tax Appeals Law (Rep. Act 1125), ‘on
grounds of public policy, it is more reasonable to con­clude that the
legislators intended to divest the Court of First Instance of the prerogative
to replevin a pro­perty which is a subject of a
seizure and forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff and Customs
Code.  Other­wise, actions for forfeiture
of pro­perty for violation of Customs laws could easily be undermined by the
simple device of replevin.

“‘Furthermore, Section 2303 of the Tariff and Customs Code
requires the Collector of Customs to give to the owner of the property sought
to be forfeited written notice of the seizure and to give him the opportunity
to be heard in his defense.  This
provision clearly indicates the intention of the law to confine in the Bureau
of Customs the determination of all questions affecting the disposal of
property proceeded against in a seizure and forfeiture case.  The judicial recourse of the property owner
is not in the Court of First Instance but in the Court of Tax Appeals, and only
after exhausting administrative remedies in the Bureau of Customs.'”

In the case of Hadji Mohamad Daud v. Collector of Customs of the Port of Zamboanga City (68 SCRA 157) this Court reiterated the
doctrine as follows:

“As early as June 30, 1955, the Court had already announced in
Millarez v. Amparo,
97 Phil. 284-85, that ‘Republic Act No. 1125, Section 7, effective June 16,
1954 gave the Court of Tax Appeals exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review an appeal, decisions of the Commissioner of Customs,
involving seizure, deten­tion or release of property affected ***
or other matter arising under the Customs Law or other law administered by the
Bureau of Customs’.  Specifically, in Caltex (Philippines) Inc. v. City of Manila,
25 SCRA 840, it was held that the law affords the Collector of Customs
sufficient latitude in determining whether or not a certain article is subject
to seizure or forfeiture and his decision on the matter is appealable
to the Commissioner of Customs and then to the Court of Tax Appeals, not to the
Court of First Instance.  The fundamental
reason is that the Collector of Customs consti­tutes a tribunal when sitting in
forfeiture proceedings (Commissioner of Customs v. Cloribel,
19 SCRA 234) beyond the interference of the Court of First Instance (Lopez v.
Commissioner of Customs, 37 SCRA 33-34). 
As expressed in Pacis v. Averia, 18 SCRA 907,’* * * the Court of First Instance
should yield to the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs is provided for in
Republic Act 1937 which took effect on July 1, 1957, much later than the
Judiciary Act of 1948.  It is axiomatic
that a later law prevails over a prior statute. 
Moreover, on grounds of public policy, it is more reasonable to conclude
that the legislators intended to divest the Court of First Instance of the
prerogative to replevin a property which is a subject
of a seizure and forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff and Customs
Code.  Otherwise, actions for forfeiture
of property for violation of Customs laws could easily be undermined by the
simple device of replevin‘.  The judicial recourse of the owner of a
personal property which has been the subject of a seizure and forfeiture
proceedings before the Collector of Customs is not in the Court of First
Instance but in the Court of Tax Appeals, and only after exhausting
administrative remedies in the Bureau of Customs (Collector of Customs v.
Torres, 45 SCRA 281).  If the property
owner believes that the Collector’s conclusion was erroneous, the remedy is by
appeal to the Commissioner of Customs, and then to the Court of Tax Appeals
should the Commissioner uphold the Collector’s decision.  The Court of Tax Appeals exercises exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to review the ruling of the Commissioner in seizure and
confiscation cases, and that power is to the exclusion of the Court of First
Instance, which may not interfere with the Commissioner’s decisions even in the
form of proceedings for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus which
are in reality attempts to review the Commissioner’s actuations (General Travel
Service, Ltd. v. David, 18 SCRA 66-67).”

Again, in Republic v. Bocar (93
SCRA 78) the Court said:

“1. The Congress of the Philippines
was vested with ‘the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction
of the various courts’ of the Philippines.  Now it is the National Assembly.  Where the matter involved is a seizure and
forfeiture proceeding, a court of first instance is devoid of power to
act.  The customs authorities possess
such competence with an appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals.  In appropriate cases, there may be further
judicial review by this Court in the exercise of its certiorari
jurisdiction.  The jurisdictional limits
thus defined and apportioned, according to the Constitution, must be
respected.  Respondent judges clearly did
not do so.  No deference was paid to a
host of cases that left no doubt as to their lack of authority to assume
jurisdiction.

“2. An excerpt from a recent decision, Commissioner of Customs v.
Navarro, 77 SCRA 264, possesses relevance. 
Thus:  ‘That such jurisdic­tion of
the customs authorities is exclusive was made clear in Pacis
v. Averia, decided in 1966.  This Court, speaking through Justice J.P. Bengzon, realistically observed:  ‘This original jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance, when exercised in an action for recovery of personal property
which is a subject of forfeiture proceeding in the Bureau of Bustoms, tends to encroach upon, and to render futile, the
jurisdic­tion of the Collector of Customs in seizure and forfeiture
proceedings.’ The court ‘should yield to the jurisdiction of the Collector of
Customs.’ Such a ruling, as pointed out by Justice Zaldivar
in Auyong Hian v. Court of
Tax Appeals, promulgated less than a year later, could be traced to Government
v. Gale, a 1913 decision, where there was a recognition in the opinion of
Justice Carson that a Collector of Customs when sitting in forfeiture proceedings
constitutes a tribunal upon which the law expressly confers juris­diction to
hear and determine all questions touching the forfeiture and further
disposition of the subject matter of such proceedings.  The controlling principle was set forth anew
in Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya,
decided in 1971.  Thus:  ‘The prevailing doctrine is that the
exclusive jurisdiction in seizure and forfeiture cases vested in the Collector
of Customs precludes a court of first instance from assuming cognizance over
such a matter.’ Reference was then made in the opinion to previous
cases.'”

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch II in Special Case No. 7114 as well as the
order denying the motion for reconsi­deration are nullified and set aside.  The writ of pre­liminary injunction
heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent.  Costs against private
respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez,
and Relova, JJ., concur.