LILIA Y. GONZALES, PETITIONER, VS. CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, RESPONDENT.

The constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 27 was assumed
in Chavez v. Zobel,^[1]
decided on the first anniversary of the 1973 Constitution.  It is entitled “Decreeing the
Emancipation of Tenants From the Bondage of the Soil Transferring to Them the
Ownership of the Land They Till and Providing the Instruments and Mechanism Therefor“.^[2]
Its constitutionality is the specific question raised in this suit for
prohibition.  In the language of the
petition itself:  “The main issue in
this case is whether martial law was validly declared throughout the country by
His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, thru Proclamation No. 1081, dated
September 21, 1972.  For, if it is valid,
then, General Order No. 1 and Presidential Decree No. 27 resting on it, are
likewise valid.  Otherwise, they are
not.”^[3]
The problem as thus posed admits of but one answer.  This Court unequivocally upheld the validity
of Proclamation No. 1081 in Aquino Jr. v. Ponce Enrile,^[4]
decided as far back as September 17,
1974.  The outcome then
cannot be in doubt.  This petition must
be dismissed.  Presidential Decree No. 27
has survived the test of constitutionality.

The facts are undisputed. 
Petitioner Lilia Y. Gonzales is the owner of Lot
2159 of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo,
with an area of 63.5959 hectares, her paraphernal
property.  It is an irrigated riceland held by thirty (30) tenants under leasehold
tenancy.^[5]
Clearly then, she was adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 27, which
ordered the emancipation of all tenant farmers as of said date and provided
that the tenants should become the owners of a family-size farm of five (5)
hectares, if the land is not irrigated, and three (3) hectares, if irrigated,
while the landowner could retain seven (7) hectares^[6]
if such owner should cultivate or would cultivate it.

As set forth at the outset, there was in the express terms of the
specific issue raised no showing of invalidity.

1.     
The then Chief Justice Makalintal
in expressing his individual opinion as well as summarizing the voting of this
Court on the major issues involved in the aforesaid Aquino
Jr. v. Ponce Enrile decision, after first stating
that on “the final result the vote is practically unanimous,” set
forth the following:  “In the first
place I am convinced (as are the other Justices), without need of receiving
evidence as in an ordinary adversary court proceeding, that a state of
rebellion existed in the country when Proclamation No. 1081 was issued.  It was a matter of contemporary history
within the cognizance not only of the courts but of all observant people
residing here at the time.  Many of the
facts and events recited in detail in the different ‘Whereases‘
of the proclamation are of common knowledge. 
The state of rebellion continues up to the present.  The argument that while armed hostilities go
on in several provinces in Mindanao there are none in
other regions except in isolated pockets in Luzon, and
that therefore there is no need to maintain martial law all over the country,
ignores the sophisticated nature and ramifi­cations of rebellion in a modern
setting.  It does not consist simply of
armed clashes between organized and identifiable groups on fields of their own
choosing.  It includes subversion of the
most subtle kind, necessarily clandestine and operating precisely where there
is no actual fighting.  Underground
propaganda, through printed news sheets or rumors disseminated in whispers;
recruitment of armed and ideological adherents, raising of funds, procurement
of arms and material, fifth-column activities including sabotage and
intelligence – all these are part of the rebellion which by their nature are
usually conducted far from the battle fronts. 
They cannot be counteracted effectively unless recognized and dealt with
in that context.”^[7]
He went further:  “Secondly, my
view, which coincides with that of other members of the Court as stated in
their opinions, is that the question of validity of Proclamation No. 1081 has
been foreclosed by the transitory provision of the 1973 Constitution [Art.
XVII, Sec. 3 (2)] that ‘all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and
acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of
the law of the land and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even
after * * * the ratification of this Constitution * * *.'”^[8]

2.     
The imperative need for such a decree was
stressed in Chavez v. Zobel.  An excerpt from the opinion in that case is
relevant:  “On this vital policy
question, one of the utmost concern, the need for what for some is a radical
solution in its pristine sense, one that goes at the root, was apparent.  Presidential Decree No. 27 was thus
conceived.  It was issued in October of
1972.  The very next month, the 1971
Constitutional Convention voiced its overwhelming approval.  There is no doubt then, as set forth
expressly therein, that the goal is emancipation.  What is more, the decree is now part and
parcel of the law of the land according to the present Constitution.  Ejectment therefore
of petitioners is simply out of the question. 
That would be to set at naught an express mandate of the
Constitution.  Once it has spoken, our
duty is clear; obedience is unavoidable. 
This is so not only because of the cardinal postulate of constitutionalism,
the supremacy of the fundamental law.  It
is also because any other approach would run the risk of setting at naught this
basic aspiration to do away with all remnants of a feudalistic order at war
with the promise and the hope associated with an open society.  To deprive petitioners of the small
landholdings in the face of a presidential decree considered ratified by the
new Constitution and precisely in accordance with its avowed objective could
indeed be contributory to perpetuating the misery that tenancy had spawned in
the past as well as the grave social problems thereby created.  There can be no justification for any other
decision then whether predicated on a juridical norm or on the traditional role
assigned to the judiciary of implementing and not thwarting fundamental policy
goals.”^[9]

WHEREFORE, this petition for prohibition is dismissed.

Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion,
Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., concur.

Teehankee and Guerrero, JJ., on official
leave.

^[1]
L-28609, January 17, 1974,
55 SCRA 26.

^[2]
It was issued on October 21, 1972.

^[3]
Petition, 2.

^[4]
L-35546, September 17, 1974,
59 SCRA 183.

^[5]
Petition, pars. 1 and 2.

^[6] Ibid,
par. 3.

^[7]
59 SCRA 183, 240-241.

^[8] Ibid,
241.  The then Chief Justice likewise
noted that the then Justice Muñoz Palma withheld
“her assent to any sweeping statement that the same in effect validated,
in the constitutional sense, all ‘such proclamations, decrees, instructions,
and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incum­bent President.’ All that
she concedes is that the transitory provision merely gives them ‘the
impri­matur of a law but not of a constitutional mandate,’ and as such
therefore ‘are subject to judicial review when proper under the Constitution.’
” Ibid.

^[9]
55 SCRA 26, 31.  Art. XIV, Section 12 of
the present Constitution reads thus: 
“The State shall formulate and implement an agrarian reform program
aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil and achieving the
goals enun­ciated in this Constitution.”