ALLIED INVESTIGATION BUREAU, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. BLAS F. OPLE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MINISTER OF LABOR; HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR; N…

It is evident, even at a cursory glance, that the stand of
petitioner Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc., in this certiorari
proceeding against the officials of the Department of Labor headed by
respondent Minister Blas F. Ople,^[1]
is hardly appreciative of the scope and amplitude of both the social justice^[2]
and protection to labor^[3]
provisions of the Constitution. 
Consequently, it is on infirm ground. 
To be more specific, after recognizing that private respondent
Victoriano Velasquez was entitled to retire­ment benefits, it would in effect
nullify such a right by informing him that at most, he was entitled to P675.00
for two years, computed at one-half month for every year of service from
November 1, 1974 when the present Labor Code became effective, instead of May,
1953 when he started working for petitioner Company.  Accordingly, private respondent Velasquez
filed a complaint with the Department of Labor against it for non-payment.  The labor arbiter, the National Labor Relations
Commission, and respondent Minister of Labor Ople were united in the view that
he was entitled to P7,762.50, computed at the rate of one-half monthly salary
per year of service, start­ing from 1953. 
Nonetheless, petitioner, adhering to its adamant attitude, instituted
this certiorari proceeding.

For reasons to be hereinafter set forth, this Court rules that certiorari
does not lie.

1. There is no question that petitioner had agreed to grant
retirement benefits to private respondent. 
It would, however, limit such retirement benefits only from the date of
the effectivity of the Labor Code.  That
is its contention.  The refutation given
in the Comment of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza is persuasive.^[4]
As was pointed out, “in the computation thereof, public respondents acted
judiciously in reckoning the retirement pay from the time private respondent
started working with petitioner since respondent employee’s application for
retirement benefits and the company’s approval of the same make express mention
of Sections 13 and 14, Rule 1, Book VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of the Labor Code as the basis for retirement pay.  Section 14(a) of said rule provides that ‘an
employee who is retired pursuant to a bona-fide retirement plan or in
accordance with the applicable individual or collective agreement or
established employer policy shall be entitled to all the retirement benefits
provided therein or to termination pay equivalent to at least one-half month
salary for every year of service, whichever is higher, a fraction of at least
six (6) months being considered as one whole year.'”^[5]
Further it was stated: “This position taken by public respondents squares
with the principle that social legislation should be interpreted in favor of
workers in the light of the Constitutional mandate that the State shall afford
protection to labor.”^[6]

2. Petitioner’s insistence that the retirement benefits should
date only from the time that the present Labor Code came into force could be
based on the assumption that it should not be given a retroactive effect.  That would be to ignore the well-settled
principle that police power legislation intended to promote public welfare
applies to existing contracts.^[7]
It was held in Ongsiako v. Gamboa,^[8]
decided in 1950, that a police power measure being remedial in character covers
existing situations; otherwise, it would be self-defeating.  Abe v. Foster Wheeler Corporation,^[9]
this Court, speaking through Justice Barrera, is even more in point.  In that case, the contracts of employment
were entered into at a time when there was no law granting the workers said
right.  Such being the case, it was then
contended that the application as to them of the subsequent enactment would
amount to an impairment of contractual obligations.  In refuting such a view, it was made clear in
the opinion that “the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment * * * is
limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of
public health, safety, morals and general welfare.”^[10]
The latest reiteration of such a doctrine came in Gutierrez v. Cantada,^[11]
decided barely a month ago.

3. Nor is it accurate to assert that the right to retirement
benefits started from the enactment of the present Labor Code.  That would be to ignore the social justice^[12]
and protection to labor provisions^[13]
of the 1935 Constitution.  In the leading
case of Antamok Gold­fields Mining Company v. Court of Industrial Relations,^[14]
decided in 1940, a concurring opinion of Justice Laurel to this effect was
cited: “‘By and large, these provisions in our Constitution all evince and
express the need of shift­ing emphasis to community interest with a view to
affirmative enhancement of human values.'”^[15]
He had occasion to repeat it in his well-known definition of social justice in
Calalang v. Williams,^[16]
decided the same year.  Thus:
“Social justice is ‘neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy,’ but the humani­zation of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated.  Social justice means the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures
calculated to insure economic stability of all the component elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in
the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through
the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-consti­tutionally,
through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on
the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema
lex.”^[17]
The present Civil Code, which took effect on August 13, 1950, has a chapter on
labor contracts, the first article of which recognizes that the relations
between capital and labor “are not merely contractual.  They are so impressed with public interest
that labor contracts must yield to the common good.”^[18]
As private respondent started working as far back as May, 1953, his
expectations that both the constitutional provisions and the applicable
legislation would be so interpreted as to grant him the benefits recognized by
law should not be frustrated.  The
unanimity which characterized the decisions of the labor arbiter, the National
Labor Relations Com­mission, and respondent Minister of Labor, reflected such
an approach.  They should remain
undisturbed.

4. From the standpoint of equity, it suffices to note the great
disparity between the offer by petitioner of P675.00 and the sum computed in
the amount of P7,762.50 as deter­mined by the labor arbiter, the National Labor
Relations Commission, and respondent Minister of Labor.  The niggardly sum offered, considering the
present high cost of living, might not even be enough for one month’s
subsistence.  Here, there is no question
as to his rendering service that at the very least was considered satisfactory
from May, 1953.  If it were otherwise,
then he would not have lasted that long. 
For petitioner, then, to be adamant in its untenable stand is to show
scant respect for the social justice principle and the mandate of protection to
labor.

WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is
dismissed for lack of merit.  No costs.

Barredo, Antonio, and
Santos, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., see concurring
opinion.

Abad Santos, J., did not take
part.

Concepcion, Jr., J., on leave.

^[1]
The other respondents are Hon. Amado G. Inciong, in his capacity as Deputy
Minister of Labor; National Labor Relations Com­mission; Labor Arbiter Apolonio
L. Reyes, and Victoriano Velasquez.

^[2]
According to Article II, Section 6 of the Constitution: “The State shall
promote social justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the
people.  To­wards this end, the State
shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of
private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits.”

^[3]
According to Article II, Section 9 of the Constitution: “The State shall
afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment,
ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate
the relations between workers and employers. 
The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of
work.  The State may provide for
compulsory arbitration.”

^[4]
He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno and Solicitor
Jesus V. Diaz.

^[5]
Comment, 4-5.

^[6] Ibid,
5-6.

^[7]
Cf. Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. Public Service Commission, 70 Phil.
221 (1940).

^[8]
86 Phil. 50.

^[9]
110 Phil. 198 (1960).

^[10] Ibid,
203.  Cf. Philippine American Life
Insurance Co. v. Auditor General, L-19255, January 18, 1968, 22 SCRA
135.

^[11]
L-36797, May 3, 1979.

^[12]
According to Article II, Section of the 1935 Constitution: “The promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people
should be the concern of the State.”

^[13]
According to Article XIV, Section 6 of the 1935 Constitution: “The State
shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women and minors, and
shall regulate the relation between landowner and tenant, and between labor and
capital in industry and in agriculture. 
The State may provide for compulsory arbitration.”

^[14]
70 Phil. 340.

^[15] Ibid,
357-358.

^[16]
70 Phil. 726.

^[17] Ibid,
734-735.

^[18]
Article 1700, Civil Code.

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