PEDRO ABENDANTE, PROTESTANT AND APPELLANT, VS. BALDOMERO RELATO, PROTESTEE AND APPELLEE.

This case concerns an election contest instituted by Pedro Abendante,
protestant, against Baldomero Relato, protestee, in the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur.

In the elections of November 13,
1951, Pedro Abendante, a Liberal, ran for Mayor of Cabusao, Camarines
Sur, against Baldomero Relato, a Nacionalista. Between Libmanan and
Cabusao there is a leper colony, known as Bicol Treatment Station, and
in this colony precinct No. 11 was created in connection with the
elections held on November 13, 1951.

On November 28, 1951,
the Board of Canvassers of Cabusao canvassed the result of the election
for mayor of the municipality, but excluding therefrom the votes cast
in precinct No. 11 which were declared illegal by said Board, and
proclaimed Pedro Abendante as mayor-elect with a majority of 56 votes.
On November 29, 1951, another Board of Canvassers was constituted at
the instance of the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur, and
said Board, after canvassing the election returns, including the votes
cast in precinct No. 11, proclaimed the protestee as mayor-elect with a
majority of 82 votes.

On December 17, 1951, the Commission
on Elections revoked the two certificates of canvass and the two
proclamations made by the Boards of Canvassers already referred to and
directed the Board of Canvassers originally constituted to reconvene
and make a new canvass of the election returns, including therein the
votes cast in precinct No. 11.

On December 27, 1951, the
original Board of Canvassers reconvened and made a new canvass as
directed by the Commission on Elections but refrained from making any
proclamation contending that the votes cast in said precinct were
illegal and void. And on December 29, 1951, upon insistence of the
Commission on Elections and its representatives, the Board of
Canvassers proclaimed the protestee as the duly elected mayor with 935
votes as against protestant’s 853.

Main basis of the protest
is the inclusion of the votes cast in precinct No. 11 which was created
within the Bicol Leprosarium, on the ground that the electors who cast
the votes in said precinct are all lepers or inmates of the leprosarium
who are not entitled to vote in view of the repeal of Sections 14 and
15 of Republic Act No. 180 by Section 4 of the Republic Act No. 599.

Issues having been joined, the lower court rendered decision holding in
substance that the lepers who voted in precinct No. 11 are qualified
voters, and, as a result, it declared the protestee legally elected and
dismissed the protest with costs. From this decision the protestant has
appealed.

The main issue to be determined in this appeal
refers to the validity of the votes cast in precinct No. 11 located
within the Bicol leprosarium, known as Bicol Treatment Station, which
is comprised within the municipality of Cabusao. In the case of Simeon
Macolor vs. Carlos Amores, supra, p. 1, we said that the
Culion Leper Colony is a national reservation created by an executive
order of the then Civil Governor of the Philippines and as such should
be considered as an administrative organization separate and distinct
from the municipality of Coron because by express provision of law it
was placed under the exclusive administrative control of the Department
of Health. The establishment of the Culion Leper Colony is a class by
itself, which should be distinguished from other leprosaria. While the
administration of the Culion Leper Colony is expressly provided for in
the Revised Administrative Code (Sections 1066-1068), the Bicol
Treatment Station was established by virtue merely of an administrative
order issued by the Department of Health segregating a portion of the
municipality of Cabusao for the treatment of lepers in the Bicol
region. This segregation cannot have the affect of separating the
leprosarium from the political territory of the municipality comprising
it. It still continues to be part and parcel of it and under its
municipal government. This has to be so unless there is an express law
to the contrary. Here there is none. This being so, it follows that the
lepers who voted in precinct No. 11 who are all residents of said
municipality should be declared as having the requisite residence to
vote in said precinct if their intention is to vote in that
municipality. And as regards their qualification to vote, we can invoke
in their favor the ruling laid down in the case of Alcantara vs. Secretary of Interior, 61 Phil. 459, wherein this court held:

“There
are a large number of people confined in the Culion Leper Colony. They
are not permitted to return to their former homes to vote. They are not
allowed to visit their former homes even though they have been
separated from near and dear relatives who are not afflicted as they
are. Why split hairs over the meaning of residence for voting purposes
under such circumstances? Assuming that the petitioners intend to
return to their’ former homes if at some future time they are cured,
this intention does not necessarily defeat their residence before they
actually do return if they have been residents ‘of the Philippine
Islands for one year and of the municipality in which they offer to
vote for six months, next preceding the day of voting.’ Surely a mere
intention to return to their former homes, a consummation every humane
person’ desires for them, not realized and which may never be realized
should not prevent them, under the circumstances, from acquiring a
residence for voting purposes.”

There is a claim
that the lepers who cast their votes in precinct No. 11 do not have the
residence qualification because they are allegedly residents of the
municipality of Libmanan, for which reason, it is claimed, they have no
right to be registered in the list of voters of said precinct and,
consequently, the list of voters as finally corrected by the Board of
Inspectors is not final and conclusive as to their right to vote in
said precinct. This claim involves a question of fact which should be
established by sufficient evidence and in this case this evidence, is
wanting. This matter can not be taken judicial notice of because it is
a fact that should be proven. The Board of Inspectors is presumed to
have passed upon the qualifications of said voters when they presented
themselves for registration and when the Board entered their names in
the list, it must be because they were qualified. Even supposing that
said voters are disqualified for lack of residence qualification this
matter should have been brought up before the Board of Inspectors
during the period provided for by law for the exclusion of voters.
Having failed to do so, it is now too late to raise this question in
these proceedings. Moreover, the law is clear that “in an election
contest proceedings, the registry list, as finally corrected by the
board of inspectors, shall be conclusive in regard to the question as
to who had the right to vote in said election.” (Section 176, paragraph
(f), Revised Election Code.) This injunction is mandatory. (Dizon vs. Cailles, 56 Phil. 695.)

The other issue raised by appellant refers to the action of the
Commission on Elections in cancelling the canvass of the election
returns made by the legally constituted Board of Canvassers which
proclaimed the protestant as mayor-elect after the period for filing a
protest had expired. It is contended that the Commission on Elections
has no such power and therefore the proclamation made by the Board of
Canvassers after said period upon the instruction of the Commission on
Elections has no valid effect.

Under the Constitution, the
Commission on Elections is charged with the exclusive duty of enforcing
and administering all laws relative to the conduct of elections
(Section 2, Article X, Constitution of the Philippines). In addition to
the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the
Commission on Elections has direct and immediate supervision over the
provincial, municipal, and city officials designated by law to perform
the duties relative to the conduct of elections (Section 3, Revised
Election Code).

The duties of the municipal Board of
Canvassers are ministerial in character, and extend only to the
counting of votes as they appear in the statements of election received
from the municipal treasurer and to the issuance of the necessary
statement of the result of their canvass. (Galang vs. Miranda,
et al., 36 Phil., 316, 319-320.) Its duty being ministerial, it follows
that the Board of Canvassers can not pass on the validity of an
election return, and much less exclude it from the canvass on the
ground that the votes cast in the precinct where the returns came from
are illegal. The Board of Canvassers of Cabusao failed to do its duty
when it excluded from the canvass the returns coming from precinct No.
11. The Commission on Elections was therefore justified in ordering
said Board to reconvene and make a new canvass by including the returns
in said precinct. Even supposing that the Commission on Elections has
exceeded its authority because the period for filing a protest has
already elapsed when it acted on the matter, appellant is deemed to
have waived his right to question such irregularity when he failed to
take the matter to the Supreme Court by way of certiorari as required
by law. (Section 5, Revised Election Code.)

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Labrador, JJ., concur.