G.R. No. L-6806. November 05, 1953
SIMEON MACOLOR, PROTESTANT AND APPELLEE, VS. CARLOS AMORES, PROTESTEE AND APPELLANT.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
office of Mayor of Coron, Palawan, filed in the Court of First Instance
of Palawan.
It appears that in the elections of November 13,
1951, Simeon Macolor, protestant, and Carlos Amores, protestee were
candidates for the office of Mayor of Coron, Palawan. After the
election returns from all the precincts in said municipality had been
received, and after making a canvass thereof as required by law, on
November 26, 1951, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed the
protestee as mayor-elect with a plurality of 212 votes.
In
the island of Culion, there were three precincts known as precincts
Nos. 16, 16-A and 16-B. In these precincts the protestant received 39
votes and the protestee 430 votes. In making the canvass, these votes
were added to those cast in the other precincts of the municipality
where the protestee received 444 votes and the protestant 623 votes.
Holding the view that the votes in said three precincts are illegal
because they were cast by persons residing in the island of Culion,
which is a national reservation, protestant instituted the present
election contest.
Issues having been joined, the lower court
rendered decision upholding in substance the view entertained by
protestant. As a result, the court declared illegal the votes cast in
precincts Nos. 16, 16-A and 16-B and held the protestant as the
mayor-elect of Coron with a plurality of 179 votes. From this decision
protestee has appealed.
The only question to be determined
refers to the legality of the votes cast in precincts Nos. 16, 16-A and
16-B which are situated within the Culion Leper Colony which comes
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Health. These votes are
decisive in this contest because if they are discarded the result would
give the protestant a plurarity of 179 votes, otherwise, the protestee
would have a plurarity of 212 votes. To determine this issue, there is
need to make a brief history of the establishment of the Culion Lepers
Colony and the machinery implanted for its internal administration.
On August 22, 1904, the then Civil Governor Luke E. Wright issued
Executive Order No. 35 declaring all the public and within the island
of Culion as a reservation for the purpose of establishing a leper
colony. Said executive order reads in part as follows:
”
* * *, I hereby withdraw from settlement, entry, sale or other
disposition under the public land laws, all the public land within the
island of Culion, Province of Paragua, and reserve the same for the
purpose of establishing a leper colony and a government stock-farm
thereon.”
Implementing said executive order,
Sections 1066, 1067 and 1068 of the Revised Administrative Code were
enacted. Said sections are hereunder copied for ready reference:
“SEC. 1066. Jurisdiction of Department Head over Culion Reservation.—The
Department Head shall have administrative control, to be exercised
through the Director of Health, over the Culion reservation and he
shall have authority to make, promulgate, and enforce in and for said
reservation, and in or upon the waters thereof, such rules and
regulations, consistent with law, as may be necessary for the efficient
control, protection, and management of the Culion Leper Colony.”“SEC. 1067. Justice of the Peace and Notary Public for Culion Reservation.—The
Chief of the Culion leper colony division of the Philippine Health
Service shall be clothed with the powers of justice of the peace and ex-officio notary public for the Culion reservation.”“SEC. 1068. Control of Shipping and Travel in Culion Reservation.—It
shall be unlawful for any owner, master, or other person in charge of
any vessel, boat, or other water craft to land passengers, discharge
cargo, or receive passengers or cargo, or permit the same to be done at
any place in or within the jurisdiction of Culion reservation until a
permit therefor in writing has been obtained from the chief of the
Culion leper colony division of the Philippine Health Service; and it
shall be unlawful for any person to land on or visit within said
jurisdiction without permission from said chief.”
A perusal of the provisions above quoted will readily reveal that the
Culion Leper Colony has been established as a national reservation with
an administrative organization distinct and separate from the municipal
government of Coron as shown by the fact that it has been placed under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Health. This was done
not only to preserve the health of the people outside its area but to
give to that department the necessary power and authority to
effectively carry out the purpose, for which the reservation has been
established. This power and authority must necessarily include the
power to adopt such measures as may be necessary to maintain internal
discipline and promote the health and welfare of the inmates within the
reservation. This is to be inferred from the wording of the law. The
Secretary of Health is given not only administrative control over the
reservation but also the necessary authority to make, promulgate, and
enforce such rules and regulations consistent with law as may be
necessary for the efficient control, protection and management of the
colony. This broad power and authority given to said official as regard
the internal administration of the colony negatives and idea that the
people within the colony may still come within the jurisdiction of the
municipal government of Coron even if the colony comes within its
territorial boundary. It may therefore be safely stated that the
intention of the government in establishing the Culion Leper Colony is
to create a reserved territory, with its own government machinery,
separate and distinct from the municipal government of Coron, and this
is so not only for purposes of government but for political purposes
such as the exercise of the right of suffrage.
Having
arrived at the above conclusion, the next question to be determined is
whether the inmates of the colony can exercise the right of suffrage,
and in the affirmative case, to what extent said right may be exercised.
In view of the repeal of Sections 14 and 15 of the Revised Election
Code (Republic Act No. 180), by Republic Act No. 599, which contain
express provisions relative to the procedure to be followed as to the
exercise of the right of suffrage of patients confined in different
leprosaria, doubt is entertained as to whether said repeal should be
interpreted in the sense that the intention of the legislature is to
deny them the right of suffrage. We do not believe that such
interpretation is warranted. The repeal of said provisions can only
mean that the intention is to return the lepers to the status they
enjoyed prior to their enactment which must necessarily be traced to
the legislation then governing the exercise of the right of suffrage as
applied to the citizens as a whole. It should be noted that prior to
the enactment of said Sections 14 and 15 the law was, as is now,
completely silent as to the right of suffrage of those confined in the
different leprosaria. This silence notwithstanding, it cannot be said
that these lepers are bereft of such right for there is nothing in the
law which disqualifies them from voting simply because of their
ailment. The mere fact that they are segregated for precautionary
reasons is not in itself a disqualification. The only thing to be
considered is whether they have the requisite residence. This question
has already been answered in the affirmative by this court in a case
involving the right to vote of lepers of the same colony in connection
with the plebiscite held in 1935.
In the case above adverted
to, petitioners, who were lepers residing at the Culion Leper Colony,
demanded that they be granted the right to vote in the plebiscite to be
held on May 14, 1935 but was refused by the Secretary of Interior on
the ground that they were not qualified voters in that they could not
be considered as having resided for six months next preceding the day
of voting because “they have not acquired residence in Culion as they
are confined therein as lepers against their will, and they have no
intention to permanently reside there.” In ruling out this objection,
and in holding that these lepers were entitled to vote, this court said:
“There
are a large number of people confined in the Culion Leper Colony. They
are not permitted to return to their former homes to vote. They are not
allowed to visit their former homes even though they have been
separated from near and dear relatives who are not afflicted as they
are. Why split hairs over the meaning of residence for voting purposes
under such circumstances? Assuming that the petitioners intend to
return to their former homes if at some future time they are cured,
this intention does not necessarily defeat their residence before they
actually do return if they have been residents of the Philippine
Islands for one year and of the municipality in which they offer to
vote for six months next preceding the day of voting.’ Surely a mere
intention to return to their former homes, a consummation every humane
person desires for them, not realized and which may never be realized
should not prevent them, under the circumstances, from acquiring a
residence for voting purposes.” (Alcantara vs. Secretary of the Interior, 61 Phil., 459.)
The
ruling in the Alcantara case is decisive as to the right of the lepers
to vote. It was there said that they can vote in the places where they
are confined provided that they evince their desire to do so and had
resided there for at least a period of six months. It is true that the
ruling was given in connection with a plebiscite, but this matter is of
no moment because the paramount issue therein involved has reference to
their qualification from the point of view of residence.
The
next question that crops up is: for what officials can they vote? Is
this right limited, or it can apply to all elective officials?
Consistent with our opinion that the Culion Leper Colony is a national
reservation with an administrative organization separate and distinct
from the municipal government of Coron the only conclusion that can be
drawn, in line with the principle underlying the right of suffrage, is
that these lepers can only take part in elections involving national
officials and not those referring to a municipal government. Inasmuch
as they have no connection whatsoever with the municipal government of
Coron, politically or otherwise, they should not be expected to
intervene in the election of its officials upon the theory that they do
not form part of the people to be governed by said officials. The right
of suffrage is predicted upon the theory that the people who bear the
burden of government should share in the privilege of choosing the
officials of that government. That is the theory of a representative
form of government. Thus, in a case which involves the right of the
residents of Dumaguete City to vote for the officials of the province
of Negros Oriental, and wherein said residents were declared without
right to vote, this court said: “The purpose of an election is to
enable the electorate to choose the men that would run their
government, whether national, provincial, municipal, or city. If so, no
useful end will be served by allowing—in the absence of express
legislative preference—the voters of a city to participate in the
election of the officials of the province which has ceased to have any
governmental authority over said city.” (Teves vs. Commission
on Elections, 90 Phil., 370.) By analogy we can say that the residents
of the leper colony of Culion cannot take part in the election of the
officials of the municipality of Coron if they can exercise their right
in so far as the election of national officials is concerned.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., concurring: I concur in the result. The opinion invokes the case of Teves et al. vs. Commission on Elections,[*]
G. R. No. L-5150, 8 November 1951, to rule that the inmates of the
Culion Leper Colony cannot vote for elective municipal officials of the
municipality of Coron, the colony being an independent and separate
administrative unit, and for practical, political and legal purposes
detached from the municipality. To that I agree; but I reserve my vote
on the question whether they are entitled to vote for elective
provincial officials, the resolution of which is not required in the
case. I make the reservation in view of my dissent in the aforesaid
case.
[*] 90 Phil., 370.