G.R. No. L-26252. December 24, 1968
CONRADO, ERNESTO, GENEROSO, PURIFICACION, RESURRECCION, RICARDO, TERESITA AND TOMAS, ALL SURNAMED DIZON, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. HONORIO ROMERO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE CO…
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
dismissing the petition for mandamus therein filed against Honorable Honorio Romero,
as Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga, and the Philippine National Bank.
On May 4, 1949,
Paula Sanchez Vda. de Dizon
executed a general power of attorney in favor of Jesus Dizon,
one of her children, authorizing him, inter alia,
“to borrow money x x x
with or without security, upon such terms and conditions as he x x x may approve x x”. Purporting to
act in pursuance of this authority, Jesus Dizon
obtained, from the Bank, from 1952 to 1956, several crop-loans for which he
executed the corresponding promissory notes, to guarantee the payment of which
he constituted chattel mortgages on standing
crops and real estate mortgages on several parcels of land, one of which
is covered by TCT No. 2727, in the name of his aforementioned mother. The latter died intestate, on May 1960. She was survived by nine (9) children,
namely, petitioners herein – Conrado, Ernesto, Generoso, Purificacion, Resurreccion, Ricardo, Teresita
and Tomas, all surnamed Dizon — and said Jesus Dizon.
On June 1, 1964,
the Bank instituted Special Proceedings No. 1783 of the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga for the appointment of an administrator
of her intestate estate. Upon the Bank’s
recommendation, Mrs. Concha B. Sugay,
Deputy Clerk of Branch II of said
Court, was appointed administratrix of said estate. Soon thereafter, the Bank commenced Civil
Case No. 2715 of the same court, against Jesus Dizon,
his wife, Felicidad Zamora and said administratrix – hereinafter referred to collectively as
the defendants – to recover the amount of the aforementioned promissory notes
and to foreclose the mortgages guaranteeing the same. Before summons could be
served, or on April 22, 1965, the Bank
amended its complaint.
The defendants took, however, no step whatsoever to resist this
action. Having heard about it,
petitioners herein, accordingly, asked the administratrix,
on June 30, 1965, to either
file her answer to the complaint in said case, or allow their counsel to represent
her therein. The administratrix
replied that she would first consult the Bank.
Three (3) days later, or on July
3, 1965, the Bank moved to declare the defendants in default. Thereupon, or on July 6, 1965, petitioners herein filed a motion praying
that they be allowed to intervene by filing an answer in intervention which
was filed on the same date. The next
day, July 7, 1965, the
defendants were declared in default. On August 11, 1965, the court, presided
over by Honorable Honorio Romero, Judge, denied said
motion to intervene. A motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners herein had, on November 12, 1965, the same fate.
Thereupon, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals their
present petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction,
against Judge Romero and the Bank, to annul the orders of respondent Judge,
dated August 11 and November 12, 1965, to compel him to allow petitioners’
intervention in said Case No. 2715, as well as to admit petitioners’ answer in
intervention therein, and to restrain respondents herein from proceeding with
and/or trying said case, until this action shall have been finally
decided. Soon later, the Court of
Appeals issued the writ of preliminary injunction sought by the
petitioners. In due course, thereafter,
the Court of Appeals rendered its appealed decision dismissing said petition
and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.
The appealed decision is based upon the theory that “the
granting or refusal of a motion to intervene is a matter of judicial
discretion” and that, “once exercised” the action of the court
“cannot be reviewed or controlled by mandamus, however erroneous it may
be”. The decision in the case of Tavera-Luna v. Nable[1],
from which this statement was taken, adds, however, that “the only
exception” to said rule “is when there is an arbitrary abuse of that
discretion, in which case mandamus may issue if there is no other
adequate remedy, though the result is that the court will be called upon to
review the exercise of a discretionary power.”[2]
It so happened that no such abuse of power had been committed in said case,
which involved an attempt by Tavera-Luna, Inc., as
owners of the Cristal Arcade building to intervene in
an action, filed by the Hogar Filipino, as
administrator of said building, to eject therefrom
Andres Luna – the very president of Tavera-Luna, Inc.
– for non-payment of rentals. The order
of the Court of First Instance, dismissing the action for mandamus against the
municipal judge who refused to allow the intervention, was affirmed because
“the sole question presented” in the unlawful detainer
case “was one of possession. The
question of ownership of the building was a matter foreign.” Such
is not the situation obtaining in the case at bar.
Upon the other hand, in the case of Otto Gmur,
Inc. v. Revilla[3] –
likewise cited by the Court of Appeals in support of its stand – the Supreme
Court issued the writ of mandamus directing the lower court to
permit the petitioners to intervene in the main case. The writ was similarly granted in Zaide v. Concepcion[4]. Indeed, rather recently, this Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Makalintal said, in Balane v. de Guzman[5]:
“It is true that mandamus cannot be resorted to in order to
control discretion, and that as a general rule
allowance of a motion to intervene rests in the sound discretion of the
court. But such discretion is not
unlimited. In the exercise thereof, the
Rules provide that the Court ‘shall consider whether or not the intervention
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties and whether or not the intervenor’s rights
may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.’ If these considerations weigh
in favor of the intervenor, a denial of the
intervention may amount to an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion
which is correctible by mandamus, if an ordinary appeal would not be an
adequate and speedy remedy.”[6]
Under the facts obtaining in the case at bar, we are of the
considered opinion that respondent Judge had abused his discretion gravely in
denying petitioners’ motion to intervene, for:
1. It is evident that the administratrix was not inclined to contest the foreclosure
suit. She did not answer the complaint
therein. What is more, when petitioners
urged her to resist the action of the bank or to allow their counsel to do so
for her, the administratrix replied that she would
first consult the bank, the very party she was supposed to fight. And, seemingly, she did consult the bank for,
three (3) days later, it moved to declare her and her
co-defendants in default. In this
connection, it should be noted that she owed her appointment as administratrix to the bank.
2. Petitioners’ motion to
intervene was filed before the defendants had been declared in default
and, hence, before the issues had been joined. In other words, the intervention would not
have caused undue delay in the proceedings.
3. The answer in
intervention attached to petitioners’ motion to intervene set up defenses which
had a reasonable semblance of validity.
For instance, petitioners assailed the validity of the mortgages
constituted by Jesus Dizon, insofar as the real
properties of their mother were concerned, upon the ground that his authority
was contained in a general power of attorney, whereas Article 1878 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines requires a special power of attorney
“to create or convey real rights over immovable property”. It is true that said general power of
attorney was given on May 4, 1949,
or prior to the effectivity of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
but it is, likewise, undisputed that the aforementioned mortgages were
constituted from 1952 to 1956, when said Code was already in force. Then, again, petitioners set up the defense
of prescription of action, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 2715 was commenced in
1965, or more than ten (10) years after the execution of some of the promissory
notes and mortgages involved in the case.
4. Respondents maintain
that petitioners herein have no actual, material, direct and immediate right or
interest to entitle them to intervene in the principal action, their interest
therein being allegedly inchoate or in expectancy. This contention is manifestly devoid of merit for successional
rights are “transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent”[7] and it is conceded that petitioners herein
are children of the deceased and her forced heirs.
Needless to say, an appeal from the decision that may be rendered
in the main case would not be a speedy and adequate remedy for petitioners
herein. On the contrary, it would unduly
delay the termination of said case, for it would require a remand thereof to
the lower court for retrial, with the possibility of another appeal.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is
hereby reversed and another one shall be entered directing respondent Judge to
grant petitioners’ motion to intervene in said Civil Case No. 2715, to admit
their aforementioned answer in intervention, and to otherwise allow them to
participate in the proceedings in said case as intervenors
therein, with costs against the Philippine National Bank. Writ granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, Fernando, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
[1] 67 Phil. 340, 344.
[2] Underscoring ours.
[3] 55 Phil. 627, 632.
[4]
32 Phil. 403, 412-413.
[5] L-21281,
May 24, 1967.
[6] Underscoring ours.
[7] Article 777, Civil Code of
the Philippines.