ANGEL M. TINIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. DALMACIO MINA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

The Agricultural Land Reform Code^[1]
goes rather far, much too far in the opinion of some of its irreconcilable
critics, whose opposition has been most vocal and bitter, in curtailing the
property rights of landholders in pursuance of the consti­tutional objectives
of social justice and protection to labor.^[2]
It is understandable then why not a few of its provisions have been assailed as
unconstitutional. One would think that a section of such act, giving due course
to any application for mechanization properly certified in accordance with the
previous statute by the Agricultural Tenancy Commission and the National
Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration with proper notices served on
the tenants at least two months prior to its approval on August 8, 1963 and
allowing the decision to be based on the Agricultural Tenancy Act formerly in
force, would not raise a constitutional question.^[3]

Nonetheless, insofar as it could stand in the way of a land­holder
ejecting a tenant based on such previous statute,^[4]
there would be a clear need for declaring Sec. 168 void; otherwise such a move
would be doomed to failure.  That
accounts for the three cases originating in the Court of Agrarian Relations
where the principal legislative question posed is the validity of the above
provision, the retroactive application of which is alleged to be violative of due process. 
The landholder in this case is plaintiff­-appellant Angel M. Tinio.  The tenants
are defendants-appellees Dalmacio
Mina,^[5]
Florencio Antonio,^[6]
and Bartolome Natividad.^[7]

For a better understanding of the controlling facts, it must be
remembered that under Section 50 of the previous law, the Agricultural Tenancy
Act, the dispossession of a tenant by the landholder based on the ground of the
latter’s intention of mechanizing
his farm was allowed subject to certain conditions.  They are that the landholder (1) shall at
least one year but not more than two years prior to the date of his petition to
dis­possess the tenant file a notice with the Court of Agrarian Relations; and
(2) shall inform him in writing in a language or dialect known to him of such
intention to cultivate the land himself, through the employment of mechanical
implements.  It is required likewise that
there be a certification of the Agri­cultural Tenancy Commission that the land
is suited for Mechanization and another certification from the manager of the
National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration that it can resettle
the tenant immediately in the event that the petition for dispossession is
authorized.

On the basis of the above statutory provision,
plaintiff-appellant Tinio, with intention to
mechanize his land occupied by his tenants, now defendants-appellees
Mina, Antonio and Natividad, obtained the required
certification both from the Agricultural Tenancy Commission on March 22, 1963 and from the National
Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration on May 30, 1963.  While
there was an allegation that the notice of such intention to mechanize was
served on the tenants, the brief of plaintiff-appellant did not show whether it
was made in writing.  No mention was made
of the date either.

The Agricultural Land Reform Code took effect on August 8, 1963, as previously
noted, while the previous ground for dispossession based on mechanization was
omitted, Section 168 thereof would preserve such right of the landholder under
the previous statute, if he could show that the corre­sponding certification
for suitability for mechanization and availability for resettlement were thus
obtained from the proper agencies and
proper notices were served on the tenants at least two months prior to its
approval.  To be more precise, the
tenants should have been notified, if reliance be placed on the above
provision, at the latest on June 8,
1963, the law having taken effect on August 8 of that year.

Plaintiff-appellant Tinio in these
three cases, however, waited almost two years from such date, having filed his
action in the Court of Agrarian Relations in Guimba, Nueva Ecija against defendant-appellee Mina under date of July 8, 1965, defendant-appellee Antonio, July 11, 1965 and defendant-appellee Natividad, August 5,
1965, the complaints were for the mecha­nization of the land under tenancy,
owned by plaintiff-appellant Angel M.  Tinio.  On August 10, 1965, defendants-appellees through counsel, the then incumbent mayor of such
municipality filed a motion to dismiss based on the ground that under the above
referred to Section 168 of Agricultural 
Land Reform Code, the Court of Agrarian Relations was without
jurisdiction over the subject matter.  It
was contended in the opposition to such motion to dismiss that to apply the
aforesaid section would be to taint it with invalidity as it would deprive
plaintiff-appellant of a vested right. 
On February 26, 1966,
the opposition not­withstanding, the Court of Agrarian Relations dismissed all
of the three above cases for lack of jurisdiction in accordance with the
aforesaid section.

A more accurate ground on which dismissal could be predicated
could have been the absence of a cause of action in all three cases, no showing
having been made that there was full
compliance by plaintiff-appellant Tinio with the
terms of Section 168, which did preserve, under the conditions therein
provided, the jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.  At any rate, appeals were taken from such
order of dismissal to the Court of Appeals, which certified the matter to us,
the decisive issue being one of constitutionality, the briefs of
plaintiff-appellant Tinio in all three cases rather
insistent in their condemnation of the alleged nullity of Section 168 of the
Agricultural Land Reform Code.

We could sustain the Court of Agrarian Relations in its dismissal
of the three above cases in view of the rather conspicuous failure of
plaintiff-appellant to show a cause of action. 
That would leave the constitutional
question still open, the doubt thus engendered likely to plague the
various Court of Agrarian Relations in subsequent cases.  Such a situation may be fraught with
undesirable consequences.

The Agricultural Land Reform Code is undeniably a major piece of social
legislation.  It is not for us to give
expression to our views as to whether it is unnecessary, unwise, or
inexpedient.  We are called upon however
to decide whether the claim of landholders of any infringement of
constitutional rights, be passed upon, and as promptly as possible.  Thereby, what­ever be the decision, others
similarly situated, and much more so, the agricultural workers for whose
benefit the legislation was enacted, could be certain as to what precisely may
be constitutionally done.  We feel under
the circumstances that the validity of Sec. 168 of the Agricultural Land Reform
Code should be inquired into.

The Court of Agrarian Relations must be upheld; the attack on the
validity of the above section of the Agricultural Land Reform Code is flimsy
and insubstantial.

1. Sec. 168 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code being
essentially procedural, the question of retroactivity hardly poses a serious
problem.  Less than a month ago, in
Gregorio v. Court of Appeals,^[8] we explicitly affirmed:  “* * *, under the doctrine uninterruptedly
adhered to by this Court, the retroactive application of a procedural law is
not violative of any right of a party who may feel
that he is adversely affected.” More to the point, in Laurel
v. Misa,^[9]
we made clear that “there is no constitutional objection to retroactive
statutes where they relate to remedies or procedure.” To the same effect: 
“The amendment being procedural in character, no vested
rights could attach.”^[10]

 2. On what basis then
could the contention of unconsti­tutionality based on retroactivity be made to
rest, with some degree of plausibility? 
Plaintiff-appellant would assert that the right to file such
an action not in accordance with the present Sec. 168 of the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, but with Sec. 50 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, is a vested
right of a substantive, not merely of a procedural, character.

As set forth in the brief for plaintiff-appellant in his case
against defendant-appellee Mina:  “The appellant before the enactment of
the new law has already acquired a vested right and has complied with the
provision of Sec. 50 of R. A. No. 1199 as amended, prior to the filing of the
instant com­plaint for mechanization.”^[11]
Also, “the new law is not procedural in nature which may have retroactive
effect, for it affects a right already acquired by the appellant.”^[12]

Assume that the right vested
in the plaintiff-appellant was in reality substantive rather than
procedural, would his contention prevail? 
The answer must still be in the negative.

It is to be admitted that a vested right, substantive in
character, comes within the protection of the Constitution under the due
process clause.  In certain cases, it
could find shelter under the non-impairment guaranty, but not according to the
facts as found in these three suits before us. 
There is no assertion of any obligation arising from contract being
disregarded, nor could any such averment be made.  To follow plaintiff-appellant’s approach, it
likewise admits of no doubt that there may be instances where retroactivity as
such would amount to a denial of due process. 
It does not follow, however, that each and every instance where a law
operates to affect past events is to be condemned as obnoxious to such a basic
right.

For what does due process signify?  According to a recent decision:  “It is responsiveness to the supremacy
of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.  Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out
and unfairness avoided.  To satisfy the
due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo,
must not outrun the bounds of
reason and result in sheer oppression. 
Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of
reasonableness.  Correctly has it been
identified as freedom from arbitra­riness. 
It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.  It exacts fealty ‘to those strivings for
justice’ and judges the act of
officialdom of whatever branch ‘in the light of reason drawn from
considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and
political thought.’”^[13]

It is thus easily understandable why the allegation based on the
insistence on the alleged denial of due process by plaintiff-appellant cannot
be deemed persuasive.  Rather than being
arbitrary or possessing an element of unfairness, the challenged Sec. 168 of
the Agricultural Land Reform Code reveals on its face the concern shown by the
legislative body for pending actions for mechanization based on the previous
Agricultural Tenancy Act.  How could it
be said that such section is tainted by unreasonableness or oppressiveness?

Plaintiff-appellant, along with almost every other Filipino, must
have been aware all the while that beginning the legislative sessions from
1962, a land reform measure, more comprehensive in scope and much more generous
in its conferment of benefits to agricultural workers, had been vigorously and
extensively discussed and debated, until its final approval on August 8,
1963.  It could have been reasonably
assumed then by landholders that whatever privileges had been enjoyed by them
under the Agricultural Tenancy Act could still
be curtailed.  The element of
surprise was clearly lacking.  They were
not left in the dark at all.  Whatever
they could validly do under the previous statute, they should have done, before
it might prove too late.  That is what
happened here.

Under the above circumstances, the allegation that the retroactive aspect of the
challenged section, even if the right formerly recognized as possessed by
landholders to file such suits for mechanization under the previous law be
considered substantive rather than procedural, sufficed to call for a judgment
of nullity should fall on deaf ears. 
There is manifestly no violation of the due process guaranty.  Section 168 is not unconstitutional.

3. Plaintiff-appellant’s case for invalidity, weak enough as it
is, dwindles to the vanishing point, considering that the case for
mechanization against defendant-appellee Mina was
filed on July 8, 1965, that against defendant-appellee
Antonio on July 11, 1965 and that against defendant-appellee
Natividad on August 5, 1965.  In these three above cases then,
plaintiff-appellant allowed almost two years to lapse after the effectivity of the Agricultural Land Reform Code before
going to court.  For him then to voice a
plea of anguish, complaining of the alleged retroactivity of the challenged
section, is to elicit not sympathy but rejection.  Whatever be the plight he might find himself in now, he has only himself to blame.

Even the equities of the
case frown on his pretension.  Plaintiff-appellant,
after allowing such a long period of time to elapse, to enforce whatever rights
he felt he was entitled to, could not thereafter impugn the challenged section
which rightfully poses an insuperable barrier to his unwarranted claim.

4.  That is all then that
these three cases present.  What was done
by the Court of Agrarian Relations was strictly in accordance with law.  The reversal of the orders of dismissal certainly
is uncalled for.  Respect for a valid
statute demands no less.  What is regrettable
is that plaintiff-appellant, adamant and unbending in his refusal to follow the
dictates of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, would seize upon a flimsy and
insubstantial argument in the vain hope of imparting deceptive plausibility to
the assertion of a non-existing right even to the extent of alleging nullity of
the challenged section.  How could he
hope to show its alleged invalidity, when, both according to reason and
precedent, no ground for such a conclusion, does exist?^[14]

WHEREFORE, the orders dated February 26, 1966, in all of
the three cases before us, dismissing for want of jurisdiction the complaints
for mechanization filed by plaintiff-appellant against defendants-appellees Mina, Antonio and Natividad,
are hereby affirmed.  With costs in each
of the three above cases against plaintiff-appellant.

Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, and
Capistrano, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the result.

Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs on
the ground that the petitions do not state a cause of action.

Ruiz Castro, J., did not take
part.

^[1]
R. A. Act No. 3844, approved August 8,
1963.

^[2]
Sec. 2, Art. V and Sec. 6, Art. XIV, Constitution of the Philippines.

^[3]
Section 168 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code provides:  “Pending Application for Mechanization.  – Any provision of this Code to the con­trary
notwithstanding, any application for mechanization where corresponding
certifications for suitability for mecha­nization and for availability of
resettlement by the Agricultural Tenancy Com­mission and the National Resettlement and
Rehabilitation Administration, respectively, have been issued and proper
notices served on the tenants at least two months prior to the approval of this
Code shall be given
due course and decided in accordance with the pertinent provisions and requirements of
Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred and ninety-nine, as amended.”

^[4]
Sec. 50,
par. (a) of the Agricultural Tenancy Act provides:  “Causes for Ejectment.
– Any of the following, and no other, shall be sufficient cause for the dispossession
of a tenant from his holdings:  (a) The bona
fide intention of the landholder-owner or his relative within the first
degree by consanguinity to cultivate the land himself personally or through the
employment of farm machinery and implements: 
Provided, However, That should the landholder-owner of the
aforesaid relative not cultivate the land himself for at least three years of
the landholder-owner and his successor in interest should fail to employ
mechanical farm implements for a period of at least five years after
dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith
and the tenant shall have the right to demand possession of the land and
damages for any loss in­curred by him because of said dispossession:  Provided; further, That the
landholder-owner of the aforesaid relative shall, at least one year but not
more than two years prior to the date of his petition to dispossess the
tenant under this subsection, file notice with the court and shall inform the
tenant in writing in a language or dialect known to the latter of his intention
to cultivate the land himself, either personally or through the employment of
mechanical implements: Provided, That in the latter case, the notice to
the tenant and to the court should be accomplished by a certification of the
Agricultural Tenancy Commission that the land is suited for mechanization and
by a certification by the manager of the National Resettlement and
Rehabilitation Administration that it will be able to provide immediate re­settlement
to the tenants in case their dispossession is authorized by the court:  * * *.”

^[5]
L-29488.

^[6]
L-29489.

^[7]
L-29490.

^[8]
L-22802, Nov. 29, 1968.  Citing Enrile v. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, 36 Phil. 574 (1917); Hosana
v. Diomano, 56 Phil. 741 (1927); Guevara v.
Laico, 64 Phil. 144 (1937); Sevilla
v. Tolentino, 66 Phil. 196 (1938); Camacho v.
Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil. 848 (1948); People v. Young, 83
Phil. 702 (1949); Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 (1950); Salcedo v. Carpio, 89
Phil. 254 (1951); Castro v. Sagales, 94 Phil.
208 (1953).

^[9]
76 Phil. 372, 378 (1946).

^[10]
Billones v. C.I.R., L-17566, July 30, 1965.

^[11]
Brief for Appellant, p. 15.  The same
statement in identical language likewise appears on the appellant’s brief
against defendant-appellee Antonio on the very same page. 
So it is in his brief against defendant-appellee
Natividad.

^[12]In
plaintiff-appellant’s brief against defendant-appellee
Antonio and defendant-appellee Natividad,
the very same language was used appearing likewise on pp. 15-16 thereof.

^[13]
Ermita-Malate Hotel Assn. v. Mayor of Manila,
L-24693, July 31, 1967, followed in Morfe v. Mutuc, L-20387, Jan. 31, 1968 and in Santiago v. Alikpala, L-25133, Sept. 28, 1968.

^[14]
The other errors assigned to the effect that Sec. 168 is not a ground for a
motion to dismiss, that there should have been a hearing and presentation of
evidence in support of a Motion to Dismiss, and that defendants-appellees were represented by the Mayor of said Muni­cipality,
who was without proper permission to practice his profession need not be considered at all, the decisive
issue being on the alleged unconstitutionality of Sec. 168 of the Agricultural
Land Reform Code.