G.R. No. L-22636. June 11, 1970
NICANOR DE GUZMAN, JR., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. DOLORES L. SANTOS, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF AMADOR D. SANTOS, DECEASED; BENITO MACROHON, AS PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZ…
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal, taken by both parties, from a decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, the dispositive
part of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the
Court hereby renders judgment declaring as null and void the Sheriff’s sale of
the properties of the plaintiff Nicanor de Guzman
Jr. on June 12, 1961 and also annulling all the proceedings in connection
therewith including the Notice of Attachment or Levy, Notice of Sheriff’s
Sale, Certificate of Sale and Final Deed of Sale. The injunction issued in this case is hereby
made permanent. The counterclaim of the
defendant is dismissed. The Sheriff is
hereby ordered to enforce the writ of execution against Nicanor
de Guzman Jr. by first proceeding against his personal properties and when the
same are insufficient to go against the real properties in the manner provided
by law.”
The record shows that on September 13, 1960, herein
defendant-appellant Dolores L. Santos, as Administratrix
of the estate of Amador Santos, filed with the municipal court of San Juan del
Monte, Rizal, an action for unlawful detainer (Civil Case No. 1814), against herein plaintiff-appellant
Nicanor de Guzman, Jr. and one Abelardo
Santos to eject both, for breach of contract, from a house and lot situated at
No. 54 Riverside Street, within said municipality, allegedly leased by Mrs.
Santos to De Guzman, and subleased by the latter to Abelardo
Santos. After the filing of defendants’
answer, controverting the alleged breach of contract,
and due trial, judgment was rendered on November 22, 1960, dismissing the complaint.
Mrs. Santos appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, where the action was docketed as Civil Case No.
6512. On motion of said appellant, dated
March 20, 1961, that court declared De Guzman and Abelardo
Santos in default, the next day, and soon thereafter, or on April 3, 1961,
rendered a decision sentencing them to vacate the aforementioned premises and
deliver the possession thereof to Mrs. Santos, as well as to pay her the sum of
P6,600.00, as accrued rentals for 11 months of 1960, in addition to P600.00 a
month from January 1961, until delivery of said premises to Mrs. Santos, with
interest at the rate of 6% per annum, apart from the sum of P200.00 as
attorney’s fees and the costs.
On motion of Mrs. Santos, filed on April 7, 1961, the corresponding
writ of execution was issued on April 14, 1961, in pursuance of which, Benito Macrohon, as Provincial Sheriff of Rizal,
acting through his deputy sheriff, Liberato C. Manalo, issued, on April 19, 1961, a notice of attachment
and levy on several real properties, one of which is a residential house and
lot of about 1,140 sq. m., located at the corner of Stanford and Shaw
Boulevard, Wack-Wack, municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and covered
by TCT No. 77090, in the name of De Guzman.
After publishing the corresponding notice of Sheriff’s sale in the Nueva Era, a newspaper of general circulation in Rizal, published in the Spanish language, said house and
lot were, on June 12, 1961,
sold, at public auction, to the judgment creditor, Mrs. Santos, for the sum of
P10,313.20. On June 21, 1962, the Sheriff issued the “officer’s
deed of absolute sale” of said property to Mrs. Santos. The next day, she moved that De Guzman be
ordered to surrender the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 77090, in view of which,
the Court ordered him, on June 25, 1962, to show cause why the motion should
not be granted. On July 6, 1962, De Guzman filed his opposition to
the motion, as well as moved to quash the writ of execution and “to annul
all proceedings of the Sheriff thereunder, including
the notice of attachment or levy, the notice of sheriff’s sale, the certificate
of sale and final deed of sale.” On
July 10, 1962, Mrs. Santos
filed her opposition to this motion, which was denied on August 26, 1962.
Meanwhile, or on July 12, 1962, De Guzman had commenced the
present action, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
– in which it was docketed as Civil Case No. 7266 – against Mrs. Santos,
Sheriff Macrohon and Deputy Sheriff Manalo, to annul the default judgment in Civil Case No.
6512 of said court, the certificate of sale and the deed of absolute sale above
referred to, as well as to recover damages and secure a writ of preliminary
injunction, to restrain said defendants from procuring the surrender and cancellation
of De Guzman’s TCT No. 77090 of Rizal. The writ of preliminary injunction was issued
the day following. Subsequently, said
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, upon the ground “that there is
another action pending between the same parties and for the same cause,” –
referring to De Guzman’s motion of July
6, 1962, in Civil Case No. 6512 – but the motion (to dismiss) was
denied, on August 31, 1962. Accordingly, the defendants filed their
answer with counterclaim, to which De Guzman replied seasonably. In due course, thereafter, the court of first
instance rendered its aforementioned decision – annulling the sheriff’s sale,
making the injunction permanent, dismissing defendants’ counterclaim and
directing the sheriff “to enforce the writ of execution against Nicanor de Guzman Jr. by first proceeding against his personal
properties and when the same are insufficient to go against the real properties
in the manner provided by law” – from which both parties have appealed
directly to the Supreme Court.
De Guzman maintains that the lower court should have annulled the
judgment in default rendered in Case No. 6512, whereas the defendants aver that
said court erred: (1) in denying their
motion to dismiss, instead of dismissing the present action as being barred by
a prior judgment or order; (2) in annulling the sheriff’s sale, including the
certificate of sale and the deed of absolute sale executed in favor of Mrs.
Santos; (3) in not dismissing the action of De Guzman upon the ground of laches; and (4) in dismissing the counterclaim of Mrs.
Santos.
The appeal taken by plaintiff De Guzman is anchored upon the theory that the judgment in
default rendered against him in Civil Case
No. 6512 is void ab initio
for lack of notice to him: (1) of the
receipt by the Court of First Instance of Rizal of
the record of ejectment case No. 1814 of the municipal court of San Juan del Monte; and
(2) of the motion of Mrs.
Santos, dated March 20, 1961, to declare the defendants in said Civil Case No.
6512 in default. This contention is
clearly devoid of merit for notice of receipt of said record was sent by the Clerk of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, on February 22, 1961, and
served on March 1, 1961, upon Atty. Arsenio Cabrera,
the then counsel of record of De Guzman, and it is well settled that notice
upon such counsel is notice upon his client.
In fact, service of said notice would have been defective had it been
made upon the latter, instead of to the former.[1]
Then, again, it has been repeatedly held that a defendant who has not filed
his answer or motion to dismiss within the period provided by law therefor is not entitled to notice of the motion filed to
declare him in default.[2]
The defendants allege that the lower court should have granted
their motion to dismiss, dated July 28, 1962, predicated upon the pendency of another action between the same parties and for
the same cause and that, in any
event, the present case should have been dismissed, upon the ground that it is
barred by a prior judgment or order, namely, that issued on August 31, 1962, in
Civil Case No. 6512, denying the motion of De Guzman, of July 6, 1962, praying
that the writ of execution issued in that case be quashed, that the sheriff’s
proceedings thereunder – including the notice of
attachment or levy, the notice of sheriff’s sale, the certificate of sale and
the deed of absolute sale executed in favor of Mrs. Santos – be annulled, and
that her motion of June 22, 1962, for the surrender of the owner’s duplicate of
TCT No. 77090, be denied. It should be
noted, however, that the present action was commenced on July 12, 1962 or about a month and a half before
said order of August 31, 1962. In other words, such order was subsequent
to the filing of the complaint in the present case and, accordingly, could not
have barred its institution.
Upon the other hand, let us grant, merely for the purpose of
argument, that said motion of De Guzman of July 6, 1962, and that of Mrs. Santos, dated June 22, 1962, for the surrender of
the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 77090, may be considered as an
“action.” Is the “cause” therein the same as that set up in
the case at bar? In this connection, it
should be noted that the latter seeks to
annul the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 6512, which, if valid, was concededly final and executory prior to June
22, 1962. In fact, such was
the theory therein sustained by Mrs. Santos, and such was, indeed, the position taken by the court of first instance in
said case No. 6512, in its order of August
31, 1962, which, as a consequence, did not pass upon the
merits of the issue on the validity of said judgment. In other words, it was thus impliedly held
that such issue could not
fittingly be settled in case No. 6512.
Hence, the proper forum for its determination is the case at bar.
Concerning the sale at public auction made in favor of Mrs.
Santos, on June 12, 1961, the lower court declared it null and void, upon the
ground of: (1) lack of proper service to
De Guzman of the requisite notice of levy or attachment of the real property in
question; (2) insufficient
publication of the notice of the sheriff’s sale; (3) failure of the sheriff to
proceed against the personal properties of De Guzman, to satisfy the money
judgment in favor of Mrs. Santos, before selling his aforementioned real
property; and (4) gross inadequacy of the sale price.
As regards the first ground, De Guzman affirms that he has not
been notified, either personally or by registered mail, of the attachment or
levy of the real property in question.
Upon the other hand, defendants maintain that copy of the notice of
attachment or levy was served
upon De Guzman, through his mother, Mrs. Pacita de
Guzman, who stays in said property, but refused to acknowledge receipt of said
copy. With respect to the last ground,
it appears that His Honor, the trial Judge, had made an ocular inspection of the property and found that the house therein
is one “of strong materials and the wood used” therein “belong
to the best group of native wood, that the premises are properly landscaped
and fully improved and x x x is located in about
the best place in Mandaluyong, Rizal”
– at the corner of Stanford and Shaw Boulevard, which is “very near the
aristocratic Wack Wack Golf
and Country Club and about a kilometer away from the Provincial Government of Rizal” – and that the property, with all its
improvements, is easily worth over P200,000.
In relation to the third ground, the decision appealed from has the
following to say, the accuracy
of which is not disputed by herein defendants-appellants:
“In the case at bar, it is beyond dispute that Nicanor de Guzman Jr. owns personal properties worth
several times more than the personal judgment against him. This is not only borne out by the testimonies
of said party and his mother Pacita de Guzman but is
confirmed by the Court in its ocular inspection of the premises. If the Sheriff’s representative only wanted
to execute the judgment against Nicanor de Guzman Jr.
out of his personal properties he could have easily done so. It is clear that the debtor in this case was
never given a chance to settle his obligation out of his personal properties
because the Sheriff’s representative never took the serious trouble of seeing
the debtor personally. As to the extent
of de Guzman Jr.’s personal properties, opposing
counsel in his memorandum makes mention of said personal properties to be
worth about P80,000.00. x x x.”
Although much can be said in favor of the foregoing findings of
the lower court, We deem it unnecessary to dwell upon the same and pass upon
the merits of the grounds therein relied upon, in view of the conclusion We had
reached in connection with the second objection to the contested sale.
Indeed, the pertinent part of Section 16, Rule 39, of the Old
Rules of Court, now Section 18, Rule 39 of the present Rules, provides:
“SEC. 18. Notice of
sale of property on execution. –
Before the sale of property on execution, notice thereof must be given as
follows:
“(a) xxx xxx xxx
“(b) xxx xxx xxx
“(c) In case of real property, by posting a similar notice particularly
describing the property for twenty (20) days in three public places in the
municipality or city where the property is situated, and also where the property
is to be sold, and, if the assessed value of the property exceeds four hundred
pesos (P400), by publishing a copy of the notice once a week, for the same
period, in some newspaper published or having general circulation in the
province, if there be one. If there are
newspapers published in the province in both the English and Spanish languages,
then a like publication for a like period shall be made in one newspaper
published in the English language, and in one published in the Spanish
language.”
Pursuant to this provision, before a real property can be validly
sold on execution, when its assessed value exceeds P400 – that of the property
in question is P58,780 – notice of the scheduled sale, particularly describing the property, shall be posted for
20 days in three public places in the municipality or city where it is
situated, and, in addition thereto, copy of said notice shall be published,
once a week, for the same period, “in one newspaper published in
the English language, and in one published in the Spanish language” –
“(i)f there are newspapers published in the
province in both the English and Spanish languages.” It is not denied that
there are such newspapers, published in both languages, with general circulation
in the Province of Rizal. Yet, the notice of the contested sale was published for not more than 15 days (on May 15, 22 and 29) and in one (1) newspaper only,
the Nueva Era, published in the Spanish language,
which has a very limited circulation. It
is thus manifest that the publication made in the case at bar has not complied
with the aforementioned provision and that the sale made to Mrs. Santos is, accordingly, null and
void.3
Herein defendants insist that the right of De Guzman to question
the aforesaid irregularities in the publication of the notice of sale had been waived
by him when, on June 5, 1961, he asked that the sale, originally scheduled for
that date, be postponed to June 12, “without need of further publication
nor posting of said sale.” This request entailed a waiver of the
publication of another notice as to the date of the sale. It did not imply a renunciation of the right
to question the same for non-publication of the notice in a newspaper
published in the English language, and for the failure of the Nueva Era to publish the notice for twenty (20) days.
The plea of laches set up by the
defendants-appellants is based upon Mateo vs. Court of Appeals,4 which is not in point. That case was predicated upon the rule that
“when the time in which the debtor may redeem from a valid sale of his property has expired, he has no further right to or
interest in the property sold.” This certainly is the rule when there has been a valid sale, not when the sale is null and void,
as it is in the case at bar.
It may not be amiss to note that, since the rendition of the default
judgment in Civil Case No. 6512, on April
3, 1961, appellant De Guzman has been far from negligent in the
assertion of his rights. Thus, on April
14, 1961, he filed a manifestation adopting by reference the answer filed by
him and Abelardo Santos in the municipal court of San
Juan del Monte. On the same date, he
filed a motion to set aside the order of default and for the admission of said
answer. Notice of the order denying that
motion having been served upon his counsel, on May 2, 1961, De Guzman filed, on June 1, 1961, a motion for reconsideration
and new trial, dated May 28, 1961, which was denied on June 12, 1961.
On the same date, he filed a motion to quash the writ of execution and
to dismiss the case, which was denied
on June 21. Then, he filed a motion for
reconsideration, dated July 20, which was denied on August 17, 1961.
On August 29, 1961,
he filed a notice of appeal, to which Mrs. Santos countered with a motion to
dismiss the appeal, which was granted on September 20, 1961.
Thereafter, De Guzman instituted Case CA-G.R. No. 30911-R of the Court
of Appeals, against Mrs. Santos, the provincial sheriff of Rizal
and His Honor, the trial Judge, for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus
and preliminary injunction, to restrain the trial court from further proceeding
in Civil Case No. 6512, and to annul its order of September 20, 1961 dismissing
the appeal. Said Case CA-G.R. No.
30911-R was dismissed by the Court of Appeals on July 3, 1962. Then
came De Guzman’s motion of July 6, 1962, in Civil Case No. 6512, to quash the writ of execution issued
therein and annul all proceedings of the sheriff thereunder,
which was followed, on July 12, 1962, by the institution of the present case.
It is thus clear that plaintiff-appellant herein is not guilty of
laches.
Being a mere corollary of the preceding questions, which have
already been disposed of, the counterclaim for damages of defendant Dolores L.
Santos needs no further discussion.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with costs against appellant Dolores L. Santos.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., took no part.
[1]
Elli v. Ditan, L-17444, June 30, 1962; Palad vs.
Cui, 28 Phil.
44.
[2]
Duran v. Arboleda, 20 Phil. 253; Inchausti &
Co. v.
De Leon, 24 Phil. 224; Monteverde v. Jaranilla, 60 Phil. 297; Manila Motor Co. v. Endencia, 72 Phil. 130; Pielago v.
Generosa, 73 Phil. 654.
3
Campomanes v. Bartolome,
38 Phil. 808; Iturralde v. Velazquez, 41 Phil. 886, 894; Borja v. Addison, 44 Phil 895, 904; Balagtas
v. Arguelles, 57 Phil. 317; Ago v. Court of Appeals, L-17898,
Oct. 31, 1962.
4
L-7056, May 31, 1956.