MARIA T. GUANZON, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND GENARO GUANZON, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MANUEL ARGEL, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ANTIQUE, JUAN, ERNESTO, ESTRELLA, …

Special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to
annul and set aside the orders issued by the Court of First Instance of Antique,
in its Civil Case No. 334, under date of 6 January and 4 March 1967, denying
petitioner Guanzon’s motions to require the Sheriff
to convey and restore to her the possession and ownership of Lot 5250 of the
cadastral survey of San Jose, Antique.

The factual background of the case is as follows:

The respondents Dumaraogs filed an
action against petitioner Guanzon for the redemption
of a parcel of rice land situated in barrio Inabasan,
San Jose, Antique, which their mother, Ines Flores,
had mortgaged to defendant, and to recover damages, before the Antique Court of
First Instance, presided by respondent judge.  They prayed that the purported pacto de retro sale be declared a mortgage
and that Guanzon be ordered to execute an instrument
of reconveyance after payment by Dumaraog
of the loan of P1,500.00.

Guanzon denied the material allegations
of the complaint and alleged that the document executed by Flores
was in fact a pacto de retro sale and
that her title as vendee had been consolidated.

After trial, the lower court rendered judgment declaring the docu­ment
involved to be one of equitable mortgage, and ordered Guanzon
to execute an instrument of reconveyance in favor of Dumaraog upon payment by the latter of P1,500.00
within 20 days from the finality of the decision, otherwise execution may issue
and the Provincial Sheriff may execute the necessary document of conveyance,
with costs against Dumaraog.  The trial court also declared that whatever
addi­tional amounts were loaned to the vendor-a-retro, Flores, by Guanzon were offset by the value
of the 30 cavans of palay a
year she received from 1949 to 1962.

Thereafter, alleging that although the aforesaid decision had
become final and that the Dumaraogs had not paid to
her P1,500.00 within 20 days from the date of the
decision, Guanzon filed a motion for execution
wherein she prayed that the Provincial Sheriff be ordered to execute the
necessary conveyance of the property in question in her favor and that she be
placed in the possession thereof.

Acting upon Guanzon’s motion for
execution, the trial court ordered the Dumaraogs to
deposit the P1,500.00 redemption price with the clerk
of court, which Guanzon shall receive, and that Guanzon shall within 10 days from receipt of the order
execute the deed of reconveyance in favor of Dumaraog, otherwise the Provincial Sheriff shall execute
the necessary conveyance in favor of Dumaraog and Guanzon could withdraw the said amount.

Dumaraog filed with the lower court a
bill of costs for its approval which Guanzon opposed
on the ground that she could be liable for costs only if Dumaraog
paid her P1,500.00 within 20 days from the finality of
the decision.  Despite this opposition,
the respondent judge by order approved the said bill of costs and issued an
execution of the same.

Meanwhile, in pursuance of the decision, Dumaraog
filed a notice of deposit of the redemption price of P1,500.00.

From the orders of the respondent judge (1) directing Dumaraog to deposit the P1,500.00 redemption price and for
her to receive the said amount and to execute a deed of reconveyance
in favor of Dumaraog, and (2) approving the Dumaraog’s bill of costs, Guanzon
filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the lower court has no
jurisdiction to issue the said orders for lack of jurisdiction, considering
that the decision has become final and executory,
hence it becomes the minis­terial duty of the court to issue the writ of
execution.

In an order dated 4 March
1967, the respondent judge denied Guanzon’s
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. 
Respondent Judge stated that it is not contemplated in the decision that
Guanzon is entitled to a deed of conveyance, and that
at most, she could withhold execution of the deed of reconveyance
until Dumaraog pays P1,500.00,
otherwise the Provincial Sheriff shall execute the neces­sary conveyance in her
favor.

Guanzon filed this petition claiming
that the respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse
of discretion, arguing that the respondent judge altered his original decision,
because although she was directed to execute a reconveyance
within 20 days in the original decision declaring the questioned document as an
equitable mortgage, in the order of 6 January 1967 herein complained of she was
given another additional 10 days to do so; and also in its order of 4 March
1967, the respondent judge allowed Dumaraog to
deposit the redemption price of P1,500.00 even after the lapse of 20 days after
the finality of the judgment.  The
petitioner states that while the decision of 31 August 1966 has become final and executory
on 14 October 1966, it was
only on 6 January 1967 that Dumaraog deposited the said amount with the clerk of court.

We find the charge of grave abuse of discretion not
justified.  The final decision of the
respondent court, in its operative clause, provided the following:

“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment:

1.  – Declaring the document
executed on 26 April 1949 by Ines Flores in favor of
Maria T. Guanzon, Exhibit A (same as Exhibit 2) an
equitable mortgage instead of a pacto de retro sale;

2.  – Ordering the defendant
Maria T. Guanzon to execute a reconveyance
in favor of the plaintiffs herein upon payment by the said plaintiffs of the
amount of P1,500.00 within twenty (20) days from the finality of this decision
otherwise execution may issue and that Provincial Sheriff may execute the
necessary conveyance, with costs against the defendants.

3.  – Counterclaim is
dismissed for lack of proof.

SO ORDERED.”

While paragraph 2 is not as clear as it could have been,
nevertheless, its purport is plain that should the plaintiffs (now private
respondents Dumaraog) fail to pay the P1,500.00 within the specified 20 days, petitioner Guanzon would be entitled to have execution issue to
collect the said amount from the properties of the respondents Dumaraog whereupon the deed of reconveyance
would be executed by Guanzon.  A converso,
should respondents Dumaraog deposit the money, but Guanzon refused to reconvey, the reconveyance could then be made by the Provincial Sheriff.  This is in accord with the provisions of
section 10, Rule 39, of the Revised Rules of Court:

“SEC. 10.  Judgment for specific
acts; vesting title.  – If a
judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land, or to deliver deeds
or other do­cuments, or to perform any other specific act, and the party fails
to comply within the time specified, the court may direct the act to be done at
the costs of the disobedient party by some other person appointed by the court
and the act when so done shall have like effect as if done by the party.  If real or personal property is within the
Philippines, the court in lieu of directing a conveyance thereof may enter
judgment divesting the title of any party and vesting it in others and such
judgment shall have the force and effect of a conveyance executed in due form
of law.”

In no way can the judgment at bar be construed to mean that
should the Dumaraogs fail to pay the money within the
specified period then the property would be conveyed by the Sheriff to Guanzon.  Any
interpre­tation in that sense would contradict the declaration made in the same
judgment that the contract between the parties was in fact a mortgage and not a
pacto de retro sale.  The only right of a mortgagee in case of non
payment of a debt secured by mortgage would be to foreclose the mortgage and
have the encumbered property sold to satisfy the out­standing
indebtedness.  The mortgagor’s default
does not operate to vest in the mortgagee the ownership of the encumbered
property, for any such effect is against public policy, as enunciated by the
Civil Code.^[1]
The court can not be presumed to have adjudged what would be contrary to law,
unless it be plain and inescapable from its final
judgment.  No such purport appears or is
legitimately inferable from the terms of the judgment aforequoted.  Hence, the orders of the court below refusing
to command the sheriff to convey the property to petitioner Guanzon,
as she demanded, and instead ordering her to reconvey
the property to respondents Dumaraog and receive the
P1,500.00 deposited by the latter, were in conformity
with the original decision that had become final and executory.

The writs prayed for are denied. 
Costs against the petitioner.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Castro, J., did not take part.

^[1]
“ART. 2088.  The creditor cannot
appropriate the things given by way of pledge or mortgage, or dispose of
them.  Any stipulation to the contrary is
null and void. “

“This forfeiture clause has
traditionally been outlawed, because it is contrary to good morals and public
policy.” (Code Commission Report, page 156)