G.R. No. L-20894. December 29, 1967
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROGER PERETO Y MANLAPAS, ET AL., DEFENDANTS. VICTORIO SAJORDA Y CAMPUS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
PER CURIAM:
In Criminal Case No. 482-R of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Roger Pereto y
Manlapas and Victorio Sajorda y Campus, were charged with the crime of murder
in the information filed against them,
which reads as follows:
“That on or about the 25th day of March, 1959, in the New Bilibid Prison, municipality of Muntinlupa,
province of Rizal, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with deadly weapons to wit:
sharp-pointed instruments, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Receval Langlañgan, thereby
inflicting upon the latter stab wounds on the different parts of his body
which caused his death instantaneously.
“That the accused are quasi-recidivists having committed the
above-mentioned felony while serving their respective sentences after having
been convicted of final judgment by competent courts.”
Upon arraignment on June
2, 1959, Roger Pereto pleaded guilty and
so the lower court rendered decision on the same day sentencing him, among
others, to death penalty.[1] Victorio Sajorda, on the other hand, pleaded not guilty, hence,
trial was held.
During the trial, Deogracias Salvador,
a guard at the New Bilibid Prisons at Muntinlupa, testified that on March 25, 1959, at about 6:45
a.m., he was informed by Viado Jopitana
that prisoners Roger Pereto and Victorio
Sajorda had inflicted serious physical injuries on Receval Langlañgan, their
co-prisoner, resulting in the death of the latter; that he proceeded to the
dormitory where the accused were confined and saw Roger Pereto
and Victorio Sajorda
holding the sharp-pointed instruments which they admitted to have used in
attacking Langlañgan; that Pereto
and Sajorda surrendered the instruments to him after
which Salvador took them to the office of Gaudencio Jimenez, an inspector of the New Bilibid Prisons, for investigation.
Describing the investigation conducted by him, Gaudencio Jimenez testified that Sajorda
and his co-accused Roger Pereto were brought to his
office in the morning of March 25, 1959; that both of them admitted their participation in the
commission of the crime; that the investigation was conducted in the presence
of two employees of his
(Jimenez) office, in the form of question and answer in Tagalog,
taken down on a typewriter by a typist.
Pertinent portion of Sajorda’s confession,
marked in the record as Exhibit B, reads as
follows:
“2 – T – Handa ka bang magbigay ng iyong kusang-loob
na salaysay sa imbistigasyong
ito?
S – Opo.
3 – T – Kung ganon, sabihin mo ang iyong pañgalan
at lahat ng mga bagaybagay na maaaring pakakilanlan
sa iyong pagkatao.
S – Victorio Sajorda, bilanggon may bilang 19005-C, 22 taong gulang, Pilipino, binata, tubo sa
Kinapandan, Samar,
at napasok dito sa bilangu-an
sa pagkakasalang pagnakaw at pagpuga sa bilanguan sa
munisipiyo ng Kinapandan, Samar.
4 – T – Bilang isang bilanggo,
saan ka nakakulong dito sa bilanguan?
S – Sa dormitoryo
4-A, Po, Silda No. 1.
5 – T – Anung
nangyari sainyo kaninang umaga?
S – Sa bandang
alas 6:30 ñgayong umaga,
Po, doon sa buyon sa dormitoryo
4-A, ako at si Roger ay pinatay namin si Receval Langlañgan,
No. 30029-P, sa pamamagitan ng pananaksak ng
maraming bisis noong siya’y bagong
tayo upang lumabas sa buyon
pagkatapos niyang tumai.
6 – T – Inaamin
mo bang pagkakasala iyan?
S – Opo.
7 – T – Nakaharap ba si
Langlañgan noong pri mirong saksakin
mo?
S – Opo.
8 – T – Sino sa
inyo ang unang sumaksak kay Langlañgan?
S – Ako, Po, at ang
tinamaan ko ay ang ibaba ng
kanyang kaliwang soso.
9 – T – Naliwanag na ba
sa loob ng buyon noong
saksakin ninyo
siya?
S – Opo.
10 – T – Saan
galing ang ginamit mong panaksak?
S – Ibinigay ni Roger (Roger Pereto) sa akin kahapon, Po.
11 – T – Matagal
na bang balak ninyo siyang patayin?
S – Matagal na po ñgunit
wala pang mahigit na isang buwan.
12 – T – Hindi ka ba membro ng
anumang ‘di legal na pangkat ng mga bilanggo
dito sa bilanggu-an?
S – Hindi, Po.
13 – T – Alin
ba sa mga
matalas naito ang ginamit mo?
S – Ito, Po.
14 – T – Bakit
ninyo pinatay si Langlañgan?
S – Dahil po sa
noong ako’y bagong pasok pa dito sa bilangguan,
habang ako’y naroon sa ‘Hospital Quarantine’, ako ay binontal ni Langlañgan nang
dahil daw sa ako ay Visaya at ang palagay niya
sa akin ay OXO daw ako. Sinontok niya ako
ng maraming bisis.
15 – T – Sapat na ba
iyon na dahilan
ng iyong pagpatay sa kanya?
S – Opo.
16 – T – Sino ba ang nakakita
sa inyo noong sina-saksak ninyo si Langlañgan?
S – Wala po sapagkat kami’y tatlo lamang doon.
17 – T – Hindi ba lumaban si
Langlañgan noong nasaksak mo na ng isang bisis?
S – Hindi, Po.
18 – T – Wala ba kayong
mainit na sagutan mona ni
Langlañgan bago mo siya sinaksak?
S – Wala, Po, basta pagpasok ko sa kubita na kasama
ko si Roger, noong
nakaka-ayos na si Langlañgan, sinaksak namin siya agad.
19 – T – Tapos na ako sa
pagtatanong. Mayroon ka pa ba ibang nais na
sabihin, bawasin sa salaysay mong
ito o kaya idagdag?
S – Wala na, Po.
20 -T- Handa
ka bang lumagda at panumpaan
na katotohanan at pawang katotohanan lahat ang mga
kasagutan mo sa aking mga tanong?
S – Opo.”
Gaudencio Jimenez further testified
that before he started the investigation he told Sajorda
the purpose of the investigation and that the record of the investigation
might be used in court against him (Sajorda) and the
latter agreed to give statements; that after the investigation, he read to Sajorda, paragraph by paragraph, the statements made by
him, after which he handed the same to Sajorda for
him to read; that Sajorda read the document and he
asked Sajorda if he understood the same and Sajorda answered “Yes”; that after that Sajorda affixed his thumbmark and
his signature voluntarily on the two pages where his statements were written;
that Sajorda swore to the truth of his statements
before Pedro S. Paje, Acting Assistant Director of
Prisons who, before signing the jurat, asked Sajorda if those
were the statements given by him and the latter answered, “Yes, sir.”
Gaudencio Jimenez had properly identified all the
signatures appearing on the document, Exhibit B.
Dr. Gervacio Acosta, who performed the
autopsy on the body of the deceased Receval Langlañgan on March
25, 1959, testified that the cause of the death of said deceased
was shock and massive hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds. This witness identified the autopsy report
which he made, marked Exhibit A in the record.
According to this autopsy report, the deceased Receval
Langlañgan received a total of forty-three wounds – 4
on the head, 10 on the neck, 5 on the anterior part of the body, 10 on the
posterior part of the body, 13 on the upper extremities, and 1 on the lower
extremity. Of the 43 wounds, 38 were
stabbed wounds.
The sharp-pointed instruments, marked Exhibits E and E-1 which
were used by the accused Victorio Sajorda
and his co-accused Roger Pereto in killing Langlañgan were properly identified by witness Deogracias Salvador.
It was also shown during the trial that the accused, Victorio Sajorda, on March 25,
1959, the time of the commission of the crime of which he is charged, was
serving in the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa, Rizal a term of three
years, six months and twenty-one days of prision
correccional for “evasion of sentence”
(Exhibit C). The record shows that he
had a previous conviction for theft.
The only evidence for the defense consists in the
testimony of accused Sajorda, who testified in his
own behalf. On the witness stand, he
disowned his confession, Exhibit B, and denied his participation in the commission
of the crime. Me declared that it was
Roger Pereto alone who killed Receval
Langlañgan. He
further declared that at about 6:30 a.m. on March 25, 1959, he was in Brigade
No. 4 lying in bed; that he heard a noise coming from the toilet, and
thereafter he saw Roger Pereto with blood on his
hands; that he was not arrested by Deogracias
Salvador but was brought by a policeman to the office of Inspector Jimenez;
that he was forced by Roger Pereto and his (Pereto’s) companions to go to Jimenez’ office and admit having
killed Langlañgan because on that same day he refused
to have himself tattoed with the “OXO”
sign; that he did not give any statement to Inspector Jimenez; that the sworn
statement, Exhibit B, was prepared by Inspector Jimenez without his intervention;
that he could not have read the document, Exhibit B, because his educational
attainment was
only that of grade III, primary; that if he signed the document it was
because Inspector Jimenez told him that the same was only temporary (pansamantala lamang) and that he
can narrate the true facts when the case reaches the court; and that he was
not brought to Acting Assistant Director of Prisons Pedro S. Paje, to have his statements subscribed and sworn to before
him.
Based on the foregoing evidence, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, on October
15, 1962, rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused, Victorio
Sajorda y Campus, guilty of the crime of murder,
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and it appearing that
the said accused is a quasi-recidivist, the court, pursuant to Article 160 of
said code, hereby sentences him to death penalty, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased, Receval Langlañgan,
in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6, 000.00), with no subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay one-half of the costs.”
The case is now before this Court on automatic review due to the
penalty imposed.
The question to be resolved at this instance revolves on the
evaluation of the extra-judicial confession of the accused, Exhibit B, and his repudiation
of the same at the trial. Or, stated in
another way, whether the bare denial by the accused of his participation in the
commission of the crime of which he is charged can be given more weight than
his confession.
We cannot disregard the confession, Exhibit B, where the accused
expressly acknowledged his participation in the commission of the crime
charged. There is ample evidence which
show that said confession was made by the accused voluntarily. Inspector Gaudencio
Jimenez, who conducted the investigation, declared that all the answers therein
contained were spontaneously and voluntarily given by the accused himself, in
the presence of two employees (witnesses) of his office; that after the
interrogation, he read the statement to the accused paragraph by paragraph,
after which the latter affixed his thumbmarks and
signatures thereon; and that when brought to Acting Assistant Director Paje, defendant admitted having given the statements
contained in the document which he signed and thumbmarked. Other than the subsequent repudiation and
self-serving insistence of the accused that his statement, Exhibit B, was
already prepared by Inspector Jimenez when he signed the same, no evidence was
adduced that the declarations in said statement were involuntary. If it were true that the answers contained in
the confession were not furnished by the accused, it would have been extremely
easy for him to expose that fact before trial, yet no explanation had been given by
him why he never denounced the same to the proper authorities – an inaction
which heavily argues against the veracity of his claim. From such inaction, the conclusion can be
drawn that accused had voluntarily confessed to his guilt when he was overcome
by remorse of conscience, when the investigation was made after the
killing. Realizing later the gravity of
his admission, it must have occurred to him, as an afterthought, to repudiate
it at the trial and claim innocence. We
cannot discard the confession of an accused simply because he denies what he
stated therein. In a similar case, this
Court held:
“Besides the testimonies of the state witnesses, we have the
extra-judicial confession of Paulino Mansit admitting his individual participation in the
commission of the crime and confirming in material points the State’s version
of the foul deed. The regularity with
which this confession was executed is sufficiently established. Pfc. Neofito
Torres, one of those who helped prepare Mansit’s
affidavit (Exhibit ‘K’), declared that all the answers therein were
spontaneously and voluntarily furnished by Mansit
himself (tsn p. 705).
After the interrogation, the declarant was allowed to go over his statements
and upon being asked whether the same were true, he replied in the
affirmative. Thereafter, he was brought
to Assistant Director of Prisons Miss before whom Mansit
subscribed and sworn to his affidavit.
x x x
“The clain of Mansit that Exhibit ‘K’ was already prepared when he signed
it, is uncorroborated and his
repudiation came only for the first time when he took the witness stand in
July, 1956, or 1-1/2 years after its execution.[2] As we said in one case:
‘The repudiation made by the accused of their affidavits of confessions
for the first time only during the trial in the court of first instance is
afterthought born of an eleventh hour attempt to escape criminal responsibility.’
(People vs. Viernes, et al., 47 Off. Gaz. 123)” (People v. Mitre,
et al., L-13030, April 29, 1960)
Moreover, the confession of defendant Sajorda,
as well as that of his original co-accused Roger Pereto
which is attached to the record, reveal the precise details of their
conspiracy to liquidate their victim and the manner they carried out said conspiracy. The record shows that the accused agreed and
planned to kill the deceased because of the grudge they had against him – Pereto, for having been mauled by Langlañgan’s
companions when Pereto lost some sweepstakes tickets
he was then selling for the deceased in Pasay City,
and defendant Sajorda, for having been boxed by Langlañgan when he (Sajorda) was
a new inmate in the penitentiary. These
are motives of the crime which the authorities of the insular penitentiary
could not have concocted.[3] Furthermore, both accused confessed having
stabbed the deceased many times, which is confirmed by the autopsy findings of
the medical officer, Dr. Gervacio Acosta, that the
deceased sustained 43 wounds on different parts of his body, 38 of them being
stabbed wounds. This fact, together with
the confiscation of the two sharp-pointed instruments (Exhibits E and E-1) do not
jibe with the claim of herein accused that said wounds were inflicted by Pereto alone. The
presumption of the law is in favor of the spontaneity and voluntariness
of the statement given by an accused, and it is incumbent upon him to destroy
that presumption.[4] This, the accused failed to do in the present
case. No evidence has been adduced to
overcome this presumption except his own retracting testimony at the
trial. Inasmuch as the question of voluntariness of the confession is one that depends upon
the credibility of witnesses, as between the lone testimony of the accused, on
the one hand, and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, on the other,
the trial court did not err when it gave greater weight to the latter, not only
because the prosecution witnesses were neutral and disinterested, being
government employees who merely testified as to what transpired in the
performance of their official duties,[5] but also because
the accused himself had admitted that the prosecution witnesses had no reason
to falsely testify against him, and that he was not subjected to any violence,
torture or bodily harm. As this Court
has said:
“Said issue of the voluntariness of
the confession is one depending upon the credibility of contending
witnesses. Such matter being within the
special competence of the trial court, we see no reason in this case to disturb
its finding and conclusion that the confession was voluntarily given and not
forcibly extracted.” (People v. Cesar Reyes y Engreso,
et al., L-19894, May 27, 1966)”
“ x x
x Time after time, this Court has declared that the
matter of assigning values to declarations at the witness stand is best and
most competently performed or carried out by the trial judge because the
latter, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimonies in the light
of the declarant’s demeanor, conduct and attitude at
the trial. (People v. Refuerzo, 82 Phil. 576; People v. Federico, L-1512, May 12,
1949; People v. Aquino, L-12123, July 31, 1958;
People v. Romawak, L-19644, Oct. 31, 1964).”
(People v. Secapuri, et al., L-17518-19, February
28, 1966)”
“ x x x As a
rule, this Court desists from disturbing the conclusion of the trial court
concerning the credibility of witnesses for that court, having seen and heard
the witnesses themselves and observed
their behavior and manner of
testifying, is in a better position to appreciate the evidence. (People v. Daycay,
etc., et al., supra, citing People v. Lumayog,
G. R. No. L-19142, March 31, 1965.”
(People v. Pasiona, L-18295, February 28,
1966; See also People v. Quintab,
L-21417, January 31, 1966)
We have made a very thorough examination of the record of this case, and We
fully agree with the following conclusion of the trial court
in its decision:
“After a careful consideration of the evidence on record, it is our considered
opinion that the guilt of the accused Victorio Sajorda has been established beyond reasonable doubt. We have no reason to doubt the veracity of
the testimony of Inspector Jimenez who investigated the said accused and that
of prison guard Deogracias Salvador. The presumption is that said officers regularly performed their official duty
and such presumption has not been overcome by evidence to the contrary. Indeed, no motive has been shown or even
intimated as to why said officers incriminated him. We cannot believe that they would be so
totally devoid of conscience as to
confabulate on an innocent man.
“We are fully
satisfied, upon examination of the extra-judicial confession of the herein
accused, that the same was spontaneously and voluntarily given. The answers to the questions are highly
responsive and the statement itself contains information and details which
could possibly be supplied only by the accused himself.”
It is noteworthy that counsel de oficio,
a very prominent member of the bar, made the following statement in the brief
that he filed for the accused:
“ x x x We have pondered and mulled
over this question long and hard, conscious that the life of a human being is at stake. We wished we
could with sincerity argue in favor of appellant’s pretension; but after
carefully considering his extra-judicial confession Exhibit B vis-a-vis his uncorroborated testimony during the trial, in
relation to all the circumstances testified to by the witnesses for the
prosecution, we could not honestly sustain appellant’s professed
innocence.”
The crime committed by the herein accused is murder, qualified
by treachery, with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
quasi-recidivism (Article 160, Revised Penal Code) – circumstances that are
duly established by the evidence.
Finding no error in the decision under review, the same is hereby
affirmed. With costs de oficio.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Makalintal, Bengzon, JP, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., did not take part.
[1]
This decision of the lower court was affirmed by this Court on April 29, 1961, but the death penalty
imposed upon Roger Pereto was commuted to life
imprisonment by the President of the Philippines
in his order dated February 21, 1962.
[2]
The repudiation of the accused in the instant case was made more than three
years after the execution of Exhibit B.
[3]
People v. Mendoza, et al.,
L-16392, January 30, 1965; See
also People v. Pagulayan, L-13292, December 29, 1960; People v.
Cruz, et al., 103 Phil., 693.
[4]
People v. Garcia, 101 Phil., 616.
[5]
Guevara v.
Girnenez, L-17171, January 30, 1965.