ASELA P. TACTAQUIN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. JOSE B. PALILEO, DE­FENDANT AND APPELLEE.

Before Us is a motion filed by plaintiff-appellant praying that We reconsider our decision promulgated
on September 29, 1967, upon the ground that the reservation to file a separate
civil action made at the trial of Criminal Case No. 4736 was timely made and that, therefore, the
doctrine of res judicata
does not bar the action (Civil Case
No. Q-6601) filed by her in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

As stated in our original decision, appellant filed the action aforesaid to recover from appellee
the total sum of P37,636.35 as damages for the death of her daughter, Norma Tactaquin, and serious physical injuries inflicted upon her
on June 16, 1961 when a car
recklessly driven by appellee hit them at Marulas, Valenzuela, Bulacan.  In connection with this accident, appellee was charged criminally (Criminal Case No. 4736, Court
of First Instance of Bulacan) and was found guilty of
homicide, with serious physical injuries, through reckless imprudence, and was
sentenced not only to suffer imprisonment but also to pay the sum of P4,000 to appellant as damages.  Because of this, appellee
moved to dismiss the civil case for damages, upon the ground that the action
was already barred by the final judgment rendered in the criminal case just
mentioned.  Sustaining this motion the
lower court dismissed the case, and appellant appealed to Us.  Our original decision affirmed the order of
dismissal, with costs.

Upon consideration of the motion for reconsideration now before
Us, We find that, according to the record, appellee,
when arraigned in connection with Criminal Case No. 4736 mentioned heretofore,
pleaded not guilty.  However, when the
case was called for trial on August
14, 1962, he was allowed to withdraw said plea and he immediately
entered a plea of guilty, the provincial fiscal forthwith recommending the
imposition of the corresponding penalty and civil liability.  Thereupon, the private prosecutor, Atty. Sundiam, made this statement for the record:

“May this representation be heard because we reserve the right
to civil liability.”

to which the
Court replied –

“That manifestation of the private prosecutor be recorded.” (T.s.n. pp.
1-3, session of August 14, 1962)

The record further discloses that notwithstanding the above
reservation and the Court’s corresponding statement, the latter subsequently
proceeded to render judgment as stated heretofore.

Upon the foregoing facts
it is
clear, firstly, that the private
prosecutor timely made a reservation
on behalf of the offended party in connection with the filing of a separate
civil action; secondly, that such reservation was duly recorded by order of the
Court; thirdly, that, as a result thereof, the question of civil liability was
automatically taken out of the case and was not before the court any
longer.  Upon these premises, the
conclusion becomes inescapable that the portion of the decision of the Court in
Criminal Case No. 4736 concerning civil indemnity was a nullity, and being so,
it can not be accorded the authority of res judicata.

The rule in this connection is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly
instituted with it “unless the offended party expressly waives the civil
action or reserves his right to institute it separately”.  While the rule does not say when or at what
stage of the criminal proceeding the reservation should be made, it seems
logical to presume that for the
reservation to be timely and legally effective, it must be made – as in the
present case – before the ren­dition of judgment.

Upon the other hand, it has been held that once the offended
party has reserved his right to institute a se­parate civil action to recover
indemnity, he thereby loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of the
criminal case (Gorospe vs. Honorable Gatmaitan, 52 0. G. p. 2526).  For this reason, herein appellant no longer
had any right – nor should she had been expected – to move for the
reconsideration of, much less to appeal from the decision in the criminal case
in so far as it decided the question of civil indemnity.  She no longer had any standing in the case.

WHEREFORE, ruling upon appellant’s motion for re­consideration,
the Court hereby sets aside its original decision and directs that
the present case be remanded below for further proceedings.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, and Angeles, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., did not take
apart.