PRESENTACION BAUTISTA, PETITIONER, VS. ANITA F. FERNANDEZ, RESPONDENT.

In 1952 the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, the original
decreed owner of lot 3, Psd-2870, with an area of 373.10 square meters located
on Dakota street, Malate, Manila, and covered by
original certificate of title 609, sold on installments the aforesaid land to Simeona L. Ricalde and Fructuosa R. Gonzales, said transaction evidenced by
contract 32-HR.  Four years later, in
1956, Gonzales, by virtue of an assignment of rights, relinquished, assigned
and conveyed all her rights unto and in favor of her co-buyer Ricalde.

On November 27, 1957, Anita F. Fernandez (hereinafter referred to
as the respondent) bought Ricalde’s consolidated
rights and secured from the Register of Deeds of the city of Manila transfer
certificate of title 49717.  Said title,
issued in the name of “Anita F. Fernandez, married to Alberto Fernandez,
Filipino,” embraced the entire lot.

The respondent, on December 19, 1957, made a written demand upon
Presentation D. Bautista (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner), an
occupant of a portion of 93.275 square meters of the land and of a house
standing thereon, to vacate the premises before February 1958.  The petitioner refused to leave the premises,
thus compelling the respondent to bring an ejectment
suit^[1]
against her on January 21, 1958
before the municipal court of the city of Manila.

The municipal court, however, dismissed the ejectment
suit on the ground that the real issue between the parties was the ownership the premises in question.  The respondent duly appealed the case to the
Court of First Instance.  On August 30, 1958, the CFI dismissed
the appealed case^[2]
on the ground of priority of possession of the premises in question on the part
of the petitioner and of her right to stay in the said premises until lawfully
ejected, by either an accion publiciana or an accion
reinvindicatoria, by a person with a better
right.

On September 28, 1958,
the respondent instituted an action^[3]
in the Court of First Instance, alleging ownership of the whole lot in question
and praying that the petitioner be ordered to “vacate the premises
immediately” and to pay actual, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees in the total amount of P14,000, plus a monthly rental of P1,000.

In her amended answer filed with the CFI, the petitioner asserted
an adverse claim of ownership in herself, alleging that she acquired ownership
of the portion of 93.275 square meters or one-fourth of the whole land,
together with the house standing thereon, from Cornelia Quiocho
on September 14, 1957 for the amount of P4,000, as evidenced by a deed of
absolute sale.  Quiocho,
according to her, in turn acquired the one-fourth portion for a valuable
consideration from Marciana Sioson
Librano on May
26, 1954.  The deed of sale
of a house and lot executed by Librano in favor of Quiocho, the petitioner alleged, carried and embodied the
written conformity of Ricalde and Gonzales, the
original co-buyers of the whole lot.

After due trial, the CFI rendered judgment on April 25, 1959
declaring the respondent the absolute owner of the whole lot, including the
portion claimed and occupied by the petitioner. 
The trial court also ordered the petitioner to vacate the premises and
to pay to the respondent the sum of P50 a month as rental from January 1, 1958 until she shall have
left the premises, plus the sum of P150 as attorney’s fees, and the costs.  The petitioner duly appealed the trial
court’s decision to the Court of Appeals.

On December 21, 1964,
the appellate court rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial
court.

Hence, this appeal by the petitioner by way of certiorari
to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner imputes five errors to the Court of Appeals, to
wit:

1)     
In recognizing the original jurisdiction assumed
by the Court of First Instance over the forcible entry case filed within  one year from the alleged dispossession,
and error in taking appellate jurisdiction to affirm the judgment in the said
case;

2)     
In sanctioning the non-joinder
of an indispensable party;

3)     
In declaring the respondent the owner of the
whole lot;

4)     
In not holding the action barred by res judicata; and

5)     
In not dismissing the respondent’s complaint.

Anent the first assigned error, the petitioner assails the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to take cognizance of the case
brought against her by the respondent in the said court.  She alleges that the nature of the action
partakes of a forcible entry case as evidently shown by the pleadings filed,
the evidence adduced, and the admissions made by both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals.  To strengthen her
stand, the petitioner argues that the respondent filed the forcible entry case
on September 28, 1958, nine
months or less than one year from the alleged dispossession.  Concomitantly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction
over the alleged forcible entry case because section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court requires that the action be brought “at any time within one (1) year
after” the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession of the land
in question “in the proper inferior court.”

In answer, the respondent alleges that the real issue raised by
the pleadings is the ownership of the disputed portion of land and, as a
necessary consequence, possession of the said land.  She asserted ownership over the land, and
alleges that the petitioner, in her answer filed with the trial court, also
claimed ownership of the premises.  These
two conflicting claims of ownership, the respondent argues, clearly placed the
case within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.

Resolution of the question of jurisdiction raised by the
petitioner depends largely upon the determination of the true nature of the
action filed by the respondent against the said petitioner in the Court of
First Instance.  This necessarily
involves a consideration of the ultimate facts alleged in the complaint
constituting the respondent’s cause of action, for the averments of the
complaint, taken as a whole, determine the nature of the action and
consequently the jurisdiction of the courts.^[4]

The trial court, after taking into account the pleadings filed
and the evidence presented by the parties, ruled the action as one for the
recovery of ownership.  Likewise, the
Court of Appeals, after an examination of the pleadings, found that, under the
said pleadings, the principal litigation relates to the “ownership of the
one-fourth disputed portion” and that any question of possession
“necessarily depends upon the result of the inquiry into the title.”

The allegations of the respondent in her complaint filed with the
Court of First Instance clearly establish a case for the recovery of ownership,
and not merely one for the recovery of possession de facto as the
petitioner vehemently insists.  The
complaint definitely raises this question of ownership and clearly gives the
petitioner notice of the respondent’s claim of exclusive and absolute ownership
of the whole land.  In brief, the
averments of the complaint sufficiently and properly plead the respondent’s
claim of ownership necessarily including possession as an elemental attribute
of such ownership.

The other allegations in the complaint regarding the petitioner’s
manner and mode of entry into the disputed portion of land merely apprise the
court of the facts and incidents relied upon by the respondent in asserting her
claim that the petitioner took possession of the disputed premises without
color of title.  The respondent also
relies upon such facts and incidents in establishing a sufficient cause for her
claim for damages.

The petitioner makes mention of the fact that the respondent, in
her complaint, sought by way of relief an order to vacate the premises and an
award of damages and not a declaration of ownership.  According to the petitioner, this clearly
shows that the action filed by the respondent partakes of a forcible entry
case.  Suffice it to state that the
allegations of fact set forth in the proper pleading, not the prayer for
relief, determine the nature and character of an action.  If ever the trial court found the respondent
entitled to a declaration of ownership – a relief not applied for – the trial
court so acted only because it believed the relief warranted by the facts
alleged in the respondent’s com plaint.^[5]
Moreover, the respondent’s broad and comprehensive prayer in her complaint,
“for such other relief and remedy” just and proper in the premises,
justifies the relief granted by the trial court.

To further strengthen her stand, the petitioner argues that the
respondent filed her action, allegedly one for forcible entry, within one year
from the alleged dispossession with the Court of First Instance and not with
the proper inferior court.  Consequently,
the CFI lacked jurisdiction to entertain the same.  This, of course, assumes the action as one
for forcible entry.  Taken in the light
of the foregoing discussion finding the action one for the recovery of ownership,
no necessity exists for the respondent to wait for the lapse of one year from
the dispossession to maintain the accion reinvindicatoria. 
In fact, both an action for the recovery of ownership and an action for detainer over the same land and between the same parties
can be filed at the same time for they involve different issues.^[6]

The petitioner raises the question of non-joinder
of her husband as an indispensable party in her second assignment of
error.  She believes her husband an
indispensable party to the action because the same involves conjugal property,
and, even assuming the land in question as not forming part of the conjugal
partnership, still the action includes a claim for damages sought to be
recovered from conjugal assets.

Significant it is to note that the petitioner, in her answer and
amended answer to the respondent’s complaint, pleaded “misjoinder
of parties,” alleging that “the husbands of plaintiff and defendant are not included in the
complaint.” Subsequently, in her motion for reconsideration of the trial
court’s decision which left unresolved the question of “misjoinder of parties,” the petitioner failed
altogether to call the attention of the court a quo to this
question by omitting mention of the same. 
Then, in her appeal to the Court of Appeals, she merely referred to the
error of the trial court “in not dismissing the complaint for failure of
the plaintiff to join her husband,” making no remark whatsoever of the
non-joinder of her husband as party defendant, thus
depriving the appellate court opportunity to rule on the matter.  Acting on the question, the appellate court
required the respondent to file an amended complaint making her husband
party-plaintiff.  Then, the petitioner,
in her motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision, raised the
question of the necessity of impleading her own
husband as party-defendant.  Now, before
this Court, she insists that the Court of Appeals failed to realize the need
for the joinder of her husband as party-defendant.

This noticeable
inconsistency in the pleadings of the petitioner, a lawyer herself deemed to
possess reasonable and sufficient knowledge of the well-settled rules of law
and procedure, reveals more than lack of care and diligence on her part.  We feel constrained to comment that we can
not tolerate the conduct of the petitioner in splitting her defenses, pleading
portions of the same whenever she deems it convenient – a practice abhorrent to
the standards of honesty and sincerity required of members of the legal
profession.

Nevertheless, we opine
that the petitioner’s husband should have been impleaded
as party-defendant, for the action involves recovery of real property admitted
by the petitioner herself in her petition filed with this Court as conjugal and
includes a demand for damages for the use and occupancy of the premises in
question.  Undeniably, the damages sought
to be recovered are chargeable against the conjugal assets under the
administration of the petitioner’s husband.

Article 113 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, re-stated in section 4 of Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, requires the joinder of the
husband in all suits for or against the wife, subject to the exceptions
enumerated therein.^[7] This case not constituting an exception,
the need to align the husband of the petitioner as party-defendant arises.

The remedial solution laid down by this Court in Cuyugan vs. Dizon,^[8]
although relating to the non-joinder of the
plaintiff’s husband, applies as well to the question of the non-joinder of the defendant’s husband.  There, this Court ruled that the case should
not be

“…dismissed for plaintiff’s failure to join her husband.  Nor should the case be remanded to the court
below and a new trial ordered on this account. 
The complaint may and should be amended here, to cure the defect of
party plaintiffs, after final decision is rendered.”

This Court, in the same case, reasoned that

“. . . a second action would be but a repetition of the first and
would involve both parties, plaintiffs and defendant, in much additional expense
and would cause much delay, in that way defeating the purpose of the section^[9],
which is expressly stated to be ‘that the actual merits of the controversy may
speedily be determined without regard to technicalities and in the most expeditious
and inexpensive manner’.”

The third assigned error refers to the adverse and conflicting
claims of ownership of both the petitioner and the respondent over the
one-fourth portion of the land.  The
petitioner predicates her argument mainly on the supposed knowledge on the part
of the respondent of the prior sale of the disputed portion of land in her
favor by Quiocho, claiming that the alleged knowledge
tainted the respondent’s title over the whole land.  The petitioner, to support her argument,
alleges that the respondent admitted such knowledge in the proceedings before
the trial court.  Consequently, the
petitioner concludes that the respondent obtained the registration of the whole
land by fraud, thus obligating her to re-convey to the petitioner the disputed
portion.

We find no clear and sufficient evidence in the records
preponderating in favor of the petitioner’s contention of awareness on the part
of the respondent of the said petitioner’s purchase of the disputed portion of
land.  Even the Court of Appeals noted
the lack of any “allegation in the several pleadings on record that title
holder Anita F. Fernandez knew
or had knowledge of the past transactions over the lot in question” and of
any proof “to establish awareness of the aforesaid transactions on the
part of said Anita F. Fernandez.”

The alleged fraud on the part of the respondent in obtaining the
registration of the whole land in her name cannot be presumed.  The same must be established by preponderance
of clear and sufficient evidence.

At all events, the record unmistakably shows that the respondent
holds a transfer certificate of title to the whole land – a fact admitted by
the petitioner herself.  Said certificate
of title has the same validity and legal effect as the original thereof.  Said certificate of title, covering the whole
land including the disputed one-fourth portion, must stand, not having been
declared null and void by judicial pronouncement, and must be afforded the full
protection of the Torrens system.  The
respondent having proved her exclusive ownership of the whole lot by means of
the certificate of title duly presumed to have been issued in accordance with
law and in due course, we find no cogent reason to reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court which declared the
respondent the absolute owner of the whole parcel of land including the portion
claimed by the petitioner.

We briefly dispose of the petitioner’s fourth assignment of error
– that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding the action barred by the
previous judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance in civil case 36590 –
by adverting to the provisions of section 7 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
to wit:

“Sec. 7.  Judgment
conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving title
or ownership.  – The judgment
rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer
shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise binds the
title or affects the ownership of the land or building.  Such judgment shall not bar an action between
the same parties respecting title to the land or building, nor shall it be held
conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a
different cause of action not involving possession.”

A judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession
and establishes only who has the right of possession, but by no means
constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or title
of ownership.^[10]

ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby ordered that the respondent,
within fifteen (15) days from notice hereof, file an amended complaint impleading the petitioner’s husband as party-defendant;
forthwith after this amended complaint shall have been filed, let judgment be
entered affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals.  Costs against the petitioner.  Let a copy of this decision be served on
the petitioner’s husband.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., reserves his vote.

^[1]
Civil Case 55549.

^[2]
Civil Case 36590.

^[3]
Civil Case 27937.

^[4]
Calo and San Jose
vs. Roldan, et al., 76 Phil. 445; Serrano and
Silver Lines, Inc. vs. Muñoz (Hi) Motors, Inc.,
et al., 21 SCRA 1085.

^[5]
Schenker vs. Gemperle,
5 SCRA 1042.

^[6]
Alejandro vs. The Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
et al., 70 Phil. 613.

^[7]
Instances when a married woman may sue
or be sued alone or without joining her husband:

1)      
When they are judicially separated;

2)      
If they have in fact been separated for at least
one year;

3)      
When there is a separation of property agreed
upon in the marriage settlements;

4)      
If the administration of all the property in the
marriage has been transferred to her, in accordance with articles 196 and 197
of the Civil Code;

5)      
When the litigation is between the husband and
the wife;

6)      
If the suit concerns her paraphernal
property;

7)      
When the action is upon the civil liability
arising from a criminal offense;

8)      
If the litigation is incidental to the
profession, occupation or business in which she is engaged;

9)      
In any civil action referred to in articles 25
to 36 of the Civil Code; and

10)  
In an action upon a quasi-delict.

In the cases
mentioned in nos. 7 to 10, the husband must be joined as a party-defendant if
the third paragraph of article 163 of the Civil Code is applicable.

^[8]
45 OG 673, 79 Phil. 80.

^[9]
Referring to section 2 of Rule 17 of the old Rules of Court (at present section
1 of Rule 10 of the new Rules of Court) which states:

“Section 1.  Amendments in general.  – Pleadings may be amended by adding or
striking out an allegation or the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake
in the name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in
any other respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be
determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and
inexpensive manner.”

^[10]
Villaroman vs. Abaya
and The Manila Southern Colleges, 91 Phil. 20.