THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, VALERIO O. ERGINO, AGUSTIN B. KAPUNO, FELICIANO BARRER, AND THE BUENO INDUSTRIAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONERS, VS. JUDGE JESUS S. RUIZ, AS …

On October 2, 1964, the Bueno Industrial
and Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the BIDCOR) filed with
the Director of Forestry (hereinafter referred to as the Director) a
letter-complaint (dated September 29, 1964) against the R.C. Aquino Timber and Plywood Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred
to as the TIMPLY) and its president, Rafael C. Aquino,
asking for the immediate suspension and then cancellation of Timber License
Agreement 68 in the name of the TIMPLY and of the Ordinary Road Right-of-Way
Permit 237 in the name of Aquino and the TIMPLY.  The BIDCOR alleged as grounds therefor TIMPLY’s violation of
the terms and conditions of its timber license agreement and ordinary road
right-of-way permit, as well as its disregard of forestry laws, rules and
regulations.

The TIMPLY, on October 8, 1964, moved to dismiss the
letter-complaint.  The Director, however,
considered the numerous charges “worth looking into” and requiring
“a thorough inquiry by an appropriate committee” for a determination
of facts.  In an order dated December 15,
1964, the Director deferred resolution
on the TIMPLY’s motion to dismiss until after proper
hearing on the letter-complaint, and created a committee to conduct the
necessary investigation.

Subsequently, on January
8, 1965, the TIMPLY moved to set aside the Director’s order creating the
investigation committee, which motion the Director denied in an order dated
January 25, 1965.  The Director also
ordered the resumption of the investigation of the charges.  The TIMPLY, in a letter dated January
8, 1965, appealed
the aforementioned order of the Director (dismissing its motion to set aside
the previous order creating the investigation committee) to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, praying that the said Secretary order the
Director to suspend or stop the investigatory hearings.

In the meantime, the
committee convened by the Director continued proceedings on the BIDCOR’s letter-complaint.

On January 29, 1965, the
TIMPLY filed with the Court of First Instance of Agusan
a petition entitled “Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and
Damages,” docketed as special civil case 185.  The TIMPLY sought the ex parte issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining the Director and five other forestry officials – three of whom
belong to the investigating committee from continuing the hearing on the BIDCOR’s charges.  On
the same day, presiding judge Jesus S. Ruiz of the CFI of Agusan
issued an order giving due course to the petition and requiring the Director
and other forestry officials and the BIDCOR to answer the petition.  He also issued and granted, upon the filing
of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction restraining and
prohibiting the Director, the other forestry officials, their agents,
representatives, attorneys, or any other person acting in their behalf from
continuing with the investigation of the charges filed by the BIDCOR against
the TIMPLY, and issuing any order or resolution pertinent to the
letter-complaint.

On February 5, 1965, the
Director and the other forestry
officials, through the Solicitor General, filed with the court a quo
a motion asking for leave to file a motion to dismiss instead of an
answer.  Likewise, the BIDCOR filed a
motion, seeking permission to file a motion to dismiss.  Both motions sought the dismissal of the
TIMPLY petition on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction of the CFI of Agusan and lack of cause of action due to non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

The TIMPLY, on February
28, 1965, filed its opposition to the aforesaid motions for dismissal of its
petition.  On March 8, 1965, the BIDCOR
filed its rejoinder to the TIMPLY’s opposition.

Resolving the motions,
Judge Ruiz, on March 31, 1965, issued an order denying the motions to
dismiss for lack of merit.  The forestry
officials moved for reconsideration of this denial on April 23, 1965 and the
BIDCOR did the same on April 28, 1965. 
The lower court denied these motions for reconsideration in an order
dated July 12, 1965.

Hence, the present
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
filed by the BIDCOR and the forestry officials.

To restrain and prohibit
the respondents and their agents and
their representatives from enforcing the lower court’s order and writ of
preliminary injunction, both dated January 29, 1965, and from conducting
further proceedings re the petition filed by the respondent TIMPLY, this Court,
at the instance of the petitioners, issued a preliminary injunctive writ on
August 24, 1965, enjoining the respondents from committing the aforestated acts.

The central question
posed by the petition at bar is whether or not the Court of First Instance of Agusan has jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining administrative officers from proceeding with an official
investigation outside of the province of Agusan.

The petitioners rely
mainly on paragraph (h) of section 44 of Republic Act 296, as amended, to
support their theory that the lower court has no jurisdiction to issue the
injunctive writ in question.  Paragraph
(h) of section 44 provides that courts of first instance and their judges, or
any of them, “shall have the power to issue writs of injunction, mandamus,
certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and
habeas corpus in their respective provinces and districts, in the manner
provided in the Rules of Court.”

Interpreted and applied
properly, the petitioners maintain, paragraph (h) limits the jurisdiction or
authority of courts of first instance to control or restrain acts by means of
the writ of preliminary injunction to those acts being committed or about to be
committed within the territorial boundaries of their respective provinces and
districts.  Thus, the Court of First
Instance of Agusan has no jurisdiction at all to
enjoin the official investigation being conducted in the city of Manila of the
charges by the petitioner BIDCOR against the respondent TIMPLY.

The petitioners also rely
upon Acosta et al. vs. Hon. Alvendia and De Santos
Agricultural Development Inc.^[1] where this Court held that paragraph (h)
defines and limits the jurisdiction of courts of first instance to issue writs
of injunction.

This
Court there stated that

“Under section 2, Rule 60^[2]
of the Rules of Court, a preliminary injunction may be granted by the Judge of
the Court of First Instance ‘in any action pending in his district.’ These
provisions clearly show that the jurisdiction or authority of courts of first
instance to control or restrain acts by means of the writ of injunction is
limited to acts which are being committed or about to be committed within the
territorial boundaries of their respective provinces and districts.”

On the other hand, the
respondents argue that the court a quo has jurisdiction to issue
the writ of injunction involved herein, citing in support thereof section 3 of
Rule 135 of the Rules of Court and Gayacao
vs. Hon. Executive Secretary of the President of the Philippines, et al.^[3] Section 3 of Rule 135 reads:

“Sec. 3. Process of superior courts enforced throughout the
Philippines. – Process issued from a superior court in which a case is
pending to bring in a defendant, or for the arrest of any accused person, or to
execute any order or judgment of the court, may be enforced in any part of the
Philippines.”

According
to the respondent TIMPLY, the aforesaid section permits the enforceability of
any process for the execution of any order or judgment of courts of first
instance throughout the Philippines.

To further strengthen its
stand, the respondent TIMPLY asserts that the pronouncement of this Court in Gayacao is applicable to the case at bar.  In said case, the respondent TIMPLY alleges, this Court held that the power of
judicial review of courts should not be confined “to courts of first
instance of the locality where the offices of respondents are maintained, to
the exclusion of the courts of first instance in those localities where the
plaintiffs reside, and where the questioned decisions are being enforced.”

We find the contention of
the respondent TIMPLY untenable.

A distinction exists
between the ruling of this Court in Gayacao
cited by the respondents and that in Acosta relied upon by the petitioners.  This difference we have recognized in several
cases.^[4]

The petitioner in Gayacao sought judicial review of the decision of the
Director of Lands and the subsequent affirmatory
decisions of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Executive Secretary by the Court of First Instance of Basilan
City. “The remedy sought was the judicial review of the administrative
decision in question and its annulment on account of errors of law allegedly
committed.” The sole point in controversy related to a determination of
“whether the decision of the respondent public officers was legally
correct or not.” This Court therein stated that “the power of
provincial courts of first instance to review administrative decisions of
national officials has been consistently recognized.”

We subsequently applied
the same rule in Zamboanga General
Utilities Inc., supra, wherein, similarly as in Gayacao, the
party-litigants raised the question of whether or not the Court of First
Instance of Basilan City has the power to review the
decision of the Director of Lands and the affirmatory
decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.  We also said in this case that a different
rule applies to petitions for injunction seeking to control the actions of
courts and officers, reiterating that the

“(J)urisdiction or authority of
Courts of First Instance to control or restrain acts by  means of the writ of injunction is limited to
acts which are being committed or about
to be committed within the territorial boundaries of their respective provinces
or districts.”

In Palanan
Lumber and Plywood Co., Inc., supra, we re-affirmed the rule of non-jurisdiction
of courts of first instance to issue injunctive writs in order to control acts
outside of their provinces or districts. 
We went further and said that when the petition filed with the court of
first instance not only questions the legal correctness of the decision of
administrative officials but also seeks to enjoin the enforcement of the said
decision, the court could not validly issue the writ of injunction when the
officials sought to be restrained from enforcing the decision are not stationed
within its territory.

To recapitulate, insofar
as injunctive or prohibitory writs are concerned, the rule still stands that
courts of first instance have the power to issue writs limited to and operative
only within their respective provinces or districts.

The respondents also
attempt to show that section 3 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court sanctions the
enforceability of the orders, processes and judgments of courts of first
instance throughout the Philippines.  We
believe however that the provisions of paragraph (h) of section 44 of R. A.
296, as amended, preclude any such comprehensive construction of section 3 of
Rule 135, for the former denies the courts of first instance authority to issue
injunctive writs affecting acts or persons beyond the territorial boundaries of
their respective provinces or districts.

Paragraph (h) of section
44 of R.A. 296, as amended, treats of the definition and limitation of the
jurisdiction of courts of first instance, whereas section 3 of Rule 135 of the
Rules of Court deals with the enforceability of the orders, judgments or
processes of courts of first instance. 
Furthermore, section 2 of Article VIII of the Constitution lodges with
Congress “the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction
of the various courts.” As a legislative act enacted pursuant to a
constitutional mandate, paragraph (h) of section 44 of R. A. 296 defining the
jurisdiction of courts of first instance re the issuance of writs of
injunction, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus, restricts the applicability of
section 3 of Rule 135 promulgated by this Court whose rule-making power section
13 of Article VIII of the Constitution limits to matters concerning
“pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law.”

In line, therefore, with
the authorities aforecited limiting the power of
courts of first instance to control or restrain by means of the writ of
injunction to acts being committed or about to be committed within the territorial
boundaries of their respective provinces and districts, we hold that the writ
of preliminary injunction issued by the respondent judge of the Court of First
Instance of Agusan restraining the continuation of
the investigatory proceedings being conducted by the petitioning forestry
officials in Manila, is null and void for want of jurisdiction.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby granted, and the writ
of preliminary injunction dated August 24, 1965
restraining the respondent judge from enforcing the order and the writ of
preliminary injunction, both dated January 29, 1965, is hereby made permanent.  Costs against the respondent R.C. Aquino Timber and Plywood Co., Inc. and Rafael C. Aquino.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

^[1]
109 Phil. 1017.  Petitioners also cite Samar Mining Co., Inc. vs. Arnado, et al., 2 SCRA 782, and Central Bank of the
Philippines, et al. vs. Cajigal, et al., 6
SCRA 1072.

^[2]
At present Section 2 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.

^[3]
13 SCRA 753.

^[4]
Zamboanga General Utilities, Inc. vs.
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 20 SCRA 881; Palanan Lumber and Plywood Co., Inc., et al. vs.
Hon. Arranz and Palanan
Logging Enterprises, Inc., 22 SCRA 1186; and Macailing,
et al. vs. Andrada, et al., 31 SCRA 126.